Readers of this volume may well be familiar with the range of tropes, found especially in Arabic biographical dictionaries, which describe a given scholar’s immense learning and erudition, inexhaustible industry, and definitive, comprehensive or trenchant contributions to branches of Islamic learning. None shall be employed here because none does the honoree’s achievement full justice. Besides, she loathes clichés.¹ I accordingly abdicate my responsibility as laudator, clichéd or otherwise. Instead—and in deep respect for her scholarly temperament—I should like to argue a case. The case is that the professional study of early Islamic history changed essentially between ca. 1975 and 1990, and that although this reshaping was a collective project, Crone’s work above all determined it, and, in some respects, continues to do so.

Now insofar as this change is characterized as a shift in perspective, greater ‘skepticism’ or, more narrowly, a privileging of one set of sources for another, this, too, may not come as much of a surprise to some of the volume’s readers. After all, it is Crone who appears in a ‘fictitious dialogue’ between a ‘shaykh and ṭālib’, which is intended to discredit a skeptical position on the transmission of material in Prophetic biography.² How many Islamicists can claim such celebrity? But this characterization grossly minimizes things, for what was (and remains) at stake was more than the soundness of ḥadīth or sīra, as the title of this contribution suggests. In fact, narrowing the scope of change to how one reads evidence (or in what language) recycles the very terms of Orientalist reference that Crone so spectacularly exposed. She was the principal force in dislodging something like a disciplinary habitus, I shall argue, because her project was more ambitious and far-reaching.

For all the antecedents, precedents and continuities that must necessarily qualify an argument for rapid and profound historiographic change, it can safely be said that no period in the history of Islamwissenschaft rivals in originality the decade that began with Hagarism (1977), and

¹ This is obvious to anyone who has read Crone, but some of us have had the experience of learning the lesson the hard way. ‘Why must everything vibrate?’, she once asked of a draft of mine that used ‘vibrant’ at least one too many times.
² G. Schoeler, The Biography of Muḥammad: Nature and Authenticity, tr. U. Vagelpohl and ed. J.E. Montgomery (New York, 2011), p. 120 (a revised ed. of Charakter und Authentie der muslimischen Überlieferung über das Leben Mohammeds [Berlin, 1996]). It is worth noting that authority is inscribed into the shape of the dialogue itself: the skeptical position is attributed to the naïve, Crone-referencing ṭālib, who is reduced to temporizing silence by the patronizing shaykh. One would have to be obtuse to deny that shadows of culture, generation and gender darken at least some of the occasionally rancorous debate about Islamic origins.
ended with *Meccan Trade* and *Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law* (1987), via *Slaves on Horses* (1980) and *God’s Caliph* (1986). It was chiefly because of Crone’s serial assaults on a range of scholarly orthodoxies that a settled consensus about early Islamic history—what questions were to be asked, how they were to be answered, and what, for the most part, the answers were—was overturned. Implicitly and explicitly comparative, and unremittingly dialectical, the assaults demolished orthodoxies because their very methods repudiated so many of mainstream Orientalism’s unspoken rules: not just its self-regulating authoritarianism or disciplinary insularity, but also what might be called its philological gnosticism—the practice of narrating as history more-or-less self-evident truths embedded in culturally valorized texts.

The claim that a disciplinary *habitus* was abandoned is a bold one, and I shall not be able to substantiate it to the satisfaction of all my readers. I freely concede that the following merely outlines the shape of an argument that it is premature to make in full. For one thing, the impact of revisionism takes time to work through the system. ‘Looking at things in new ways is very hard, much harder than our garden-variety histories of scholarship suggest’, writes Marchand in her exhaustive survey of 19th- and early 20th-century German scholarship on the Orient. For another, a framework for understanding mid- to late 20th-century European and North American scholarship on the pre-modern Middle East or Islam has not yet been assembled. That scholarship is inflected by political culture is a truism, of course, but how, for instance, post-war American ‘engagement’ with the Middle East set it apart from British, French and German varieties, freed as they became of the constraints of imperial entanglement, remains an open question. Given the modest number of scholars working in a handful of academic networks, one may not need political culture to explain why a tired field’s regeneration began where it did. Be this as it may, there is no question that the dominant strain until the mid-1970s was deeply conservative—even complacent and self-satisfied,

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4 ‘Even after the publication of a pathbreaking book, many are left fumbling in the dark, without the proper resources or training to switch gears; many will have to finish old research projects even though they are obsolete simply because they are too far along to abandon them.’ See S.L. Marchand, *German Orientalism in the Age of Empire: Religion, Race, and Scholarship* (Cambridge, 2009), pp. 217ff.

5 There is a well-known and steady stream of research on modern Middle Eastern scholarship (see, for example, Z. Lockman, *Contending Visions of the Middle East: The History and Politics of Orientalism* [Cambridge, 2004]), and a less well known and rising tide of scholarship on Islamic studies before the Second War, such as A. Haridi, *Das Paradigma der „islamischen Zivilisation“ – oder die Begründung der deutschen Islamwissenschaft durch Carl Heinrich Becker* (1876-1933) (Würzburg, 2005), but too little has been written about 20th-century scholarship; for now, see R. Irwin, *For Lust of Knowing: The Orientalists and their Enemies* (London, 2006), esp. pp. 237ff.—a strange compendium of biography, bio-bibliography, apologia and aside.

6 For just how profoundly instrumental scholarship on the Middle East and Islam is supposed to be, see M. Kramer, *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle East Studies in America* (Washington D.C., 2001).
as we shall see. Since it was against that conservatism that the tide was turned, it is with it that we can make a proper start to this appreciation of Crone’s contributions.

I

In 1974 Crone completed her PhD dissertation under the supervision of B. Lewis,\(^7\) already celebrated as the author of *The Arabs in History*, which was written in 1947 and published in 1950; by 1973 it had appeared in the fifth of its six editions, and it remains in print to this day, lightly revised, some 65 years after its original publication, available in multiple platforms and translations, the most recent apparently being a Uighur e-book.\(^8\) At once authoritative and concise, it showcases Lewis’s extraordinary linguistic and historical range; and adorned with epigrams credited to Isaiah, God, Tennison, Tabari, Rimbaud and Marlowe (amongst others), it effortlessly exudes the transcendent command of history and culture that was once a mark of British Orientalism. It also captures, in miniature, what was then the settled consensus on the essential shape of Islamic history in Anglo-American scholarship, both conceptual and chronological: his is an untroubled narrative of the rise and decline of a civilization, framed largely (though not exclusively) in ethnic and political terms. In other words, the little book’s big and enduring success cannot be understood properly unless one concedes that it introduces its readers to an Islamic-Middle Eastern culture without disturbing what was in many respects a 19th-century template of history.

By many standards, *The Arabs in History* documents a disciplinary inertia that is nothing short of staggering.\(^9\) In fact, it is both a tribute to Lewis’s powers of synthesis and a diagnostic of Orientalism’s torpor that *The Arabs in History* can be read as an epitome of much of the *Cambridge History of Islam*, which had appeared in 1970, some thirty-three years later after it first appeared,\(^10\) this is the case in both vision and narrative effect.\(^11\) Implicated as I am in the volumes that succeeded this effort, I will be the first to concede that every Cambridge history is by its very nature something of a Frankenstein’s monster, its oft-recycled limbs re-animated by dubious science.\(^12\)

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11 Thus the acute M. Arkoun (in *Arabica* 20 [1973], p. 97): ‘En somme, *The Cambridge history of Islam* se présente non seulement comme un état actuel des connaissances sur l'histoire de l'Islam, mais aussi comme la consécration d'une forme de la connaissance historique, d'un mode de détermination, d'interrogation et de retranscription des documents (en majorité écrits).’
12 *The New Cambridge History of Islam*, ed. by M. Cook et al. (Cambridge, 2010).
And because Cambridge histories conventionally function as authoritative statements about the state of a given field, they often serve as lightning rods for sharp and sometime internecine criticism. What better way for a Young Turk to make a name? In this case, however, the reception was especially brutal. Almost immediately the *Cambridge History of Islam* was recognized as obsolete in both conception and execution.\(^13\) The *coup de grâce* belonged to R. Owen, whose excoriating review describes a lifeless beast of a project, one pervaded by a ‘general sense of omniscience’, and a ‘malaise’ caused by disciplinary insularity; until disabused of their fixation upon ‘civilization’ as the unit of historical analysis, Orientalists were unlikely to produce sophisticated history.\(^14\)

The rude reception should not have come as a complete surprise. I do not need to rehearse in full how methods and conclusions that subverted Orientalism’s positivist consensus—an accepted framework of questions about (and sources for) where ‘Islam’ came from, or who Muḥammad was, about the basic chronology and essential nature of early Islamic institution- and state-building, or the origins of orthodoxy or orthopraxy—had been marginalized. One can point to the paradox that was I. Goldziher (d. 1921): issuing from the creative fusion of Talmudic study and *Religionsgeschichte*,\(^15\) his brilliance was recognized by contemporaries, but the results of his *hadīth* criticism were wished away for decades. For his part, J. Schacht (not without some bitterness and self-interest) was ‘astonished’ by the profession’s failure to develop his own lines of criticism, aligning his rough treatment at the hands of N.J. Coulson with that of the Hungarian master: ‘[W]hat happened in the past to the work of Goldziher had happened again, recently, with regard to the conclusions… achieved by critical scholarship’, he wrote.\(^16\) One can also point to the case of J. Wellhausen (d. 1918), whose source criticism of early *akhbār* was abandoned, at least until rekindled by A. Noth (d. 1999), whose *nasab* meant that he could scarcely have escaped the influence of such criticism.\(^17\) And, finally, one can point to the criticism of the historicity of

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\(^{13}\) In addition to Arkoun (cited above), see J.P. Roux’s long diatribe, at once querulous and trenchant, in *Revue de l’Histoire des Religions* 180 (1971), pp. 178-86. Even one of the project’s contributors, C. Cahen, could not resist taking some swipes (*Revue Historique*, 247 [1972], pp. 187-189).

\(^{14}\) R. Owen, ‘Studying Islamic history’, *The Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, 4 (1973), pp. 287-298; always the gentleman, A. Hourani was more polite (*The English Historical Review*, 87 [1972], pp. 348-57), but his frustration was thinly disguised.

\(^{15}\) So Marchand, *German Orientalism*, p. 329.

\(^{16}\) As has been well documented, the resistance came not only from Coulson, but also from Gibb and Watt, who chose to avoid engaging Schacht’s arguments. For a discussion (and the quotation), see J. Wakin, ‘Remembering Joseph Schacht (1902-1969)’, *Occasional Papers of the Islamic Legal Studies Program* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 29f.; for Schacht’s opponents, D. Forte, ‘Islamic law: the impact of Joseph Schacht’, *Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review* 1 (1978), pp. 1-36; see also Crone, *Slaves on Horses*, p. 14; and *eadem*, *Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law*, p. 123, n. 59.

Prophetic sīra leveled by the ill-tempered H. Lammens (d. 1937), or the consequences of the dissertation written in the 1920s by J. Fück (d. 1974) on the transmission history of Ibn Isḥāq: the most generous reading of the situation would grant that German Arabistik was slightly less lethargic in the 1960s, at least insofar as it generated some literary criticism of hadīth and akhbār and form criticism of the sīra. According to this reading, the Islamic historical tradition was starting to come into focus as primary in the sense that, understood properly, it shed light on the circumstances of its secondary development; what it was not, however, was a repository of accounts that accurately documented the events that they purport to relate: it told us about the eighth and ninth centuries, not the seventh. Even so, the norm was decades of décalage between critical insight and systematic progress.

The scholarly somnolence that I have described belongs to a very different time, one that is difficult to conjure now. When H.A.R. Gibb (one of Lewis’s teachers) told R. Irwin that he was still learning Arabic 40 years after starting it, he was recycling a monotheist stereotype of ‘multitude and prediction’ and, much more significantly, monitoring an academic frontier. For joining the Orientalist guild required paying a toll—not merely endless years of language study, but the acculturation of broader disciplinary norms. Chief amongst these was the framing expectation, which was itself based on intellectual and cultural pre-commitments about the nature of philology,

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20 Thus E. Stetter’s study of al-Bukhārī’s Sāhib, ‘Topoi und Schemata im Hadīth’ (PhD dissertation, Tubingen, 1965), which prefigures Noth’s Quellenkritische Studien, and which had obvious consequences for hadīth criticism; see H. Berg, The Development of Exegesis in Early Islam: The Authenticity of Muslim Literature from the Formative Period (Richmond, Surrey, 2000), p. 17.

21 Fück’s work was extended by R. Sellheim, ‘Prophet, Chalif und Geschichte: Die Muhammed-Biographie des Ibn Ishāq’, Oriens 18/19 (1965/1966), pp. 33-91, which was followed up a decade later by his student, S.M. al-Samuk, ‘Die historischen Überlieferungen nach Ibn Isḥāq: ein synoptische Untersuchung’ (PhD dissertation, Frankfurt, 1978) (such as it is, post- Fück scholarship on sīra to the late 1970s is discussed on pp. 5ff.).


24 Conrad, ‘Abraha and Muḥammad’, pp. 230ff. According to Irwin (Lust for Knowing, pp. 325), in the 1960s Oxford students were set the essay topic of ‘What explains Muḥammad’s success?’ When I arrived there in 1993 it was still being set by some tutors.
literature and society, that the project of reconstructing Islam was essentially transcriptional—about setting an Islamic score to western instrumentation, one might say. Because the sources were held to constitute a reasonable, coherent, and (not coincidentally, largely Sunni) consensus, the scholarly project was by definition conservative; the framework created by those sources being fundamentally sound, this boiled down to introducing new details, texts and figures, and qualifying and adjusting subordinate interpretations. All this goes some way towards explaining why so much of the most path-breaking work in the post-War period was disproportionately produced not by members of the European Orientalist establishment (there was no American one to speak of), but by those who worked either on its margins or entirely outside of it. The body of evidence was not necessarily changing, but because they were drawing upon fresh ideas and approaches, historical materialists (Annaliste, Marxist or otherwise, such as C. Cahen, M. Rodinson and M. Lombard), along with other non-conformists (such as M.G.S. Hodgson), were breaking new ground. Predictably, much of their work was ignored.

II

Crone’s and Cook’s *Hagarism* appeared in 1977, ‘pretentious humbug’ in the words of one especially rattled reviewer. It proposed that Muḥammad led a messianic movement of Jews and Arabs towards Jerusalem, and that the history of this conquest movement was radically transformed, starting in the late seventh century, into the myth of origins that was (and is) consecrated in (and by) the Islamic historical tradition. The reconstruction has enjoyed little popularity—and not just because it was an unfamiliar argument expressed in a peppery style; it can also be said to have substituted a large corpus of late and tendentious literary representations with a small corpus of early, but manifestly polemical literary representations. R.B. Serjeant may have been amongst the most patronizing of the work’s critics, but in both method and conclusions the book was widely panned by the Orientalist establishment. In pairing *Hagarism* with Wansbrough’s *Quranic Studies*—the two were ‘foaled in the same stable’, as he evocatively puts it—Serjeant was probably the first to express what has since become a common misunderstanding, viz., that ‘revisionists’ or ‘skeptics’ are more or less all of a

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26 For the very shallow roots there, see Irwin, *Lust for Knowing*, pp. 213f. and 245ff.
27 As noted by Crone herself, *Slaves on Horses*, pp. 212f., note 97.
29 A fair-minded recapitulation (and rejection) can be found in N. Robinson, *Discovering the Qur’an: A Contemporary Approach to a Veiled Text*, 2nd ed. (Washington D.C., 2003), pp. 47ff.
30 As F.M. Donner understated it thirty years later (*Middle East Studies Bulletin* 40 [2006], pp. 197-99 at p. 197), the book ‘came as a very loud wake-up call to the then rather sleepy field of early Islamic studies and, like most wake-up calls, its arrival was not exactly welcomed’. 
piece, or belong to the same ‘school’. Wansbrough made his own views clear about *Hagarism*, and, more generally, about the prospects for historical reconstruction, Hagarene or otherwise: they were very dim indeed, the relevant accounts being ‘incarcerated in a grammar designed to stress the immediate equivalence of word and world’, as he so memorably put it. His was a textual austerity that rejected the conventional relationship between signified and putative referent, and so had little in common with Crone’s (and Cook’s) pragmatic skepticism. For her part, Crone made equally clear her objections not only to Wansbrough’s most notorious argument for the late crystallization of the Qur’ānic text, but also to his exiling of Islamic origins from an Arabian setting. The question of when the Qur’ān achieves agency upon the law is one thing; but that it provides for Crone reliable information about the religious and social setting of Arabian Muslims can hardly be doubted. In sum, anyone who thinks at all deeply about Wansbrough’s work will recognize how distant his interests lay from theirs.

An obvious source of this and other confusion is *Hagarism*’s terseness—sometimes even its gnomic quality. Opening the book is akin to entering a conversation *in media res*: the historiographical assumptions that undergird the argument, forged in Bloomsbury in the early 1970s, were only fleshed out in subsequent works that appeared in the 1980s, especially *Slaves on Horses* and *Meccan Trade* in Crone’s case, *Muhammad* in Cook’s. There (and elsewhere) no room is left for doubt. ‘The entire tradition is tendentious, its aim being the elaboration of an Arabian Heilsgeschichte, and this tendentiousness has shaped the facts as we have them, not merely added some partisan statements that we can deduct. Without correctives from outside the Islamic tradition, such as papyri, archaeological evidence, and non-Muslim sources, we have little hope of

31 The collapsing of diverse hermeneutic attitudes into a single ‘skeptical’ or ‘revisionist’ position is a chronic source of confusion; for one discussion, see C.F. Robinson, ‘The Ideological uses of Islam’, *Past & Present* 203 (2009), pp. 205-228.
32 Where he takes the authors to task for their ‘methodological assumptions, of which the principal must be that a vocabulary of motives can be freely extrapolated from a discrete collection of literary stereotypes composed by alien and mostly hostile observers…’; see his review in *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 41 (1978), pp. 155f.
33 J. Wansbrough, ‘*Res ipsa loquitur*: history and mimesis’ now reprinted in *The Sectarian Milieu: Content and Composition of Islamic Salvation History*, foreword etc. by G. Hawting (Amherst, NY, 2006), pp. 159-72 (the quotation is on p. 162).
34 Here it is worth noting in passing that Cook’s reconstruction of the ‘Uthmānic skeleton is hardly compatible with Wansbrough’s model of gradual crystallization; M. Cook, ‘The Stemma of the regi- codices of the Koran’, *Greco-Arabica*, 9-10 (2004), p. 89-104.
36 ‘Two legal problems’.
reconstituting the original shape of this early period. Historiographic skepticism had been in the air, but never had it been delivered with such concussive force: *Hagarism, Slaves and Horses, Meccan Trade, Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law* and *God’s Caliph* hammered not only at the central planks of that *Heilsgeschichte*, but also the elaboration of the political and intellectual traditions in the eighth and ninth centuries, as we shall see.

Language, model and evidence delivered the blows. Much could be said about Crone’s style, particularly what might be called a prosecutorial rhetoric. Question-posing is very common across academic prose, of course, but in her hands it is uncommonly potent, not merely inaugurating argument (especially by addressing the *status quaestionis*), but also propelling and steering it. ‘What was the nature of the early caliphate?’ ‘How much, and in what way, did the customary law of the pre-Islamic Arabs contribute to Islamic law?’ ‘How long did the Khārijites continue to call their imams khilīfa and amīr al-muʾminīn?’ ‘Having unlearnt most of what we knew about Meccan trade, do we find ourselves deprived of our capacity to explain the rise of Islam?’

The question framed, the interrogation begins: witnesses (sources) are probed, stories are checked out, probabilities measured. A particularly good example of discrediting a witness appears in *Meccan Trade*, where she sets a jackhammer into the exegetical foundations of the *sīra*. The Qurʾān alludes to a journey in Sūrat Quraysh, but what are we to make of the accounts that explain it?

The answer is worth reproducing nearly in full:

The journeys, we are told, were the greater and lesser pilgrimages to Mecca: the *hajj* in Dhū’l-hijja and the *ʿumra* in Rajab. Alternatively, they were the migrations of Quraysh to Ṭāʾīf in the summer and their return to Mecca in winter. Or else they were Qurashi trading journeys. Most exegetes hold them to have been trading journeys, but where did they go? Then went to Syria, we are told: Quraysh would travel by the hot coastal route to Ayla in the winter and by the cool inland route to Busrā and Adhriʿat in the summer. Or else they went to Syria and somewhere else, such as Syria and Rām, however that is to be understood, or Syria and the Yemen, as is more commonly said: Quraysh would go to Syria in the summer and to the Yemen in the winter, when Syria was too cold, or else to Syria in the winter and the Yemen in the summer, when the route to Syria was too hot. Alternatively…

In short, the sura refers to the fact that Quraysh used to trade in Syria, or in Syria and the Yemen, or in Syria and Ethiopia, or in all three, and maybe also in Iraq, or else to their habit of spending the summer in Ṭāʾīf, or else to ritual visits to Mecca. It celebrates the fact that they began to trade, or that they continued to do so, or that they stopped; or else it does not refer to trade at all…

41 *Meccan Trade*, pp. 203f.
Cataloguing the tradition's inconsistencies had never been carried out with such devastating results.\(^{42}\) Here imagery serves to rouse, rile and provoke: early Islamic history is a ‘whirlwind’, and what remains is ‘rubble’, ‘dust’ and ‘debris from an obliterated past’; the *Kitab al-muhabbar* ‘rank[s] with the *Guinness Book of Records* among the greatest compilations of useless information’; early Muslim lawyers suffer from ‘collective amnesia’.\(^{43}\) From this perspective, her prodigious referencing—those avalanches of notes that plow through conventional wisdom and anticipate counter-arguments—serves not merely to document and substantiate in exhaustive detail, or even to surface problems and ventilate debates.\(^{44}\) The notes are also the equivalent of the prosecutor’s binders, thumping theatrically upon the courtroom table.

If the sources narrate *Heilsgeschichte*, the most salient features of which are the Arabian origins of monotheist preaching and the articulation of a proto-Sunni political order, how is one to write genuine history? Here it must be underlined that scepticism about the preservation of authentic, seventh-century material in eighth-, ninth- and tenth-century sources is not simply a matter of disposition or temperament. To be sure, Crone both reflected (and propelled) a trend discernible across several fields of pre-modern history towards accepting the limitations of evidence and deploring the hubris of historians who pretend that things are otherwise. ‘The natural vice of historians is to claim to know about the past,’\(^{45}\) is how one western medievalist has responded to the paucity of contemporaneous evidence for regions of the post-Roman west. W. Raven puts it nicely, speaking of the *horror vacui* that leads some scholars, despite all the obstacles, to mine for facts in *ṣīra* and non-*ṣīra* material that stands at several generational, cultural and geographic removes from Muḥammad’s west Arabia.\(^{46}\) This said, Crone’s skepticism is grounded in a deeper critique of Orientalist positivism, especially its implicit exceptionalism, its imperviousness to model-building, and the insights (some obvious, some less) that come with understanding social change as the product of both the particular and the universal. ‘I have simply refused to treat the Arabs as an exception to the normal rules of history, and something is badly wrong in Islamic studies if I have to justify this procedure,’ she wrote in response to an especially

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\(^{42}\) Cf. M.J. Kister, ‘The Expedition of Bi’r Ma’ūna’, in G. Makdisi, ed., *Arabic and Islamic Studies in Honor of Hamilton A.R. Gibb* (Leiden, 1965), pp. 337-57 at p. 346: ‘In summary, it may be said that the traditions about this expedition are contradictory as to whether the expedition was a peaceful one sent to teach Islam and the Koran, or a military enterprise; whether it was sent to the Banū ʿĀmir or to Sulaim; whether the members of the expedition were slain by clans of Sulaim, by clans of ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa, by clans of Sulaim led by ʿĀmir b. al-Ṭufail; or by a man of Sulaim; whether the ʿĀmir b. Ṣaʿṣaʿa opposed the relations between Abū Barāʾ and the Prophet or supported it...’

\(^{43}\) *Slaves on Horses*, pp. 6ff.; *Roman, Provincial and Islamic Law*, pp. 98.

\(^{44}\) Thus *Slaves on Horses* features 91 pages of text, followed by 6 appendices (in 107 pages—entirely dominated by references), which are followed by no fewer than 711 endnotes spread across 70 pages. Cf. *Roman, Provincial, and Islamic Law*, pp. 100ff. (4 appendices, etc.).


\(^{46}\) W. Raven, *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. ‘Ṣīra’.
offended member of the Arabist old guard.\textsuperscript{47} It would be folly to try to encapsulate thousands of pages of scholarship within a single sentence, but this may be as close as one can come.

In fact, to understand Crone’s approach to Islamic history one is well advised to read what she has to say about non-Islamic history, especially about the state, politics and religion.\textsuperscript{48} Doing so clarifies her terms of historical and sociological analysis (e.g. ‘barbarian’, ‘religion’), as well as her materialism; perhaps even more important, it reveals a framework of understanding the patterns of pre-modern global history. What one also finds, \textit{inter alia}, is an inversion of Orientalist presumptions: it is early modern Europe that presents the ‘oddity’, the Islamic Near East an elaboration of the norm.\textsuperscript{49} From this perspective, the argumentative rhetoric of \textit{Slaves on Horses}, etc. can be seen as an admonition that the field should be arguing about Islamic history not within its own terms, but as a series of problems that constitute one trajectory—the spread of a monotheist religio-political tradition within the late antique Near East—that is itself one variation of pre-modern history. \textit{Slaves on Horses} consigns Wellhausen’s venerable \textit{Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz} to obsolescence in part because it offers a better understanding of Umayyad factionalism (and the like),\textsuperscript{50} but in larger part because it frames the Sufyānid-Marwānid-Abbasid narrative as an ongoing (and unsuccessful) set of solutions to the central challenge of early Islam: how, in the absence of sophisticated ruling traditions of their own, were Muslims to institutionalize God’s dispensation without assimilating the traditions that they had replaced? This is why adding Icelandic sagas (to take one of many examples) is not the performance of erudition,\textsuperscript{51} although that erudition—or, more precisely, the combination of erudition and industry—is stupefying. (Surely I am not the only one to arrive at article’s end punch-drunk, or to have been dumfounded to learn that her field of knowledge encompassed species of baboons.)\textsuperscript{52} Rather, it is about drawing parallels and comparisons in order to isolate what is distinctive (sometimes even remarkable) in Islamic history.

What all this means is that reconstructing history is more than a matter of indentifying what is reliable. A first step, of course, is controlling for date, provenance or perspective, such as by relying exclusively or chiefly upon the testimony of sources that provide alternatives to the Arabo-Islamic \textit{Heilsgeschichte}, such as Syriac or Hebrew apocalypses, pre-canonical \textit{ḥadīth}, papyri, coins, documents and poetry, or, for that matter, traditions that lie outside of the Sunni mainstream.\textsuperscript{53} But reconstructing history is also a matter of source deployment—of identifying the most promising fit

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{Pre-industrial Societies}, pp. 37f., 123ff. and (for ‘the oddity of Europe’), pp. 147ff.
\textsuperscript{50} J. Wellhausen, \textit{Das arabische Reich und sein Sturz} (Berlin, 1902); tr. as \textit{The Arab Kingdom and its Fall} (Calcutta, 1927).
\textsuperscript{51} \textit{Slaves on Horses}, pp. 8f.
between evidence and model. An egregious case of misfit, one in which bad evidence is imposed badly upon social setting, is Watt’s interpretation of Muḥammad’s program in the Ḥijāz: Watt was wrong not merely because he was reading the sources credulously, but because his model of west Arabian society was laughably anachronistic. ‘Watt’s desire to find social malaise in the desert would have been more convincing if the Meccans had been members of OPEC rather than the ḥilf al-fuḍūl’. R. Dussaud may have thought the ‘problem of Muḥammad’ solved by ‘les arabisants’, but she knew that historians had scarcely addressed it as such, and so, in stark contrast to Watt, what is provisionally offered as a solution to the ‘problem’ of Meccan trade seeks to align the available evidence, duly evaluated, with the appropriate model. To make sense of the marriage of prophecy and conquest in early seventh-century Arabia, one should thus look to comparable moments of human history in which alien domination triggered primitive political action—that is, nativist movements.

To my mind, God’s Caliph is the most exciting and consequential work of early Islamic history written over the last half century, and it packs its extraordinary punch because it applies evidence to model so effectively. Of course Watt and Schacht (amongst others) had set the groundwork for challenging the classical Sunni view on the Umayyad and early Abbasid caliphate, but it was Crone and Hinds who recognized how deeply the jurists’ and traditionists’ views had misrepresented things, especially by denuding legislating and salvific caliphs of their religious authority. As they show in exacting detail, documentary, numismatic and literary evidence, all of which can be dated to the seventh and eighth centuries, documents a pre-classical conception of God’s Deputyship rooted in (and legitimated by) Muḥammad’s indivisible authority. What results is a genuinely radical revision of the state’s governing institution, along with a striking recasting of early Islamic religious history, in which the genealogies of orthodox and heterodox positions are re-mapped: the Sunni construction of the caliphate is shown to be a departure, the Imami conception an ‘archaism rather than an innovation’. Had Walter Bauer been an Islamicist, he might well have shown the same.

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54 Slaves on Horses, p. 209, n. 71 (where Shaban is guilty of the same).
55 Thus his review of Blachère’s Le Problème de Mahomet in Syria 30 (1953), p. 163.
56 Meccan Trade, p. 4.
58 Whatever the ultimate inspiration for the idea may be; see God’s Caliph, pp. 111ff., and now P. Crone, Medieval Islamic Political Thought (Edinburgh, 2004), pp. 40ff. (which is also published as God’s Rule: Government and Islam, Six Centuries of Medieval Islamic Political Thought, New York 2004).
59 The caliphate would remain near or at the heart of future work on political thought; see below, n. 63.
60 God’s Caliph, p. 99.
That the origins and evolution of early Islam constitute problems may sound banal, but as pursued by Crone they ramify in several main, sometimes intersecting, but always interesting lines of inquiry. One concerns how tribes relate to states, including how tribes turn into states;\textsuperscript{61} in the case of the birth of Islam in its tribal environment, the work of ‘unlearning’ initiated by \textit{Meccan Trade} has now yielded to a re-appraisal of trade as a source of both wealth and information.\textsuperscript{62} Another is about incorporation, especially the social practice and legal institution of clientage;\textsuperscript{63} since its genesis of \textit{walā‘} is predictably murky, the inquiry necessarily leads to the vexing and controversial question of how Islamic law relates to pre-Islamic and contemporary legal traditions (\textit{Jāhilī}, Roman, provincial and Jewish). A third addresses colonialism, and how natives respond to it.\textsuperscript{64} A fourth is about rulership and the law, both in theory and practice.\textsuperscript{65} Still another, closely related in some respects, aims to describe the evolution of religious ideas, especially by throwing into doubt orthodox truisms.\textsuperscript{66}

In sum, behind the ‘combination of holy law and learned laity’\textsuperscript{67} that may be said to characterize classical Islam lies a multitude of ideas, movements, practices and institutions. Some were compelling only in the short term, others enduring; but in one way or another they were all formed by history, especially the articulation of an Islamic political order. One can agree or disagree with specific assertions or arguments, but there is no denying the overall impression created by the body of work: early Islam was more contentious, more controversial, and more creative than most Orientalists could ever have imagined.

III

This last point has obvious significance not just for reconstructing early Islamic history, but also for the present.

Things have changed over the last 40 years or so. As is well known, across the humanities and social sciences, all manner of literary and cultural critiques have thrown into doubt a wide

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{61} Thus, for example, \textit{Slaves on Horses}, pp. 18ff.; ‘The Tribe and the state’, in J. A. Hall, ed., \textit{States in History} (Oxford 1986), pp. 48-77, which is revised in J. A. Hall, ed., \textit{The State} (London 1994), i, pp. 446-476; ‘Tribes and states in the Middle East’, \textit{Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society} 3, 1993, pp. 353-76.
\item \textsuperscript{65} Crone and Hinds, \textit{God’s Caliph}; P. Crone, \textit{Medieval Islamic Political Thought}.
\item \textsuperscript{66} Of several examples, an especially good one is ‘The First-Century Concept of Hiğra’, \textit{Arabica} 41 (1994), pp. 352-87.
\item \textsuperscript{67} Crone and Cook, \textit{Hagarism}, p. 30.
\end{itemize}
range of certainties, both methodological and substantive (if one is allowed to posit such a crude dichotomy). Meanwhile, in our networked and globalized world, digital technology now narrows to seconds and minutes the time between event reported (or book published) and opinion voiced, creating a virtually infinite public sphere for scholarly and cultural debate. In the case of Islam and the Middle East, the debates have been driven mainly by state and non-state violence, demographic change within Europe (especially resulting from Muslim immigration) and the emergence of new varieties of Islamic political thought, some still theoretical, some finding application in Middle Eastern states. Sometimes the debates are sterile or substantive, still other times even existential. What will become of the ‘West’ if its religio-cultural-legal traditions fail to withstand the effects of Muslim immigration? How does one engineer an ‘Islam’ that will prosper in multi-cultural and democratic societies, especially given the rising din of conservative, even militant Islamism? Since past practice is commonly adduced to answer these and other questions, it is little wonder that Islamic history matters more and more.  

The demand for information and understanding having grown so, supply has accordingly adjusted; and the stakes being so high (at least for some), the din of polemics has risen as well. In some respects, these are the best and worst of times for Islamic studies. At their worst, the polemics recycle perennial aspersions: Muhammad did not exist or is an imposter; the Qurʾān is a sham text. Islam discredited, the West is best, or so we are supposed to conclude. On the other hand, more scholars and more students study early Islam than ever before, accessing online tools and data that used to be the preserve of graduate seminars. Debates about the Qurʾān manuscripts, once limited to Orientalists’ correspondence and the like, now appear in mass-market magazines and newspapers. In the early 1970s an unlikely argument about the Christian origins of the Qurʾān was ignored outside of a small circle of scholars; by the early 2000s, a pseudonymous book, also on the Christian origins of the Qurʾān, could generate multiple editions, a translation and a collected volume, not to mention innumerable blogs, all in a matter of a few years. In 1961, with Watt’s

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68 Thus A.A. An-Naim (Islam and the Secular State: Negotiating the Future of Sharia [Cambridge, MA, 2008], p. 45), where he sets out to show that his ‘proposal for a secular state is more consistent with Islamic history than is the so-called Islamic state model proposed by some Muslims since the second quarter of the twentieth century’.  
70 For example, Ibn Warraq, Virgins? What Virgins? (Amherst, NY, 2010).  
72 G. Lüling, Über den Ur-Qurʾān: Ansätze zur Rekonstruktion vorislamischer christlicher Strophenlieder im Qurʾān (Erlangen, 1974); a revised version and translation appeared 30 years later as A Challenge to Islam for Reformation: The Rediscovery and Reliable Reconstruction of a Comprehensive Pre-Islamic Christian Hymnal Hidden in the Koran under Earliest Islamic Reinterpretations (Delhi, 2003).  
73 C. Luxenberg, Die syro-aramäische Lesart des Koran: ein Beitrag zur Entschlüsselung der Koransprache, 4th ed. (Berlin, 2011; original, Berlin, 2000); translated as The Syro-Aramaic Reading of the Koran: A
biography still casting a long shadow, Rodinson looked across about 25 years of scholarship on Muḥammad, and thought eight monographs worth mentioning. Over the last four years or so alone one can count many more than that, some proposing radically new views, others holding to fairly conventional lines.

These and other signs of the efflorescence of Islamic studies are difficult to imagine absent the critical turn effected in the 1970s and 1980s. A generation ago, the essential soundness of the early Islamic historical and biographical traditions was self-evident, and at the center of the Orientalist tradition such criticism as took place amounted to little more than filtering obvious anachronisms, and reconciling or harmonizing inconsistencies and contradictions. It is testimony to the persuasiveness of the revisionist critique that writing Prophetic biography in a conventional sense—that is, by re-narrativizing sīra episodes—no longer occupies the center of the field; it is left to popularizers or scholars writing in a popularizing mode. As far as the historiography of early Islam is concerned, the burden of proof has shifted decisively: what was once effortlessly assumed is now painstakingly documented. In fact, much of what was radical in the 1970s and early 1980s is now middle-of-the-road, the radical fringe now occupied by those who deny what so-called revisionists freely concede, e.g. that Muḥammad existed or that the conquests took place. It is largely due to the skeptical turn that the once-sleepy field of early Islamic historiography has

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changed beyond recognition, and so, too, the study of early Islamic documentary and material culture (e.g. archaeology, epigraphy, papyrology and numismatics). It is upon the basis of such sources that matters once settled (such as the nature of the earliest Islamic state) are now subject to stimulating controversy.

Needless to say, some of what is written about Islam has created more heat than it has light. To serve a broad audience of non-Islamicists Crone has written online and commissioned works of haute vulgarisation, thus implicitly or explicitly arguing against ignorance, willful or otherwise. She has always been as generous as she is uncompromising in her comments on the work of students and colleagues, but it is tempting as well to infer from the sparer prose and lighter referencing in some of her more recent work an attempt to deliver sophisticated Islamic history to non-Islamicists curious about the pre-modern background to contemporary events. This is explicitly the case of Medieval Islamic Political Thought, which, tracing a 600-year evolution from Muhammad to the Mongols, is something of a summa of thirty years’ work. Accommodating ‘political thought’ in an expansive sense so as to include sectarianism, politics, political theory, law, theology (and much more besides), it subsumes an extraordinary array of sources and problems, and traces the contentious but nearly always consistent attempt to engineer a theocracy that expressed Muslims’ possession of both ‘truth and power’. As much as Slaves on Horses made Wellhausen’s work on the Umayyad caliphate obsolete, Medieval Islamic Political Thought is the first sustained study that makes political, religious and ideological sense of Islamic history. The book’s implications for modern Islamic thinking are not inconsiderable, and so leave no doubt that the present converses with the past.


81 Crone serves as General Editor of the ‘Makers of the Muslim World’ series of biographies (Oneworld); for a list of published volumes, see http://www.oneworld-publications.com/series/makers-of-the-muslim-world.

82 Everyone has a story, and mine, which is typical, has her responding to a long and undisciplined draft article within 36 hours—with 3 single-spaced pages of comments. Much to my embarrassment, she understood my intended argument better than I did.

83 Islamic Political Thought, p. 16.
What, then, is the responsibility of the scholar, especially one who claims to know a distant and seminal past? Liberal societies require ‘truthful inquiry’, as B. Williams reminds us, which can take ‘myths to pieces’.\(^84\) One answer that she gives is to insist on the primacy of evidence and the difficulty of reaching conclusions. We might well wish the early Islamic community to have been ecumenical, but that does not make it so.\(^85\) We might wish to prove that the leather trade was key to Qurashī wealth, but at present the model is better than the evidence.\(^86\) Another, perhaps less obvious answer issues directly from the historicizing project itself. For the scholar, what better way to reduce the ‘tension’ between ‘historian and believer’ than to highlight the constructed and contingent nature of orthodoxy in general and the Sunni synthesis in particular?\(^87\) Here it should be recalled that the process of harmonizing inconsistencies and contradictions that produced the master narrative of Islamic history, more-or-less faithfully recapitulated by the majority of Western historians until a generation ago, was fundamental to Sunni success, not least of all because it was so radical. For not only was controversy to be forgotten and the process that created consensus obscured by the onset of ‘collective amnesia’;\(^88\) it is also the case that hermeneutical techniques were put in place to routinize the harmonization of contradictions and inconsistencies, such as the imposition of Tradition upon Scripture.\(^89\) History as description is one thing, and history as prescription something else; when the two are confused, sometimes it takes a correspondingly radical reappraisal to set things right. And Crone’s contribution—that ongoing project of comprehensive disambiguation—aims at precisely that.

So more than any other scholar, it is thanks to her that historians are finally doing their subject justice. We may—or should—disagree about the precise causes and vectors of change, but one can hardly disagree with P. Brown that early Islam constituted ‘the last, most rapid crisis in the religious history of the Late Antique period’.\(^90\) Highly controversial, inventive and experimental, the project that Muslims set for themselves was as ambitious as it was unimaginable. How is one to make sense of it or draw proper lessons from it without asking fundamental questions about how it came to be?

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86 ‘Quraysh and the Roman army’.
88 As good an example as any being the so-called ‘four-caliph thesis’, which not only went some way towards reconciling Sunni and Shi’ite views, but also defanged God’s caliph; see Crone, *Medieval Islamic Political Thought*, passim.
89 ‘No compulsion’, pp. 164f.