SLAVES ON HORSES
The evolution of the Islamic polity

Patricia Crone
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE ISLAMIC POLITY
For T. C. and V. C.
I have seen slaves upon horses, 
and princes walking as slaves upon the earth.

Eccles. 10:7.
CONTENTS

Preface ix
A note on conventions x

PART I: INTRODUCTION
1 Historiographical introduction 3
2 The nature of the Arab conquest 18

PART II: THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONQUEST SOCIETY
3 The Sufyānid pattern, 661–84 [41–64] 29
4 Syria of 684 [64] 34
5 The Marwānid evolution, 684–744 [64–126] 37
6 The Marwānid faction 42
7 Syria of 744 [126] 46
8 Umayyad clientage 49

PART III: THE FAILURE OF THE ISLAMIC EMPIRE
9 The abortive service aristocracy 61
10 The emergence of the slave soldiers 74
11 The emergence of the medieval polity 82

APPENDICES
I The ashraf of Syria and Iraq 93
II The subgovernors of Syria, 685–744 [65–126] 123
III The subgovernors of Iraq and its dependencies, 694–744 [75–126] 129
IV The Yamaniyya and the Qaysiyya 154
VI Maula in the sense of ‘kinsman’ 197
Notes 201
Contents

Bibliography 288
General index 272
Prosopographical index 293
This book is a reincarnation of the first part of my thesis ('The Mawāli in the Umayyad Period', University of London Ph.D., 1974) in a form so different that theologians might dispute the identity. I should like to thank Professor B. Lewis, who supervised me in 1969–73, Professor M. J. Kister, who helped me during a term in Jerusalem in 1972, Robert Irwin, whose queries inspired two pages of part III, and Dr Martin Hinds, whose criticisms inspired many more. Above all I wish to thank Michael Cook, who read the entire typescript in both its past and its present form, and whose advice I have nearly always followed, if not always with good grace. I also owe a special debt to Magister E. Iversen for suggesting to me, many years ago, the unfamiliar idea of becoming a historian. Needless to say, not even Magister Iversen can be held responsible for the result.

P.C.
A note on conventions

Dates in the text are A.D., but hijrī dates have been added in square brackets where appropriate; in the appendices and notes all dates are hijrī unless otherwise specified. The full names of Arabic authors are given in the bibliography, but only the short forms are used elsewhere.
PART I
INTRODUCTION
I

HISTORIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION

This work presents an explanation of how and why slave soldiers came to be a central feature of the Muslim polity. The conceptual framework in which the explanation is set is that of Hagarism, and to the extent that the crux of the explanation has already appeared there, this work may be regarded as simply an overextended footnote. There is, however, one respect in which the two works differ radically; for where Hagarism rejected the Islamic tradition, the present work is squarely based upon it.

This apparent lack of historiographical morality may meet with some disapproval, but it arises from the nature of Islamic historiography itself. Whereas the religious tradition is such that it must be accepted or rejected in toto, the secular tradition can to some extent be taken to pieces, and though a great deal of it has to be discarded, there remains enough for a coherent historical account. Before going on to the subject of this book, it is worth lending substance to this claim.

Muslim knowledge of the Muslim past was transmitted orally for about a century and a half. Whatever the attitude to the permissibility of writing history, little history was actually written until the late Umayyad period, and the first historical works proper were only composed in early 'Abbāsid Iraq. The fact that history was transmitted orally does not, of course, in itself mean that it was transmitted unreliably. Human brains can become memory banks of astonishing capacities, procedures can be devised for the transfer of memory from one bank to another, and professional memorizers easily hold their own against copyists in the business of perfect replication: the Vedas, Pāñini's grammar and the Avesta were all transmitted for centuries by such men. But rigorous procedures along these lines are only adopted for the transmission of highly authoritative works which need to be immutably preserved, not for works of religious innovators; for where classics need to be preserved, new ideas need above all to be spread, and inasmuch as they engender change, they cannot well be shielded from it. Adherents of a new religion necessarily inhabit a different world from that of the founder himself: were it otherwise, his attempt at a religious paradigm
shift would have failed. Hence they will go over their tradition oblivious of the problems with which the founder struggled, struggling with problems which the founder never envisaged, and in so doing not only elaborate, but also reshape the tradition which they received. And since the world of our grandparents, as not quite that of our parents, easily becomes ancient history of which we know little and understand even less, the founder must resign himself to the fact that it takes only three generations for his life and works to be thoroughly reshaped:6 the only insurance policy he can take out against it is to write his own authoritative works.7 Oral transmission in the formative period of a new religion, in short, does not mean faithful preservation, but rapid transformation of the tradition.

Thus against the Hindu Vedas we can set the Buddhist Skandhaka, in which the life of the Buddha was first presented.8 It was a grandchild of the Buddha’s generation who created this authoritative work in an effort to outbid the Vedas. Formally it was a biography. Substantively it was an exposition of monastic rules interspersed with entertaining legends, in which remains of the tradition from which the biography was recast could still be found, but which was otherwise devoid of historicity. And thanks to its success it is directly or indirectly the source for the bulk of our knowledge of the Buddha’s life today.9

Similarly thanks to its success, the Sira of Ibn Ishaq is practically our only source for the life of Muhammad preserved within the Islamic tradition. The work is late: written not by a grandchild, but a great-grandchild of the Prophet’s generation, it gives us the view for which classical Islam had settled.10 And written by a member of the ‘ulama, the scholars who had by then emerged as the classical bearers of the Islamic tradition, the picture which it offers is also one sided: how the Umayyad caliphs remembered their Prophet we shall never know. That it is unhistorical is only what one would expect, but it has an extraordinary capacity to resist internal criticism, a feature unparalleled in either the Skandhaka or the Gospels, but characteristic of the entire Islamic tradition, and most pronounced in the Koran: one can take the picture presented or one can leave it, but one cannot work with it.11

This peculiar characteristic arises from a combination of the circumstances and the method of transmission. The circumstances were those of drastic change. Whereas Buddhism and Christianity spread by slow infiltration, the coming of Islam was by contrast an explosion. In the course of a few decades the Arabs exchanged their ancestral paganism for monotheism, the desert for a habitation in the settled Middle East, tribal innocence for state structures, poverty for massive wealth, and undisturbed
Historiographical introduction

provinciality for exposure to the world's polemical attention. Rarely have a preacher and his followers lived in such discontinuous environments: what made sense to Muhammad made none to Mu'awiya, let alone to 'Abd al-Malik.

Even so, the Arabs might well have retained a more integral recollection of the past had they not proceeded to adopt an atomistic method of transmission. The transmitters memorized, not coherent narratives or the components of one, but isolated sayings, short accounts of people's acts, brief references to historical events and the like. It was a method evolved by the Jewish rabbis for the transmission of the Oral Law, and the Mishnah was handed down with the same rigorous attention to immutability as were the Vedas. But it was also a method which, once the rigour was relaxed, made for even greater mutability than that exemplified in the formation of the Skandhaka. Being short and disparate, the components of the tradition were easily detached from context, forgotten or given a new meaning by the addition of a single word or two. Rabbinical memories of the past not only suffered rapid attrition and deformation, but also tended to be found in a variety of versions set in a variety of contexts in answer to a variety of problems, with the overall effect that the original contours of the tradition were blurred beyond all hopes of recognition. For the rabbis the past was constantly disintegrating into amorphous bits even at the most stable of times. For the Arabs the combination of atomistic transmission and rapid change was to mean both fast erosion of old structures and fast appearance of new ones.

To this came a further circumstance. Muhammad was no rabbi. Whereas Jesus may have been a teacher whose doctrine may well have been handed down in accordance with the normal methods of rabbinic transmission, Muhammad was a militant preacher whose message can only have been transmitted bi'l-ma'nā, not bi'l-lafz, that is to say only the general meaning was passed on. For one thing, rabbinic methods of transmission were not current among the bedouin; and for another, the immediate disciples of a man whose biography was for some two hundred years studied under the title of 'ilm al-maghażi, the Prophet's campaigns, are unlikely to have devoted their lives to the memorization of hadith. In time, of course, Muhammad's words were to be transmitted with the usual attention to immutability, both orally and in writing, and he himself to some extent laid down his sword to assume the role of the authoritative teacher of the Sīra. But that is not how things began. The Muslim rabbis to whom we owe the Prophet's biography were not the original memory banks of the Prophet's tradition.

The Prophet's heirs were the caliphs, to whose unitary leadership the
embryonic religion owed its initial survival. The ‘ulamā’ appear with the Oral Tradition itself, perhaps in the mid-Umayyad period, perhaps before, and the history of Islam thereafter is to a large extent the history of their victorious emergence. The tradition as we have it is the outcome of a clash between two rival claimants to religious authority at a time when Islam was still in formation.

We have, in other words, a situation in which the Arabs were rent by acute internal tension and exposed to scathing external polemics, under the pressure of which current doctrines were constantly running out of plausibility. As the caliphs pushed new doctrines at their subjects and the nascent ‘ulamā’ took them up, worked them over and rejected them, the past was broken into splinters, and the bits and pieces combined and recombined in different patterns, forgotten as they lost their relevance or overlaid by the masses of new material which the pressure generated: it is no accident that whereas the logia of Jesus have remained fairly small in number, those of Muḥammad can be collected by the volume.

For over a century the landscape of the Muslim past was thus exposed to a weathering so violent that its shapes were reduced to dust and rubble and deposited in secondary patterns, mixed with foreign debris and shifting with the wind. Only in the later half of the Umayyad period, when the doctrinal structures of Islam began to acquire viability, did the whirlwind gradually subside. The onset of calmer weathers did not, of course, mark the immediate stabilization of the Islamic tradition. On the one hand, the controversies over the Oral Law continued to generate Prophetic hadiths into the ninth century; and on the other hand, the Muslim rabbis now began not just to collect but also to sift and tidy up the tradition, an activity which issued in the compilation of the first historical works in early ‘Abbāsid Iraq. Nonetheless, it is clear that it was in the course of the first hundred years that the basic damage was done. For the hadiths from the late Umayyad period onwards can to some extent be dated and used for a reconstruction of the evolution of Islamic theology and law. And the rabbinic censorship, though far from trivial, eliminated only the remains of a landscape which had already been eroded. That much is clear from Ibn Hishām who, as he tells us, omitted from his recension of Ibn Ishaq’s Sīra everything without direct bearing on the Koran, things which he felt to be repugnant or which might cause offence, poems not attested elsewhere, as well as matters which a certain transmitter could not accept as trustworthy. Despite his reference to delicate topics, Ibn Hishām clearly saw himself as an editor rather than a censor: most of what he omitted had long ceased to be dangerous. We have in fact examples of badly censored works in Muslim eschatological books, particularly the
Kitāb al-fitan of Nu'aym b. Hammad, who happily defines the mahdi as he who guides people to the original Torah and Gospel;2 and though Jewish and Christian material is conspicuously present in these works, the doctrinal formations of which it is the residue can no longer be restored: the structural damage had been inflicted in the course of oral transmission. But it is above all our one surviving document which conclusively demonstrates this point. The Constitution of Medina is preserved in Ibn Isḥāq’s Sīra, in which it sticks out like a piece of solid rock in an accumulation of rubble,21 and there is another recension in the Kitāb al-amwāl of the ninth-century Abū ‘Ubayd.22 Abū ‘Ubayd’s version, which is later than Ibn Isḥāq’s, is a typical product of written transmission: it has copyists’ mistakes,23 interpolations,24 several of the by now unintelligible clauses have been omitted,25 and it has also been equipped with an isnād;26 but otherwise the text is the same. The Constitution, however, also survives in a number of hadiths. The hadiths are all short; they mention two or three of the numerous clauses of the document, but do not spell them out; they characterize the document as a scroll coming from the Prophet, but leave the occasion on which it was written unidentified, and turn on the point that the scroll was in the possession of ‘Aṭī.27 Whereas written transmission exposed the document to a certain amount of weathering which it withstood extremely well, oral transmission resulted in the disintegration of the text, the loss of the context and a shift of the general meaning: the document which marked the foundation of the Prophet’s polity has been reduced to a point about the special knowledge of the Prophet’s cousin.

The religious tradition of Islam is thus a monument to the destruction rather than the preservation of the past. It is in the Sīra of the Prophet that this destruction is most thorough, but it affects the entire account of the religious evolution of Islam until the second half of the Umayyad period; and inasmuch as politics were endowed with religious meaning, it affects political history no less. There is not much to tell between the sīra of the shaykhayn, the first two caliphs, and that of the Prophet: both consist of secondary structures stuffed with masses of legal and doctrinal hadiths. The hadiths do at least have the merit of being identifiable as the product of the late Umayyad and early ‘Abbāsid controversies, and though they constitute a sizeable proportion of our information about the conquests,28 they taper off with the coming of the Umayyads. For if the reign of the first four caliphs was sīra, a normative pattern, that of the Umayyads, by contrast, was jauw, paradigmatic tyranny, and where the fiscal rectitude of the first four caliphs is spelt out in a profusion of detail, the fiscal oppression of the Umayyads is summarily
Introduction
dismissed in a number of stereotype accounts which, for all their bias and
owersimplification, do in fact contain some historical truth.\textsuperscript{29} And by the
time of the 'Abbāsids the lawyers had begun to reach their classical
positions on the subject; the fiscal policy of the 'Abbāsids was therefore
neither \textit{sirā} nor \textit{jawr}, but simply history, of which the sources do not have
all that much to say. The secondary structures, however, do not taper
off until the second half of the Umayyad period. They are manifest in
the mass of material on the battle of Siffin\textsuperscript{30} and in the received version of
the \textit{Tawwābūn};\textsuperscript{31} the accounts of Mukhtār successfully blur what was
clearly a dangerous message and defuse it by systematic ridicule,\textsuperscript{32} while
those of Shābib and Mu'tarrīf, the Khārijites in the days of Ḥajjāj, con-
versely turn minor rebels into prodigious heroes and pinnacles of piety of
riveting interest to the chroniclers.\textsuperscript{35} It is only with the revolts of
the Yemeni generals, Zayd b. 'Alī, 'Abdallāh b. Mu'āwiya and Ḍahḥāk the
Khārijite, that we find highly charged events described in fairly neutral
terms,\textsuperscript{34} and by the time of the 'Abbāsids, of course, the Sunnī attitude had
set: 'Alid rebels continue to receive sympathetic attention,\textsuperscript{35} but the
successors of the prodigious Shābib in the Jazīra are dismissed in short
notices to the effect that they rebelled and were defeated.\textsuperscript{36}

The legal and doctrinal \textit{ḥadīths} are thus only one of the problems which
the Islamic tradition presents. Were they the only problem, we should still
have a fairly good idea of how Islam began; but the basic trouble is that
these \textit{ḥadīths} are a layer deposited relatively late and that the layer under-
neath consists of rubble reorganized in minimal order. No scholar in his
most extravagant fantasies would dream of reconstructing the Constitu-
tion of Medina from its debris in the \textit{ḥadīths} about 'Alī; and yet scholars
are doing precisely that when they reconstruct the origins of Islam from its
debris in the Islamic tradition.

Islamic historiography, however, does not consist only of a religious
tradition, but also of a tribal one; and the question to which we must
now turn is the extent to which the tribal recollection of the past survived
with its structures intact.

What the Arabs did with their tribal tradition can best be set out against
the background of Iceland. Icelandic and Islamic history unexpectedly
share the feature of beginning with a \textit{hījra}: as the future Icelanders made
their exodus from Norwegian monarchy in the name of their ancestral
freedom,\textsuperscript{37} so the future Muslims made theirs from Arab paganism in the
name of their ancestral God. And both \textit{hījras} led into an isolation, physical
in the one case and moral in the other, which enabled the \textit{mubājirūn} to
retain and elaborate the values in the name of which they had walked out.\textsuperscript{38}
Hence, for the Icelanders and the Muslims the heroic past was no mere backdrop to history, but history par excellence, the classical age embodying their abiding values and on which their intellectual efforts were spent. Where the Greeks or the Germans remember their jāhiliyya, barbarian past, only from an epic, and others not at all, the Icelanders and the Muslims, by contrast, became assiduous collectors of antiquities relating to the country they had left,\textsuperscript{19} the exodus,\textsuperscript{40} and the society which ensued.\textsuperscript{41}

The character of these works is nonetheless very different. Where the Icelandic jāhiliyya merely escaped from monarchy and survived the coming of Christianity, the Arab jāhiliyya by contrast interacted with an Arab religion and state. Hence, where the Icelandic material is either historical or epic in character,\textsuperscript{42} the Arab material bears all the marks of having been through religious discussions. The Landnámabók and Íslendingabók simply recorded the past on the basis of oral tradition collected while the classical society was still in existence, and the Íslendingasögur evoked this past in literary works composed during the agonized centuries when the classical society caved in;\textsuperscript{43} but where Ari recorded and Sturla evoked, the Arabs argued, and the books of futūh and ansāb are thoroughly rabbinicized. The tradition has been broken up. Coherent narratives, though they do exist, are rare;\textsuperscript{44} and for all that heroic prowess and lapidary style are common enough, the fragments of which the tradition came to consist are so many residues of religious arguments. At the same time pagan timelessness has been replaced by monotheist history. The heroes are sometimes pious and sometimes impious, but of heroic fatalism there is none;\textsuperscript{45} and where the sagas are pure family history, the futūh and ansāb are that and a good deal more besides.

The tribal tradition was, like politics, endowed with religious meaning, and for that reason it did not escape the ravages of the whirlwind. There is no qualitative difference between the tribal and the strictly religious material in the Sīra, the Constitution of Medina being once more the only exception;\textsuperscript{46} accounts of the conquests, insofar as they do not consist of legal and doctrinal hadīths, are formulaic and schematized;\textsuperscript{47} tribal and religious history up to the accession of Mu'āwiya are largely beyond disentanglement;\textsuperscript{48} and the careers of the Umayyad ashrāf are as stereotyped as the accounts of Umayyad fiscal policy.\textsuperscript{49}

It is, however, undeniable that the tribal tradition was located off the centre of the whirlwind, and suffered less damage as a result. Where the Sīra is marked by secondary constructions, the ayyām are simply legendary;\textsuperscript{10} there is occasional material relating to the period between the ridda and the first civil war, above all in Sayf b. 'Umar, which is strikingly alive;\textsuperscript{51} and there is still more relating to the subsequent period, and above
all the second civil war, which is manifestly historical.52 The fact that material is alive does not necessarily mean that it is true, but it does mean that it has been through an undisturbed transmission such as the religious tradition did not enjoy: of the Prophet the tribesmen remembered nothing, but of their own history they obviously did remember something.

But it is not much, and what is worse, much of it is of very little use. What the tribal tradition preserved was above all personalia: who married, divorced and killed whom, who was the first to say and do such and such, who was the most generous of the Arabs, what so-and-so said on a certain occasion, and so forth, in short the chit-chat and gossip of the Arab tribal sessions. Of such material a ninth-century scholar was to make an entire collection, the *Kitāb al-muhabbar*, which must rank with the Guinness Book of Records among the greatest compilations of useless information.53 It was material which was well equipped to withstand the effects of atomization, and it was, of course, precisely the stuff of which the Icelanders made world literature; but it is not the stuff of history.

Whether one approaches Islamic historiography from the angle of the religious or the tribal tradition, its overall character thus remains the same: the bulk of it is debris of an obliterated past. The pattern in which the debris began to be arranged in the eighth century A.D. acquired the status of historiographical *sunna*54 in the ninth, the century in which the classical works of history and *hadith* were compiled. The tradition did not, of course, entirely cease to change on reduction to writing, but basically the canon had now been closed and endowed with the same kind, if not quite the same degree, of sanctity as that which was attached to the Prophet’s words; and both were passed on without substantial modifications, complete with *ikhtilaf* and *ijma*, disagreement and agreement.

The works on which the canon was based were compilations pure and simple. Had historical works composed before the subsidence of the tempestuous weathers come down to us, we might very well have had the excitement of seeing early Islamic history through independent minds; but because the tradition has been shattered, all the later historians could do was to collect its remains.55 The works of the first compilers—Abū Mikhnaf, Sayf b. ‘Umar, ‘Awāna, Ibn Ishāq, Ibn al-Kalbī and so forth—are accordingly mere piles of disparate traditions reflecting no one personality, school, time or place: as the Medinese Ibn Ishāq transmits traditions in favour of Iraq, so the Iraqi Sayf has traditions against it;

‘Awāna, despite his Syrian origins, is no Umayyad zealot;57 and all the compilations are characterized by the inclusion of material in support of conflicting legal and doctrinal persuasions.58

Inasmuch as the classical sources consist largely of extracts or free
renditions of these works, they could not easily be very different in character. We have an apparent abundance of rich and diversified sources for the history of the first two centuries. Sunnis and Shi‘ites, Iraqis and provincials, Arabs and Persians all contributed over the years to the mountain of universal chronicles, local histories, genealogical works, biographical dictionaries, legal handbooks, collections of poetry, of proverbs and of gossip, heresiographies, polemical tracts and essays which shield the Muslim past from the unholy designs of modern historians. But the diversity is depressingly deceptive. Ya‘qūbī gives us nothing like the Shi‘ite experience of Islamic history, merely the same body of tradition as the Sunni Tabarî with curses in appropriate places; similarly local historians such as Azdî have no local experiences and few local sources, but merely pick out from the canon what was of local interest; compilers of biographical dictionaries picked out their prosopa, jurists and historians their hadiths on taxation, and Persian historians simply translated their selections into Persian; Baladhuri’s Ansâb is a universal chronicle genealogically arranged, Ibn ‘Asâkir’s Ta’rikh a biographical dictionary topographically based, and so on ad infinitum: wherever one turns, one finds compilers of different dates, origin and doctrinal persuasions presenting the same canon in different arrangements and selections. This does of course have its practical advantages. Inasmuch as every compiler will have bits of the canon not found elsewhere, one can go on finding new material even in late sources; and in theory one ought to read the entire corpus of Muslim literature on the period before venturing an opinion on what it was about. But in practice, of course, this is not feasible, and one all too soon reaches the point of diminishing returns: in a late local chronicle written in Persian such as the Ta’rikh-i Sistân there is admittedly bric-à-brac which is not found elsewhere; but there is little else.

The source material thus consisted of an invariable canon formed between a hundred and fifty and two hundred years after the Prophet’s death. It is for that reason that it is so extraordinarily impenetrable. Passing from one source to another and finding them very much the same, one is harassed by an exasperating feeling that one cannot see. And in fact one cannot see. Whoever comes from the Mediterranean world of late antiquity to that of the Arab conquerors must be struck by the apparently total lack of continuity: the Syria to which Heraclius bade his moving farewell seems to have vanished, not just from Byzantine rule, but from the face of the earth. Nothing in the Arab accounts of the conquests betrays the fact that the Arabs were moving into the colourful world described by historians
of late antiquity: in the east the Arabs saw kisras and marqabans, in the west qaysars and batrafqs, but of whatever else they saw, they took no notice; and for the better part of the Umayyad period, the only non-Muslim presence to come through in the sources is that of Khurāsān. The Syrian pillar saints dispensing grace to local Arab tribesmen, the Coptic peasants, riotous Alexandrines or sophisticated Nestorians at home at the King of Kings’ court, all these have been conjured away at a stroke and replaced by faceless ‘uluj and nasārā: one comes straight from late antiquity to classical Islam.

Unvaried and impenetrable, the tradition is also marked by an extraordinary unreality. The accounts which the sources push at us never convince, and if one accepts the descriptions of Muḥammad’s years in Mecca, ‘Alī’s fiscal policy in Kūfa or the course of the battle of Șīffin, it is because the sources offer no alternatives, not because they ring true. In part, of course, this unreality arises from the fact that what the sources would have us believe cannot be true: new religions do not spring fully-fledged from the heads of prophets, old civilizations are not conjured away. But more particularly it reflects the circumstance that the tradition which the sources preserve was dead; for whereas the epic has compelling verisimilitude even when its information is wrong, the Islamic tradition is completely unpersuasive even when its information is correct. Thus Noth dismisses the use of takbirs as battle cries as a mere literary topos, and as it happens a Syriac source proves him wrong; but had it not been for the Syriac source, who other than the most ijihiri of historians would have believed it? The epic evokes a lived experience, but the Islamic tradition had been through too many upheavals to retain much vividness: true or false, it has all become dust in the eyes of the historians.

But above all the tradition is marked by high entropy. Unsurprisingly, it is full of contradictions, confusions, inconsistencies and anomalies, and if these could be ordered a certain meaning might emerge. But the debris is dejectingly resistant to internal criticism, and because it cannot be ordered, nothing much can be proved or disproved. There is nothing, within the Islamic tradition, that one can do with Baladhuri’s statement that the qibla in the first Kufan mosque was to the west: either it is false or else it is odd, but why it should be there and what it means God only knows. It is similarly odd that ‘Umar is known as the Fārūq, that there are so many Fāṭimas, that ‘Alī is sometimes Muḥammad’s brother, and that there is so much pointless information; but all one can do is to note that there are oddities, and in time one gets inured to them. It is a tradition in which information means nothing and leads nowhere; it just happens to be there and lends itself to little but arrangement by majority and minority opinion.
The inertia of the source material comes across very strongly in modern scholarship on the first two centuries of Islam. The bulk of it has an alarming tendency to degenerate into mere rearrangements of the same old canon — Muslim chronicles in modern languages and graced with modern titles. Most of the rest consists of reinterpretations in which the order derives less from the sources than from our own ideas of what life ought to be about — modern preoccupations graced with Muslim facts and footnotes. This combination of traditional rearrangement and modern preoccupations does little to uncover the landscape that we are all trying to see: things can occasionally be brought to fit, but one all too rarely experiences illumination. And for the same reason new interpretations do not generate much in the way of new research. Theories and facts do not mesh, paradigms produce no puzzles and puzzles no paradigms: we are forever shifting rubble in our own peculiar field without appreciable effect on the work of our successors or that going on in adjoining areas. Hence what patterns we opt for hardly seems to matter: maybe Muhammad was a Fabian socialist, or maybe he merely wanted sons; maybe the Umayyad feuds were tribal or maybe that was how Umayyad politicians chose to argue. What difference does it make? We know as little as and understand no more than before.

The inertia of the source material is similarly reflected in the inordinate time it has taken for a helpful Quellenkritik to emerge. In 1899 Wellhausen applied to Islamic historiography the principles of literary criticism which had paid off so handsomely in his study of the Pentateuch; and since in both cases he was up against tribal and religious traditions belatedly committed to writing, one might have expected his Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte des Islams to have been as revolutionary a work as was his Prolegomena zur ältesten Geschichte Israels. But it is not altogether surprising that it was not. The Biblical redactors offer us sections of the Israelite tradition at different stages of crystallization, and their testimonies can accordingly be profitably compared and weighed against each other. But the Muslim tradition was the outcome, not of a slow crystallization, but of an explosion; the first compilers were not redactors, but collectors of debris whose works are strikingly devoid of overall unity; and no particular illuminations ensue from their comparison. The Syrian, Medinese and Iraqi schools in which Wellhausen found his J, E, D and P, do not exist: where Engnell and other iconoclasts have vainly mustered all their energy and ingenuity in their effort to see the Pentateuch as a collection of uncoordinated hadiths, Noth has effortlessly and conclusively demonstrated the fallacy of seeing the Muslim compilers as Pentateuchal redactors.

After Wellhausen the most striking feature of Islamic Quellenkritik was
Introduction

its absence. It was only in 1967 that Sellheim published his stratigraphy of the Sira, a work notable for its failure to relate itself to either Wellhausen or Schacht, and for its definition of a Grundschicht so broad that the basic problems of the formation of the Prophet's biography were evaded. And not until 1968 did Wellhausen's ideas begin to be taken up by Noth. Noth himself has adopted a form-critical approach, and the result is both enlightening and wholly negative. Form-criticism is, like literary criticism, a method evolved for the study of the Pentateuch. Biblical form-critics treat Wellhausen's redactions rather as conglomerates in which each individual component has its own individual history, and in pursuing these they take us back in time. But just as the Islamic tradition is not the product of either slow crystallization or a gradual deposition of identifiable layers, so also it is not a conglomerate in which ancient materials have come together in a more recent setting. Hence, where Biblical form-critics take us back in time, Noth by contrast takes us forward. He demonstrates time and time again that the components of the Islamic tradition are secondary constructions, the history of which we are not invited to pursue: they simply have to be discarded. Where Biblical form-criticism takes us to the sources behind the sources, Noth exposes us to a gaping void behind the sources. And the practical outcome of his Quellenkritik is accordingly not the rewriting of Islamic history, but a warning to foolhardy Islamic historians.

By far the most important contributions, however, have come from the field of Hadith. Here too there was a notable delay. Already in 1890 Goldziher demonstrated that the bulk of the traditions attributed to the Prophet in fact originate in the doctrinal and legal controversies of the second and third centuries of the hijra, and his ideas were taken up by Lammens and Becker. But thereafter the implications of Goldziher's theories were quietly forgotten, and not until the 1940s did they receive systematic development at the hands of Schacht. With Schacht, however, things did begin to move. His work on Islamic law for the first time related atomistic hadiths to time and place and used them for the reconstruction of an evolution, a feat which has generated the first and as yet the only line of cumulative research in early Islamic studies. At the same time his work on Islamic historiography demonstrated that second-century hadiths abound in the accounts of the Prophet and the Rāshidūn, and that the earliest historiographical literature took the form of dry lists of names chronologically arranged — ta'rikh as opposed to hadith and akkābār.

Among historians the response to Schacht has varied from defensiveness to deafness, and there is no denying that the implications of his theories are, like those of Noth, both negative and hard to contest. That the bulk
of the Sīra and lives of the Rashidun consists of second-century hadiths has not been disputed by any historian, and this point may be taken as conceded. But if the surface of the tradition consists of debris from the controversies of the late Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid periods, the presumption must be that the layer underneath consists of similar debris from the controversies which preceded them. The fact that so much of the Sīra has no apparent doctrinal point is not, of course, a proof of its historicity: of the lives of prophets little is remembered or invented unless it has a point. And the pointlessness testifies, not to the extraordinary detachment of seventh-century Arab reporters, but to the extraordinary erosion of seventh-century religious and historical structures. The question which Schacht's theories beg is whether the chronological and prosopographical skeleton identified by him as the Grundschicht of the Sīra can withstand critical inspection, and it is remarkable, but perhaps not insignificant, that no historians have so far rushed to its defence. It cannot withstand such inspection. The chronology of the Sīra is internally weak, schematized, doctrinally inspired, and contradicted by contemporary non-Muslim sources on one crucial point. And that the prosopography shares these features needs hardly to be pointed out. There is of course no doubt that Muhammad lived in the 620s and 630s A.D., that he fought in wars, and that he had followers some of whose names are likely to have been preserved. But the precise when, what and who, on which our interpretations stand and fall, bear all the marks of having been through the mill of rabbinic arguments and subsequently tidied up.

As far as the origins of Islam are concerned, the only way to escape the entropy is thus to step outside. It is our luck that, unlike historians of the Buddha, we can step outside: all the while that Islamic historians have been struggling with their inert tradition, they have had available to them the Greek, Armenian, Hebrew, Aramaic, Syriac and Coptic literatures of non-Muslim neighbours and subjects of the Arab conquerors, to a large extent edited and translated at the end of the last century and the beginning of the present, and left to collect dust in the libraries ever since. It is a striking testimony to the suppression of the non-Islamic Middle East from the Muslim sources that not only have these literatures been ignored for questions other than the chronology of the conquests and the transmission of Greek philosophy and science, but they have also been felt to be quite rightly ignored. Of course these sources are hostile, and from a classical Islamic view they have simply got everything wrong; but unless we are willing to entertain the notion of an all-pervading literary conspiracy between the non-Muslim peoples of the Middle East, the
crucial point remains that they have got things wrong on very much the same points. That might not, it is true, have impressed the medieval Muslims who held the Jews and Christians capable of having maliciously deleted from their scriptures precisely the same passages relating to the coming of Islam; but as the Jews and Christians retorted, given their wide geographical and social distribution, they could scarcely have vented their anti-Muslim feelings with such uniform results.\(^9\) It is because there is agreement between the independent and contemporary witnesses of the non-Muslim world that their testimony must be considered; and it can hardly be claimed that they do not help: whichever way one chooses to interpret them, they leave no doubt that Islam was like other religions the product of a religious evolution.

Stepping outside is, however, not the only solution as far as the political history of the Arabs after the Rāshidūn is concerned.\(^99\) Here too the Grundschicht consists of a chronological and prosopographical framework, and that the Arab horror anonymitatis contributed to the proliferation of names here as elsewhere can hardly be open to doubt;\(^100\) but the lists include the names of governors who can be checked against the evidence of numismatics, papyrology and epigraphy, and against the testimony of non-Muslim sources, and the result of such a check is unshakeable, surprising and impressive agreement.\(^101\) Who compiled these lists, when and why is one of the most intriguing problems of Islamic historiography;\(^102\) but what matters in the present context is that the one thing we can pride ourselves on knowing in early Islamic history is who held power and when.

It is thus not surprising to find that whereas the non-Muslim sources offer a wholly new picture of the religion that was to become Islam, they generally confirm the familiar outline of the society that was to become the Muslim polity;\(^103\) and since they do not usually offer many details, their importance is necessarily reduced. Not that this does much to justify the reluctance of Islamic historians to touch a non-Muslim source. Syriac sources offer a contemporary account of the revolt of Mukhtār,\(^104\) descriptions of a proto-mamlūk army under Mansūr\(^105\) and a slave revolt in Harrān;\(^106\) and had it occurred to Dennett to glance at a collection of Nestorian responsa edited, translated and indexed in 1914, he would not have had to write his Conversion and Poll-tax in 1950 to prove that the Arabs did indeed impose a tax on the unbelievers’ heads.\(^107\) But the fact remains that for political history the non-Muslim sources offer additional, not alternative, information.

The obvious way to tackle early Islamic history is, in other words, prosopographical. To the extent that the pages of the Muslim chronicles are littered with names, prosopography is of course nothing but a fancy
word for what every historian of that period finds himself to be doing. But early Islamic history has to be almost *exclusively* prosopographical. There is, to be sure, a scatter of tribal traditions and stereotypes which can be used, but the vast mass of information is gossip which cannot be used for what it asserts, only for what it conveys, primarily the background and status of the persons gossipped about. The gossip provides a context for the men in power, and without such context the lists would be of little use to us. But it does not provide much else.
A Ch‘i-tan prince of the Liao dynasty in China once caught a servant reading a book. It was an embarrassing moment, for needless to say the book was Chinese; hurriedly, the prince hid the book in his sleeve and cautioned the servant in future to do his reading in secret. Similarly, ‘Umar I once caught an Arab copying the book of Daniel. It was not, however, an embarrassing but a frightening moment, for ‘Umar thrashed the man repeatedly to the accompaniment of the verse ‘we have revealed to you an Arabic Koran’ until the wretched victim cried out that he repented. There could be no question of reading Daniel or other foreign writings on the side.

These stories nicely catch the contrast between Central Asian and Arab conquest. The Ch‘i-tan episode was merely one of the many undignified moments the Central Asian conquerors had to endure in the course of their invariably vain attempts to resist Sinification. There were few who were not determined morally to stay in their ancestral ‘forests of Ötükän’, and yet there were none who escaped at least a measure of cultural assimilation: even the Ch‘i-tan, who had so aggressively insisted that they possessed a respectable civilization of their own, took a Chinese type of administration with them when they escaped to western Turkestan. And no barbarian conquest of China ever resulted in the formation of a new civilization. But the Arabs had conquered the Middle East in the name of a jealous God, a God who dwelt among the tribes and spoke in their language, and morally they did remain in Mecca: where the Ch‘i-tan could at best translate the Chinese classics, the Arabs read their own Koran and tribal poetry. And, culturally, the outcome of their conquest was indeed a new civilization: where the Ch‘i-tan adhered to Chinese values even in western Turkestan, the Syrians and the Persians adopted Arab values even in the settled Middle East. What are the features of Central Asia and Arabia in terms of which this extraordinary difference can be explained?

We may start with Central Asia, the paradigmatic home of barbarian conquerors. Two points are relevant here. Firstly, in terms of ecology
Central Asia is a land of steppe. The steppe is close to ideal pastoral land: if generally too poor to be exploited by agriculture, it is generally also too rich to be wasted on camels. The steppe pastoralists can keep a wide variety of domestic animals, and above all they can specialize in horses. Horses permit a high ratio of livestock to man, and moreover they are in the nature of cash cattle. It is perhaps for these reasons that the process of sedentarization through excessive wealth and poverty, which elsewhere siphons off the top and the bottom of the social pyramid, scarcely seems to have been operative on the steppe: just as vast herds could be accumulated before the point of diminishing returns was reached, so a large number of impoverished tribesmen could be kept in business as shepherds. Central Asian tribes thus disposed of greater endogenous resources than is common in a pastoral context and possessed a correspondingly high potential for internal organization.

Secondly, in terms of geopolitics Central Asia was a huge sea of barbarians set in the midst of interlocking continents. Thanks to its border on the Siberian forest in the north, it was open to barbarian incomers who would upset existing polities and set migrations going. And being surrounded by the four civilizations of China, India, Iran and the West, it was the recipient of a steady flow of moral and material resources from the settled states, some arriving in the form of imperial subsidies, others being left behind by the commercial and diplomatic caravans that traversed the steppe, or by the garrisons and missionaries who followed in their wake: as Greek fabrics, Graeco-Roman masks and Chinese lacquers could find a common grave in Pazyryk and Noin Ula, so Manichaeanists, Nestorians and Buddhists were all to reach the Orkhon at their appointed times. There were thus two external sources of commotion in the barbarian sea, and the very size of the sea was such that the commotion could reach gigantic proportions. Hence the potential for internal organization was liable to be encashed.

This was particularly so in the area along the Chinese wall. Mongolia though split into two by the Gobi, formed a compact steppe wide open to the forests in the north, but in head-on collision with a compact civilization in the south — a situation very unlike the patchwork of oases, steppe and desert which constituted the Transoxanian border of Iran, where nobody could dream of building a single wall to keep the barbarians out. Tribes certainly did enter Mongolia from the north, and Chinese resources certainly did pour into it from the south, but the only safety-valve was the narrow Jungarian corridor to the west. Accordingly, very high pressure could be built up in the Mongolian steppe, and for this reason Mongolia was the classic site of Central Asian state formation. Generally, Turkish
and Mongol tribes are highly stratified. The lineages are ranked in the order of seniority on the principle that no man is his brother’s equal, and divided into two estates, nobles and commoners, the ‘white’ and the ‘black bones’ respectively, and these may be further subdivided. The nobles collect taxes and services from the commoners and command them in war, and descent groups are or may easily be reorganized as units of internal administration. Periodically, the warfare endemic in Mongolia would act on these tribes to produce larger political structures. On the one hand, a chief became indispensable: ‘a body fares badly without a head’, as the conventional wisdom had it. And on the other hand, kinship ties were slowly being ground away by the savagery and length of the struggles. As tribes were broken up by dispersal or enslavement, social stratification encroached on segmentation, free retainers clustered around nobles and chiefs, and one of these would eventually subdue his neighbours, distribute them in military and administrative units headed by his vassals, kinsmen or the nobles, and commonly mark the foundation of his polity by the promulgation of laws.

It was thus possible to found a state in the steppe; but the caravan trade notwithstanding, it was scarcely possible to maintain it there. Hence such states had no option but to conquer, and from the Hsiung-nu in the third century B.C. to the Manchus in the seventeenth century A.D. northern China was the seat of a long succession of barbarian states bent on the absorption of their rivals along the wall on the one hand, and the annexation of the fertile lands behind it on the other.

At the other end of Central Asia, by contrast, the steppe was sprawling and civilization well tucked away behind the Caucasus and the Danube. Here, then, the pressure was deflated. There was of course no lack of tribes coming in from the east, any more than there was lack of revenues pouring in from the south; but on the one hand, the tribes were free to spread out in the almost endless steppe, and on the other hand, the almost endless steppe lacked a natural centre of expansion: the Crimea was a place of refuge, not a place from where to conquer. Typically, therefore, the tribal states of southern Russia were loose structures. A layer of tribal rulers was spread thinly over a local population of pastoralists, peasants and hunters; military organization was usually restricted to a royal bodyguard and an army of nobles; and resources came largely in the form of tribute from the subject population and revenues from whatever trading colony the area might house at the time. The basic structure of the Mongolian states — kings, retainers and an aristocracy in command of the tribes — was usually present, but the tightness was entirely absent, and that holds true of both the Iranian states of the Scythians and Sarmatians.
The nature of the Arab conquest

The nature of the Arab conquest

The nature of the Arab conquest 21
the Germanic ones of the Goths and the Rus,\textsuperscript{144} and the Turco-Mongol
ones of the Huns, Khazars, Volga Bulgars or Tatars.\textsuperscript{144} Eventually,
of course, civilization began to close in on the steppe: where the Sarmatians
could spread into Poland at a slight push from the Alans in the first
centuries A.D., the Cumans had to negotiate their entry into Hungary
when threatened by the Mongols in the thirteenth, while the Kazakhs
scarcely budged when slaughtered by the Kalmuks in the seventeenth
and eighteenth. And then the tightly organized states did make their
appearance.\textsuperscript{143} But by then it was too late for world conquest. And until
then the barbarians of southern Russia had a simple choice between
staying in the steppe at the cost of failure to conquer civilization, and
conquest of civilization at the cost of losing their tribal homes.\textsuperscript{144} In
practice they usually stayed in the steppe: \textsuperscript{143} when the Byzantine empire
finally fell to the Turks, it fell to those who came from the east.

That is not to say that until then civilization was safe from tribal
incursions in the west. Because tribal pressure in Central Asia was con-
centrated in the east, it was in the west that migrations tended to end up,
so that southern Russia became instead a dumping ground for unwanted
barbarians. The up-and-coming states along the Chinese walls would send
their defeated rivals through the Jungarian corridor, from where the
waves of displacement would eventually reach the Russian steppe. Hence
where China was typically faced with attempts at concerted conquest
by barbarian states such as those of the Hsiung-nu or the Yuan-yuan,
Byzantium typically had to endure invasions of barbarian hordes such
as those of the Huns or the Avars; while Iran, in all respects in between,
suffered a bit of both.\textsuperscript{146}

Europe and Arabia can both be seen as variants on the Central Asian
pattern. Up to a point, Northern Europe and Central Asia are directly
comparable: along the Rhine, as along the wall, barbarians were in direct
confrontation with a compact civilization, and here as there the confronta-
tion engendered state structures among the tribes — kings, \textit{comitati}, military
and administrative divisions,\textsuperscript{147} and possibly even laws.\textsuperscript{148} But for one
thing, Europe was a land of forests, not of steppe, and thus underdeveloped
rather than deprived. And for another, it was peninsular in shape. The
sea placed a limit on the barbarians who could come from the north,
while the eastern frontier, tiny as it was by Central Asian standards and
moreover mountainous in parts, was not at all impossible to defend.
Neither the ecological potential nor its defensibility can have been very
obvious to those who witnessed the days of the migrations. But the
Germanic tribes could hardly have overrun the Roman empire without the
intervention of Central Asia in the shape of the Huns: Germanic state structures were too embryonic and Germanic mobility too limited for a conquest of the Chingizid type; and the Goths who broke the frontier as terrified refugees from the Huns, or the Franks who crossed a deserted Rhine with their cattle and cumbersome ox-carts, were certainly a far cry from the devastating horsemen who swept down on the Chinese. Conversely, it is not accidental that the Germanic states which escaped imperial reconquest proved viable, so that in Europe the establishment of barbarian states with a veneer of civilization was cumulative. As Charlemagne smote the Avars and baptized the Saxons, so even his feeble successors could withstand the onslaught of the Vikings, whose mighty display of barbarian savagery soon degenerated into mercenary and commercial services to the civilized south, and colonization of the empty north. And though the Mongols could still take the Hunnish road to Hungary, the Cuman refugees did not conquer France.

But in Central Asia the barbarian states regularly fell, if not to the Chinese then to other barbarians. Central Asia was the region not of stable but of vanished nations, the umam khaliya of the Turks and Mongols who left behind a long tradition of tribal unification and conquest. Evidently, this tradition was primarily about Mongolia and China; but whereas the barbarians of Europe, settled in their stable states, forgot their ambition to replace 'Romania' by 'Gothia', those of Central Asia by contrast learnt that there was more to the world than the Orkhon and the Middle Kingdom. On the one hand, it was clear that control of the entire steppe was required for the conquest of the Middle Kingdom; and on the other, control of the entire steppe led to awareness of the civilized world beyond it. And it was doubtless thanks to this piling up of barbarian experience that Chingiz could conceive the ideas deep in the wilds of Mongolia of conquering the world, so that instead of setting up yet another peripheral state that sent the losers westward, he combined the conquest and the invasion pattern in a single snowballing conquest of both China and the west. In Central Asia it was thus barbarian conquest which was cumulative, and it was only in the sixteenth century that the stability of the Mongol polity finally issued in the definitive establishment of civilization there.

If Europe was too rich and too well-protected to conform to the Central Asian pattern, Arabia by contrast was too poor and too isolated. Ecologically, the deprivation of the desert is extreme: sheep and goats can be reared only along the edges, but in the interior only camels can subsist. And inasmuch as camels demand a considerable investment of labour
without yielding a commensurate return on the market, differentiation of wealth along the lines of the Central Asian pastoralists could not arise.¹⁹ Geopolitically, the peninsula was simply a backwater. No tribes pressed south in search of its meagre pastures: what tribal movement there was went in the opposite direction. And what interest the settled states displayed in the peninsula was limited to the fertile strips along the eastern coast and in the south.¹⁶⁰ The Yemen, for all that it might be Felix, was no China, and by Central Asian standards the traffic it engendered was derisory, so that commercially the Arabs could make it only in the Syrian desert or at sea. Inner Arabia thus remained all but innocent of foreign contamination. There may have been Manichaeans in Mecca just as there may have been Manichaeans in Siberia,¹⁶¹ but against the Manichaeans, Buddhists and Christians who populated the oases of the Tarim basin, writing in some eleven languages and about as many scripts,¹⁶² Arabia had only the Jews of Wādi‘l-Qurā and the Christians of Najrān; and these scarcely even wrote.

Hence, where the history of Central Asia is one of endless political upheavals, that of Arabia by contrast is one of tribal immutability: there is not much to tell between the Arabia of the Bible and the Arabia of Musil’s Rwala.¹⁶³ In the sparsely inhabited and uniformly impoverished desert social stratification remained trivial. Tribal nobility, sharaf, conferred a prestige as elusive as that of the ‘good family’ among the bourgeoisie; an acquired status,¹⁶⁴ it entailed no formal privileges or bans on intermarriage, and its occupants collected no taxes, transmitted no orders and had no tribal units to command. Similarly, chiefs were invariably peers among equals,¹⁶⁵ who did not issue orders as much as formulate a general consensus.¹⁶⁶ It is true, of course, that warfare might increase their authority dramatically;¹⁶⁷ but just as there were few endogenous resources for the chief to work on, so also there was no erosion of kinship ties.¹⁶⁸ It is precisely because there were so few resources to fight for that warfare in Arabia never came near the ferocity of the wars between the tribes in Chingiz’s Mongolia. Tribes were rarely dispersed: the fate of the Bajila is a marvel, not the norm.¹⁶⁹ And still less were they collectively enslaved or executed.¹⁷⁰ Where the Central Asian tribes had wars, the Arabs typically had feuds;¹⁷¹ they went to battle for the sake of honour and excitement and occasionally for wells or pastures; but though warfare might trigger the formation of confederacies, it did not lead to states. There is thus no parallel in Arabia to the political tradition of the Mongols or the Turks. The Arabs could scarcely even have afforded the Veblenian waste of human lives, animals and material objects — women, servants, horses, lacquers, textiles — that went into the burial of a Hsiung-nu or a
Scythian chief. And where the Central Asian tribes have a profuse and eclectic vocabulary of political titulature, the Arabs made good with shaykh, sayyid and a few other terms. The halif was no retainer, the chiefly slaves no ordo, military and administrative divisions appear only after the conquests, and there never was an Arab Yāṣa.

It was of course possible for the Arabs to have states in the Syrian desert, where civilization was ready to assist with commercial revenues and imperial subsidies. But by the same token such states were forced into undignified dependence. In times of imperial weakness they might either pander to civilization as commercial statelets as they did in Petra, Hatra and Palmyra, or infiltrate it as settled kings as they did in Emesa and Edessa; but those who like the Nabateans or Zenobia tried both commerce and conquest were a shortlived menace at best, and culturally they were no menace at all. In times of imperial strength they might either fight for civilization as client states after the fashion of Ḥira and Ghassān, or they might fight against it as unorganized tribes as they did at Dhū Qār. But whatever they did, organization and independence could not be had together. Equally, it was possible to have states in the south and on the coast where the ecology improved. But such states were too remote. The best the Yemenis could do was to have outposts in the north—the kingdoms of Lihyān and Kinda—but of these only the Kindi kingdom was a military as opposed to a commercial outpost, and precisely for that reason it did not survive: it was not the Kindi tradition that Muḥammad took up. What the Yemen contributed to north Arabia was above all a script, and what the tribes of the Damascene harra recorded in this script was not records of their victories, but details of their genealogies and sheep. Had Arabia been geographically inverted, there might well have been across the Roman limes a state endowed with the ecology of the Yemen without its parochiality, the commercial revenues of the Nabateans without their subservience, and the military following of the Ghassānids without their clientage. But Arabia as it was in real life could not and did not have a Chingiz Khan: there was never any empire du désert. So the Byzantines worried about their share of Central Asia in the north, and the Sāsānids worried about theirs in the east, but both quite reasonably thought that the Arabs were simply marauders.

Instead the Arabs possessed a characteristic very uncommon among tribes: they had enormous antiquity. The corollary was that they enjoyed an ethnic and cultural homogeneity quite without parallel in Central Asia or Europe. Central Asia being as we have seen land not of stable but of vanished nations, the tribes of Mongolia were no more Mongols than the Germanic tribes were Germans; but because the Arabs had lived
The nature of the Arab conquest

in freedom from ethnic and social disturbance since very ancient times, their mobility had given them a common identity such as other peoples acquire only through their state structures.\textsuperscript{183} Similarly, because they were ancient inhabitants of an impoverished peninsula, they combined a long-lived geographical proximity to civilization with a complete ecological distance from it. Unlike Huns or Vikings arriving out of nowhere, they knew what civilization was even if they did not have it, and unlike Goths or Mongols building states, they could continue not to want it. The common run of barbarians could vindicate their identity only in the name of a civilized tradition and so they acquired cultural unity as states within a foreign civilization; but the Arabs had their identity instead of states, and so they acquired cultural unity as a peninsula outside it.\textsuperscript{184}

They might very well have stayed in their peninsula, and to this extent their conquest was a formidable historical accident. From the point of view of Arabia, the existence of the Jews was, after all, quite fortuitous.\textsuperscript{185} It is similarly factors external to the peninsula which explain how Jews and Arabs got together.\textsuperscript{186} But it is above all the circumstance that an individual was there to conceive the idea which drives home the extraordinary intersection of historical opportunity and accident to which Islamic civilization owes its existence:\textsuperscript{187} it is a fact that, whichever way the origins of Islam are explained, Islamic civilization is the only one in the world to begin in the mind of a single man.

But if the event itself was accidental, the potential was not. The very deprivation which made the Central Asiatic paradigm inoperative in Arabia predisposed the Arabs for conquest on the model of the Jews. With its monotheist articulation of barbarian ethnicity, its divinely sanctioned programme of state formation and conquest, and its intrinsically religious leadership, the Judaic tradition constituted a sort of sacred obverse to the political tradition of Central Asia which the Arabs were uniquely qualified to make their own.\textsuperscript{188} Where a Mongol statesman could accumulate earthly power, the Arab prophet tapped divine authority; and where the Mongol conquests were an explosion caused by the disintegration of a tribal society, the Arab explosion by contrast was caused by its fusion. Once invented, the idea was applied again and again by impoverished tribes in Arabia and North Africa who reenacted the Prophet's career in areas which had previously seen only monotonous raids and revolts: in the Islamic, as not in the Roman, Middle East the desert was as prolific a source of tribal conquest as the steppe behind the Chinese wall.\textsuperscript{189}

It was, however, precisely because the Arab conquest had to be invented that it was followed by an outburst of barbarian creativity: the unlikeliness
of the event and its unlikely outcome are two sides of the same coin. Chingiz's conquests superbly realized an existing idea, and their outcome was predictably a reinforcement of existing Shinto: the political sanctity of the Hsiung-nu came back as that of the Chingizids, who in the name of their right to world dominion peremptorily ordered the western rulers to submit and martyred a Russian prince for his refusal to bow in the direction of Chingiz's qibla. But even Mongol Shinto was no solvent of existing civilizations. The conquerors of China could and occasionally did try to impose their identity on the Chinese, just as they could and usually did try to resist the blandishments of Chinese culture; but their identity having no truth with which to interact, they could not create: Buddhism was no substitute for an ethnic God. Hence, when the tribal ties decayed, the imprint of the barbarians was all but completely washed off the face of Chinese civilization. But the Prophet's conquests came out of the Prophet's imagination. Muhammad having fused a jealous God and a peninsular identity, something had to happen. In the name of their jealous God the Arabs ordered the rulers of the Middle East to convert and martyred the garrison at Gaza; and in the name of their peninsular identity they withdrew into the conquest ghetto. But either way they kept creating: it was exactly in the interaction between a universal truth and a parochial identity that the dynamic potential of their aegis lay. Vindicated by the force of conquest, this aegis was accordingly a powerful solvent. The barbarian imprint could not merely be washed off the face of the Middle Eastern civilizations, and when the conquest society collapsed, the dissolution of these civilizations was already far advanced.

Islamic civilization thus took shape in an intensive interaction of religious and tribal power at very high cultural temperatures, and it is for this reason that its basic structure had set irreversibly within what was scarcely more than moments after the initial explosion. The key element of this structure was a tribal hostility to settled life which, having become religiously fixed, constituted one of the fundamental constraints within which Islamic culture and the Islamic polity were to evolve. The Arabs escaped absorption into the cultures of their subjects because morally they stayed in Mecca. But because morally they stayed in Mecca they were to find it impossible to legitimate a Muslim state in the settled lands.
PART II

THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONQUEST SOCIETY
The problems which the Arabs came up against when they set about organizing a conquest society were precisely the opposite of those which normally afflicted the barbarians in China. In contrast to the latter, the Arabs found it a relatively easy matter to take over the native administration. For one thing, it was in the nature of their conquest that they possessed an imperviousness to native values which no Turkish or Mongol conqueror ever enjoyed. And for another, it was their good fortune that whereas the Chinese bureaucracy was the backbone of Chinese civilization, those of the Byzantines and Sāsānids were mere instruments of government; in particular, the provincial bureaucracy of Byzantine Syria was strikingly devoid of social and cultural distinctiveness. The translation of the Greek administrative records thus dragged no classics in its trail, and there are no parallels in the Arab Middle East to the desperate dodges whereby the barbarians in China tried to have Confucian bureaucracy without Confucian civilization. But in return the Arabs found it extremely hard to organize themselves. Their religious aegis could provide them with a rationale for a continuing political authority when the days of the messiah were over, just as the tribal armies furnished the material for a continuing Arab state when the days of the conquests were over; but for the shape of the conquest society neither the Judaic nor the Arab tradition had much to offer. The barbarians of Central Asia fought their civil wars before the conquests and arrived with state structures; typically, their organization thus endured. But the Arabs had to fight one civil war to devise an organization, another to maintain it, and a third to prove it obsolete, all within some eighty years.

Because the Arabs arrived with a common identity instead of state structures, their conquest society was organized along lines very different from that of the Mongols in China. Where the Mongols parcelled out northern China in appanages to the Mongol aristocracy, the Arabs huddled together in garrison cities to maintain their tribal isolation along the edge of the settled land. And where the Mongol aristocracy was the instrument of government, the Arab tribe could at the most be an instru-
Evolution of the conquest society

ment of indirect rule. The Arab solution can in fact best be characterized as a form of inverted colonial rule. The garrison cities have rightly been compared with the coastal outposts of the British. In both cases the conquerors arrived without the intention of making themselves permanently at home; in both cases, therefore, they settled in locations whence they could easily return to their homeland, and in both cases their relations with the natives were characterized by a combination of cultural tolerance and economic exploitation. But in the Arab case it was the tribesmen who congregated in the Bathursts and Dakars, and two crucial features of Sufyânid rule arise from this inversion: unlike a colonial empire, the Sufyânid state had to be tribal even in its metropolis; and where the British brought their own administration for themselves and practised indirect rule of the native tribes, the Sufyânids by contrast borrowed the native administration and practised indirect rule of their own tribes.

The Sufyânid metropolis was located in Syria. In terms of the normal geopolitics of the area this was an old location, but in terms of tribal settlement there was scarcely an alternative. The unsuitability of Medina was obvious: quite apart from being too remote, it was no tribal power base, a point which was forcibly brought home when 'Uthmân was murdered in 656 [35]. But Iraq or for that matter Egypt were no more suitable since the problem of the garrison cities was precisely that they had to be controlled by a precarious system of tribal balance, not by reliance on any one group; it is thus not surprising that 'Ali's fate was as unhappy as 'Uthmân's. Had Syria been similarly constituted, the unitary state would presumably have dissolved in the civil war: both 'Uthmân and 'Ali had after all anticipated key features of the Sufyânid solution, the former by his reliance on his kinsmen and the latter by his tribal amalgamations. But Syria was an exceptional province, firstly in that the Arab population was spread evenly over the countryside, and secondly in that one confederacy, the Qudâ‘a, by far outnumbered any other tribe. It was thus possible for the Syrian as for no other governor to rely on a local group, and since Mu‘âwiya was not slow to take advantage of the situation, the outcome of the first civil war was not political dissolution, but a transfer of the capital to Syria.

For purposes of indirect rule appropriate tribal units had to be created. The subtribe of the desert, though fairly well-defined in terms of social cohesion and political authority, was too small to be directly utilizable, while conversely the tribe and confederacy, which had a more suitable size, were too ill-defined. New units had been set up already in 638 [17] when Kufa had been divided into sevenths, and the Sufyânids
followed suit about 670 [50] when all settlements were divided into quarters of fifths. The basis of these units varied considerably with the availability of tribal material, but the original groups were always retained by way of subdivision so that the quarter or fifth was in the nature of a large semi-artificial tribe, a qaum or qabila which could serve for the organization of army and city alike. Militarily, it was a division with its own range of commands. Administratively, it was a unit for the payment of stipends, the collection of taxes, and the maintenance of law and order.

With the quarters and fifths the Arabs had got their tens, hundreds and thousands. The leaders of these units, however, were not tribal vassals, but tribal chiefs, the ru‘ūs al-qābīlā or ru‘ūs al-gawm who formed the tribal aristocracy or asbrāf of the Umayyad period.

The asbrāf constituted the link between governor and governed in the Sufyānid system of indirect rule; they commanded their units in times of war and were responsible for them in times of peace. Asbrāf and governor came together in the latter’s majlis, a session which did not differ greatly from a tribal meeting. Absence was a sign that something was wrong, while attendance provided an occasion for the exchange of information, orders, requests, and for a display of traditional generosity on the part of the governor. The ra‘s al-qabila in turn passed on information and gifts in his own majlis, and the process was repeated in the sessions of the lesser chiefs to reach the tribal group which had formed the primary unit of the conquerors. Occasionally, it was repeated also at a higher level, as when the wufūd took deputations of asbrāf to the majlis of the caliph. There were admittedly also elements of more direct rule in the system. Government by reliance on the asbrāf was supplemented morally by direct confrontation between governor and tribesmen in the weekly Friday service, and materially by the coercive power vested in the shurta, the local police force. But the exchange of bloodcurdling speeches and showers of gravel which marked the Friday service was hardly a major contribution to the smooth functioning of government, and the shurta was drawn from the tribesmen themselves so that the governor had no independent force against the citizen militia. Primarily, then, it was on the asbrāf that the Sufyānid set-up rested.

The position of the ra‘s al-qabila, like that of any tribal chief under conditions of indirect rule, rested on the dual basis of influence within the tribe and acceptability to the authorities, and it was accordingly marked by the tense balance of loyalties that this implies on both parts. He was usually chosen from among the larger groups accommodated in the unit, and usually from within existing chiefly houses where the position tended to be hereditary. To this extent the asbrāf demonstrate the continuing
evicacy of the pre-conquest stratification. But he was appointed by the
authorities and occasionally even by the caliph himself: rivalry for
nomination is thus a recurrent theme. And moreover, he was bound to
the governor by a certain amount of intermarriage, by the prospects of
promotion to a minor subgovernorship, and not least by the highest
available stipends, the shbaraf al-’ata. The ashrāf were not the creatures
of the state, and there is no lack of men among them who sided with their
fellow-tribesmen against the governor: in 684 [64] few of the Basran
ashraf had any compunction about the expulsion of ‘Ubaydallāh. But
they certainly were indebted to the state, and there is equally no lack
of men who took the opposite side: already in 680 [60] ‘Ubaydallāh
had been able to send Kufan ashrāf against their fellow-tribesmen during
the affair of Muslim b. ‘Aqil. And the way the balance was tipping is
clear from the standard accusation against the ashrāf, built into virtually
every one of their biographies, that they support the powers that be.

Between the metropolis and the provinces were the provincial gover-
nors; on them fell the duty of ensuring that the Arab tribes and the non-
Arab bureaucracy were kept apart in the provinces, while at the same
time both were linked to the metropolis. This problem was solved by
two simple measures. Firstly, the number of governors at the highest
level was reduced to an absolute minimum. The conquered lands were
divided into four huge provinces: Syria with Mesopotamia where the
caliph himself was supreme governor, Egypt with the west, and Kufa
and Basra with their eastern dependencies. Some of these provinces
were later subdivided and others were assigned together, but whatever
the variations the number of top-governors was always very small; and
it was in line with the same policy that fiscal and military power was all
but invariably concentrated in the hands of one man. Secondly, the
offices were entrusted to a kinsman of the caliph, be he agnatic, cognatic
or affinal, or to members of a small tribe closely related to his, such as
Quraysh, or Thaqif or the Anṣār. These men in turn relied on their
own kinsmen and, to a less extent, the local ashrāf for the many sub-
governorships they controlled, so that the vast majority of tribesmen
were debarred from office or at the most admitted to interim governor-
ships and insignificant posts.

The solution worked, but at a price. Where government is monopolized
by a small circle of relatives and friends, personal relations will necessarily
take precedence over the impersonal demands of bureaucratic rules. There
was of course no lack of such rules; the governor’s revenues were acknow-
ledged to be public money which had to be sent on to Damascus after
the deduction of local expenses, and had the Sufyānids been able, they
would doubtless have ensured that the rule was enforced. But where officials need to be controlled, friends by contrast have to be cultivated, and it was accordingly by an elaborate system of indulgence that the Sufyanid system was upheld. The governor spent enormous amounts of public money on opening moral accounts with asbrāf, honourable visitors, potential rebels, family, friends, poets, and other hangers-on, and enormous amounts were likewise invested by the caliph in the governor. The distinction between public and private money was tenuous in practice, and governorship soon came to be regarded as a source of private enrichment for the incumbent, so that what was actually sent on to Damascus depended largely on the goodwill of the governor, and what the caliph expected to receive was determined largely by what he had received from the predecessor. The only remedy the caliph allowed himself was to call the governor to account on dismissal in an effort to retrieve what was deemed to have been illegitimate gains, the usual agent chosen for this procedure being the successor. Very early on, governorship thus assumed the nature of qabāla, the governor sending on a fixed sum and pocketing an unlimited one which could be regained only through post-dismissal extortion; and the relatively gentle treatment which the governors received in this period was evidently due to the limitation of the rivals for the spoils to a small number of personal acquaintances to the exclusion of the tribal leaders. But it was precisely on this insulation of political and fiscal power from the tribal structures of conquest that the viability of the Sufyanid system turned.

The system was, however, vulnerable in both structural and temporal terms. Unlike a colonial empire, the Sufyanid state was tribally based even in its metropolis: it was thus a basic feature of the system that the mutual insulation of tribes and state could not obtain everywhere. And unlike colonial subjects, the Sufyanid tribes were conquerors: it was thus also a basic feature that the insulation could not obtain for long. As long as the precarious balance of tribal alliances in the metropolis and the tense balance of sharifian loyalties in the provinces were maintained, the state could not become the object of tribal or factional fighting. But in 684 a momentary fluctuation in high politics upset the system in Syria; and already before 684 the long-term erosion of the tribal roots had begun to undermine its foundations.
The background to the events in Syria in the second civil war was two-fold. Firstly, in terms of religious developments the transfer of the capital to Syria had placed the Umayyad high priest in exile from his temple; the Umayyads may have done something to make the temple come to Syria, but for the politically redundant Quraysh of Arabia it was a more appealing idea to have the capital come back to the Hijaz. Accordingly, on the death of Mu‘awiya in 680, Ibn al-Zubayr refused to pay allegiance to Yazid I, sought refuge in the temple, and awaited an opportunity to make his bid for the caliphate.

Secondly, in terms of tribal politics the rise of Quḍā‘a had led to the emergence of three rival confederacies in Syria. The Quḍā‘a, who were then considered descendants of Ma‘add, were represented in the three districts of Jordan, Damascus and Hims where they had the support of neighbouring tribes such as Ghassān and Kinda. In the north, however, the immigration of members of the confederacy of Qays in the reign of Mu‘awiya led to the detachment from Hims of the new district of Qinnasrin by Yazid I, and here the Quḍā‘a had no foothold. They similarly lacked representatives in the southernmost district of Palestine, and their efforts to win over the Palestinian Judhām by intervening in a quarrel over the tribal leadership proved unsuccessful. The rivals were Nātīl b. Qays al-Judhāmī who held the leadership, and Rawḥ b. Zanbā‘ al-Judhāmī, a younger man who hoped to get it. Hassān b. Bahdal al-Kalbī, the Quḍā‘ī chief, intervened on behalf of Rawḥ, who in return proselytized for the affiliation of Judhām to Asad of Ma‘add, but Nātīl retorted by opting for Qaḥtān, a confederacy which had recently been formed for the benefit of Hīmyar and Hamdān in Hims. The once undisputed predominance of the Quḍā‘a was thus threatened in the north by Qays and in the south by Qaḥtān, and both confederacies moreover were busy winning allies against the Quḍā‘a in the central districts. The tribal balance on which the Sufyānīd system rested had become unstable, and for this reason there was an opening for Ibn al-Zubayr in Syria.

The death of Yazid I followed by that of his son Mu‘awiya in 683
Syria of 684

[64] provided the occasion. For the Qudā’a and their allies it was evidently imperative to close the interregnum with a Sufyānid or at least an Umayyad caliph. Accordingly, on the news of Yazīd’s death, Hassān b. Bahdhāl, who was governor of Palestine at the time, left Rawḥ b. Zanbā’ as his deputy, gathered his tribal following in Jordan and joined the other pro-Umayyad asbrāf at Jābiya, where the chiefs of the Qudā’a, Kinda, Ghassān, ‘Akk, Ash’ar and others elected Marwān b. al-Ḥakam in a last grand tribal majlis. For the Qays and Qaḥṭān, however, it was clearly no less imperative that the Umayyad house be excluded, and both confederacies thus gave their allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr and/or Dahhāk b. Qays, a Damascene Qurashi who stepped forth as Ibn al-Zubayr’s representative in Syria; in Palestine Nāṭil b. Qays expelled Rawḥ in the name of the Zubayrid cause; in Hims Nu’mān b. Bashir, the Anšārī governor, declared for him on behalf of Qaḥṭān; and the Qaysīs followed suit in Qinnasrin. The antagonists met at Marj Rāḥit, where the Qudā’ī supporters of Marwān won a signal victory.

Inasmuch as the Syrian tribes constituted the Umayyad power base, it was in the nature of Syrian politics that what they were about was not merely a confrontation of asbrāf and state apparatus, but sharīfian control of this apparatus. The interregnum had brought tribal rivalry to a head in both Syria and Basra; but whereas the Basrans could only try to evade or reject the state, the Syrians by contrast fought for its possession under the leadership of their respective caliphal candidates. It is easy to see that in this respect Syria of A.D. 684 is a taste of the future. Equally, it is worth noting that the events had one effect of some importance for the future; that is, they generated the alignments which were to dominate the Marwānid period. Shortly after Marj Rāḥit a local feud broke out between the Qays and the Kalb in the region around Palmyra, and it was in the course of this feud that the Qudā’a under the leadership of the Kalb and with the encouragement of Khālid b. Yazīd b. Mu‘awiya changed their genealogy from Qudā’a b. Ma‘ād to Qudā’a b. Himyar. The tribal instability thus issued in a genealogical realignment: the confederacy of Ma‘ād was dissolved and its members absorbed by the Qaḥṭān. In future it was the Qaḥṭān, or in other words Yemen, who were to be poised against the Qays.

But in itself there was nothing futuristic about this civil war. A tribal conflict for the possession of the state apparatus was a hazard built into the Sufyānid system, not the result of its collapse, and whatever the undesirability of such a conflict, there was no reason why the system should not in due course be restored. On the one hand, the mixture of religious and political issues was purely adventitious. The Zubayrid utopia
was extrinsic, and indeed contrary to the ambitions of the Syrian *ashraf* who had not the slightest interest in handing over the state apparatus to the Hijāzī Quraysh, and the rumour which had it that Dahḥāk was seeking the caliphate on his own behalf is likely to have been right.\textsuperscript{258}

The interregnum might change the dynasty, but once the dynasty was there nobody in Syria displayed the slightest interest in the Zubayrid issue.\textsuperscript{259}

On the other hand, the agents of the war were still authentically tribal. Hassan b. Bahdal and his rivals were tribal chiefs who put their confederacies together with time-honoured genealogical glue, and though the civil war might change the alignments, the new alignments could serve as well as the old. The civil war changed many names, but substantially it left things as they were.
Yet if the Sufyanid system could still be made to work in 684, its foundations had of course long been subject to steady erosion, and by the Marwānid period the effects began to tell: out of the unitary tribe of the Sufyānids came the soldiers and civilians of the Marwānids.

The new armies can be seen emerging from the time of 'Abd al-Malik (685–705 [65–86]). They were not all of the same type. On the one hand, there was the Syrian field army which was based on the five districts of Palestine, Jordan, Damascus, Ḥims and Qinnasrin, and which provided garrisons for the entire empire and emergency troops wherever they might be required. And on the other hand, there were the local armies of which only those along the frontiers retained their importance. But field and frontier armies alike reveal a number of common features in terms of both composition and organization which suffice to establish the dislocation of military power from the tribal structures of conquest.

In terms of composition the dislocation is evident in two ways. In the first place, the manner of recruitment was now entirely voluntary enlistment. The unwieldiness of the old militia, difficult to mobilize and hard to keep in the field, appears to have been a problem already in the Sufyānid period, and by the time of Hajjāj the institution was defunct. Hajjāj accordingly recruited soldiers at the price of a horse, arms and three hundred dirhams for his new muqātila. Similarly, after the battle of the Pass in 731 [112f], Hishām ordered the governor of Khurasān to recruit at least fifteen thousand men while promising him reinforcements raised in Iraq. And in the course of the third civil war three new armies were raised: the thirty thousand volunteers recruited by Hāfs b. al-Walid in Egypt at the order of Yazīd III, the twenty odd thousand Jazīrans enrolled by Marwān II at Ḥarrān, and the armies of Abū Muslim in Khurasān.

In the second place, the domain of recruitment now embraced both Arabs and non-Arabs. There had of course always been non-Arabs in the
Evolution of the conquest society

Arab armies; but for one thing, the rarity of volunteers meant that in effect only prisoners-of-war were involved; and for another, the tribal organization of the early armies offered no facilities for the large-scale accommodation of non-tribal groups. The Persian Asāwira had had to turn themselves into a subtribe of Tamīm, while the prisoners-of-war were either placed in a regiment loosely attached to the person of their captor or else, as was more commonly the case, distributed among the soldiers as servants and batmen. But by the time of 'Abd al-Malik volunteers were sufficiently numerous and the tribe sufficiently eroded for non-Arabs to form a quarter or fifth of their own. Such units of mawālt, that is to say ethnic, social or religious renegades to the Arabs, appear in Syria under 'Abd al-Malik, in Iraq under Ḥajjāj, in Khurasan under Qutayba, and in Egypt under 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Marwān. There were also separate regiments of non-Arabs such as the Waddāḥiyya, named after its commander, a Berber freedman of 'Abd al-Malik, and the Qīqāniyya, a regiment of archers from Qīqān. Finally, there were the mutatawwī'īs, irregular volunteers for the duration of a single campaign in whom voluntary enlistment and non-Arab origin converge. Rarely paid and usually finding their reward in plunder, such volunteers are mentioned as early as the reign of Mu‘awiya, but again they reach significant proportions only under the Marwānids.

In terms of organization, the dislocation of military power from the tribal structures of conquest is evident in the disappearance of the smaller tribal groups accommodated in the quarters and fifths, and their replacement by regular regiments known as ajnūd. Every such jund was placed under a commander, a qa‘id, whose men or asbāb were certainly registered under him in the 'Abbasid period and perhaps before. Henceforth, the ra‘s al-qabīla was chosen from among the qa‘ids. As before, he commanded his qabīla in war and was responsible for its good behaviour in peacetime, but the archaic terminology notwithstanding, the qabīla was henceforth composed of regiments, not of tribal groups, and its leader was a general, not a tribal chief. The tribal pretensions of the Arab and non-Arab qabilas were equally false, and eventually of course they disappeared. The Khurasānī fifths are last heard of in 741 [123], and a few years later Abū Muslim's men are described as coming from four new quarters in Marw which appear to bear topographical names. By 775 [159] the fifths had also disappeared from Basra. Parallel evidence for the remaining provinces is absent, but it is scarcely hazardous to guess that by the end of the Umayyad and the beginning of the 'Abbāsid periods the last vestiges of the tribe had disappeared from the entire army organization.
It is, however, of some importance that the tribal nomenclature persisted as long as it did. Syria of 684 had changed only names: the substance was left as before. But the Marwānid evolution changed only substance: the names were left as before. In other words, where the Sufyānid system might have continued to work under the new labels, the Marwānid erosion displayed its effects under the obsolete labels of the Sufyānids.

With the dissociation of military and tribal structures the army became the instrument of control of the Arab and non-Arab population alike, the distinction between the two becoming increasingly effaced. Henceforth governors thus had to be chosen from among men who had the obedience of the army, that is generals rather than kinsmen, and the large number of subgovernorships would accordingly be distributed among men on whom the generals could rely, that is other generals rather than kinsmen and tribal chiefs. The net effect of the erosion of the tribal roots was thus to crack open the Sufyānid kinship state. In the metropolis the Quḍāʾī confederacy of the Sufyānids was replaced by the standing army of the Marwānids, while in the provinces the tribes under indirect rule were replaced by a civilian population under direct military control. And between metropolis and provinces the kinsmen to whom the state had owed its impermeability gave way to generals. Just as the Arabs had been their own colonial rulers, so also they inherited their own peculiar version of a post-colonial dilemma: colonial rulers usually go home, leaving the tribes with alien political roles; but in the Arab case the tribal roles disappeared, leaving the Arabs with alien rulers.

This transition is well illustrated by the governors of ʿAbd al-Malik. This ruler, after the successful termination of the second civil war, began by appointing his kinsmen entirely in the Sufyānid style; his departure from the old pattern is first discernible in the appointment of Muhallab b. Abī Ṣufra to Khurāsān. Muhallab is said to have been now a sharīf and now a mawla, and the ambiguity is instructive. On the one hand, he never held the riyaṣa, the leadership, of Azd in Basra, and he doubtless owed his appointment to the military ability he had demonstrated in his campaigns against the Azāriqa as well as to his long acquaintance with Khurāsān. It is thus difficult not to see in his appointment, as in that of Mūsā b. Nuṣayr to North Africa under Wālid I, a recognition of the fact that the empire could no longer be governed by manipulation of kinship ties, and it is not of course surprising that this recognition should have come first in a frontier province. But on the other hand, the reaction of Muhallab is typical in his attempt to assimilate to the old model. First, he encouraged the immigration of Azd so as to set himself up as a tribal
Evolution of the conquest society

Secondly, he tried to make himself out as a kinsman by forging affinal and symbolic kinship ties with the caliphal house: he married his daughter to Hajjaj and, like Mūsā b. Nuṣayr a few years later, he proclaimed a characteristically intimate loyalty to the ruling house in the naming of his sons. There is a similarly ambivalent pattern in the career of Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhili. But when Jarrah b. ‘Abdallāh al-Ḥakamī opened a long sequence of Syrian governors in Khurāsān, the generals ceased to disguise themselves.

We thus have a situation in which the tribal character of the Sufyānid army and the affinal character of the Sufyānid state have both given way to military politics. At this point one might have expected one of two things to happen: the dissolution of the conquest society might have issued in the effective disintegration of the unitary state on the pattern of Merovingian history; or it might have led to the attempt at an orderly reorganization of the state on the pattern of Visigothic history. But the actual character of Marwānid politics arises from the fact that neither happened. The unitary state continued, but as one in which access to office and its spoils was normatively and substantively disorderly.

The unitary state continued because two crucial variables held constant in the transition from Sufyānid to Marwānid rule: metropolitan government remained affinal in character, and provincial power remained monolithic in shape. In contrast to most barbarian rulers, the Marwānid caliph was no soldier. Syria therefore continued to be ruled very much as before by men chosen from among the kinsmen of the caliph and the ashrāf, and the Syrian troops who ruled a civilian population abroad found themselves subject to what had now become civilian rule at home. It was thus a basic feature of the Marwānid system that the head of state and the military were not competitors: the civilian caliph did not control the generals and the generals did not control the metropolis. Equally, in contrast with most barbarian rulers, the Marwānids vested immense provincial power in the hands of a tiny number of men. The top-governors continued to fill masses of subordinate offices and to handle huge fiscal resources. All competitors for office thus focused their attention on these men from whom all power flowed, and these men in turn fixed their attention on the caliph to whom they owed their appointment. Hence, it was also basic to the system that the struggle for power was centripetal. As long as both conditions held good, the unitary state would survive: the power structure invited provincial bids for the metropolis, not provincial bids for independence.

Had the caliphs become military men, or conversely had the generals
taken control of Syria at this point instead of in the third civil war, the metropolitan problem of keeping control of rebellious provinces would doubtless have resulted in both attempts at reorganization of the state and the danger of disintegration; in fact these were postponed until the advent of the 'Abbāsids. And in the mid-Umayyad period, as not in the 'Abbāsīd period, such a development might well have precluded the survival of Islamic civilization: had the pre-conquest polities resurfaced, the Arabs might still have Arabized the Middle East, but like the Germanic conquerors of the west, they would have left behind only barbarian kingdoms within the imperial civilizations.

It is, however, not altogether surprising that the dissolution of the Arab conquest society had a different sequel. Unlike Germanic or Central Asiatic kingship, the caliphal office was a priestly one closely associated morally, if no longer physically, with a sanctuary in the tribal homeland. And unlike Germanic and Central Asiatic conquerors, the Arabs had no compelling imperial tradition to confront in Syria. Indeed, the archaic character of the Marwānid metropolis in which a high priest without a sanctuary presided over a tribal society which no longer existed is one of the most striking testimonies to the strength of the Hagarene aegis on the one hand, and the extraordinary etiolation of imperial culture in Syria on the other. The Umayyad princes might be soldiers, and the caliph Hishām took a certain interest in imperial statecraft, but basically it took fifty years before an Umayyad prince and the Syrian troops decided to break the illusion.

The unitary state thus survived, but the reasons why it survived are also the reasons why access to office was disorderly. It was in the nature of provincial power that competition for office was highly centripetal: all the competitors were, so to speak, trying to crash the same gate. And it was in the nature of metropolitan rule that the caliphs could not regulate the competition. There are of course always many more competitors than there are spoils, but usually the authorities see to it that hurdles of one kind or another eliminate a sufficient number of candidates on the way. The unwritten rules of kinship and sharaf had had precisely this function under the Sufyānids, but these were now obsolete. Had the Marwānids been military men, they might have acknowledged unwritten rules of military valour; and had they been reformers, they might have devised a formal cursus honorum. But as civilians orientated towards a tribal past, they could not tell their generals how to select their men. And in the absence of both traditional and formal rules of allocation, competition for office necessarily took the form of factionalism.
The Marwanid faction is identified as such by the fact that the interests involved were not susceptible of rationalization. The parties were drawn from the same army and fought for the same spoils; they merely happened to be too many for the spoils available. Accordingly, they offered no programmes, demanded no reforms and laid no claim to the possession of truth until the faction came home to the metropolis as civil war: it is this failure to argue, as opposed to merely pour abuse, which is such a tell-tale indication of the nature of Marwanid 'asabiyya.'

The faction was articulated in a tribal language because the soldiers aligned themselves by the nearest criteria to hand, that is to say along the lines of their regimental units. These, as will be remembered, bore tribal names, and it was thus the archaic labels of the Sufyanid period which were bandied about as factional slogans. Since a soldier was assigned to his particular regiment on the strength of his tribal background, it is not surprising that tribal and factional membership virtually always coincide: a Kindi by tribe is a Kindi by regiment and a Kindi, that is to say a Yemeni, by factional affiliation. This does not of course mean that the loyalties were tribal, for the labels meant nothing to an Arab civilian, while conversely they meant much to a non-Arab soldier. But nor does it mean that the tribal language was wholly inert. The factional issues and the tribal language interacted in three major ways.

Firstly, in contrast to most factions that of the Marwanids was a response to a moral vacuum. Unlike, for example, the factions of Chinese gentry trying to manipulate the examination system, Qays and Yemen attempted to invent rather than to circumvent the rules, and to this extent they can scarcely be classified as corrupt. Intrinsically, the rules they invented were neither better nor worse than so many others tried out through the ages: Qaysi descent is presumably as good a ground on which to give a man a job as knowledge of the classics. But because they had been invented by the competitors as opposed to the authorities, they did not constitute an acceptable title to rule. Here the tribal vocabulary came alive, for it could supply not only the rules, but also the honour.
The Marwanid faction

a world in which the metropolis persisted in defining nobility as tribal, the soldiers scarcely had much choice but to see their generals as chiefs: their poetry may not be very pre-Islamic in style, but it leaves no doubt that they took their tribal pretensions seriously.

Secondly, in contrast to most factions that of the Marwanids was polar. This was clearly the result of the monolithic character of provincial power: just as there could not be a number of generals breaking away from Marwanid control, so there could not be a number of factions sharing the enjoyment of Marwanid power. But it meant that the tribal language was very convenient. The lines of polarization could of course have been invented, but since the Sufyanid confederacies had divided all the major tribes into two or at the most three groups, dividing lines with ancestral sanction already existed: Qays, Mudar or Nizar and Yemen have no pre-Islamic history, but the generals certainly saw their antagonism as the legacy of a venerable past.

Finally, it is the combination of regimental composition and tribal nomenclature which explains the extraordinary rigidity of the Marwanid factional lines. Just as confederacies are usually made up of changing tribal groups, so factions usually consist of changing coalitions; but the Marwanid factional groups were fixed as if ab aeterno precisely because the language was dead: being soldiers, the participants could no longer reshuffle their alignments in accordance with the tribal rules, but having adopted a tribal vocabulary they could not reshuffle in defiance of them either.

The role of the faction in Marwanid politics can be analysed at three levels. Firstly, it played a local role in cementing the teams competing for provincial power and fiscal resources. The faction pushed its leaders at the caliph for nomination, and rewarded its supporters with office and commands. It thus provided a simultaneous solution to the problems of the civilian caliph who was faced with a profusion of eligible generals, and those of the Syrian general who had to select his men from among masses of eligible soldiers.

In the governors of Iraq generals and faction can be seen to emerge together. The Marwanid period opens with Hajjaj b. Yusuf, a Syrian of Qays and affinal kinsman of the caliph who relied a great deal on his own family of Abû ‘Aqîl. To that extent he harks back to the Sufyanid kinship state, and it would certainly be absurd to claim that he favoured Qays or Mudar over Yemen. But as a pointer to the future he was also the man who introduced Syrian troops into Iraq. He was followed by Yazid b. al-Muhallab, an Iraqi of Azd/Yemen and the son of a general in disguise.
Evolution of the conquest society

who already showed a more marked inclination for men of his own regimental background when he could not rely on members of his own family; and as a pointer to the future he was also the man who introduced Syrian troops into Khurāsān. With 'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī, a Mesopotamian general of Qays, all the subgovernors whose tribal affiliation is known are of Qays and Muḍar; Khālid al-Qasrī, a Damascene of Bajila/Yemen, reversed the factional background, but kept it equally uniform; and Yūsuf b. ‘Umar, a relative of Ḥajjāj, dismissed all Khālid’s men to replace them with Qays and Muḍar in an elegant illustration of the demise of the kinship state. All Yūsuf’s men were dismissed in their turn by the Yamaniyya, the Yemeni following of Yazīd III on the outbreak of the third civil war.

High stakes kept the faction going. As before, governorship was a source of private enrichment, but now of course the competitors were no longer confined to a small circle of friends. As the governor increasingly relied on men of his own regimental background, the appointment of a top-governor came to mean the appointment of a faction whose members from the lowest subordinate at the bottom to the figure-head at the top all diverted part of the revenues into their own pockets. Dismissal of a sub-governor accordingly came to mean the dismissal of a faction whose successors had few inhibitions in the application of the post-dismissal treatment. This was clearly a vicious circle. The greater the threat of extortion on dismissal, the larger the amount of money embezzled and the harsher the treatment accorded on the inevitable fall. Failure to pay up was met by imprisonment and torture, often resulting in the death of the victim, while willingness to pay was also dangerous since it encouraged the belief that there was more to be had with the application of pressure. Hence Marwānid governors were rarely dismissed as much as seized and thrown into jail; hence also a change of governors was planned with the greatest secrecy and fears of revolt in the event of a leak; and when the secret did leak the men in office would usually consider either revolt or a contribution to the top figure so that he could buy himself a renewal of tenure or at least immunity from torture. The faction in power was thus cemented both by its profits and its fears, just as the men outside were united by their aspiration to replace it.

Secondly, the faction played a medial role in linking up the metropolitan and the provincial armies. It was the ubiquitous Syrian troops who had generated the faction in their scramble for provincial spoils, but to the extent that local men continued to be eligible for office they were inevitably split by factions of their own. In Iraq, where the local army was of negligible importance, the local faction is likely to have been a simple
product of the Syrian presence, but in Khurāsān or Spain where the armies were power structures of their own they were doubtless of autonomous origin. Here, however, the local and the Syrian faction had to relate, and the tribal vocabulary provided a universally intelligible guide to the alignments. Throughout the Marwānid empire the soldiers were thus united by their participation in a faction which had everybody turn his attention to the centre, and though by origin the faction was the price that had to be paid for the continuance of the unitary state, it certainly paid off by contributing to that continuance. It is a striking fact that whereas the ‘Abbāsids were peripatetic, it took civil war to make the Umayyads budge from Syria.

Thirdly, the faction played a central role by providing the categories for the conduct of metropolitan civil war. The faction was not, of course, a metropolitan phenomenon as such. Just as Syria escaped the direct rule of the Syrian troops, so also it escaped the factional competition for its resources; and for all that Qays and Yemen loathed each others’ sight abroad, they lived peacefully enough at home. But the faction was clearly capable of becoming a metropolitan phenomenon. If the instability of high politics could generate a conflict between confederacies in the days when Umayyad power was based on tribes, it could similarly generate a conflict between factions when the tribes had been replaced by troops; and it is precisely this point which is illustrated in Yazid b. al-Muhallab’s flight from Ḥajjāj’s instruments of torture in Iraq to Sulaymān b. ‘Abd al-Malik’s succession quarrel in Syria. Back in the metropolis, however, the faction could not remain a faction. High politics meant civil war; and it was then that the factional slogans assumed the nature of political programmes: the Yamāniyya of Yazid III and the Qaysiyya of Marwān II consisted of the same soldiers who had fought each other for provincial office and spoils in Iraq; but back in Syria they fought for the possession of the state apparatus.
In Syria of A.D. 744 the Marwānid evolution came full circle. Once again the Syrians were lined up under their respective caliphal candidates in a conflict for the possession of the state. But whereas the second civil war had been fought for the maintenance of the Sufyānid order, the third civil war by contrast was enacted for its final destruction.

In the first place, the agents had drastically changed. The leaders of the third civil war were generals. Yazīd III's Yamaniyya had served in North Africa, Iraq, Armenia, Khurāsān, and Sind at various times before the revolt, while Marwān II's Qaysiyya were frontier troops, and it was only such soldiers who responded to the factional slogans. But the victims of the civil war were asbrāf. With a few exceptions the Sufyānid aristocracy supplied no sons to the generals of 744, and the few that one does find among them are indistinguishable from their fellow soldiers in terms of careers and interests. The sons of the asbrāf of Jābiya appeared as the opponents of Yazīd. In contrast to the Yamaniyya they were purely local figures. They had no careers in the far-flung provinces of the empire, but they were greatly respected at home where they commanded the loyalty of the city or district populace, coming forth as its leaders in a legitimist revolt on behalf of the sons of Walīd. But militarily they were no match for the generals, and it was no longer they who elected the caliph. Inside the army the difference between sharīf and general had been effaced; outside the army even the Syrian asbrāf had now lost out to the generals.

In the second place, the political centre of gravity had changed. Many of Yazīd's supporters shared a connection with Iraq, either their fathers and/or they themselves having been stationed there in the past; their first act after the murder of Walīd was to send Syrians to Iraq, where they counted on and with few exceptions received the allegiance of the local Syrians, and it was in Iraq that the last battles between the Yamaniyya and the Qaysiyya were fought. This Iraqi orientation is of interest in two ways. Looking forward, it heralds the end of the Syrian metropolis. Since Syria owed its metropolitan status exclusively to its
peculiar tribal composition, the decay of the tribal roots which had swept away the *asbāf* at the same time eliminated the one ground for keeping the capital where it was. The *Yamaniyya* did not of course abolish their own metropolitan standing and even Marwān went no further than Harrān. But it was with Iraqi resources that the Yemenis reduced Syria to military rule, and so it was largely a question of time until Iraq would reduce it to a province.

Looking back, the Iraqi connection provides the clue to the transition from faction fighting to civil war. The Syrians stationed in Iraq since the time of Ḥajjāj had been drawn wholly or largely from the southern districts of Syria which, unlike the northern ones, had no frontier to defend; and as it happened, the southern districts were overwhelmingly Yemeni in composition while the northern ones were overwhelmingly of Qays. This coincidence meant that the faction was open to contamination by political issues, for if initially Qays and Yemen were simply so many rival generals, their relationship to the key province of Iraq increasingly differentiated them into two discrete military units, the Syrian field army and the Syro-Mesopotamian frontier troops. The question thus arose which of the two was to inherit the status of imperial troops. For the Yemenis who had acquired families and struck roots in Iraq there was no doubt that they possessed the title-deeds to provincial control; and yet in practice they tended to be excluded by the Qaysis, not only in the eastern provinces, but also in Iraq itself, where the insecurity of their hold on the province was demonstrated on two humiliating occasions: in 720 [101] the revolt of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab brought Maslama to Iraq with an army of Syro-Jazīrans who stayed on to take the governorships under Ibn Hubayra; and, more bitterly, in 738 [120] the dismissal of Khalid al-Qasri meant the end of fifteen celebrated years of Yemeni control. It was against the background of this second loss that the Yemenis prepared their take-over of the metropolis in 744.

That the factional slogans could serve to conceptualize the interests of two rival armies was thus accidental; certainly far more so than the use of tribal labels in the faction itself. But that this was indeed how they served is suggested by two exceptional cases. The first is that of the odd men out. Inevitably, the coincidence of tribal and military membership was imperfect: there were Qaysis in the south just as there were Yemenis in the north. In the faction fighting such men would side with the party to which their genealogy assigned them, but in the civil war significant exceptions begin to appear. Not all of these are amenable to explanation, but with some it is clear that we have to do with men siding with the party to which they belong by career: in the civil war, as not before, a Jordanian
Qaysī would fight with the Yamaniyya. The second case is that of Khurāsān. It was in the nature of the faction that the Yemenis of Khurāsān would identify with the Yemenis of Syria, and the ‘Abbāsid missionaries did their best to play on their Yemeni discontent; yet the ‘Abbāsid revolution was no Yemeni revolution: in Khurāsān the factional differences failed to coincide with any material ones, so here the recruitment for the take-over of the metropolis had to be cross-factional.

Finally, the relationship between religion and politics had changed. In 744 as in 684 the agents of the civil war were up against a dissociation of sanctity and power, but whereas in the second civil war the mixture of religious and political issues had been adventitious, in the third civil war it was intrinsic: the Yamaniyya based their action on a Ghaylānī doctrine of the imamate. In 684 the dissociation had not yet been strongly felt; for all that Mu‘āwiya did not return to the Prophet’s seat, he still presided over a tribal society which made sufficient sense of his rule to deprive Ibn al-Zubayr’s utopia of its persuasiveness in the Syrian metropolis, or even in Iraq. But by 744 it was the tribal character of Umayyad society that failed to carry conviction, so that even for the Syrians the Umayyad caliphate was now in need of redefinition. It is well worth noting, however, that the Syrian generals could very easily have avoided the task of providing such a redefinition. A discreet coup behind the scenes would have enabled them to dispense with religious issues; it would almost certainly have spared them the confrontation with Marwān; their material interests would have been equally well served; and there was even a precedent for a majordomus in Dahhāk b. Qays. But the Yemenis still saw the murder of the impious Walīd as the first item on their religio-political agenda: they did not merely want power, they wanted to put power right. Had the Muslims been content simply to legitimate power after the fashion of the Franks, the archaic caliphate might well have continued as cosmetics for a Yemeni sultanate. But power in Islam had to be intrinsically sacred: it was only when power and sanctity no longer could be kept together that the Muslims had to make do with an illusion. Yazīd’s Yamaniyya and Marwān’s Qaysiyya were the same sort of generals; but because Marwān was both a legitimist on behalf of the civilian Walīd and a general who assumed caliphal power, he could make no sense of his rule, and few names are so suggestive of ugly power-politics as his. By contrast, the Yamaniyya who killed a caliph so that military power might be sanctified have come down to posterity with an unmistakable aura of righteousness.
UMAYYAD CLIENTAGE

We may now reverse the perspective and look at the evolution of the conquest society from the point of view of the non-Arab convert. The non-Arab converts were the representatives of the two empires which the Arabs had respectively truncated and destroyed, and in the Marwānid period such converts were becoming increasingly numerous. Yet they signally failed to direct the political evolution of their conquerors: just as the Arab conquerors contrived to keep up their fixation on the tribal past, so the non-Arab converts remained in the position of mere clients to the Arab tribes.

Clientage among the Arabs was known as *walā*¹, a term which also designated the patronate. It always bound two individuals, both known as *mawālī*, but never groups.³⁴⁹ And it arose on either manumission or voluntary commendation, the latter being known as *tibā'a*, *luzām*, *inqitā', khidma*, or generically as *muwālāt*. The clientage which arose on conversion can readily be seen as a special form of voluntary clientage. *Walā* was in all likelihood a *Fortleben* of Roman clientage, the Arabs having borrowed it from their subjects with their usual lack of acknowledgement,³⁵⁶ and to that extent it is comparable with Frankish ties of dependence. But whereas in Gaul Roman clientage fused with a Germanic political tradition and operated in a context of disintegrating state structures, in the Middle East it fused with a Judaic tradition and operated in the context of a fully bureaucratic state.

Throughout the Umayyad period *walā* was the only mechanism for the attachment of newcomers to the conquest society. Being adherents of an ethnic faith the Arabs were not always willing to share their God with gentile converts,³⁵⁷ and being conquerors they were usually unwilling to share their glory with defeated enemies - both problems to which clientage provided an apt solution. Clients were freely accepted without conversion,³⁵⁸ but no converts were allowed to escape the humiliation of *walā*, the newcomers to the faith being attached to the person 'at whose hands' they had converted.³⁵⁹ This use of the tie is at the same time a striking example of the imperviousness to native values which the fusion of tribalism and monotheism had created and one of the most important
mechanisms whereby the imperviousness was maintained. The newcomer automatically renounced his position in the pre-conquest polity, and an Iranian noble would find himself rubbing shoulders in the clients' rank with the peasants whom his ancestors had ruled. The institution thus operated to distance the conquerors from the pre-conquest polity and its cultural values, not to merge them in it as it did among the Franks.

Even so, the clients might well have got a better grip on the development of Arab society if they had been recruited predominantly from among the free members of the pre-conquest elite, in particular the Persian aristocracy. There were of course members of the elite who defected to the Arabs, and even some who defected to the Arab God, notably in Syria though the converts also included a scatter of dibgāns; and as was to be expected they placed their legacy at the disposal of the conquerors: the resurfacing of clientage is in itself an example. But it would require considerable imagination to see these converts as being at all near determining the actual direction of the Marwānid evolution. In part their feebleness reflects the fact that the position of client is a disadvantageous one from which to negotiate syncretic deals, but it also reflects the fact that the Syrians had little direction to offer: had the Iranian aristocracy converted in large numbers, the Marwānid evolution would certainly have taken a very different course. But the nature of the Arab conquest was such that aristocratic renegades by choice were few and far between.

The overwhelming majority of converts in the Sufyānid and very likely also the Marwānid periods were prisoners-of-war who had been enslaved and were subsequently manumitted. The number of prisoners-of-war which the Arabs took in the course of their conquest was staggering, and enslavement hit all social, ethnic and religious groups in the Middle East. For their future role, however, the provenance of the slaves scarcely mattered: dispersed among the conquerors and employed for the most part as domestic servants, they all rapidly adopted the norms and values of their masters, while at the same time they and their descendants continued to be despised by the freeborn members of their masters' society. To the extent that they supplied a disproportionate number of scholars, scribes, tutors and poets active in the late Umayyad and early 'Abbāsid periods, their role in Arab society is comparable to that of the Oriental slaves in republican Rome. But their contribution was shaped overwhelmingly by Arab values, not by their native ones. Whereas the Romans, being no monotheists, had happily let their slaves and freedmen teach them Hellenistic culture and Oriental cults, the Arabs by contrast made theirs operate wholly within the political and cultural directives furnished by their own religious aegis. Without doubt the freedmen of the Arabs contri-
buted far more to the civilization of their masters than had their ancestors to that of Rome; but they were in far less of a position to change its overall character.

In the Marwānid period the converts began to enter willingly, but if before they had been slaves, now they were overwhelmingly fugitive peasants. The predominance of this type of convert in the Marwānid period has to be seen against the background of the fact that the Arabs, particularly those in Iraq, continued to be concentrated in the garrison cities after the collapse of the tribal order had led to their demilitarization. The continuing urban character of Arab settlement in Iraq may to some extent reflect the fact that the ex-tribesmen still saw themselves as settlers in an alien land, but more particularly it resulted from the circumstance that the countryside was beyond their control in the crucial period of transition: whatever their wishes, they were in no position to make the alien land their own. Under the Sufyānids the *dīhqāns*, protected by a state for which they acted as tax-collectors, enjoyed an autonomy which effectively made the countryside theirs, and which enabled them to resist inundation by prospective Arab landowners as effectively as they did conversion. Hajjāj put an end to their autonomy, placing the countryside under the direct control of *maulf* tax-collectors about the same time as he made over the Iraqi cities to the Syrian troops: it was not for nothing that he suspected the *dīhqāns* of having sympathized with the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath and the *asbrāf* But it was the state, not the Iraqis, that benefited from this change; and insofar as land passed into Arab hands in the course of it, it was the caliph, his family and governors who acquired it, only a fraction passing into the ownership of the ex-tribesmen. On the one hand, then, the Marwānid period saw the formation of the so-called Muslim bourgeoisie. The ex-tribesmen became shopkeepers, craftsmen and merchants, and the *Sharī'a* which they wrote is accordingly marked by a high regard for mercantile activities which landed nobilities usually despise: that of Sasanid Persia was no exception. On the other hand, the Marwānid governors could subject the countryside to bureaucratic rule with merciless efficiency. Being wholly out of sympathy with the lifestyle of a landed aristocracy both by origin and by evolution, they everywhere eliminated privileged estates, fiscal exemptions and other intervening structures as relentlessly as they did in Iraq. Because the countryside was thus denuded of its protective network, flight from the land replaced the traditional search for a rural patron as the primary mode of tax-evasion. And since power, protection and fiscal exemption were now concentrated in the cities, rural communities found it increasingly hard to withstand their attractions.
Evolution of the conquest society

The peasant flights which bedevilled the Umayyad governors did not always go in the direction of the cities; a great many went to monasteries and districts in which the peasants were not registered; and wherever they went, it was the departure from the land which caused the relief to the peasants and the loss to the authorities who invariably reacted with ruthless determination to make up for their losses. To that extent there was no difference between the escape routes. But unlike the rural refugee, the peasant who went to the city went straight into the lion’s den, and here conversion was a *sine qua non* for survival. It was, however, not enough for survival. The typical fate of those who chose this course is described in a stereotype episode which recurs at various times and places in the chronicles, in which a tax-collector writes to a governor that the *dhimmis* have flocked to Islam and that the taxes are in arrears; somebody thereupon points out that they have only converted to escape their taxes, and the governor accordingly takes action by rounding up the fugitives in the city concerned, sending them back to their land and reimposing their taxes. The chronicles scarcely envisage any other type of convert. Whatever the truth of each particular episode, posterity clearly remembered the Marwânid converts as fugitive peasants for whom conversion was a standard but unsuccessful means of tax-evasion.

How then did they survive? The answer is by finding a patron: it was the acquisition of an Arab protector that made the conversion socially effective. There were clearly some who managed to find such a patron among civilians. By way of example we have the success story of Māhān, the father of Ibrāhīm al-Mawsīlī. He is described as a *dibqān* from Arrajān in Fars who fled from the fiscal tyranny of the Umayyad tax-collectors to settle in Kufa. Here he became the client of the B. Nadla b. Nu‘aym, presumably by conversion ‘at their hands’, took a wife from the family of another fugitive *dibqān* and, when he had a son, reinforced the tie between himself and his patrons by fostering. Māhān being the client of a Tāmīmī *sharif*, the sources either did not recollect or else did not see fit to provide him with a history of continued fiscal martyrdom.

By far the majority of the runaways, however, concentrated their efforts on entering the army. In a variant on the stereotype *mawla* episode it is the good caliph rather than the bad governor who takes action, and he does so, not by sending the fugitives back, but by granting them tax-relief and enrolling them in the army. It is clearly not the case that non-Arabs as such were excluded from the army; equally, when we are told that ‘twenty thousand *mawāli* fought in the army without pay or rations’ we are not to take it that the Arabs enrolled the non-Arabs, but in a niggardly fashion refused them pay. What these stories say is that peasants
were excluded. Admission to the army transformed a tax-payer into a tax-recipient, a fact vividly illustrated in the papyri of Qurra b. Sharīk with their monotonous demands for money and produce from the *ahl al-ard* for distribution among the *ahl al-arqāq*, and it is not surprising that the authorities should have been bent on keeping the *ahl al-ard* quite literally in their place. Provided that they paid their taxes, however, the peasants were perfectly free to work out their fascination with the army as *mutatawwara*, unpaid and/or irregular volunteers, and it is clearly as such that the twenty thousand *mawali* have to be identified. No less than thirty thousand *mutatawwara* are said to have participated in Maslama’s expedition to Constantinople, and they appear in unspecified numbers in the armies of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab in the extreme east as well as in those of Muṣa b. Nuṣayr in the extreme west.\(^{388}\)

Needless to say, not all of these volunteers were necessarily peasants on the look-out for a military haven, but a great many are likely to have been, and whatever ‘Umar II’s action in the matter, it was not usually a caliph who would let them in. About the time that peasants begin to congregate in the ranks of the volunteers, private retainers also begin to cluster around the generals. These retainers are not to be confused with the personal servants of the soldiers; such servants, of course, continued to be found in the Marwānid armies,\(^{389}\) but they are quite distinct from the armed retinues which now appear.\(^{390}\) Most of them are mentioned in the third civil war, by which time they were clearly an institution of some standing;\(^{391}\) and though as a rule they appear to have been quite modest in size,\(^{392}\) some, like the famous *Dhakwāniyya* of Sulaymān b. Hishām, consisted of several thousand men.\(^{393}\) Some of these retainers were freed-men;\(^{394}\) and some were even slaves;\(^{395}\) but it is hard not to see in the majority of them the peasants from the ranks of the volunteers. And how such a peasant might be picked up from there is precisely what we are told in Naṣr b. Sayyār’s harangue to his client Yūnūs:\(^{396}\) ‘You, Yūnūs b. ‘Abd Rabbih, are one of those who wished to escape the burden of supplying provisions to Marw, and you and your family were among those whose necks Asad b. ‘Abdallāh wished to seal in order to put you in the infantry; but I gave you appointments and I favoured you...’ Yūnūs and his family, in other words, were runaway peasants whom one governor would treat as such by sealing their necks and relegating them to the ignominious and presumably unpaid peasants’ infantry; and here another would pick them out for positions of trust.\(^{397}\) It was without doubt this latter kind of patron most of the converts hoped to acquire,\(^{398}\) and Naṣr’s action was certainly not the only one of its kind. Already in 696f [77] Bukayr b. Wishāḥ had been told that he only needed to promise converts
Evolution of the conquest society

remission of their taxes to collect a superbly obedient army, and according to Christian sources it was precisely in this way that Hafs b. al-Walid, the governor of Egypt, obtained his semi-private army consisting of some twenty or twenty thousand renegades and other troops.

The appearance of such retinues is not in itself a phenomenon of major interest. Soldiers are generally inclined to collect them, and the Marwānid caliphs were particularly badly placed to object: there are no measures against *mawālī tībā‘a* to compare with the Byzantine legislation against *Bucellarii.* The governor-general was virtually at liberty to choose between taxes and retainers, and in civil war he evidently opted for retainers.

But both the predominance and the fate of the peasant converts provide a striking illustration of the manner in which the Arab possession of both truth and power kept the pre-conquest polities at bay. Possessing both, the Arabs were sufficient unto themselves, and their relations with their subjects were almost exclusively fiscal. The non-Arabs were rarely asked or forced to convert; on the whole they were dissuaded. They simply had to pay for the upkeep of those who had defeated them, preferably in a manner which emphasized their twin humiliation of non-Arab ethnicity and unbelief. Now the landed aristocracy of Iraq and the Iranian plateau on the whole could afford the price and bear the humiliation, shielding themselves on their estates. But their peasants, for all that they might have borne the humiliation, could not afford the price, and in the Arab, unlike the Hellenistic, Middle East it was thus the peasants who went to live in the cities. Where the Greeks had siphoned off the local elites but left the rural masses virtually untouched, the Arabs by contrast siphoned off the masses from underneath the elite and mopped up the elite when in due course its position had collapsed.

It was thus those least qualified to represent the Persian polity that the Arabs had to deal with in the crucial period in which their tribal ties dissolved. Moreover, these sorry representatives arrived as fugitives, illegal immigrants dependent on the elusive patronage of Arab generals and other individuals with access to power for their precarious foothold in a society which looked with mixed feelings at the prospect of *dhimmīs* wishing to save their souls. The crowds of peasants hammering at the doors of an Arab Heaven were hardly in a better position to retain or pass on what legacy they might possess than were those who had been dragged to Paradise in chains. When the rural masses of the Hellenistic Middle East had acquired Christian voices, there was no lack of chauvinism in what they spoke: their heritage had been deeply eroded, but at least they were no Greeks. But the masses who flocked to Islam in the century of Umayyad rule simply became Arab Muslims.
The Arabs, in other words, uprooted their subjects by enslavement in the course of their conquest, and by taxation in the course of their administration, subjecting those whom they had thus uprooted to the indignity of clientage. The role of shaping the political and cultural evolution of the conquerors thus fell almost exclusively on the members of the bureaucracy who for all their clientage were the only non-Arabs to combine native learning with a position of power in the Arab state. And since it was not until the capital was moved to Iraq that the Arabs were exposed to bureaucrats with a strong commitment to the order of the past, the imagination of the Umayyad rulers continued to be exercised more strongly by the tribal rather than the native after-image.

There is another way of demonstrating the same point. In the Marwānid period ties of dependence began to develop even among the Arabs themselves. Thus next to the *mawla* retinue we find the *qawm*, a term which had once denoted a man's tribal following, but which now came to be used of a general's personal recruits, usually from within his own tribal group. For all that the recruits were private dependents, the institution was tolerated or even encouraged, and some of these retinues appear to have been comparable with the *Dhakwāniyya* in size. If Hafs b. al-Walid’s recruits in Egypt were a giant *mawla* retinue, Marwān II’s recruits in the Jazīra can be seen as a giant *qawm*.

Within the *qawm* there were plain retainers and more distinguished ones, *āshāb* or companions, who were the general’s most trusted men. How such a companion might be acquired is graphically told in the story of Ziyād b. ‘Ubaydallāh al-Ḥarithi and Khālid al-Qasri. Ziyād, who has just enrolled in the Damascene army, meets Khālid, who has just received his appointment to Iraq. After having assured himself that Ziyād is a Yemeni, Khālid invites him to Iraq. He also asks him to inform his companions, who are waiting for news at the camp, of his appointment, instructing him to ask for remuneration. On hearing the news Khālid’s companions go mad with joy and shower Ziyād with gifts, a taste of what he might get in Iraq. Ziyād is then in a quandary until his ‘ārif, the army official in charge of payment, undertakes to draw his pay in his absence on the understanding that he may keep it for himself if Ziyād’s venture should turn out to be a success. It did. By the time he was back from his first meeting with Khalīd in Iraq he had received six hundred dinars worth of gold, silver and other commodities, and he was subsequently appointed to the *shurta*. As Naṣr picked Yūnus from the infantry, so Khalīd picked Ziyād from the rank and file. There is yet another story to illustrate the ideal relationship between the governor and his companions. The scene is once more Yemeni and it is now ‘Abdallāh b.
Evolution of the conquest society

‘Umar who takes the role of governor. He has just sat down to eat in the company of his generals, scribes and other servants in Hira when he receives the message that the rebel Ibn Mu‘awiya is approaching. Having paused for a moment, he unperturbedly gives the sign for the cook to serve, and though everybody is in tremors of fear, he does not bat an eyelid. Having finished his meal, he has gold, silver and other valuables brought out for distribution among his companions. Only then does he set out for battle, and though the place is now swarming with Ibn Mu‘awiya’s men he wins.

It is not, of course, particularly remarkable that Ibn ‘Umar should be depicted here as a paradigm of military valour. These were clearly stories told of soldiers for soldiers, and apart from the name of the faction to which the heroes belong, there is not the slightest trace of tribal notions, nor, despite Ibn ‘Umar’s pious ancestry, of religious ones. But there is an undeniable whiff here of the private lord in the Anglo-Saxon or Scandinavian style, the warlord and gold-giver whose followers would faithfully repay him in battle and avenge his death. Considering that Khalid and Ibn ‘Umar were generals of a public army whose gold had been raised by an orderly bureaucracy, the virtues they exemplify would seem peculiarly out of place. They reappear, nonetheless, in the accounts of Abū Muslim and his men, among whom companionship and clientage almost converged. Himself a mawla, Abū Muslim was the lord of Arab and non-Arab companions who held him dearer than the world and the hereafter; they were a constant menace to Mansūr when he planned the elimination of their master; and they honoured the obligation to avenge his death, at least in Khurasan. And the men who had accompanied him to Iraq and allowed themselves to be dispersed by a combination of threats and bribes were well aware of their infamous conduct, as is clear from their penitential *bī nā mawlānā bī l-darabim*, ‘we have sold our lord for silver’.

Despite the tendency towards convergence attested in Khurasan, companionship and clientage never did fuse, nor was that really to be expected. Clientage was about affiliation of the weak and the despised. Clients were non-Arabs, and non-Arabs were *‘abīd* and *‘alāj*, slaves and peasants. The tie was far too thoroughly associated with them ever to lose its social stigma, and though emotive loyalties towards the patron are very much in evidence among the clients, reciprocal attitudes among the patrons are thinly exemplified. The occasional client who rose to honour did so not as a client, but as a kinsman, the kinship having been created by fosterage or by the widespread custom of naming one’s children after the patron. There was no such thing as an Arab *mawlā*.
but with a bit of good-will a mawla might be seen as almost an Arab.\textsuperscript{423}

Companionship, by contrast, was about providing honour for a post-tribal military, and it is this phenomenon which is interesting. Transitions from tribal to private ties are of course commonplace, but not usually in the presence of a fully-fledged state: vassals appeared among the Franks in the context of crumbling state structures, nökös among the Mongols in the context of nascent ones, but the post-tribal Mongols in China simply became a Chinese-style gentry.\textsuperscript{424} The post-tribal Arabs, however, did not become an Iranian-style aristocracy. The peculiarity of the Arab case lies in the fact that unlike the post-tribal conquerors of China they did not inherit any political roles from their subjects, and unlike the post-colonial subjects of the Europeans they could not inherit any from the conquerors. As the tribal illusion wore off, the soldiers thus found themselves in an undisguised moral vacuum. Because the metropolis remained committed to the ashräf of the past, the soldiers were given public power without the corresponding public honour: the Marwānid generals never became an aristocracy at all. It was this vacuum that the ideals of private lordship filled; in a world in which tribal honour belonged to the past and military honour to the future, the soldiers had no choice but to see the generals as their private lords and masters.\textsuperscript{425} The Arabs and the Franks are thus obverse cases. The Franks had all the will to set themselves up as a Gallo-Roman aristocracy, but the material collapse of Gaul was such that they could not. The Arabs by contrast had all the material capacity to set themselves up as an Iranian or for that matter a Greek nobility, but their moral distance from the conquered polities was such that they would not. To the extent that clientage was one of the chief mechanisms whereby this distance was maintained, clientage and companionship are in a curious way two sides of the same coin.
PART III

THE FAILURE OF THE ISLAMIC EMPIRE
With the closure of the third civil war the reorganization of the conquest society could no longer be postponed. On the one hand, the common past had receded beyond the point where it could offset the drastic changes accompanying the rise of the new dynasty. In particular, the new dynasty drew its soldiers from Khurāsān, a highly distinctive frontier province in which Iranian civilization enjoyed a unique Fortleben in Islam, so that the revolution could not fail to be ominously reminiscent of a Persian reconquest. For all their illegitimacy the Syrian soldiers had at least been Arabs who never stooped to speaking Syriac, but it was no secret that the Khurāsānīs did speak Persian. Hence it was only too easy to believe that the ‘Abbasids had ordered the extermination of the Arabs in Khurāsān, and there was widespread fear that the conquerors would now have to endure the humiliation of being ruled by their own clients.

With the loss of the common past the idea of secession was likely to suggest itself. Not that it came easily: despite the massacre of his relatives, the Umayyad refugee in Spain acknowledged ‘Abbasid overlordship until as late as 757 [139]. But when Spain eventually did secede, the precedent had been set.

On the other hand, the factional ties had snapped. The civil war had turned the caliphs into military men in command of their own generals; and what is more, the transfer of the capital to Iraq eliminated the vital provincial spoils: henceforth there were governors of Basra and Kufa, but not of Iraq, let alone of the entire east. The faction thus disappeared all but overnight from the metropolitan army, and insofar as it survived, it did so as a purely local phenomenon which the governors would henceforth try to suppress, not one to which they would relate. In view of the distinctive character of Khurāsān this was no mean loss. There was of course no question of moving the capital there: Khurāsān was the dār al-bijra not the umm al-qurā of the revolution, and the western provinces would scarcely have accepted it as anything else. But conversely, having staged the revolution, Khurāsān was unlikely to submit willingly to the hegemony of a culturally alien Iraq. It was thus vital for the
Failure of the Islamic empire

‘Abbāsids to find a way of integrating Khurāsān into the Islamic empire: were they to fail, the eastern frontier would go the way of Spain.

The main features of the ‘Abbāsids reorganization are well known. The bureaucracy was hugely expanded, fiscal and military governorships began to be separated, and an elaborate espionage system was set up to facilitate central control. The basic problem of the ‘Abbāsids, however, was not the fairly simple one of creating the machinery required for imperial rule, but rather that of giving meaning to such rule. They urgently needed a political rationale.

The difficulties involved in the creation of such a rationale were determined by the fact that the Marwānids had contrived to do without one for so long. In the 690s Islamic civilization hardly existed, and had the Marwānids undertaken a reorganization of the conquest society then, they would of necessity have had to seek their rationale for it in the political traditions of their non-Muslim subjects. But by the 750s Islamic civilization did exist, and whatever political rationale the ‘Abbāsids might attempt to create, it was clear that it was within Islam that they would have to find it. There was of course nothing to prevent them from seeking inspiration in the imperial tradition of the Middle East, that of the Sāsānids, and given the prominence of this tradition in Iraq it is not surprising that they did: the increasingly inaccessible monarch, the complex court etiquette, and the appearance of the chief qādī are well-known examples of the ‘Abbāsids attempt to reshape Islamic government according to the Persian model. But since the moral identity of the empire was to be Islamic, a direct revival of the Sāsānid tradition was ruled out. What the ‘Abbāsids had to do was thus to fuse the Sāsānids tradition with Islam.

By the 750s, however, Islam had already acquired its classical shape as an all-embracing holy law characterized by a profound hostility to settled states. The Shari‘a was created by men who had exchanged a tribal past for a commercial present in the demilitarized cities of Iraq, outside imperial Iran and in opposition to caliphal Syria. Its political ideal can be seen as the intellectual counterpart to the military faction, that is as the price which the Muslims paid for the continuance of the Umayyad state beyond the point where the tribal ties had disappeared. The ‘ulamā‘, as also the generals, found that power had lost its Sufyānid meaning, and both in their different ways tried to rediscover it in the Arabian past. But the generals, for all that they operated in a moral vacuum, were the representatives of power, whereas the ‘ulamā‘ were merely the subjects of it, so that unlike the Syrians, whom they saw as their oppressors, they were deeply alienated from the existing regime; and their alienation went into the Shari‘a they
elaborated. Where the generals merely exploited the tribal language of their faction, the ‘ulama’ defined God’s law as *haqq al-arab*, the law of the Arabs, just as they identified his language as the *lisan al-arab*, the normative language of the bedouin, the consensus being that where God had not explicitly modified tribal law, he had endorsed it. The result was a tribal vision of sacred politics. The simple state of the Prophet and the *shaykhayn*, the first two caliphs in Medina, was held up as the ideal from which the Umayyads had deviated, the accumulation of secular and religious power alike being condemned as a presumptuous encroachment upon the omnipotence of God. Kings were rejected as Pharaohs and priests as golden calfs, while God’s community was envisaged as an egalitarian one unencumbered by profane or religious structures of power below the caliph, who was himself assigned the duty of minimal government.

The *Shari’a* caught the ‘Abbasids in an insoluble dilemma. To the extent that it was the core of Islam, an Islamic empire must of necessity represent the norms embodied in it; yet were the ‘Abbasids to abide by its norms, an Islamic empire could not be created: it was as if Charlemagne had been asked not to revive the Roman imperial tradition, but to fuse it with a divinely sanctioned Salian law. Had the ‘ulama’ been content to desanctify power, they could have rendered unto Caesar what was Caesar’s, but the very fact that politics are covered by the law testifies to its continuing sanctity. Where the Christians had left power alone, the ‘ulama’ gave it minimal definition, and they did so with a wealth of casuistic detail which bound the caliph hand and foot; so that where the Christians might see imperial power as vain, the Muslims saw it as illegitimate in the most literal sense of the word.

Effectively, the ‘ulama’ had thus made up their minds against settled states for good, a point which can also be made in another way. Political alienation was a feature of Iraqi society at large in the late Umayyad period: Sunnis, Kharijites and Shi’ites, not excluding the lunatic fringe of Gnostic *ghulat*, were at one in their rejection of the Syrian state. But it was only the Zaydis and the *ghulat* who engaged in ill-planned revolts against the Syrian troops or terrorism, and only the Kharijites and the ‘Abbasids who sent out missionaries to raise troops outside Iraq for a future revolution. The Sunnis refused to act. Outside Iraq we have revolts by soldiers who, for all that they had power, wanted a different type of state, witness the *Yamaniyya* in Syria and Ḥārith b. Surayj in Khurāsān. The religious persuasions of these men were neither Shi’ite nor Kharijite, but nor were they Sunni in the strict sense of the word, inasmuch as the creeds came from the theologians, not from the traditionists. The Sunni traditionists neither rebelled nor inspired others to rebel:
being a Sunni meant being a quietist. The ‘Abbāsids staged their revolution because they wished to make a difference, and yet it was already a basic feature of the Sunni outlook before the revolution that it would not make much difference whoever won the state; where the ‘Abbāsids wished to be redeemers, the Sunnis had come to terms with their exilic situation.

The intractable Sunni ‘ulama’ were of course not all there was to Islam in the 750s. Outside Iraq the fixation on the political paradigm of the tribal past was probably less pronounced, certainly so in Khurāsān, where the soldiers found it easy enough to adopt Iranian political roles. And even in Iraq the ‘ulama’ were not the only exponents of Islamic norms. They shared their literacy with both mutakallims and kutṭāb, the theologians and secretaries who perpetuated the traditional division of learning in pre-Islamic Iraq, that between Christian priests and bureaucrats; and though not all the mutakallims and none of the kutṭāb disputed the validity of the traditionists’ law, the former certainly did not see it as the core of Islam, while the latter would have none of its infatuation with the desert. Similarly, the Sunni traditionists faced the rivalry of the Shi’ite imam in whom the high-priestly authority of the early caliphs lived on: the ‘ulama’ went so far, after the revolution, as to accept the caliph as a layman endowed with ijtihād in matters of the law, but for the Shi’ites the imam was the very fount and the origin of this law. The ‘Abbāsids rose to power by staging a revolution of Shi’ite colouring in Khurāsān, from the start employing mutakallims who as religious disputants and propagandists played an integral part in the ‘Abbāsid establishment; and they soon inherited the bureaucracy of Iraq. They thus possessed what resources were available for a syncretic handling of Islam. Certainly, a caliph whose soldiers would have obeyed had he ordered them to pray with their backs to the qibla, ought to have had no problems when it came to a reshaping of Islamic law. But the most striking feature of these resources was their marginality. Just as Khurāsān was a frontier province, so Shi’ism was a heresy, while the theological and bureaucratic traditions were both tainted with the double stigma of secular status and foreign origins, Greek reason in the one case, Persian statecraft in the other. Despite the arch-heretics among their followers, the ‘Abbāsids were certainly less marginal than the Ismā’īlīs who were in due course to attempt a repeat performance of the ‘Abbāsid revolution: it is not for nothing that the fears of a Persian religious and/or political restoration in the 750s were minimal compared to the paranoia which the Ismā’īlīs were to induce. But the fact remains that it was in traditions marginal to mainstream Islam that the ‘Abbāsids found their intellectual resources, while at the same time it was to the Muslims at large that they had to make themselves acceptable. And in this dilemma lies the explanation of their failure.
The rationale with which the 'Abbasids set out to restore the meaning of politics rested on a conflation of the priestly and the messianic roles familiar to Shi‘ism. The conflation was in all likelihood a product of the circumstances attending the last phases of the revolution. The mission in Khurasan had revolved around the themes of revenge for the Prophet’s family and the restoration of power to a member of this family, but precisely who was intended to take power in precisely what political role is not clear because ‘Ibrahim al-Imām, the crucial figure of the revolution, died in Marwān II’s prison before the arrival of the troops in Iraq. The point is, however, that the leaders of the revolution would appear to have known no better: there is nothing in Abū Salama’s bewildered convocation of ‘Alids and ‘Abbasids for a prosaic *shūrā* to suggest that a priestly line had already been fixed among the latter, and the choice of Abū l-‘Abbas by impatient generals was certainly unforeseen. Whatever the original programme, the result of the confusion was that the ‘Abbasids who had promised the climactic redemption were also the men who took the ongoing power; and if the meaning of their venture was to be preserved at all, they had of necessity to recast themselves as priests. What appears to have begun as a simple mess thus ended up as a formal ideology.

The formal ideology combined an abstract title to power with rights arising from a concrete event in the past. As Hashimites, that is as members of the Prophet’s lineage, the ‘Abbasids claimed an ascribed right to the caliphate to the exclusion of all other Qurashīs, let alone non-Qurashīs: all previous caliphs with the exception of ‘Alī were thus rejected as usurpers. And as leaders of the *dawla*, that is the revolution, they claimed to have encashed these rights to the exclusion of all other Hashimites: ‘Alī’s descendants were thus also excluded. The ‘Abbasid stress on their Hashimite descent was a claim to membership of a priestly lineage, but the *dawla* was an apocalyptic event, a millenarian turn of fortune which had eliminated the Umayyad usurpers, avenged the Prophet’s family, restored the rightful dynasty and filled the earth with justice: the black banners of the avenging armies, the violence with which they treated the members of the offending dynasty, the messianic names of the early caliphs, and the analogies between the revolution and the rise of Islam were all so many proclamations that political redemption had come.

Participation in the past event was the hallmark of the three crucial ranks of the ‘Abbasid aristocracy. Here too there is an analogy with the rise of Islam: the principle was that of *sābiqa*, priority in service. The lowest of these ranks was that of the *abl al-dawla*, *ansār al-dawla*, *abl al-da‘wa*, *abl al-shi‘a* and so forth, that is the members of the Khurāsānī troops who had brought about the revolution in the past and who were
now spread all over the empire as garrisons in replacement of the Syrian troops. Their title to nobility was a corporate one acquired on enrolment, for just as ‘Abbāsid rule was known as the ‘blessed dawla’ long after the revolution, so the Khurāsānī soldiers knew themselves as ‘people of the dawla’ long after the original members of the revolutionary armies had died out. The concept thus attempted to bridge the moral gap between the caliph and his soldiers on the one hand, and the soldiers and the caliph’s subjects on the other.

Within the abl al-dawla there was the more select group of the Abnā’, that is abnā’ al-dawla, abnā’ al-shi’a or abnā’ al-da’wa. Generally, the Abnā’ were the bodily, as opposed to institutional, descendants of the participants in the revolution, and they are found as far afield as North Africa and Khurāsān. Specifically, they were the descendants of those participants who had settled in Baghdad to become the new imperial troops, and it is here that the sons of the greatest leaders of the revolution are found. Either way, their status rested not only on membership of the Khurāsānī army, but also on descent, a combination which distinguished all the major families of the early ‘Abbāsid period. It was these men who were assigned the crucial role of forging moral bonds between the metropolis and Khurāsān. Thus on the one hand, they were flattered for their Khurāsānī origin, their mixed descent, and their Iranian nobility, while Baghdad was described as the Khurāsān of Iraq. And on the other hand, they held a virtual monopoly on the offices most intimately associated with the fortunes of the dynasty. In Baghdad they commanded the caliph’s personal troops, his šburta, held the leadership of his personal guard, the haras, and commonly enjoyed the privilege of guarding his private seal. In the provinces they held a large number of military commands and governorships; and above all, they supplied the governors of Khurāsān.

Finally, within the Abnā’ there was the most select group of abl al-bayt, the honorary kinsmen of the caliph. Primarily, of course, the abl al-bayt were the real kinsmen of the caliph, the ‘Abbāsid princes who ranked above the Abnā’ and held an enormous number of governorships in all provinces except Khurāsān. But in addition a number of Abnā’ were bound to the ‘Abbāsid house by nomination as members of the family or fosterage, and Jahiz credits all Abnā’ with the habit of naming their children after the caliphs. Officially, these men were not known as mawālī, but just as the Prophetic precedent for the nomination of kinsmen involved a Persian mawālī, so it was with wala’ that fosterage and symbolic naming had typically been associated in the Marwānid period; we doubtless have here the fictitious kinship tie with which the Marwānid generals
The abortive service aristocracy

had raised their clients to honour. The honorary kinsmen would usually possess not one, but three titles to merit in the Islamic state. Khalid b. Barmak, for example, was one of the leading *ahl al-dawla*, his descendants were among the most illustrious *Abnā’*, and they were also members of the *ahl al-bayt* by fosterage. It was thus as Islamic nobles, not as alien Khurāsānis, that they and their like enjoyed their enormous power in the Islamic state.\(^{486}\)

In addition to the Khurāsānī aristocracy there were two non-Khurāsānī groups, both associated with the caliph by private ties. The first of these was the *saḥāba*, the companions, an institution which is attested only under Mansūr and Mahdī, and which doubtless perpetuated the military companionship of the Marwānid period, now Islamized on analogy with the companionship of the Prophet. The companions were men who could claim no services to the *dawla*. Some were Umayyad princes,\(^{487}\) and others were scholars,\(^{488}\) but many and perhaps the majority were Syrian generals who had stayed on in the metropolitan army after the dynastic change.\(^{489}\) They were now settled in Baghdad,\(^{490}\) where indeed they would have to live to conform to the description of companions, and they held a number of military commands and governorships outside Baghdad.\(^{491}\) Though some of the better known Syrian governors and generals are not identified as companions,\(^{492}\) it is tempting to see in the *saḥāba* the outcome of Ibn al-Muqaffa’s advice to Mansūr that he single out a special group from among the Syrians to win them over to the dynasty.\(^{493}\) If conciliation of the defeated Syrians was the main point of the institution, its ephemeral nature would certainly be less puzzling.\(^{494}\)

The second group was the *mawālī*, the clients of the caliph.\(^{495}\) like the honorary kinsmen they might be bound to the caliph’s family by fosterage and symbolic naming,\(^{496}\) but unlike them they were officially known as *mawālī*, and some of them were distinguished by the title *mawālī amīr al-mu’minīn*. This title is clearly honorific and semantically equivalent to the Frankish *vasso domini*, and it is conceivable that these *vassi* were intended as a non-Khurāsānī counterpart to the *ahl al-bayt*: one of the first men to bear the title was suggestively a governor of Syrian origin.\(^{497}\) In practice, however, the difference between the clients and the kinsmen, or for that matter the rest of the service aristocracy, was a far more fundamental one. It is not merely that most of the clients were of non-Arab origin,\(^{498}\) for so were many of the Khurāsānis; it is not even that most of them were of servile origin,\(^{499}\) for there must similarly have been slaves among the ancestors of the Khurāsānis. It is rather that the clients had been chosen not despite but because of these origins: the *mawālī* of the caliph, like those of the Koran, were defined by the obscurity of their parentage.\(^{500}\)
Failure of the Islamic empire

Some, it is true, were relatives of the caliph, but always on the female side and not always very reputable; and the vast majority were freedmen of the ‘Abbāsids themselves. The honorary kinsmen were public servants who had been incorporated in the private household of the caliph as a final legitimation of their status; but the clients were private servants who had been pushed onto the public scene with perfunctory legitimation as caliphal vassals. The honorary kinsmen perpetuated the free clientage of the Marwānids; the clients by contrast represented a novel reliance on the servile tie.

In itself this reliance on freedmen is not particularly remarkable. The mawāli were employed overwhelmingly where one would expect to find them, in private and semi-private functions associated with the household, the court, the postal service, courier and espionage system, the prisons and the like; and though quite a number of them were already found in the less traditional roles of bureaucrats, governors and generals under Mansūr, this was not so ominous in view of the fact that they rose in what was manifestly an uneasy period of political transition. For all that there had been freedmen in Augustus’ fisc, the Romans never handed over to their slaves. What was remarkable, then, was not that freedmen were used, but that within a century of the revolution they had taken control. The explanation is not far to seek: if they rose in a period of political transition, they stayed because the transition failed.

This failure is apparent in a number of ways. Doctrinally, the ‘Abbāsids fell between two stools. The Shi‘ites narrowed down the priestly lineage to the descendants of ‘Alī, more particularly those of Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, so that other Ḥāshimites were excluded, while the Sunnīs conversely admitted all Quraysh to the caliphate, so that the Ḥāshimite lineage was devalued. In the face of this opposition the ‘Abbāsids fidgeted. At one extreme they claimed to have inherited the imamate by bequest from an ‘Alīd, and at the other extreme Mahdī claimed that it vested in the descendants of ‘Abbās to the exclusion of ‘Alī. But neither argument of course satisfied the Shi‘ites and both stood to offend the Sunnīs by their rafīd, rejection of the first two caliphs. The ‘Abbāsids did better when they shifted the argument from genealogy to deeds. The ‘Alids were said to have been inactive and inefficient, while the Umayyads were branded as iniquitous: only the ‘Abbāsids had brought about the dawla in the past and continued to uphold Islamic norms in the present. The Shi‘ites of course rejected the dawla as having installed the wrong dynasty, but the Sunnīs could at least accept that it had eliminated the Umayyad ‘kings’. It is thus not surprising that the ‘Abbāsids should have gravitated...
towards the Sunnis. But in so doing, they were stripped of their priestly pretensions; and past events of course recede. They were thus coming back to where the Umayyads had ended.

The problems which the 'Abbāsids experienced with their ideology simply restate the problem of their marginality: the Shi'ites from whom they borrowed their ideas, and the Sunnis whom they wished to accept these ideas, were too far apart. It is certainly possible that the very accession of the 'Abbāsids catalysed the polarization between Sunnis and Shi'ites by forcing them to take up position vis-à-vis the new state; but if that is so, it merely illustrates the fact that whatever hopes the 'Abbāsids may have had of being a happy compromise, they could not be redeemers to Sunnis and Shi'ites alike. In fact, being no 'Alids, the 'Abbāsids could not be redeemers to the Shi'ites without handing over to an 'Alid. It is true that just as sectarian lines may well have been less clear-cut before the revolution, so the Hashimite family may well have enjoyed greater unity; but Sharīk al-Mahri, for one, had no doubts that it was for an 'Alid, not an 'Abbāsid, ruler that he had taken up arms, and when the accession of the 'Abbāsids forced the 'Alids into open revolt, the 'Abbāsid pretensions to having accomplished Shi'ite ambitions had to be given up. For practical purposes this was the moment when the long 'Abbāsid trek towards acceptance of the Sunni role as guardians of the Muslim community began. For it was now from the Sunnis alone that the 'Abbāsids could hope to have their dawla accepted, and the Sunnis had neither hoped nor worked for the 'Abbāsid redemption. The 'Abbāsid claim to having begun a new and better era thus shrivelled and withered on exposure to the sheer indifference of their Sunni subjects. The Sunnis were not, on the whole, hostile to the 'Abbāsids; they dutifully learnt their lesson: the 'Abbāsids, so they knew, were of the house of the Prophet, though it did not really matter; they had defeated the impious Umayyads, though it did not make much difference. The Sunnis gathered that they had been redeemed, but they had never felt it.

The marginality of the 'Abbāsids reappears in the fact that they made this trek towards the Sunni camp, which they seem to have reached in the days of Hārūn, without ever attempting a showdown with the 'ulamā'. They began with every available asset: troops, secretaries, theologians, religious prestige. and Ibn al-Muqaffa' provided the blueprint for precisely such a showdown when he submitted his Risāla fi 'l-sahāba. For Ibn al-Muqaffa' the caliph was the sole source of religious and political authority, and the caliph is advised to use this authority to impose religious and legal uniformity, to maintain a corps of religious representatives to whom people can turn for instruction, to preserve the aristocratic
status of his public servants, taking particular care to maintain the
dignity of the military, and to exclude menials from positions of author-
ity at court. It was a truly imperial vision of Islam presented without a
single reference to Kisra, Buzurjmihr or anything Persian, and it was
certainly one to which the caliph must have given serious thought. But
Mansur did not try it out; and it was zindigs. Manichaeans, not
‘ulama’, who were the victims of Mahdi’s inquisition. In part, of
course, Mansur was simply too preoccupied with the post-revolution-
ary task of consolidation: the suppression of ‘Abdallah b. ‘Ali’s revolt,
the liquidation of Abû Muslim and its aftermath. But it was clearly
the outbreak of the ‘Alid revolts which effectively deprived the ‘Abbâsids
of what leverage they had on their traditionist rivals. Mahdi’s outrageous
rejection of every non-‘Abbâsid caliph, be he a companion or the cousin
of the Prophet, was a declaration of intent that could not very well become
a programme of action: even a foolhardy caliph would hesitate to pick
a fight with the entire Muslim world. The ‘Abbâsids were thus forced
into attempts at conciliation of the very men who had usurped their
religious authority. And meanwhile the ‘Abbâsid assets wasted.

As the creed of the ‘Abbâsids wilted, the institutions which it was meant
to support began to fall apart. Whereas the bureaucrats, overwhelmingly
recruited from among converts in Iraq, kept up their professional commit-
ment to the Persian political tradition and its attendant culture, the new
generation of Abnâ’ who grew up in Baghdad forgot their Persian and
their heretical views and settled down instead as the leaders of the
hashwiyya. There is no more striking illustration of the extent to which
the secretaries and the soldiers of the ‘Abbâsid caliphs went their differ-
ent ways than the divergent careers of the grandsons of Khâlid b. Barmak
and Hanbal b. Hilal. Both men were Khurasanls, the former a native of
Balkh, the latter of Marw, and both joined the revolution; the descendants
of both ended up in Baghdad where they counted among the Abnâ’.
The sons of Khâlid, however, went into the bureaucracy, where the third
generation became the very embodiment of secretarial culture: the Barmak-
ids were readers of Persian literature, patrons of the Shu‘ûbis, sponsors
of Greek philosophy and kalâm who took a soft line on the ‘Alids and an
aristocratic line on trade. But the son of Hanbal b. Hilal stayed in the
army, first in Khurâsân and next in Baghdad, and here his grandson be-
came the archetypal Sunni ‘âlim, Ibn Hanbal, who was in due course
to lead the traditionist opposition to the Barmakid type of religion and
culture as the hero of the obscurantist masses of Baghdad. The distance
between the pillars of the ‘Abbâsid state thus widened into a gulf. And
inasmuch as the caliphs could not afford a confrontation with the
'ulamā', it was the secretaries that they kept trying to bring into line: the execution of Ibn al-Muqaffa', the Manichaean purges which hit the court and the bureaucracy, and finally the crash and splinter as the Barmakids themselves came down, can all be seen as violent adjustments to the outlook of the 'ulamā'. That the cultural policy of the early caliphs was always consistent is unlikely; but it was the chief qādi, not the chief secretary, who drew up a treatise on taxation for Hārūn. At a provincial level the failure of the 'Abbāsid ideology is reflected in the high incidence of political disturbance. Some of the provincial troubles, of course, were of the type liable to accompany any major transfer of power: for instance, the secession of Spain, the revolt on behalf of the Umayyads in Syria and the Jazira in 750f [132f], or the Syrian attempt at a come-back by support of 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī's bid for the throne in 754 [137]. Others clearly reflect the shift from a loose conquest society to an integrated state, witness the frequency with which fiscal or administrative oppression acted as a trigger. The Coptic jacqueries in Egypt, very likely also Bundār's rising in Christian Lebanon, the Khārījite rebellions in Sīstān, possibly also those in the Jazira, the massive peasant revolts under the leadership of syncretic prophets in Transoxania, Khurāsān, the Jībāl and Azerbaijan, and the Transoxanian revolt of Rāfi b. Layth; all these were in their very different ways attempts to shake off the heavy hands of the 'Abbāsid governors. But it would certainly be wrong to see no more than that in these revolts. On the one hand, it is clear that, for all their governmental machinery, the 'Abbāsids could not cope. Spain was written off from the start, though Mansūr and probably also Mahdī went through the motions of an attempt at reconquest. In 789 [172] when Morocco passed into the hands of Idrīs, an 'Alid refugee from Fakhkh, Hārūn is said to have arranged for his poisoning; but as for attempts at reconquest, he did not even go through the motions. And in 800 [184] he practically sold Tunisian North Africa to Ibrāhīm b. al-Aghlab, the son of a Khurāsānī soldier. On the disappearance of tribal and factional ties the Muslim state had become too big: the 'Abbāsids had found no alternative ways of keeping it together. On the other hand, the revolts were all too often directed not merely against the agents of the state, but also against the state itself. That was certainly so in Syria which never came round to acceptance of 'Abbāsid rule. When Amin tried to enrol ex-Umayyad soldiers for a defence of the dawla in the fourth civil war, the outcome was Syrians and Khurāsānis at each others' throats in a minor reenactment of the revolution, and Umayyad legitimism provided the aegis both for the urban take-over of local power in Damascus at the time of the civil war, and for the rural
insurrection in Palestine towards the end of the reign of Mu’tasim. Similarly, the Khārijites who kept the ‘Abbāsid governors out of the Sīstānī countryside were under no illusion that the caliph would be on their side if only he knew what was going on, as were Robin Hood or Oleksa Dovbūš in respect of their kings. The Sīstānī Khārijites were rural bandits, but they were also Muslim heretics and thus politicized: unlike their many counterparts throughout the world, they forced the head of state to argue. And it is indicative of the threadbareness of the ‘Abbāsid title to power that in this argument Hārūn did none too well.

The revolts in Transoxania are of particular importance in that they illustrate the continuing gulf between the syncretic frontier province from which the ‘Abbāsid armies came and the straightlaced Iraq in which they settled. The followers of the Iranian prophets belonged to the same population from which the ‘Abbāsids had recruited their Rāwandiyya, the most extreme heretics among their soldiers, a number of whom had to be liquidated in Iraq in 758 [141]. Whatever the repercussions of this incident in the east, the eastern heretics had already concluded from the murder of Abū Muslim that the ‘Abbāsid state was an Arab state, and they rose in revolt inspired by hopes of the imminent collapse of foreign domination, in precisely the same manner as the Bantu or Bakongo prophets, the Amerindian Ghost Dancers, the Judaizing Maori, and a host of other syncretic rebels, who were in due course to act upon apocalyptic visions of the end of the white man’s rule. Unlike the peasants who had gone to the Arab garrisons, the semi-Islamized populations of rural Transoxania and, as the westward spread of the revolts was to show, also those of the Jībāl and Azerbāijān, still saw the Muslim state as one of alien colonists. Given both the extreme syncretism and the rural locus of these rebels, they clearly could not be fatal to the political status of the ‘Abbāsids as long as the wielders of power in the east were not infected by them; and on the whole they were not. But something of the same contrast between a colourful local society and a state perceived as alien recurs in the revolt of Rāfī’ b. Layth, and here it was very damaging. Rāfī’ was an Arab Muslim of a family settled in Khurāsān for generations, he was a member of the Khurāsānī army, and he became a rebel, according to some, to avenge his private honour. But no sooner had he begun than the recently pacified Transoxania once more went up in flames. What was so particularly undermining about this revolt was that for Rāfī’ the soldier, as also for Muqanna’ the prophet, the Turks of the area were more acceptable members of the local scene than the representatives of the Baghdādī state: the Turks were called in and the ‘Abbāsids were rejected, according to Ibn Ḥazm for an Umayyad restoration.
And worse still, a number of the local Abnā' joined the insurrection. Just as the Abnā' went their different ways in the army and the bureaucracy, so they went their different ways in Iraq and eastern Iran.

Only in Iraq, and above all in Baghdad, did the new dynasty succeed in winning acceptance. In the fourth civil war the Baghdadi populace fought for the Abnā' with precisely the same passion with which the Himsi populace had defended their asbrāf against the Yamanīyya in Marwānid Syria; and the fury with which the mob, the semi-naked criminals, vagabonds and riff-raff threw themselves into the battle against Tahir's troops was at the same time a superb illustration of the loyalties which the 'Abbasids had hoped to inspire and a pathetic attestation of their failure. For the Abnā' had been designed as an imperial aristocracy, and they had ended up instead, like the asbrāf, as nothing but the heroes of a local mob.

Yet there was a crucial difference between the Marwānid and the 'Abbasid predicaments. The Marwānid problem had been that outside Syria the asbrāf could have no power, but there had at least been hopes that the generals who took the power could also inherit the legitimacy when the asbrāf were swept away. But the 'Abbasid problem was that outside Baghdad the Abnā' could have no legitimacy, and it was obvious that the 'ulamā' who took the legitimacy could not also take the power if the Abnā' were to disappear. Given that the Abnā' had failed as a pillar of the state, who then were to inherit their power? In Khurasan an Iranian aristocracy was still in existence, but the Muslim world at large had been denuded of heirs: here the caliphs had only their dependents.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SLAVE SOLDIERS

The large-scale encroachment of the dependents on the territory of the service aristocracy began under Mahdi and Hārūn. Mahdi turned the clients of the ‘Abbāsid house into a servile army fighting under its own commanders and filled a substantial number of governorships with men of this kind; much resented by the Khurāsānīs, this policy was continued by his successors. Hārūn in addition recruited free clients among the non-Arabs of Khurāsān. The enrolment of foreigners was not without precedent. Already in 766 a Christian churchman had been scandalized by the ‘locust swarm’ of Alans, Khazars, Kufans, Ethiopians, Medians, Persians and Turks who went on summer campaign in that year, worshipping the sun and carrying with them the false gods of their nations. But the scale of Hārūn’s enterprise was doubtless new. Altogether half a million Iranians are said to have been recruited, presumably on making a formal renunciation of their false gods, and like the locust swarm they became mawātī of the caliph. Graced with the name of ‘Abbāsiyya, some twenty thousand were transferred to Baghdad where, if the figures are at all correct, they were numerically on a par with the Abnā’. Though the freedmen and the Iranians were different types of clients, they were inspired by the same concern. The point of the former was their utter dependence; that of the latter their utter alienness; and the contrast with the Abnā’ is obvious: with the dawla the ‘Abbāsid had tried to identify their servants with the norms of Islam, but with wulā they bound them to a ruler who could not exercise his power without transgressing these norms.

The creation of the mamlūk institution consisted in a simple fusion of the two components which had hitherto remained discrete, servile status and alien origin. Freedmen reared in an Islamic environment and free mercenaries recruited abroad, for all that they became extremely common in the Muslim armies, were so to speak approximations to the ideal type: the classical mamlūk is characterized by both personal dependence and cultural dissociation.

Given that within fifty years of the revolution it had already become
clear that politics and religion were to go their separate ways, one might have expected the *mamluk* institution to have already emerged by then. It is in fact between 800 and 820 [184–204] that slave armies begin to make their appearance, first in Ibrāhīm b. al-Aghlab’s North Africa and next in Hakam I’s Spain; and a similar army was under formation in the secessionist Egypt of ‘Ubaydallāh b. al-Sarī. But it was not until thirty years later that Mu’tasim made slave armies a standard Muslim institution by creating one in the metropolis itself. Why did it take so long?

The problem was Khurāsān. If Khurāsān could not accept the hegemony of Baghdad in the shape of the Abnā’, *a fortiori* it would reject it when the Abnā’ were replaced by private dependents. The failure of the Islamic aristocracy thus meant that the Islamic heartlands and the eastern frontier had to separate: if the *mamlūks* were to inherit the former, the local nobility were the obvious heirs to the latter. But though it came easy enough to Hārūn to sell North Africa, granting Khurāsān autonomy was a different matter; and the caliphal road to the *mamlūk* institution was accordingly a tortuous one which passed through civil war.

Hārūn can be seen groping for a solution in the governors he appointed to the troublesome province. The first were Abnā’ and two were relatives on the female side — private dependents in disguise; but in 806f [ 191] he appointed Harthama b. A’yan, a native Khurasānī, with the title of *mawlā amr al-mu’minīn*. Harthama’s *wala’* was double-faced, its meaning depending on the side from which it was read: neither a Banawī nor a freedman of the caliph, he was more of a local representative than the Abnā’ to the Khurasānīs and more of a dependent *vis-à-vis* Hārūn. And precisely the same ambiguity was to recur in the *wala’* which bound Tāhir and his successors to the caliphal house. Unlike Tāhir, however, Harthama is not known to have had noble blood, and he certainly had no independence.

Both noble blood and independence arrived with Ma’mūn, who replaced Harthama on Hārūn’s death in 809 in accordance with the dispositions Hārūn had made as far back as 802 [186] for the division of the empire between his sons. In this solution kinship replaced *wala’*, and once again the tie was double-faced: an Iranian by maternal descent to the Khurāsānīs, Ma’mūn was an ‘Abbāsid *vis-à-vis* Baghdad, and his interest in the continuance of the unitary state was further guaranteed by the fact that he was also an heir-apparent. To that extent the solution was an ideal one. But as Hārūn himself was painfully aware, the dynastic arrangement positively invited civil war; and civil war was not slow in coming.
The fourth civil war dealt the coup de grâce to the ‘Abbāsid rationale in that it set Khurāsānīs against the Abnā’. Had the Abnā’ won, the dawla would of course have been vindicated, and the Abnā’ could have prided themselves on having saved it as well as having brought it about in the first place. But they could not have saved its Khurāsānī identification: just as the Syrians had been discredited as Zawāqil by the civil war, so the Khurāsānīs would have stood condemned as ‘ajamī traitors to the ‘Abbāsīd revolution. A Banawī victory might have been followed by a straightforward Iraqi domination of Khurāsān, but in all likelihood Iraq and Khurāsān would soon have parted ways.

Instead the Khurāsānīs defeated the Abnā’: in 813 as in 750 a caliph and his Sunni notables were swept away by Persian-speaking troops. Admittedly, the Abnā’ did not immediately disappear from the political scene, and as late as 870 [236] Muhtadī could try to play them against the Turks. But the dawla had been discredited, and it was thus a Khurāsānī domination of Iraq which preceded the parting of the ways.

There were three components to the Khurāsānī interlude. Firstly, in 813, as not in 750, the capital was transferred to eastern Iran: not even during the civil war did Ma‘mūn leave Marw. Secondly, where Ḥārūn had gravitated towards the Sunnis, Ma‘mūn by contrast made a bid for the Shi‘ites. In common with his predecessors he based his title to power on membership of the Hashimite lineage, but the dawla having lost its legitimatory force, he gave up the ‘Abbāsīd claim to have excluded the ‘Alīds by their deeds: he was thus free to invert the testament of Abū Ḥāshim and designate an ‘Alīd as his heir on the ground of personal merit. Finally, where Ḥārūn had resorted to dependents, Ma‘mūn by contrast relied on princes. The tie, now as then, was wala—what other ties were left? But the change of capital made for a crucial difference. In the first place, wala had locally assumed the character of royal vassalage. Pre-Islamic Iran had been familiar with a tradition for local kinglets to surrender their crown and their throne to the King of Kings, receiving them back as his vassals. Sāsānīd measures of centralization on the one hand, and the nature of the Arab conquest on the other, had combined to eradicate this tradition from the central Iranian provinces; but it survived along the frontier, where it fused with wala’ al-islām. Thus when Qutayba restored Bukhārā to the Bukhārkhudā, the latter converted to become the mawla islam of the man to whom he owed his crown and his throne, in the same way the Sāmānkhudā became a mawla islam of Asad al-Qasrī when the latter restored him to Sāmān; and a similar behavioural pattern is exemplified in the story that Barmak had gone to the caliph’s court to convert. Mahdi may well have been the first to make extensive use of this
The emergence of the slave soldiers

tie in Khurasan, but it was Ma’mūn who took it up for a systematic legitimation of the eastern Iranian principalities: invited to submit to God and the caliph, the local rulers were confirmed in their positions as caliphal clients. In the second place, the mawālī who ruled the empire at large were now public rather than private servants. It is not that they were all of different origin from those of Hārūn; some in fact had served under Hārūn, though obviously most of them were new. But with the change of capital they ceased to rule as aliens: Hārūn had valued them for their distance from the metropolitan tradition of Iraq; under Ma’mūn by contrast it was their affinity to the tradition of Khurasan which was rewarded.

The cultural flexibility characteristic of the Shi‘ite heresy and the eastern frontier thus came together for a brief moment under Ma’mūn, generating a remarkable openness to secular learning and secular elites alike. Had Ma’mūn been content with a Khurasan successor state, he might have stayed on as an ‘Abbāsid Tāhirīd: the graceful surrender of Rāfī‘ b. Layth, the delight in Ma’mūn’s Iranian mother, and the general pacification of his eastern domains all go to demonstrate that in Khurasan at least he was at home. But to the Islamic world at large his policy was an affront, merely a partial admission of their rights in the eyes of the Shi‘ites, and a straightforward Zoroastrian plot against Islam in the eyes of the Sunnis. And when the Baghdadis rebelled under the leadership of the Abnā‘, rejecting Ma’mūn as a traitor to his house and raising up a son of Mahdī, Ma’mūn was forced to return. Ruefully liquidating his Iranian minister and ‘Alid heir on the journey back, he entered Baghdad in 819, where the Baghdadis, in a supreme effort to conciliate the caliph, awaited him dressed in the obnoxious green which was to have symbolized his new and better era.

But although he returned, Ma’mūn did not thereby regain the capacity to glorify the dawla and the Abnā‘ with which his predecessors had tried to persuade the Sunnis to accept an imperial state, and he might well have given in completely to the Sunnis at this point. But give in he would not; and because there was no longer any point in trying to conciliate the ‘ulama‘, whom the return to Baghdad had brought back into prominence, the caliphal showdown with the traditionist rivals finally came. Claiming for himself the prerogatives of the Shi‘ite imam, Ma’mūn unpacked his priestly insight as Mu‘tazilite theology and proceeded to make what was to be the first and the last attempt in Islam to bring the traditionists under inquisitorial control. But for all the inventiveness and nerve with which he persisted in his manipulation of the symbols of religious authority, his efforts were not only inefficient, but also to some extent
superfluous: even granted a fair measure of success, his abstract imamate could not easily have served to sanctify concrete and intimate bonds. It was thus Ma'mūn's return to Baghdad, not the Sunni restoration under Mutawakkil, that marked the final parting of the ways.

In both Khurasān and the Islamic heartlands the heirs of the Abnā' were mawālī. But in Khurasān the mawālī were caliphal vassals. The province received its autonomy in 821 [205] on the appointment of Ṭāhir, a member of the local nobility,609 with the title of mawālī amīr al-mu'āminīn,610 while at the same time the leadership of the Baghdadi shūrta, traditionally associated with Khurasān, was granted to the Iraqi branch of his family by way of reinforcement of the tie.611 Less controllable than Harthama, Ṭāhir was also less dangerous than Ma'mūn, and though he is said to have declared himself independent shortly after his appointment,612 the arrangement was kept up with his descendants. In due course, as the caliphs lost their power to the Turks, it was to work out as an alliance for the protection of Iraq.613

In the Islamic heartlands, by contrast, the mawālī were unfree clients. Already Ma'mūn himself was credited with large-scale purchases of Turkish slaves;614 it was certainly in his lifetime and with his blessing that Mu'tasim, his brother and successor, began to accumulate his servile army;615 and on his accession Mu'tasim systematized the practice.

As a legacy of the past Mu'tasim's armies were a peculiar mixture of princes and slaves. The princes came as mawālī islām from Transoxania precisely as they had done under Ma'mūn;616 but they came no longer as representatives of the metropolitan tradition, but as foreigners to it: witness the Afshīn, whose renunciation of the false gods of his nation had not extended to a renunciation of its ancestral culture.617 The combination was thus not quite so odd as it might look. As the princes eventually disappeared they were replaced by Daylamites, Kurds, Africans, bedouin and other peoples marginal to the settled Islamic world: all were mercenaries and nobility simply did not matter.

The slaves were largely Turks captured among the tribes beyond the Muslim border in Transoxania, though some were still purchased in Iraq.618 Usually they were manumitted, and they were virtually always converted,619 but both were somewhat perfunctory concessions to traditional values. It is not for nothing that unlike ordinary freedmen they continued to be known as mamluks,620 and unlike ordinary converts to be called by their ancestral names, for all that these names were as barbarous on the tongues of the believers as those of the crassest Shu'ūbīs.621
Manumission was dispensable and in time increasingly dispensed with, and conversion, though far more de rigueur, was rarely more than a formality. Bughā, who, wondering what the trial of Ibn Ḥanbal was about, revealed that he knew only two things about Islam, had lost no more of his ancestral ignorance than had the Afshīn of his ancestral culture. And the whole point of Muṭaṣim’s Samarra was to keep both the slaves, their specially imported wives and their descendants in this state.

The combination of cultural dissociation and personal dependence was a very forceful one in that it obliterated the soldier’s public personality. Legally and psychologically aliens do not belong, and mercenaries do not usually have strong views on public issues in the polity which recruits them. Similarly, dependents do not count, and slaves are usually as indifferent to public issues as are women, children and private servants. Samarra may be viewed as both a ghetto and as a harem: the ruler would bring up his foreign slaves as his children, and they existed in the Muslim polity only through him. It was this extinction of the soldier’s autonomy which made the mamlūk such a superb instrument of his master’s will when it was coupled with personal obedience; by the same token, of course, it made the loss of personal obedience the more disastrous. And it was a feature which sharply differentiated a servile army from a feudal one. The barons were no aliens, but members of their own polity who subscribed, with whatever cynicism, to its political values, whereas the mamlūks had to be born in Islam to acquire a comparable commitment to the political norms of Islam, and precisely for this reason home-born mamlūks were eventually excluded from the army: where the sons of barons hoped to honour their ancestors as soldiers, those of mamlūks had to forget theirs as scholars. Equally, the barons were free men participating in a public culture: their code of private fidelity and chivalry became itself a public one. The mamlūks by contrast had only a superficial Islamic veneer unless they acquired sovereign power of their own, and when they did so, it was not a servile code that went public: their court culture might be Arabic, Persian or Turkish, but it was invariably imported. Mamlūks were not supposed to think, but to ride horses; they were designed to be not a military elite, but military automata.

Once endorsed by the caliphs, the mamlūk institution soon spread throughout the settled Middle East; and as eastern Iran brought itself into line with mainstream Islam under its successor dynasties, even this last bastion of princes fell: ‘slaves upon horses’, far from a topsy-turvy vision, became in Islam the most everyday of sights.
course vanish altogether from the Muslim armies; but from the eastern
to the western borders of the caliphate and from the mid ninth century
into modern times, the crack troops at least of the settled rulers were
composed of slaves.

The incidence of the *mamlûk* institution elegantly confirms the
diagnosis of the disease of which it was a symptom. Among the Muslims
of the Middle East it became both general and chronic. Yet it was not as
if the outcome of the 'Abbâsid experiment had been apt to encourage
prospective imitators; nor were slaves always easy to obtain: Africans,
Slavs, Indians, Greeks, Abyssinians and Circassians might replace the
Turks, but the greatest of all *mamlûk* institutions had to fall back on its own
Balkan peasantry, enslaved in flagrant contravention of the law. Against
the ubiquity of the institution in the Muslim Middle East we have its total
absence in the pre-Islamic and the non-Islamic Middle East. If the Muslims
braved both offputting experiences and daunting obstacles to procure their
*mamlûks*, their non-Muslim neighbours by contrast signally failed to
borrow the idea. It was not that slaves were always difficult to get in the
Christian world, still less was the *mamlûk* institution always inefficient;
there were no religious objections, and there were certainly men who
entertained the idea of imitating their Muslim neighbours. Yet there were
no *mamlûks* in Spain after the expulsion of the Muslims, and none on
Byzantine soil before the Muslim conquest; and there were only mercen-
aries in northern Europe.

The *mamlûk* institution is thus a specifically Muslim institution.
There are, however, two illuminating exceptions to this rule. Within the
Muslim world the ubiquity of the *mamlûks* in the Middle East is balanced
by their total absence beyond the frontiers of the culturally destructive
conquests, where the rulers could continue to seek their legitimating
resources in the pre-Islamic traditions. And conversely, within the non-
Islamic world the general failure to borrow the institution is matched by
the independent invention of comparable institutions precisely where
political meaning had for one reason or another been destroyed. The
convergences thus point unambiguously to the Islamic deprivation of
legitimating resources as the root from which the institution grew.
Evidently, the meaning of power has always been a problem wherever
power has existed, and there have been few states in which its wielders
have not made at least occasional use of their private dependents, even at
the best of times: witness the eunuchs of Confucian China, Sâsânîd
Persia and Byzantium. Conversely, wherever slaves have existed,
there have always been those who would enrol them for the exercise of
power, if only at the worst of times: witness the gladiators in the Roman
The emergence of the slave soldiers
civil wars or the enrolment of prisoners-of-war by Mukhtār. But
the systematic handing over of power to slaves (or for that matter to
women) to the more or less complete exclusion of the free males of the
community bespeaks a moral gap of such dimensions that within the
great civilizations it has been found only in one.
II
THE EMERGENCE OF THE MEDIEVAL POLITY

The adoption of the mamlûk institution by the 'Abbâsids was followed almost immediately by fainéance of the caliphal office and disintegration of the caliphal state. It is clearly not the case that slave armies necessarily entail either one or the other: the caliphs might have stayed in power, if only in Iraq, just as the unitary state might have survived, if only as a sultanate. But it is not very likely that the adoption of the new armies and the onset of general disorder simply happened to coincide. How then is the disorder to be explained? The key to the explanation must clearly lie in the manner in which the peculiar nature of the mamlûk institution interacted with the peculiar legacy of the 'Abbâsids.

It is in the nature of slave armies that they can easily get out of hand: because they are private in character, their discipline turns to a greater extent than is usually the case on the personal forcefulness of the ruler. There were various ways in which the institution could be rendered more sensitive to such forcefulness, and the 'Abbâsids might have been better off if they had not been beginners. Both the isolation and the homogeneity of the Samarran slaves probably exceeded the safety limit; when the ruler and his troops came out of their joint quarantine, generational recruitment of new slaves replaced Mu'tasîm's grandiose attempt to breed them, and free mercenaries and other elements were brought in to balance the Turks; the institution thus certainly became more amenable to control. But it was far more important that the presence of the forcefulness itself could not be guaranteed. No dynasty can be relied on to produce an unbroken succession of able rulers; and even if it could, no state can ensure the constant availability of a military scene in which the rulers can display what ability they have. Of the two most long-lived mamlûk institutions one was non-dynastic while the other combined dynastic succession with the brutal selective pressure of fratricidal war. Either way the principle was the survival of the fittest; and in both cases the principle depended for its proper function on continuing external war: when warfare petered out, the Mamluk power struggles degenerated into mere anarchy, while the Ottomans withdrew from the command, stopped their fratricidal struggles and followed the 'Abbâsids into fainéance.
The emergence of the medieval polity

Mu’tasim’s successors may well have been men of some ability, but it was in the nature of their office that they lacked a military scene. The meaning of the caliphate had never lain in warfare. Internally, the caliphs were too exalted to go into the field against mere rebels in the manner of simple amirs. Externally, not even the ‘Abbāsids had ever been committed to the personal conduct of frontier campaigns; and, given the sheer physical extent of the caliphate, they could not easily adopt the role of ghāzīs. The incessant campaigns of Mu’tasim himself do indeed recall those of the early Ottoman sultans; but for all the brilliance of his capture of Amorium, the summer expeditions on the Byzantine frontier had long been a ritual display, while conversely the real expansion of the Muslim frontier in Transoxania and North Africa necessarily had to be the work of local governors. There was no warfare for the ‘Abbāsids to conduct; and for this reason they did not even get the proverbial run of three generations before being relegated to the harem, but lost control of their slaves within some thirty years.

It was, however, not in the nature of the mamlūk institution that the vacuum at the top should have continued for so long. In themselves slave armies can be restored as easily as they can get out of hand, and to some extent, of course, the caliphs regained their power under Muwaffaq and his immediate successors. But the caliphal restoration was ephemeral, and no stable sultanate emerged until the arrival of the Büyids in 945 [334], so that for the better part of a century no one person was in firm control. The explanation for this prolonged vacuum doubtless has to be sought primarily in the nature of the ‘Abbāsid heritage. It was crucial for the ‘Abbāsids that they adopted the mamlūk institution against a background of failure: there never had been an Islamic empire. The imperial past was located outside Islam altogether, so that where the Ottoman officials were restorationists for ever looking back to the days of Sulaymān the Magnificent, the ‘Abbāsid secretaries were merely alienated: there was no hankering for the magnificent days of Mansūr. The caliphs accordingly had little support to derive from the one pillar of the administration on which they ought to have been able to rely. Increasingly Shi‘ite in recruitment, the secretaries had become a species of administrative mamlūks who were scarcely more committed to the wider interests of the caliphate than were the slaves; and since their own interests lay in keeping military power fragmented, they could be relied on to put spokes in the wheels of whoever threatened to alter the status quo: in 908 [295] they flagrantly called a halt to the ‘Abbāsid restoration by elevating a minor to the throne, and throughout the period it took the threat of external conquest to make them search for Badr al-Jamālis and Köprülü viziers.
It was thus up to the soldiers to take over. But the ecology of Iraq was such that the power struggle there could not easily issue in a definitive victory for any one of the parties involved. A flat rural plain, it had no local niches of the kind which enabled Mahmūd of Ghazna to conquer the Sāmānid metropolis,\(^6\) even after the creation of the chief emirate in 936 \([324]\) none of the competitors managed to retain it: Ibn Rā'iq, Bajkam and Mu'nis all rose on the flimsy basis of Iraq or its immediate environs and fell within a few years.\(^6\) At the same time, the combination of secretarial intrigues, rival generals and public insolvency which confronted the potential conquerors of Iraq was unlikely to attract them, and morally the caliphate did not signify enough to make them come. Even after the chief emirate was there for the taking, the only interested candidates outside lower Iraq were the Ḥamdānids of Mosul: the Ikhshid, for all that he was willing to have a caliph for his sultanate, refused to play the sultan to the caliphate.\(^6\) Iraq thus had to await the anti-‘Abbāsid animus of the Būyids, who set out with the idea of removing the caliph, and the pro-‘Abbāsid sentiments of the Seljuqs, who entertained the idea of saving him, for the conquerors finally to arrive.\(^6\)

The loss of both political meaning and personal control by the ‘Abbāsids thus combined to make over the Islamic world to foreign slaves for almost a hundred years. Because mamlūk armies are essentially bodyguards writ large, they have all the virtues of elite troops at their best, but all the vices of private servants and foreign mercenaries at their worst: the facility with which palace officials can manipulate the state apparatus without ever considering the wider interests of politics, and that with which a hired soldiery can mutiny, ravage, loot and enter rebel service without ever going home, came together in the persons of the military slaves. A well-controlled mamlūk army might have kept the unitary state intact, but an uncontrolled one could not fail to bring about its total disintegration.

Between foreign slaves and alienated secretaries, politics degenerated into mere intrigues and bickerings for the proceeds of a state apparatus which either party could permanently control, both parties squandering resources on an impressive scale while few indeed were reinvested in the state. At the same time the political horizon tended to narrow down to Iraq and its immediate environs. One by one the provinces were thus left to fall to obstreperous, dexterous or undisturbed governors,\(^6\) rebels, heretics or robbers,\(^6\) while Iraq itself was slowly laid waste as dykes broke, peasants fled, and bedouin advanced in the tracks of mamlūk desolation.\(^6\) Meanwhile, in the provinces the combination of foreign governors and a passive populace meant that there were few local buffers
The emergence of the medieval polity

against the chaos spreading from Baghdad. Had the chaos broken out before the ‘Abbāsids adopted the mamlūk institution, such buffers might have appeared in the form of provincial warlords: the descendants of local ashrāf and Umayyad governors who took over Syria during the fourth civil war and its sequel and promised to be exactly that. Equally, had the chaos been brought under sufficient control for the ‘Abbāsids to obstruct the formation of local states, ashrāf and mamlūks might have merged as a'īyān and derebeys. But because the adoption of the mamlūk institution was immediately followed by loss of control, the men who took over were all mamlūks, foreign mercenaries or mercenary bedouin, whose states faithfully replicated the metropolis from which they had broken away. In terms of origin, they were all Muhammad ‘Alīs.

The disintegration of the ‘Abbāsid state was an intensely painful process in which it seemed at times as if the very venture of Islam was coming to an end, like that of Alexander the Great before it. While Byzantine armies marched into Syria to the accompaniment of euphoric Byzantine prophecies of a Jerusalem regained, the astrologers in a depopulated Baghdad stricken by military infighting, popular disorder, brigandage and famines, serenely predicted both a Persian restoration and the supersession of Islam by a new faith. Indeed, that Islam was soon to disappear was the very premise upon which the Ismā‘īlī revolutionaries held out their promise of a moral and material recovery: nothing less than a restoration of Adam’s faith in a post-physical world could now save the marriage between religion and power to which the Islamic polity owed its existence. And whether this polity could survive the divorce proceedings was still an open question.

Yet for all its agony the divorce was also a source of great relief to the Sunni world. The state had ceased to lay claim to religious authority, so that for the ‘ulamā’ it was no longer a competitor, and its very presence soon became sporadic. Hence where the ‘ulamā’ in the ‘Abbāsid cities had devoted enormous energy to defining their stand vis-à-vis the state, their successors in the Büyid cities were free to devote their attention to sorting out their position in whatever local society they found themselves. This was the development which permitted the emergence of the local notable, the distinctive figure of the medieval polity. The local notables were the obverse of the imported mamlūks: an urban elite, they were distinguished in negative terms by their lack of military and, except on a very minor scale, governmental functions, and in positive terms by their combination of both landed and commercial wealth and religious learning. They represented a fusion of the urban ‘ulamā’, who had so far
made a living by trade and craftsmanship, and the landed ex-asbrāf, ex-
governors and generals who had begun to take an interest in scholarship, a fusion which took place throughout the provincial cities of the Islamic world, and which is epitomized by the appearance of the sharīf in the medieval sense of sayyid, descendant of the Prophet. The medieval sharīf is an ‘Alid who is not a political pretender, usually not even a Shi‘ite, and who instead encashes his Prophetic genealogy as a title to local status. Such ‘Alids can be seen to have made their appearance in Hamadhān by the 870s, in Qazvin by the 940s, in Nīshāpūr by the 960s, and in Bayhaq by the end of the tenth century A.D. Wherever they appear, they are a sure sign that morally states have ceased to matter. And whenever they appear, the old fear of judicial office gives way to endless quarrels between such men and other local notables for precisely this office and the city headmanship. It was a development whereby the ‘ulamā‘ took on a role quite unlike that of any rabbi. Where the ‘ulamā‘ in caliphal Iraq had seen themselves as the leaders of a Muslim diaspora sub-
jected to a Pharaonic yoke, their successors in the days when the yoke had collapsed took advantage of the fact that the Pharaohs had in fact been their own. The ‘ulamā‘ inherited the land; they made themselves at home, founded dynasties of learned men, wrote local chronicles and engrossed themselves in the intricacies of family politics. And in that diversion of interests there was a great release of tension.

The peculiarity of the polity that ensued can be set out against the contrast of both Sāsānid Persia and medieval Europe. In Sāsānid Persia and the medieval West, landownership was vested in a military aristocracy, while religious learning was the monopoly of a church closely associated with this aristocracy in terms of both revenues and recruitment. The cities stood outside this framework. In Persia they were non-Iranian assets, and in Europe they were a late growth. Being centres of non-landed wealth and non-clerical learning, they were also rivals to the traditional holders of power: they supplied professional skills to the royal bureaucracy on the one hand, and bred religious dissidents on the other — Christians and Manichaenians in Persia, Waldensians in Europe. In one respect, of course, there is complete continuity between Sāsānid Persia and medieval Islam. The cities continued to produce professional men for the ruler’s administra-
tion and court; witness the doctors, astrologers and above all secretaries who upheld the tradition of secular learning in Islam, and who maintained the continuity of administrative practice which lay behind the endless political vicissitudes of the time. As in the days of the Sāsānids they were frequently recruited from among members of the minority religions, especially Christianity; even when they were not, they tended to stand
The emergence of the medieval polity

out against society at large. But what they stood out against had drastically changed. In Sasanid Persia their distinctiveness had arisen from the fact that they were an urban elite and what is more an Aramaean one, in a society which located its power in the Iranian countryside. But in medieval Islam the ethnic difference had disappeared and power had moved to the cities; and had this transfer represented a bourgeois revolution such as was eventually to take place in Europe, the professional men would have been its leading exponents. But it did not. Dhimmis and converts, the professional men stood out against the rest of society because they collaborated with a state from which the rest of society had withdrawn. It was not the bourgeoisie that had taken over, but the Muslims at large that had walked out. The commercial wealth of the cities, the landed property of the aristocracy and the religious learning of the church had all come together in a non-political elite; and the bourgeois appearance of medieval Muslim society arises precisely from its non-political character. The characteristic contrast in European history may be between city and countryside, but in medieval Islam it is between society and state.

There is another way of putting the same point. Just as Islam is unique among the great civilizations in the extent to which the state has ceased to embody public norms, so it is unique among pre-industrial societies in the extent to which government service has ceased to be associated with the ownership of land. The slave soldiers were no barons. Where the point of the European fief was to invest a native soldiery with land, that of the Muslim iqta' was precisely to dissociate a foreign soldiery from it, so that unlike the baron who was the apex of local society, the muqta', whatever his usurpation of governmental functions, was merely the local tax-collector: slaves vis-à-vis their lord, the mamluks were mercenaries vis-à-vis the land. Equally, the notables were no patricians. They did indeed combine landed and commercial wealth, urban residence and cultural leadership in a manner reminiscent of the elites of the medieval Italian and other cities. But the patricians of the European cities and city states, not to mention those of ancient Rome, were the wielders of public power, whereas the distinctive feature of the notables was precisely that the many assets they combined did not suffice to give them a share in such power. To that extent the medieval polity was comparable to a conquest society.

It is precisely the fact that the medieval polity was in the nature of a conquest society that explains some of its more striking features. Politically, the lack of integration between an alien state and a local society meant that there was far less to obstruct the workings of the central government, when a central government was present, than there was in medieval or
Failure of the Islamic empire

early modern Europe, and that conversely governors and notables alike were badly placed to take over the maintenance of local order if the central government collapsed. And the same disjunction explains why government so often took the form of manipulation. As the governor could play notables against each other by dangling official rewards such as the city headmanship, the qadāʾ, local tax-farms, perquisites, reliefs and benefits of all kinds, so the notables could bring their influence to bear on the governor by a judicious handling of the information and advice on which he depended to rule what to him was a foreign land. Hence the political pattern that accompanied this disjunction was one of oscillation between the extremes of despotism and anarchy on the part of the state, and ritual avoidance and factionalism on the part of the notables. It was a pattern on which the local variations are considerable, interesting and to a large extent still unexplained. But it only disappeared with the medieval polity itself.

Intellectually, it is the very totality of the disjunction between the exponents of state and religion that explains why the relationship between the two could come to be seen even by the medieval Muslims as a symbiosis: once the divorce was finalized, there was nothing to obstruct an improvement in the relationship between the divorcees. Having won the battle for religious authority, and lacking Shiʿite hopes of future glory, the Sunni ʿulamāʾ certainly showed themselves at their most generous, and in two ways an organic link between religion and politics remained. Internally, the ruler kept his providential role: he protected the Shariʿa, enabled the community to prosper, kept the roads safe, and for practical purposes that was enough. To be sure, Suyūṭī could still adduce a vast array of proof-texts in defence of his refusal to pay the customary visit to the sultan, and avoidance of the state remained the norm. But Suyūṭī’s intransigence reflects his own considerable self-esteem rather than a genuinely widespread fear of the polluting touch of power. The truth of the matter was that where the Umayyad loss of sanctity had been outrageous, the openly profane nature of a stage such as that of Mamluk Egypt was really very comforting; so that where the early traditionists had lost no time in rejecting the Umayyads as Pharaohs, their medieval successors accepted even Pharaoh as a representative of divine providence. In theory the ruler was a shepherd; and in practice the mamlūks, for all that they might fleece their sheep, directed their predatory instincts mainly against their own kind.

Externally, the ruler retained the obligation of jihād. The doubts which the jurists of Aghlabid North Africa had evinced as to the status of holy war conducted by an illegitimate ruler never resulted in an unambiguous
The emergence of the medieval polity

internalization of *jihād* among the Sunnis as it did among the Shi'ites. Holy war remained an exoteric activity in the performance of which even a ruler by usurpation could gain for himself a certain instrumental sanctity. Certainly, for all his services to Islam even so great a warrior as Saladin held only profane power; but for all their unashamed profanity even so alien a set of rulers as the slaves of Mamluk Egypt could legitimate their rule by brilliant defence of Islam. It is thus not surprising that when a Muslim empire rose again, it did so as a *ghābār* state.

At the same time the occlusion of sacred politics opened up a new dimension of *jihād* in holy war against corrupt believers. In itself of course the phenomenon was not new. Long before medieval times Muslims had raised armies in the backlands for a conquest of the settled states; witness the Ibādis, Zaydis, Carmathians and Fātimids. But there was a significant doctrinal shift. Just as the imamate ceased to generate new heresies, so the desert ceased to be the breeding-ground of heretics: it was now Sunnis who enrolled the tribes. The ease with which the orthodox learning of the urban ‘ulamā’, be it reformist or Sufi, passed into programmes of militant activism at the hands of Almoravids and Almohads, or for that matter Wahhābis and Sanūsīs, is quite without precedent in classical Islam.

We thus have the elements for the alternation between tribal and servile rule which became so characteristic a feature of medieval Islamic history. At one extreme we have the religious conquerors from the desert such as the Arabs themselves or their Berber imitators, at the other extreme the Central Asiatic slaves imported by the ‘Abbāsids and the successor dynasties; and in between we have their permutations. Central Asian conquerors followed in the wake of the imported slaves, Central Asian slaves took over from their importers, while mercenary tribesmen set up their local dynasties and once more imported slaves. But it was a coming and going of states over a society which, for all the chaos and factionalism which it experienced, remained extremely stable.

By way of epilogue we may return to the subject with which this study began, the contrasting relationship between tribes and civilization in the Chinese and the Middle Eastern worlds. We left the Turkish and Mongol barbarians to their fate of Sinification in China, and we have now been through the formation of one aspect of the civilization which the Arabs created for the Middle East. How then do the Chinese and the Muslim views of tribal conquerors compare? There is one irresistible contrast here, that between the Confucian theorists and Ibn Khaldūn, both celebrated propounders of cyclical theories of history. For the Confucians as for Ibn Khaldūn, history consisted of dynamic cycles punctuated, *inter alia*, by
tribal conquest; but the moral evaluations of this scheme are radically dis-
similar, and it is the dissimilarity that we must proceed to consider.

The attention of the Chinese was riveted on the inevitable decline of
settled dynasties. Such dynasties were seen as running out of a quality
defined now as virtue and now as a Spenglerian life-force, through the
gradual loss of which they would sooner or later reach the nadir where a
fresh dynasty must take over. Tribal conquest belonged at the rock
bottom of the cycle, and of tribal decay the Chinese had no real notion:
being barbarians, the tribesmen possessed no virtue that could be cor-
rupted. That barbarians could not govern China as such was taken as
axiomatic. But were the tribesmen to lose their ancestral rudeness, the
Chinese would construe the loss, which the barbarians themselves usually
lamented, as acquisition of the very virtues which Chinese government
represented: the transition from tribal to settled rule could not fail
to be a transition to better, stronger and more enduring government.

Ibn Khaldūn, by contrast, was fascinated by the inevitable decline of
tribal dynasties, and where the Chinese tried to define the properties of
virtue, Ibn Khaldūn laboured to identify the nature of tribal solidarity.
In his scheme tribal conquest marks the high point of the cycle, and the
loss of tribal ties is seen as a proof not that settled government will win
out, but that tribal conquest must of necessity recur. The idea that the
transition to settled rule could be a transition to better, stronger and
more enduring government never suggested itself to him, and he would
certainly have been puzzled by Manchu or Frankish history, had he known
of them: as far as he was concerned, civilization equalled effeminate cor-
ruption. Ibn Khaldūn, in short, saw the cycles from the barbarian’s
point of view: we have here the Muslim fixation on the tribal past restated
in the secular terms of macro-history.

Ibn Khaldūn’s theory, however, has to be seen in the light of his evalua-
tion of the mamlūk institution. In a celebrated passage he praises this
institution as a gift from God for the salvation of Islam. Its benefit
consists in the fact that it enables the Turkish tribes which are imported
from the land of heathendom to embrace Islam with the determination of
true believers, all while retaining their nomadic virtues undefiled by lust-
ful pleasure, untouched by the excess of luxury, unmarred by the habits
of civilization. The passage brilliantly describes the mamlūks as institution-
alized tribal conquerors. What this means is that Ibn Khaldūn saw the
medieval polity as consisting of a settled non-political society and a tribal
state, be it imported or imposed by conquest. He saw, in other words,
that the medieval polity was in the nature of a conquest society, and if
the idea of applauding the transition to settled rule did not suggest itself
to him, it was for the simple reason that Islam, in such contrast to China, lacked a form of settled government to which the transition could have been made. Politics in Islam had remained the domain of the barbarians: it was precisely the non-political nature of settled society that gave Ibn Khaldūn so strong a feeling that civilization was effeminate.

The reason why Ibn Khaldūn had so clear a view of the nature of Islamic politics is partly that he was a very clever man, and more particularly that he was a highly cultured man of urban origin whose lifelong ambition was to be a great politician.\textsuperscript{7} In his failure the political evolution of Islam has come full circle. It was because the Arab fixation on the tribal past had been religiously fixed that the Muslims handed over power to slaves and tribes; and it was because power had thus been handed over to slaves and tribes that a medieval Muslim became a statesman manqué who could do no better than to sublimate his disappointment into a theory of the circulation of tribal elites.
Virtually all the families included in this list are said to have been sharifian in the technical sense of the word (sharif labu bayt qadim or statements to similar effect), but ambiguities do of course occur: the pretensions may be spurious or the nobility may lie in the character. Where such doubts arise, this is stated. Since the number of sharifian families in an Arab settlement was necessarily considerable, the list is by no means exhaustive. With a few exceptions only families that can be followed for a minimum of three generations have been included.

A. SYRIA (WITHOUT QINNASRĪN)

(1) Bahdal b. Unayf al-Kalbī. Bahdal belonged to the chiefly house of the B. Ḥāritha b. Janāb/Kalb and made his fortune by marrying off a daughter to Muʿāwiya (Encyclopaedia of Islam¹, s.v.; cf. also Lammens, Études sur le règne du Calife Omaïyade Muʿāwiya, pp. 286f). Three of his descendants dominated the political scene of Sufyānid Syria. Ḥassān b. Mālik b. Bahdal commanded the Quḍāʿa of Damascus at Ǧißin for Muʿāwiya (Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, Waqāʾat Ǧißin, p. 233; Dinawārī, Akhbār, p. 184), governed Jordan and Palestine for Muʿāwiya and Yazīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 468; Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 65, vol. v, p. 128), and led the movement in favour of an Umayyad candidate after the death of Yazīd I (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 63ff); though at first he supported Khālid b. Yazīd, he was brought to accept Marwān at Ǧābiya (ibid., vol. v, pp. 128, 130), fought for him at Marj Rāḥit (ibid., vol. v, p. 138) and agreed to change the succession in favour of his sons (ibid., vol. v, p. 150). Later he supported ʿAbd al-Mālik against ʿAmr b. Saʿīd al-Asdaq (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 785; cf. also Encyclopaedia of Islam¹, s.v. ʿḤassān b. Mālik”). A Ḥassān b. Mālik appears as the issuer of a bilingual entagion dated 70 A.H. and a Ḥassān who is perhaps identical with him is mentioned in two slightly earlier Greek documents (P. Colt 67, 92f in Kraemer,
Appendix I: Ashraf

Non-literary Papyri, pp. 196f 290ff). The reading of the names is uncertain and the chronicles do not remember Hassān as having resumed his governorship of Palestine after the civil war, but this is clearly not impossible. Sa‘īd b. Mālik b. Bahdal, his brother, was governor of Qinnasrin for Yazīd I (Aghāni, vol. xix, p. 195). Ḥumayd b. Ḥurayth b. Bahdal, his cousin, was head of Yazīd’s šurta (Balādhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 6, 60) and leader of the tribal feuds between Kalb and Qays after Marj Rāḥit (ibid., vol. v, pp. 308ff); under ‘Abd al-Malik he supported Ashdaq (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 784ff).

The family disappeared almost completely in the Marwānid period. It made a brief reappearance in the third civil war when Khālid b. ‘Uthmān b. Sa‘īd b. Bahdal fought against the Yamaniyya as the head of Walid II’s šurta (ibid., p. 1803; Ibn al-Kalbī, Ḡambara, s.v. ‘Ḥālid b. ‘Utmān’), while an unnamed member of the family fought on the other side as a Yemeni commander who was sent to reinforce the Syrians in Iraq in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 19). It reappeared again in the reign of Hārūn when ‘Āṣīm b. Muḥammad b. Bahdal al-Kalbī emerged as the leader of the Yemenis in the factionalism between Qays and Yemen in Damascus (Ibn ‘Asākir, Tahdhlīb, vol. vii, pp. 129ff).

(2) Dhū Asbah and Dhū ‘l-Kala’ were the two major Himyari families in Ḥims. Abraha b. al-Šabbāh and Abū Shamir, his son, were among the conquerors of Egypt where most of the Asbahīs settled (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2586f, cf. ser. ii, p. 211; Kindī, Governors, p. 12, cf. p. 19). Kurayb b. Abraha Abū Rishdīn was head of Himyar in Syria under Mu‘āwiya and fought for the latter in the civil war (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ḡambara, s.v.). He later went to Egypt, supported Ibn al-Zubayr in the second civil war, negotiated the treaty with Marwān after the Egyptian defeat, and was sent by ‘Abd al-Malik to Byzantium together with Ḥumayd b. Ḥurayth b. Bahdal to negotiate yet another treaty for the caliph (Kindī, Governors, pp. 41f, 44; Balādhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 300; cf. also Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 786). A cousin of his, Ayyūb b. Shurahbīl b. al-Šabbāh, was governor of Egypt for ‘Umar II (Kindī, Governors, pp. 67ff). Naḍr b. Ya‘rīm b. Ma‘dikarīb b. Abraha b. al-Šabbāh stayed in Syria where he was head of Himyar and governor of Palestine for ‘Umar II (Khalīfa, Ta‘rīkh, p. 465; Ibn al-Kalbī, Ḡambara, table 278 and s.v. ‘al-Naḍr b. Ya‘rīm’). Thereafter the family disappears. One hears only of the South Arabian branch of Asbahīs in the third civil war, in which they appear as followers of Abū
Syria


Samayfa‘ b. Nākūr Dhū‘l-Kalā‘, the founder of the other family, was among the conquerors of Syria (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gamhara*, s.v.; Tābārī, ser. i, pp. 2082, 2085, 2094, 2151ff, 2389). He also settled in Hims and fought for Mu‘āwiya at Siffin, where he fell (Khalifa, *Ta‘rikh*, pp. 220, 222; Nasr b. Muzāhīm, *Waqqat Saffin*, pp. 233f, 239, 269; Tābārī, ser. i, p. 3314). Another two members of his family are supposed to have participated in the battle, but their names are clearly Asbahl (Nasr b. Muzāhīm, *Waqqat Saffin*, pp. 234, 358; Khalifa, *Ta‘rikh*, p. 219; Dīnawarī, *Akhbār*, p. 184). Shurahbīl b. Dhī‘l-Kalā‘ was sent by Nu‘mān b. Bashir, the Zubayrist governor of Hims, to reinforce Dahhāk b. Qays against the Umayyads in the second civil war (Tābārī, ser. ii, p. 474; but the Zubayrist sympathies of the family were perhaps limited, for it was also Kalā‘īs who hunted down Nu‘mān after the defeat, *ibid.*). He later joined the army of ‘Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād, fought against the Tawwābūn and fell against Ibn al-Ashtar at Khāzir (*ibid.*, pp. 533, 557ff, 711, 715). Several other Kalā‘īs are known, though their precise relationship cannot be reconstructed. Thus Khālid b. Ma‘dān b. Abī Karib al-Kalā‘ī was head of the *shurta* of Yazīd I, a participant in Maslama’s expedition against Constantinople, and a traditionist (Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tabābīb*, vol. v, p. 86; Tābārī, ser. ii, p. 1315). ‘Imrān b. al-Nu‘mān al-Kalā‘ī was governor of Sind for ‘Umar II (Khalifa, *Ta‘rikh*, p. 430). Saqī b. Saffwān al-Kalā‘ī is supposed to have participated in the battle of Marj Rāhīt, though on what side is not stated; in the third civil war he was among the Ḥimsī *asbrāf* whom Yazīd III took great care to conciliate after he had suppressed their revolt and received their allegiance (Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tabābīb*, vol. vi, p. 444; Tābārī, ser. ii, pp. 183of).

(3) Haywil b. Yasār Abū Kabsha al-Sakāṣik/Kinda. Abū Kabsha, whose *ism* is also given as Jabawil or ‘Ulaqa, was one of the few Syrian *asbrāf* to found a family of generals. He is said to have been ‘arīf of Sakāṣik (Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tabābīb*, vol. v, p. 22), but that is probably a misreading of his tribal group, ‘Ariq of Sakāṣik (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gamhara*, table 243), for he was scarcely less than a *ra‘s al-gabila*. Like so many other Syrian
Appendix i: Ashraf

Ashraf he is said to have been sent by Yazid I to Ibn al-Zubayr to demand allegiance from the latter (Baladhurī, ʿAnsāb, vol. iv b, p. 20), and he was one of the men who met at Jābiya to elect Marwān (Baladhurī, ʿAnsāb, vol. v, p. 128). Ibn al-Kalbī lists him as the father of Yazīd and Ziyād (Gambara, table 243). Yazīd b. Abī Kabsha was head of ʿAbd al-Malik's shurta for a while (Khalīfah, Taʾrikh, p. 349). In 79 he was in Iraq where Ḥajjāj sent him on a campaign against a Khārijite (ibid., p. 358) and appointed him head of his shurta in Wāṣit (ibid., p. 411, where Abu ʿUlaqā should be emended to Abū ʿUlāqa; Baladhurī, ʿAnsāb, vol. xi, p. 270).

In 94 he conducted a campaign against the Byzantines (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1256), and in 95 he became governor of Iraq for a short while on the death of Ḥajjāj (ibid., pp. 1268f). Sulaymān appointed him governor of Sind where he seized Muhammad b. al-Qāsim al-Thaqafi, the governor and relative of Ḥajjāj, and where he died soon after his arrival (Khalīfah, Taʾrikh, pp. 429f; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, vol. iv, p. 465). Nothing is known of Ziyād b. Abī Kabsha, but Sarī b. Ziyād, his son, was among the conspirators against Walīd II and he is doubtless identical with the Abū ʿUlāqa al-Saksākī who appears among the leaders of the Yamanīyya in Syria in 127 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1800, 1878, 1894).

(4) Hubaysb b. Dalja al-Qaynī. Dalja b. al-Mushammit, a Qudāʾ sharif who settled in Jordan, is said to have visited the Prophet and to have wintered at Balda in 36 (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambara, s.v. ‘Dalga b. al-Musammit’). Hubaysb b. Dalja Abū ʿAbd al-rahmān, his son, commanded the Jordanian Qudāʾa at Siffin for Muʿāwiya (Khalīfah, Taʾrikh, p. 222; Naṣr b. Muzāḥim, Wāqʿat Siffin, p. 234). In 47 and 48 he wintered at Antioch (Khalīfah, Taʾrikh, pp. 244, 245; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 84, 85); in 63 he commanded the Jordanian troops with Muslim b. ʿUqba in the Hijāz (Yaʿqūb, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 299; Baladhurī, ʿAnsāb, vol. iv b, pp. 41, 47); and in 65 he was put in command of an army which was sent by Marwān against Ibn al-Zubayr and which was defeated at Rabadha where he fell (Baladhurī, ʿAnsāb, vol. v, pp. 150ff; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 578ff). The family then disappears completely until 126 when Jordan rebelled against Yazīd III. The formal leader of the revolt was Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Malik (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1831), but when Yazīd III sent Sulaymān b. Hishām to Jordan it was Ḥakam b. Jurw and Rāshid b. Jurw al-
Syria 97

Qaynī that he was concerned to mollify (ibid., p. 1832); they may therefore be taken to have been the real leaders of what feeble resistance there was in the district. Their full nasab is never given, but there can scarcely be any doubt as to their identity; Ibn al-Kalbi, whose list of Qayn is extraordinarily detailed, only has four Qaynīs by the name of Jurw, and of these three are related to Dalja b. al-Mushammit (Ibn al-Kalbi, Ġambara, tables 313 and 324); in all likelihood it was two grandsons of Hubaysh who led the movement against Yazid III in Jordan just as it was descendants of Sufyānid ashrāf, who led it in the other districts.

(5) Ḥusayn b. Numayr al-Sakūnī. Ḥusayn was one of the most famous members of the Sufyānid nobility. Sayf has his career start already in 11 (Tabari, ser. i, p. 2004, cf. p. 2220) which seems unduly early for a man who was killed fifty-six years later, and we are on firmer ground when we are told that he conducted summer campaigns in 58 and 62 (Khalifa, Taʾrikh, pp. 271, 288). He was governor of Hims for Yazid I and commanded the jund of Hims in Muslim b. ‘Uqba’s expedition to the Hijāz, where he succeeded to the general command on Muslim’s death (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Huṣayn b. Numayr’).

On the news of the death of Yazid he offered Ibn al-Zubayr his allegiance on condition that the latter come to Syria, but Ibn al-Zubayr refused (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 430ff) and Ḥusayn returned to Syria to participate in the election of another caliph at Jabiya, where he came out in support of Marwān (ibid., pp. 474, 487; Balādhuṭi, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 134). He was then sent against Iraq, fought the Tawwābūn and fell at Khāzir against Ibn al-Ashtar (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 557ff, 714). Yazid b. Ḥusayn, his son, also participated in the battle against the Tawwābūn (ibid., p. 560). He was later governor of Hims for ‘Umar II (Khalifa, Taʾrikh, p. 465). Muʾawiya b. Yazid b. Ḥusayn is not heard of until 126 when the populace of Hims mutinied on hearing of Walid’s murder, destroyed the house of ‘Abbās b. Walid, elected Muʾawiya their leader and refused to pay homage to Yazid III (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1826). Yazid easily put down the revolt, showered honours on the disgruntled ashrāf, and appointed Muʿawiya governor of Hims (ibid., pp. 1826ff, 1830ff, 1834), but Muʿawiya and other ruʾūs nonetheless could not wait to pay allegiance to Marwān II when the latter came to Syria (ibid., p. 1892), and Numayr b. Yazid, the brother of Muʿawiya b. Yazid, went with Marwān’s governor to Egypt (Kindī, Governors, p. 88).
Appendix I: Ashraf

(6) Khuraym/Huraym b. ‘Amr al-Murri. The sharifian status of this family is doubtful in the extreme. Khuraym does appear at Mu‘awiya’s court, but only in connection with a spurious story (Baladhuri, Ansáb, vol. iv a, p. 137), and he certainly receives none of the attention accorded to ‘Abdallâh b. Mas‘ada al-Fazârî (cf. no. 7) or Hammâm b. Qabîsa al-Numayrî, the head of the Damascene Qays who commanded a rub’ for Mu‘awiya at Siffin and fell at Marj Râhît in support of Ibn al-Zubayr (Naṣr b. Muzâhîm, Waq‘at Siffin, p. 233; Baladhuri, Ansáb, vol. v, p. 137). It is thus not surprising that whereas Hammâm’s family disappears in the Marwanid period, that of Khuraym becomes increasingly prominent. Khuraym himself figures at the court of Sulaymân and he would seem to have been implicated in the revolt of Qutayba (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1300, 1312). Junayd b. ‘Abd al-Rahmân, his nephew, was governor of Sind under Yazid II and Hishâm (ibid., p. 1467; Khalîfa, Ta‘rikh, p. 538, cf. p. 484 where he has become ‘Abd al-Ḥamîd; Baladhuri, Futûh, p. 442), and in 112 he was appointed to Khurâşân where he died in 115 or 116 (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1527 ff., 1564; cf. also Ibn al-Kalbi, Gambarâ, table 127). He is said only to have appointed Muḍarîs (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1529). ‘Umâra b. Khuraym was in the service of Junayd in Khurâşân and was briefly deputy governor there (ibid., pp. 1529, 1532, 1565). ‘Uthmân b. ‘Umâra. b. Khuraym was a member of Mansûr’s sahâba and probably identical with the Abû Yahyâ b. Khuraym who fought against Ibrâhîm b. ‘Abdallâh in Basra in 145 (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 281, 305); according to Ibn al-Kalbi he was also governor of Armenia and Khurâşân for Mahdî, which is certainly wrong (Gambarâ, s.v.); but under Hârûn he was governor of Sîstân (Khalîfa, Ta‘rikh, p. 745; Ta‘rikh-i Sîstân, pp. 152 ff where he has become Khuzayma al-Muzâni). Khuraym b. Abî Yahyâ was an authority on the Syrian Qays (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1300, cf. p. 1302). ‘Ămir b. ‘Umâra b. Khuraym Abû’l-Haydâm was the leader of Qays in the factionalism which broke out in Damascus in 176 (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1565, ser. iii, pp. 624 ff.; Ibn ‘Asâkîr, Tabbîb, vol. vii, pp. 176 ff.).

(7) Mas‘ada b. Hakama al-Fazârî. Mas‘ada is said to have been killed in Zayd b. Ḥâritha’s raid on Fazâra, as a result of which ‘Abdallâh b. Mas‘ada was brought to the Prophet (Tabari, ser. i, p. 1557). ‘Abdallâh and ‘Abd al-Rahmân, his brother, both settled in Damascus where they were among the ashrâf of Qays. ‘Abd al-Rahmân conducted summer campaigns under Mu‘awiya and is said to have gone with other ashrâf and his brother to extract an oath of alleg-

(8) Qays b. Thawr al-Sakūnī. Qays was a minor *sharīf* from Hims who is found in the entourage of Mu‘awiya (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 49). ‘Amr b. Qays, his son, was sent to reinforce Maslama in Azerbayjan in 98 and/or he conducted a summer campaign in that year (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1317); in 100 he conducted another summer campaign with Walīd b. Hishām al-Mu‘ayyī (ibid., p. 1349); and in 126 he was able to assist Walid II with 500 men, though there is no indication that he was governor of Hims (ibid., p. 1802). Insofar as his career is known, it is thus a distinctively military one, and one would have expected him to have joined the *Yamanīyya*; if nonetheless he not only assisted Walid, but also supported the revolt of the *asbrāf* against Yazid III (ibid., pp. 1826f), it was perhaps because his career had been enacted on the Syro-Byzantine frontier rather than in Iraq, with the result that behaviourally he was a Qaysi. He is not, it is true, mentioned among the generals who joined Marwān on the latter’s arrival, but that was scarcely to be expected of a very old man: he died in 140 at the age of a hundred (Ibn Hibbān, *’Ulamā*, p. 117). His son ‘Īsā Abū Jamal, however, must have been one of them, for he commanded the *jund* of Qinnasrin in the army of Marwān’s governor in Egypt (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 88). It is worth noting that ‘Īsā’s career continued under the ‘Abbāsids: he was governor of Basra for Mansūr in 143 and 152 (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambara*, s.v. ‘‘Īsā b. ‘Amr’; Khalīfa, *Ta’rikh*, pp. 646, 660, 674f, where he has become a Saksaki). Abū Thawr b. ‘Īsā was reduced to the local role of governor of Hims under Harūn before the family disappeared (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambara*, s.v.).

(9) Rawh b. Zanbā al-Judhāmī. Zanbā, the founder of the family, is
Appendix I: Asbrāf

credited with suhba (Lammens, *Califat de Yazīd*, ch. 20, with other details on the family). Salāma b. Zanbā‘ appears in a majlis with ‘Amr b. al-‘Āṣ at the latter’s estate in Beersheba in 36 (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3250; for the location of ‘Amr’s estate see *ibid.*, p. 2967). Rawḥ b. Zanbā‘ was the most successful member of the family. Yazīd I sent him along with other asbrāf to demand an oath of allegiance from Ibn al-Zubayr (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 20) and he commanded the Palestinian troops in Muslim b. ‘Uqba’s expedition to the Hijāz (Ya‘qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 299; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 424). His rivalry with Nāṭīl b. Qays over the riyaṣā has already been described (above, p. 34). At Jābiya he supported the candidature of Marwān (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 134f), and he became one of the most influential advisers of ‘Abd al-Malik, who is said to have made him his secretary (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1164; Jahshiyārī, *Wurtard*, p. 35). He was deputy governor of Palestine for ‘Abd al-Malik in the reign of Marwān, and he also assisted Bishr b. Marwān in Iraq (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 149; Jahshiyārī, *Wurtard*, pp. 36f; Mas‘ūdī, *Murūj*, vol. v, pp. 254ff). His sons certainly inherited a good deal of prestige, and it is not surprising that Sa‘īd b. Rawḥ could be described as ra‘ al-Filastīn (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1831). But they inherited little of their father’s power, and they are never heard of during the Marwānid period until they rebelled in 126 under the nominal leadership of Yazīd b. Sulaymān b. ‘Abd al-Malik (*ibid.*, pp. 1831f). The revolt was not a source of much danger to Yazīd III, who offered Dab‘ān b. Rawḥ the governorship of Palestine in the expectation that he would find the offer irresistible, as indeed he did (*ibid.*, p. 1832). Ḥakam b. Dab‘ān, however, continued the family’s attempt to recover its former prominence. According to one version he took control of Palestine on the death of Yazīd III with the help of Lakhm and Judhām, giving his allegiance to Sulaymān b. Hishām (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 152); another version has him take over at the time of Marwān’s defeat at the Zāb (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 47); while finally a third version states that he rebelled with ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Alī in 136, on which occasion several members of his family got killed (Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 103ff; cf. Omar, *Abbasid Caliphate*, p. 185). ‘Abdallāh b. Yazīd b. Rawḥ, by contrast, remained loyal to Marwān (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 47; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, p. 136). However this may be, the family scarcely mattered politically thereafter. Rawḥ [b. ‘? b. Rawḥ b. Zanbā‘ did indeed rise to the position
of deputy governor of Egypt for Ibrāhīm b. Śāliḥ in 176 (Kindl, Governors, p. 135). But ‘Abdallāh b. Yazīd b. Rāwḥah and Rājā’ b. Salāma b. Rāwḥah are known only as transmitters (Tabārī, ser. ii, pp. 374, 1831). The contrast between the sharīfī descendants of Rāwḥah b. Zanbā’ī with their popular and semi-tribal support on the one hand, and the upstart soldier Thābit b. Nū‘aym with his Palestinian troops on the other, is perhaps the single most illuminating illustration of the Marwānīd evolution (cf. Appendix IV, no. 34).

(10) Simt b. al-Aswād al-Kindī. Simt and his son Shurāḥbīl figure as staunch Muslims in the wars of the ridda (Tabārī, ser. i, pp. 2004f), and both distinguished themselves in the wars of conquest, the one in Syria and the other in Iraq (ibid., pp. 2225, 2265 etc.; Balādhurī, Futūḥ, pp. 131, 137f, 145, 245). Simt settled in Hims and Shurāḥbīl in Kufa, but when the latter came up against the rivalry of Ash’āth b. Qays al-Kindī, he left to join his father in Hims (Balādhurī, Futūḥ, pp. 133f; cf. below, no. 21). Shurāḥbīl was a firm supporter of Mu‘āwiya in the first civil war, and he is described as one of the most important men in Syria at the time (Naṣr b. Muzāhim, Waq‘at Siffin, pp. 49ff). Nonetheless he and his descendants seem to have lost out completely to Husayn b. Numayr. There is virtually no information about them until the third civil war, though an Ibn al-Simt b. Shurāḥbīl is mentioned as having been in Iraq at the time of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab’s revolt during which he was taken prisoner and apparently executed by the rebels (De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 58; the reversal of the two names is commonplace). In 126, however, Simt b. Thābit b. Yazīd b. Shurāḥbīl b. al-Simt came forward as the second leader of the revolt against Yazīd III side by side with Mu‘āwiya b. Yazīd b. Husayn b. Numayr with whom he is said to have been on bad terms (Tabārī, ser. ii, pp. 1827f). Like his rival he received a great deal of honorific attention from Yazīd III after the revolt had been put down (ibid., p. 1830), but unlike him he would appear to have found Marwānī II no more to his liking, for he is said to have been crucified by him after participation in the Himsi revolt against him (Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbār, p. 485; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 404; Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambarā, s.v.); according to another version, however, he and his son were both crucified in the reign of Hārūn (sic), presumably for ‘asabiyya (Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbār, pp. 487f; cf. Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, p. 495; perhaps a later generation
of the family is intended). The B. al-Simt who took control of Hims during the fourth civil war and its aftermath, were doubtless descendants of this family (Ya'qubi, Historiae, p. 541).

(11) Yazid b. Asad b. Kurz al-Qasri. Asad b. Kurz is said to have been now a runaway slave and now the chief of Bajila, and his sharifian status is correspondingly uncertain (Gabrieli, Il Califato di Hishâm, pp. 6f). However this may be, Yazid b. Asad, his son, settled in Syria, where he is said to have been a fervent ‘Uthmân throughout the first civil war (Tabari, ser. i, pp. 2985, 3265; Naṣr b. Muzâhim, Waq‘at Sifín, pp. 49, 190, 271f etc). He commanded the Damascene troops in ‘Amr b. al-‘As’ reconquest of Egypt and conducted a summer campaign for Yazid in 64 (Ya’qubi, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 226; Khalifa, Taʾrikh, p. 319).

‘Abdallah b. Asad, his brother, conducted a similar campaign in 62 (ibid., p. 288). ‘Abdallah b. Yazid, his son, fought for Ibn al-Zubayr at Marj Râhît (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 794; differently Ibn Habîb, Muḥabbâr, p. 262); he also supported the revolt of ‘Amr b. Saʿīd al-Asdaq, fled to Muṣ‘ab and eventually got amân from ‘Abd al-Malik (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 138f, vol. v, pp. 299, 354). His two sons were among the most prominent men of the Marwānīd period. Khâlid b. ‘Abdallah was perhaps governor of Rayy in 83 (Gaube, Numismatik, p. 79); he was certainly governor of Mecca for Walid from 89 (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1199, 1231, 1305; Khalifa, Taʾrikh, pp. 400, 415, 428); and in 105 Hishâm appointed him to Iraq, where he stayed for fifteen years, making vast profits, enthusing the Yemenis and indulging the Christians until he was dismissed and imprisoned in 120, harassed for a number of years, and finally sold to Yūsuf b. ‘Umar al-Thaqafi, his successor in office, who had him killed under torture in 126 (Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 328ff, 358f).

Asad b. ‘Abdallah, his brother, was governor of Khurāsân in 116–9 and 117–20 (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v.). Several of his relatives were among the Yamanîyya of the third civil war. Yazid b. Khâlid fought on the side of Yazid III, apparently as the head of his šbūta, and led the Damascene revolt against Marwān II who had him executed (De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 152; Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1841f, 1878, 1893f). Muhammad b. Khâlid rebelled in Kufa in favour of the approaching Khurāsânî armies (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 18ff). Ismāʾîl b. ‘Abdallah fled from Marwān to Iraq where he participated in the faction fighting between Qays and Yemen and became governor of Kufa for ‘Abdallah b. ‘Umar
Syria 103

(ībid., ser. ii, pp. 1881ff, 1902, ser. iii, p. 66; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 616). And Abūl-Asad, a client of Khalūd or more probably of Asad al-Qasrī under whom he had served in Khurāsān, was likewise among the soldiers of Yazīd III (Ṭabarānī, ser. ii, pp. 1650f, 1860f, 1841f, 1878f). After the revolution Muḥammad b. Khalīd was governor of Mecca, Medina and Tāʾīf for Mansūr (Ṭabarānī, ser. iii, pp. 137, 141, 143, 161ff), while Ismāʿīl b. ʿAbdallāh became governor of Mosul and a member of Mansūr’s šahāba (Azdī, Mawsil, pp. 178, 214f, 217; cf. Ṭabarānī, ser. iii, p. 402). Yazīd b. Jarīr b. Yazīd b. Khalīd b. ʿAbdallāh al-Qasrī was governor of the Yemen for Maʾmūn (Ṭabarānī, ser. iii, pp. 857, 863f).

(12) Ziml al-ʿUdhri and Ziml al-Saksākī. These two Yemeni ashrāf have become somewhat mixed up in the sources. Ziml (Zāmil, Zumayl) b. ʿAmr al-ʿUdhri is said to have visited the Prophet with a delegation of ʿUdhra (Ibn ʿAsākir, Tabābib, vol. v, p. 383). He settled in Gerasa (cf. Ṭabarānī, ser. ii, p. 478), fought for Muʿawiyah in the first civil war, and appears as one of the witnesses to the arbitration agreement of Siffin (ībid., ser. i, p. 3338). Either he or his Saksākī namesake was head of Muʿawiyah’s shurta (ībid., ser. ii, p. 205; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tabābib, vol. v, p. 383). Yazīd I made him his secretary and also sent him to Ibn al-Zubayr along with the other ashrāf (Masʿūdi, Tanbih, p. 306 = 397; Balāḏurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 20). After Yazīd’s death he was one of the men who gathered around Ḥassān b. Bahdāl at Jābiya and he fell at Marj Rāḥīt (Balāḏurī, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 128; Ṭabarānī, ser. ii, p. 478). An Ibn Ziml al-ʿUdhri is mentioned under ʿAbd al-Malik, but the family would appear to have played no further role in politics (Balāḏurī, Ansāb, vol. xi, p. 164). Mudlij b. Miqdād b. Ziml and Ḥārith b. Hānī b. Mudlij b. Miqdād al-Zimli were transmitters (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ġambarā, s.v. Mudlij b. Miqdād; Ibn ʿAsākir, Tabābib, vol. iii, p. 460; the Ibn Mudlij al-ʿUdhri who is mentioned as having received property in Damascus at the time of the conquests by Ibn ʿAsākir, Taʾrikh, vol. ii, p. 126, was doubtless a member of this family).

Ziml b. ʿAbd al-Rāhmān al-Saksākī was a shariʿ from Bayt Lihya in the district of Damascus and the father of Daḥḥak and ʿAbbās (Ibn ʿAsākir, Tabābib, vol. vii, p. 2; Ibn al-Kalbī, Ġambarā, table 243 and s.v.). As mentioned already, he himself may have been head of Muʿawiyah’s shurta. A son of his is found in the entourage of Muʿawiyah (Balāḏurī, Ansāb, vol. iv a, p. 49).
Dähhāk b. Zīml (commonly Ramal) was governor of the Yemen for Yazīd or Walīd II and an authority on Syrian affairs (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 552; Ibn ‘Asākir, Tabdhib, vol. vii, p. 3; Azdī, Mawsil, pp. 15, 136). Hajjāj b. Zīml accompanied Marwān II on his flight from Syria, refusing to leave a man who had honoured him (Azdī, Mawsil, pp. 136f).

Ibn ‘Asākir notwithstanding, Zāmīl b. ‘Āmr b. Ḥubrānī who was governor of Damascus for Marwān II, was not a member of either family (Tabdhib, vol. v, p. 346; cf. Appendix IV, no. 82).

B. QINNASRĪN AND THE JAZĪRA

(13) ‘Adī b. ‘Āmmīra al-Kindī. ‘Adī was the head of Banū Arqam, a small branch of the Mu‘āwiya al-Akrūmūn/Kinda who had gone to Kūfa after the conquests, but who migrated to the Jazīra on the outbreak of the first civil war; here they settled in Edessa as adherents of Mu‘āwiya, and ‘Adī fought in the battle of Sīfīn on his side (Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbār, p. 295; Balādhurī, Futūḥ, p. 205; Ibn al-Kalbī, Ğambara, s.v. ‘Adī b. ‘Āmmīra’, cf. also table 237). Some remained in Kūfa, where Arqam b. ‘Ābdallāh was among the followers of Ḥujr b. ‘Adī al-Kindī (Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv a, pp. 220, 228; Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 136, 139, 144); but in the Jazīra ‘Adī b. ‘Adī b. ‘Āmmīra appears in the rather different role of commander for Muhammad b. Marwān, who sent him against the local Khārījīs (Tabarī, ser. ii. pp. 887ff); he was also among the Jazīran soldiers who were called in to deal with Shabīb for Ḥajjāj in Iraq (ibid., pp. 897, 899, 921); and finally he was governor of Armenia, Azerbayjan and the Jazīra at various times for Sulaymān and ‘Umar II (Balādhurī, Futūḥ, p. 205; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, pp. 426, 464; Ibn al-Kalbī, Ğambara, s.v. ‘Adī b. ‘Adī’).

‘Urs b. Qays, who was the last of the family to leave Kūfa, became governor of the Jazīra for Yazīd II (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 485; Ibn al-Kalbī, Ğambara, s.v.). Fāʾīd b. Muhammad al-Kindī, who was likewise governor of the Jazīra for Yazīd II, was perhaps also a member of this family (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 485). There appears to be no further information on the family, but it is scarcely to be doubted that they could easily have joined the Qaysīyya despite their Yemeni genealogy.

(14) Ḥāṭim b. al-Nūmān al-Bāhili. Ḥāṭim was yet another Jazīran of Iraqi provenance. Having settled in Basra, he was exiled by ‘Alī
and participated in the battle of Siğfın on Mu‘āwiya’s side, where he appears under a variety of garbled names (Jāhiz, ‘Risāla fi’l-hakamayn’, p. 428; Ibn ‘Asākir, Tahdhib, vol. iii, p. 429; Naṣr b. Muzzāhim, Wāq’at Siğfın, pp. 207, 233; Hinds, ‘Banners and Battle Cries’, p. 26, cf. p. 24 where a Basran relative of his appears on ‘Ali’s side). In the second civil war he was governor of Harrān and Edessa for Ibn al-Ashtar (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 251; cf. also Ibn al-Kalbī, Gāmbara, table 137 and s.v.). ‘Abdallāh, his son, was governor of Armenia and Azerbaijan for Muhammad b. Marwān in 85 (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 393; cf. Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 205 where the chronology is wrong). ‘Abd al-‘Azīz, another son, participated in the feuds of Qays against Taghlib together with ‘Umayr b. al-Hubāb in the second civil war; later he was governor of the Jazīra, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 323; id., Futūb, p. 205; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, pp. 393, 426, 431, 464, 476; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1346; Ghevond, Histoire, p. 34; Movsēs Dāxuranci, History, pp. 280f). ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Hātim joined the Qaysiyya; he was one of Marwān’s commanders in the service of Ibn Hubayra (De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 162).

(15) Qa‘qā’ b. Khulayd al-‘Absī. This family would seem to have no Sufyānid history; they are first mentioned under ‘Abd al-Malik, who married Wallāda, the cousin of Qa‘qā’ and mother of Walid and Sulaymān (Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 146). ‘Abd al-Malik (or Walid) granted them the land near Qinnasrīn on which they were settled (Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 146; Yāqūt, Wörterbuch, vol. ii, p. 373), and Qa‘qā’ became the secretary of Walid (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 837). Walī d b. al-Qa‘qā’, who was no doubt named after his caliphal kinsman, served in Armenia under Maslama and in Khurāsān under Junayd (Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 206; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1529, 1550); in 119 he was back in Syria where he conducted a summer campaign and was appointed governor of Qinnasrīn by Hishām (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1593, 1783). ‘Abd al-Malik b. al-Qa‘qā’, who was similarly named after a caliphal kinsman, became governor of Hims (ibid.). The family got involved in several succession disputes. Qa‘qā’ would appear to have supported Walīd’s efforts to deprive Sulaymān of the succession, and his sons similarly supported Hishām’s efforts to deprive Walīd II of the succession (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1312; Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, vol. v, p. 198), but unlike their father they did not get away with it: on his accession Walīd sent Yāzīd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra as governor

(16) Rabīʿa b. ʿĀsim al-ʿUqaylī. Rabīʿa was a Basran sharīf who fell in the battle of the Camel in support of ʿAʾishah (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3208); the family then emigrated to the Jazira in the tracks of the Banū Arqam and Banū Ḥātim (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ḡambara, s.v. ‘Muslim b. Rabīʿa’; cf. also table 102). Muslim b. Rabīʿa fought with Zufar b. al-Ḥārith at Qarqisīyāʾ (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 303), ʿAbd al-Malik b. Muslim was one of Maslama’s commanders in Armenia and Azerbayjan (Baladhurī, Futūḥ, p. 206), and perhaps also governor of Armenia for Marwān II (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ḡambara, s.v.). Iṣḥāq b. Muslim similarly served in Armenia and Azerbayjan (Baladhurī, Futūḥ, p. 206; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1635), and in 126 Marwān put him in charge of the Qays who were stationed at Bāb and/or appointed him governor of Armenia (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1871; Baladhurī, Futūḥ, p. 209; Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, p. 564; Ghevond, Histoire, p. 113). In 128 he was in Mesopotamia with Marwān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1941; Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, pp. 574f). In 132 he was back in his post as governor of Armenia, and it was from here that he set out to join the Mesopotamian revolt against the ‘Abbāsids (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 56ff; Walker, Umayyad Coins, pp. 229f). The ‘Abbāsids pardoned him and he became one of the most influential members of Mansūr’s saḥāba (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 57f, 281). Bakkār b. Muslim, his brother, likewise joined the revolt and was presumably pardoned; he rebelled again with ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī and must have received a second pardon, for in 150 he was in Khurāsān campaigning against Ustāḏhās, and in 153 Mansūr appointed him to Armenia (ibid., pp. 57, 96, 356, 371). ʿĪsā b. Muslim, the third brother, appears among Marwān II’s generals, but he does not seem to have survived into the ‘Abbāsid period (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1877, 1909). Muslim b. Bakkār b. Muslim is credited by sons with a campaign against a Khārijite in the Jazira in 180 which others ascribe to
Qinnasrin and the Jazira

Sa‘īd b. Salm b. Qutayba; in 177 he was head of the shurta of Ishaq b. Sulaymān in Egypt (Tabarī, ser. iii, p. 645 (contrast Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 728 and Azdī, Mawsil, p. 291); Kindī, Governors, p. 136).

(17) ‘Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī. ‘Umar’s title to sharifian status rests on the claim that his maternal grandfather was chief of the B.‘Adī (Ibn Qutayba, Ma‘ārif, p. 179), but nothing is heard of his family until he appears as a general under the Marwānids. He served under Sufyān b. al-Abdār al-Kalbī in Iraq in 77, and participated in Maslama’s expedition to Constantinople in 97–8 (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 973, 996, 1306, 1315; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 423, 425; Michael the Syrian, Chronique, vol. iv, p. 453 = vol. ii, p. 484).

‘Umar II or Yazīd II appointed him to the Jazīra in 100 or 102 (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1349; Azdī, Mawsil, p. 16), and Yazīd II appointed him to Iraq and Khurāsān in 102 or 103; he was dismissed in 105, put to torture, but freed on paying up (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1433f, 1467f; De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 85). Yazīd b. ‘Umar, his son, was governor of Qinnasrin for Walīd II (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1783), and he was one of the wujūh of Qays who joined Marwān II when the latter came to Syria (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 564; Azdī, Mawsil, p. 61). Marwān appointed him to Iraq where he was killed by the ‘Abbasids in 132 after the famous siege of Wāsīt (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1913ff, ser. iii, pp. 61ff; Miles, The Numismatic History of Rayy, pp. 18f; Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 530f). Dāwūd b. Yazīd, who was with his father at Wāsīt, and Muthannā b. Yazīd, who was governor of the Yamāma for his father, were likewise killed (Ibn Qutayba, Ma‘ārif, p. 179; Tabarī, ser. iii, p. 69). Mukhallad b. Yazīd, however, survived in Syria where he is said to have had much influence and many sons (Ibn Qutayba, Ma‘ārif, p. 179). One of them, Yazīd b. al-Mukhallad, was governor of Tarsus for ‘Abd al-Malik b. Sālih, but the Khurāsānī soldiers could not bear his Hubayrīyya and drove him out (Baladhuri, Futūh, p. 170); later he commanded summer campaigns against the Byzantines, and he fell on such a campaign in 191 (Tabarī, ser. iii, pp. 709, 712; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 738).

(18) ‘Umayr b. al-Hubab al-Sulami. ‘Umayr was a Qaysī from the Balikh area in Mesopotamia who participated in the conquest of an Armenian fortress in 59 (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 314; id., Futūh, p. 184). He is better known for his role in the second civil war. Having paid homage to ‘Abd al-Malik after the battle of Marj Rāḥit, he fought under ‘Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād against the
Tawwābūn and Ibn al-Ashtar, considered deserting to the Iraqis, but opted for joining Zufar b. al-Ḥārith at Qarqșiyya’, where he organized raids on Kalb, started the wars with the Taghlib and acquired a reputation as one of the mightiest men of the day (Ṭabari, ser. ii, pp. 707ff; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, pp. 248ff, 268, 308, 313ff, 345). Despite this display of tribal valour, his brother and his sons all appear as generals. Tamīm b. al-Ḥubāb was sent to Kufa under Yazīd II to assist in the campaigns against the Khārijites (Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 1376; Azdī, Mawsil, p. 7). Dhufāfa and Khālid b. ‘Umayr both served under Maslama in Armenia, and Khālid also participated in Maslama’s campaign against Constantinople (Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 206; Ibn ‘Asākir, Ṭabdhīb, vol. v, p. 84). No members of the third generation appear to be known (though a rebel in Aghlabid North Africa counted ‘Umayr among his ancestors (Ṭalbi, Emirat Aghlabide, p. 148)). They ought to have been among the Qaysiyya.

(19) Zufar b. al-Ḥārith al-Kilābī. Zufar was yet another Iraqi shārif who migrated to the Jazīra in the first civil war. He had settled in Basra ( Ibn ‘Asākir, Ṭabdhīb, vol. v, p. 376) and commanded the B. Āmir (b. Sa’ṣa’ā) in the battle of the Camel for ‘Ā’isha (Ṭabari, ser. i, pp. 3179, 3208ff, 3216; the Ḥarīth b. Yazīd al-‘Āmīrī who appears on p. 2479 as a participant in the conquest of Hit and Qarqśliyya’ is doubtless meant to be his father). His is credited with the usual combination of participation in the battle of Siffin (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 222), a journey to Ibn al-Zubayr under Yazīd I (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 20), and a command in Muslim b. ‘Uqba’s expedition to the Hijāz (Ya’qubī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 299). On the death of Yazīd I he gave allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr, and may or may not have fought the battle of Marj Rāḥit (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv, b, p. 59; vol. v, pp. 132, 140). After the battle, however, he fled to Qarqśliyya’ where he fortified himself against ‘Abd al-Malik until eventually a ṣulḥ was brought about between them (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 69, 145, 157ff; vol. v, pp. 140ff, 301; vol. xi, pp. 24ff). Back in Qinnasrin Zufar was the neighbour of Maslama who owned a castle at Na‘ūra (Yağūt, Wörterbuch, vol. iv, p. 732), and Maslama married one of Zufar’s daughters while Hudhayl b. Zufar became a general in Maslama’s service (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 307; Ṭabari, ser. ii, p. 1402). Zufar’s family were considered to be the very incarnation of Qaysiyya (cf. Ṭabari, ser. ii, pp. 1300, 1455), and they were certainly among the followers of Marwān II; Kawthar
b. Zufar was his governor of Mar'ash (Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 189), while Majza'a b. al-Kawthar Abu'l-Ward and Wathiq b. Hudhayl b. Zufar were among the wujūb of Qays who joined him on his arrival in Syria (Khalifa, Ta'rikh, p. 564; Azdī, Maṣīl, p. 61). Majza'a is described as one of Marwan's aṣḥāb, qawwād and fursūn (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 52); he served Marwan in Syria (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1894), submitted to the 'Abbāsids after Marwan's defeat, but was later brought to revolt when an 'Abbāsid general was settled among the descendants of Maslama at Na'ūra (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 52ff; Ibn al-'Adīm, Zubda, vol. i, pp. 53ff).

C. IRAQ

(20) 'Abbad b. al-Ḥusayn al-Ḥabati. 'Abbad appears to have no pre-Islamic history. He is first mentioned in Basra at the time of Mu'āwiya, when he accompanied 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Samura to Sistān as the head of the latter's shurta (Baladhuri, Futuh, p. 396). In 64 he participated in the tribal feuds in Basra as the leader of the B. 'Amr b. Tamim for Ahnaf (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 112, where Hanzali is doubtless to be emended to Ḥabati; cf. also ibid., p. 108; Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 453ff). In the Zubayrid period he was twice head of the shurta, participated in the campaign against Mukhtar, fought against the pro-Umayyad Jufriyya, and became deputy governor of Basra for Muṣāb on the latter's departure for Maskin (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 681, 720ff, 725, 733ff, 738f, 748f, 807; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 155ff, 159f). At Rustaqābādī he was loyal to Ḥajjāj, but in decrepit old age he sided with Ibn al-Ash'ath and fled to Kābul where he was killed (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 289, 343; Ibn Qutayba, Maʿārif, p. 182). Jahdam, his son, who similarly joined Ibn al-Ash'ath, was executed by Ḥajjāj (Ibn Qutayba, Maʿārif, p. 182).

Miswar b. 'Abbad (or b. Ḥumayn b. 'Abbad) participated in the suppression of the revolt of the Muḥallabids in 101 (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1383). In 126 he was head of the shurta and/or aḥḍāb in Basra for Ibn 'Umar, but he was dismissed by 'Amr b. Suhayl, Ibn 'Umar's deputy, whereupon a fīna broke out which lasted till the arrival of Ibn Hubayra (ibid., p. 1875; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 185). Ibn Hubayra at first chose Miswar as his civilian deputy in Basra, but he later had to cancel the appointment in favour of a qāḍī, with whose appointment the tumults seem to have come to an end (Khalifa, Ta'rikh, p. 615). A son of Miswar
by the name of 'Abbād is listed by Ibn al-Kalbī, but nobody seems to have anything to say about him (Gamhara, table 81).

(21) Ash'ath b. Qays al-Kindī. Ash'ath, who founded one of the best known sharifian houses in Iraq, was chief of the B. Mu'āwiya al-Akramūn in South Arabia, where he is said to have been among the most influential men of the B. Ḥārith/Kinda (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamhara, s.v. ‘Ma'dikarib b. Qais’). After a number of pre-Islamic exploits, conversion and a celebrated apostasy, he joined the wars of conquest and settled in Kufa where he soon acquired the leadership of Kinda: Shurahbil b. al-Simt, his rival, withdrew from the contest and went to Syria (Baladhurī, Futūb, pp. 135f; cf. above, no. 10). Under ‘Alī he was governor of Armenia and Azerbayjan, and he fought on his side at Siffin, where his performance earned him the everlasting hatred of the Shi‘ites (Encyclopaedia of Islam’, s.v. ‘al-Ash'ath b. Ḥays’). He married in accordance with his status: one of his wives was a sister of Abū Bakr (ibid.), and he gave two daughters as wives to the family of ‘Uthmān (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamhara, s.vv. ‘Ḥabbāna’ and ‘Qariba bint Ma'dikarib’).

The next generation is represented by Qays and Muhammad, both of whom held the leadership of Kinda after their father’s death (ibid., s.v. ‘Muḥammad b. Ma'dikarib’; Ṣabari, ser. ii, p. 386). Qays b. al-Ash’ath commanded the rub’ of Kinda and Rabl’a at Karbala’ (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 326), and Muḥammad b. al-Ash’ath was one of the witnesses against Hujr b. ‘Adī (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv a, p. 221); he was also governor of Ṣabaristān for ‘Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād and of Mosul for Ibn al-Zubayr (Baladhurī, Futūb, p. 325; id., Ansāb, vol. v, p. 229). He fled to Mus‘ab after Mukhtar’s take-over of Kufa and fell in battle against the latter at Ḥarūrā’ (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. v, pp. 241, 259f). His daughter was married to ‘Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād (ibid., vol. iv b, p. 83).

With the third generation we reach the period in which the tribal chiefs begin to give way to generals. Muḥammad’s sons all appear as commanders in the old muqātila; Ṣaḥāq fought against the Azāriqa in western Persia and Ṣabaristān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 857, 1018); Qāsim and Ṣabhāb similarly fought in Ṣabaristān (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. xi, p. 324); and ‘Abd al-Rahmān was sent against Shabīb in Iraq and against the local ruler in Sīstān (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 930, 1042ff). But the campaigns were all to the discredit of their commanders; Ṣaḥāq deserted from the wars against the Azāriqa; it was Syrians who finally dealt with
Shabīb; it was similarly Syrians who provided the backbone of the army in Tabaristān; and ‘Abd al-Rahmān’s expedition to Sistān culminated in the spectacular revolt which meant the definitive reduction of the old muqātila to a local police force (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 857ff, 1018ff; Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Ibn al-Ash‘ath’).

Thereafter the Ashbā’īta never played any major role in politics. Two became rebels: Muḥammad b. Ishaq and ‘Uthmān b. Ishaq both joined the revolt of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1397, 1411). Four were satisfied with a modest role in the local politics of Kufa: Mundhir b. Muḥammad commanded the division of Kinda and Rabī‘a in the old muqātila against Zayd b. ‘Alī in Kufa in 126; Taḥla b. Ishaq b. Muḥammad was deputy governor of Kufa in 137; Ishaq b. al-Ṣabbāḥ b. ‘Imrān b. Ismā‘īl b. Muḥammad was likewise governor of Kufa between 156 and 159 and for three months under Hārūn; and Faḍl b. Muḥammad b. al-Ṣabbāḥ was briefly appointed to the same office by the supporters of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī in 202 (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1702; ser. iii, pp. 92, 465f, 1019, 1022; Khalīfa, Ta‘rikh, pp. 695, 744; Miles, Rare Islamic Coins, p. 117). One seems to have become a Shi‘īte: Muḥammad b. Muḥammad b. al-Ash‘ath, the tenth-century Kufan who transmitted Ashb‘athiyāt in Egypt, was presumably a member of the Ashbā’īta (Madelung, ‘Sources’ pp. 33f). And one consoled himself with the pursuit of abstract truth: Ya‘qūb b. Ishaq b. al-Ṣabbāḥ b. ‘Imrān b. Ismā‘īl b. Muḥammad is better known as al-Kindī, the philosopher of the Arabs (Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, p. 255 = 615; for other members of the family, see Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 816; Ibn ‘Asākir, Tabdhīb, vol. iii, p. 82).

(22) Dhū’ l-Ghūṣa al-Hārithī. Husayn b. Yazīd Dhū’ l-Ghūṣa was a chief of Ba‘l-Hārith in the Yemen, where he fell in a tribal war with the Murād (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambarā, s.v.). Shihāb b. al-Husayn avenged his father (ibid., s.v.), ‘Abdallāh b. al-Husayn inherited his chieftainship (ibid., s.v.), and Qays b. al-Husayn is credited with a visit to the Prophet who gave him the chieftainship (Ibn Sa‘d, Tabaqāt, vol. v, p. 528). Having settled in Kufa, the family supplied ashrāf for the Sufyānid set-up. Kathir b. Shihāb b. al-Husayn appears as the head of Madhhij and one of the ru‘ūs al-Yamanīyya who bore witness against Ḥujr in 51 (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambarā, s.v.; Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv a, pp. 218, 221), and in 60 he was one of the men who were sent with their following to dissuade the adherents of Muslim b. ‘Aqīl from rebellion (Tabarī,
Appendix I: Asbrāf

ser. ii, pp. 256ff). He was also governor of Rayy for Ziyād b. Abihi (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv a, p. 136). Qatān b. 'Abdallāh b. al-Ḥusayn, his cousin who likewise appears among the witnesses against Hujr, was governor of Azerbayjan for Ziyād (ibid., pp. 136, 221); he commanded the division of Asad and Madhhij at Maskin as a lukewarm supporter of Muṣ'ab, and briefly held the office of governor in Kufa after 'Abd al-Malik's victory (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, pp. 341, 344, 351, 354).

With the fourth generation we reach the Marwānid period and the family begins to recede. 'Uthmān b. Qatān was one of the men who remained loyal to Ḥajjāj when the army mutinied at Rustaqābādh in 75 (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 284ff); he fell in 76 against Shabīb (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 911, 919, 929ff). Khālid b. Qatān, his brother, joined the revolt of 'Abdallāh b. Muʿāwiyah in 127 (ibid., p. 1880). Muhammad b. Zuhra b. al-Ḥārith b. Qays b. Kathīr b. Shihāb was greatly esteemed in the time of Rashīd, under whom he held a minor administrative office (Ibn al-Kalbi, Gambara, s.v.)

(23) Ḥārith b. 'Amr al-Riyahi. Qa‘nab b. 'Attāb b. al-Ḥārith seems to be the earliest member of this family to have been equipped with a history: the fāris of the B. Yarbū', he died in the early sixth century A.D. (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 986; Ibn al-Kalbi, Gambara, s.v.). Other members appear in the armies of conquest: 'Attāb b. Nuʿaym and Nuʿaym b. 'Amr fought at Qādisiyya, while Warqā' b. al-Ḥārith and Habīb b. Qurra were among the conquerors of Tustar (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2307, 2554f; compare Ibn al-Kalbi, Gambara, table 68). The family settled in Kufa where little is heard about them in the Sufyanid period. Hurr b. Yazīd, however, commanded the division of Tamīm and Hamdān at Karbalā', where he is said to have deserted the Ḥusayn (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 326). In the Zubayrid period 'Attāb b. Warqā' was governor of Isfahān (ibid., pp. 762ff; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. xi, p. 118). He fought halfheartedly for Muṣ'ab at Maskin and was later one of the many Kufans who campaigned unsuccessfully against the Āzāriqa and Shabīb (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, pp. 341, 344; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 878, 940ff). Khālid b. 'Attāb who also fought against Shabīb was governor of Mada'in and Rayy for Ḥajjāj; he had been one of the drinking companions of Bishr (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 961, 965ff, 1002, 1069; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 172).

The subsequent history of the family is one of discontent and disappearance. Abrad b. Qurra, who had known better days under
Iraq

Muṣ'ab, joined the revolt of Ibn al-Ash'ath, while Hanzala b. 'Attāb supported that of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 773f, 1076, 1397). There was, however, a branch of the family in Khurāsān. Ḥabīb b. Qurra had been governor of Balkh for 'Uthmān in 29 (ibid., ser. i, p. 2831), Abrād b. Qurra had married off a daughter to a Khurāsānī soldier (ibid., ser. ii, 1691), and Samhārī b. Qa'nab who was with Junayd in Khurāsān was presumably a member of the same family (ibid., p. 1530). Perhaps it was also in Khurāsān that 'Attāb b. Warqā' had acquired his Shākirīyya (ibid., p. 965). Here, at all events, 'Abbād b. al-Abraḍ and Abrād b. Dāwūd appear among the generals of Naṣr b. Sayyār in the struggle against Ḥārith b. Surayj and in the faction fighting towards the end of the Marwānīd period (ibid., pp. 1917f, 1921).

(24) Hudayn b. al-Mundhir al-Shaybānī. Hudayn b. al-Mundhir was a minor saharīf in Basra who is said to have fought for 'Alī in the first civil war as a young man endowed with hasab, and even to have commanded the Basran Bakr b. Wā'il in the battle of Siffin (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3312; Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, p. 221; Dinawārī, Akhbār, p. 182). His brother would appear to have settled in Kufa (cf. Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv a, p. 223). Though a number of stories play up his standing in Basra, Hudayn was clearly a less impressive figure than Shaqīq b. Thawr or Mālik b. Mismā', the major Bakrī chiefs (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3414, ser. ii, pp. 434f; cf. below, nos. 28 and 32), and it was perhaps for this reason that he chose to go to Khurāsān where he is found under Yazīd b. al-Muhallab and Qutayba and where he was the head of the Bakr b. Wā'il in 96 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1141f, 1289f, 1291). His son accordingly had a very different career from that of the āsbrāf who stayed in Iraq. While the descendants of Shaqīq and Mālik were reduced to mere subjects of Ḥajjāj and his Syrian troops, Yahyā b. Hudayn became a general who commanded the Bakrī division in the Khurāsānī army, participated in the wars of conquest, fought against Ḥārith b. Surayj, came up for nomination to the governorship of Khurāsān, and joined the faction fighting of the late Umayyad period (ibid., pp. 1445, 1571f, 1577, 1581, 1609, 1660, 1662, 1692, 1865, 1921). On the outbreak of the revolution he joined Ibn Hubayra and the Syrian troops in Iraq, where he was among those who claimed to have killed Qahtaba and where he is met for the last time, besieged by the 'Abbasid troops in Wāsīt (ibid., ser. iii, pp. 15, 62f). Mūjahīd b. Yahyā
Appendix I: Ashraf

b. Ḥudayn, a close companion of Naṣr b. Sayyār, was caught and killed by Abū Muslim (ibid., ser. ii, p. 1995). Ubaydallāh b. Yahyā b. Ḥudayn joined the revolt of Ibrāhīm b. Abdallāh, the Ḍalid in Basra in 143 (ibid., ser. iii, pp. 290, 299).

(25) ʿImrān b. al-Faḍil al-Burjumī. What little is known of this family illustrates the same contrast between Iraq and Khurāsān as seen above, no. 24. ʿImrān b. al-Faḍil (or Faṣil) al-Burjumī participated in the conquest of eastern Iran in 29, settled in Basra, and set out for Khurāsān with Salm b. Ziyād in 61 (Tabari, ser. i, pp. 2830 ff., ser. ii, pp. 392 ff.). One of his sons, Hudhayl b. ʿImrān, stayed in Basra where he was the drinking companion of Bishr, and where he came up against Ḥajjāj; he mutinied against him at Rustaqābād and was executed in 75 (Balāḏūrī, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 178, vol. xi, pp. 279 ff., 286, 291 ff.). Another son, however, must have gone to Khurāsān, for Bishr b. Bistām b. ʿImrān appears as a soldier there under Naṣr b. Sayyār in 128; a Marwānid loyalist, he joined the Syrian troops of Ibn Ḍubāra at Isfahan to fight against Qaḥṭāba in 131 (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1918, 1991, ser. iii, p. 5). The Rabīʾ b. ʿImrān al-Tamlīlī, who converted Transoxania with Abūʾl-Ṣaydāʾ in 110 (ibid., ser. ii, pp. 1507 ff.), was probably yet another son of this sharif.

(26) Jarir b. Ṭ. b. Ṭ. b. ʿAbdallāh al-Bajali. Jarīr is presented as the head of the B. Ḥazīma of Qasr and the rival of Asad b. Kurz in the Jābiliyya, and he is celebrated as an early convert, a participant in the wars of conquest and the unifier of his scattered tribe in the time of Islam (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambara, s.v. ‘Garir b. Ṭ. b. Ṭ. b. ʿAbdallāh’; Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Badjila’). He settled in Kufa, where he would seem to have been the leader of one of the sevenths at the time of the Ḥujr affair, and where his son Bashir b. Jarir led Bajla in the sharifian revolt against Mukhtār (Balāḏūrī, Ansāb, vol. iv a, p. 215; Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 652, 656). Even in its reconstituted form, however, Bajla was not a very important tribe and the family scarcely found it hard to exchange their sharifian role for one of loyal assistants to the Syrian governors in Iraq. Bishr b. Jarir fought the Azāriqa among the abl al-Māḏīna in 74 (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 857); Ziyād b. Jarir was head of Ḥajjāj’s shurta and deputy governor of Kufa for several years, and he retained this office under Ḥajjāj’s successor (ibid., pp. 1182, 1191, 1208, 1266; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 410, 414, 427); Khalīd b. Jarir fought against Ibn al-Ashʿath with Kufan recruits originally destined for Khurāsān (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1099); and Muhammad b. Jarir was sent against Khārijites.
in 1006 (ibid., pp. 1348, 1375). There is little change in this pattern in the next generation except for an involvement with the Syrian Yamanîyya. Muḥammad b. Ziyād b. Ṣarīr was governor of Bahrayn for Khālid al-Qasrî (Khalîfa, Taʾrikh, p. 538); Ibrāhîm b. Ṣarīr commanded the abl al-Madina in the old army against Zayd in 126 (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1702); Ṣarīr b. Yâdî b. Ṣarīr was deputy governor of Basra for Mansûr b. Jumhûr and he also appears briefly in the service of Mansûr (ibid., ser. ii, p. 1837, ser. iii, p. 104; Khalîfa, Taʾrikh, p. 559). ʿAbd b. Ṣarīr b. Yâdî b. Ṣarīr b. ʿAbdallâh was briefly governor of Armenia for Ḥârûn (Yaʾqûbî, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 516). And yet another Ṣarīr b. Yâdî was governor of Basra for Ḥârûn and of the Yemen for Amin (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 740; Yaʾqûbî, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 528), but it is not clear whether he is a descendant of Ṣarīr or of Khâlid al-Qasrî (compare above, no. 11).

(27) Ṣarûd b. ʿAmr al-ʿAbdî. Ṣarûd appears as one of the leaders of ʿAbd al-Qays at the time of the death of the Prophet; he is credited with a visit to the latter, a refusal to join the ridda, and participation in the wars of conquest in the course of which he fell in Fars in about 20 (Ibn al-Kalbî, Ḡambarâ, s.v. ʿBisr b. ʿAmr al-Ṣurûd′; Ṣarîrî, ser. i, pp. 1938ff, 2699). His family settled in Basra. Here Mundhir b. Ṣarûd became one of the more distinguished ashraf of the Sufyânîd period; he had already been governor of Ḳatākh for ʿAlî (Yaʾqûbî, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 240), and he now became head of a khums (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 240), governor of Ḳandâbil or Hind (Khalîfa, Taʾrikh, p. 287; Baladhûrî, Futûh, p. 434), and father-in-law of the Umayyads: one of his daughters married ʿUbaydallâh b. Ziyād, another ʿAbd al-ʿAzîz b. ʿAbdallâh b. Khâlid b. Asîd (Baladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. iv b, pp. 78, 164). It is thus not surprising that Ḥâkîm b. al-Mundhir b. al-Ṣarûd joined the pro-Umayyad Jâfriyya in Basra in the second civil war (ibid., p. 162).

Under the Marwânîds, however, the family displayed many signs of disaffection. ʿAbdallâh b. al-Ṣarûd instigated the mutiny against Ḥâjîj at Rustaqabâdh (Baladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. xi, pp. 280ff); Bisîr b. al-Mundhir and ʿAbd al-Rahmân b. al-Mundhir both joined the revolt of Ibn al-Asîhath (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1106, 1109, 1125; Baladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. xi, p. 343, where the names are slightly different). And Ḥajfar (or Jâfîr) b. al-Ḥâkîm al-ʿAbdî and his son Mundhir, the Shiʿîte traditionists, were perhaps also members of this family (Najâshî, Kitâb al-rijâl, pp. 95, 297; Sprenger, Tûsî′s List of Shîʿâ Books, pp. 79, 338f.
I owe both references to Professor W. Madelung. Ziyād b. al-Mundhir, who participated in Zayd’s revolt and founded the Zaydī ḽārīḍa, was clearly taken to be a member of this family by some, for he sometimes appears with the nisba al-‘Abdī (thus Ibn al-Nadīm, Fihrist, p. 178 = 443; Mas‘ūdī, Murūj, vol. v, p. 474); but the consensus is that he was a Hamdānī (Van Arendonk, Débuts, p. 282; drawn to my attention by Professor Madelung); Mālik b. al-Mundhir, however, kept a clean record. He fought against Mukhtār as the leader of the ‘Abd al-Qays under Muṣ‘ab, similarly commanded the ‘Abd al-Qays against Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, and later became the head of Khālid al-Qasrī’s ṣhurtā (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, pp. 253, 259; Ṣuhayrī, ser. ii, pp. 1831, 1837, 1487). Ash’ath b. ‘Abdallāh b. al-Jārūdī was governor of Bahrayn for Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, but apparently stayed out of the revolt (Khalifa, Ta‘rikh, p. 430). Under the ‘Abbāsids another two members of the family appear in similarly modest roles. ‘Abdallāh b. Sulaymān b. al-Mundhir was governor of Bahrayn for Abū‘l-‘Abbās (Khalifa, Ta‘rikh, p. 632), and Mundhir b. Mūhammad al-Jārūdī commanded a thousand Basran volunteers in ‘Abd al-Malik b. Shīhāb al-Mīsamī’s expedition to Hind in 159 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 461; cf. below, no. 28). There was also one who took to scholarship: ‘Abdallāh b. Sulaymān b. Yūsuf b. Ya‘qūb b. al-Mundhir was known as a traditionist (Ibn ‘Asākir, Tahdītīb, vol. vii, p. 443).

(28) Mīsmā’ b. Shībāb al-Shaybānī. Jāhār b. Ḏubay‘a, the legendary ancestor of the Masāmī‘a, is one of the heroes in the story of the war of Basūs (Aghānī, vol. v, pp. 37, 41, 43, 46). Mīsmā’ himself appears in the ridda in which apparently he fell (Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 84; Ṣuhayrī, ser. i, p. 1971). Three of his sons are found in Basra. Mālik b. Mīsmā’ is said to have commanded the Bakr b. Wā’il in the battle of the Camel for ‘Ā‘ishā (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3179), to have protected Marwān after the battle (ibid., pp. 3220f), and to have joined Mu‘āwiya in Syria (ibid., ser. ii, pp. 765f), all of which is proffered in explanation of the later Marwānīd sympathies of the family. Whatever his activities in the first civil war, he emerged as one of the most prominent men in Basra in the second, when he negotiated the hilf with the recently arrived Azd, took a leading role in the tribal debacle of 64, and definitively usurped the riyyasa from the family of Shaqīq b. Thawr (ibid., pp. 448ff; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 105ff; cf. below no. 32). Under Muṣ‘ab he commanded the khums of Bakr against Mukhtār, sided
with the pro-Marwānid Jufriyya in 71, and fled to Yamāma after its failure; he returned to Basra after Muṣ‘āb’s death and died shortly afterwards, amply rewarded by ‘Abd al-Malik (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 720, 726, 799ff; Balādhūrī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 156ff, 160ff, 165). His two brothers are much less heard of. Muqātīl b. Misma’ is said to have encouraged Mālik to protect Marwān after the battle of Camel, but he is nonetheless listed among ‘Ali’s commanders at Siffin (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 322of; Hinds, ‘Banners and Battle Cries’, p. 24). Under Muṣ‘āb he commanded the infantry against Mukhtār at Hartrā, and after ‘Abdal-Malik’s victory he was appointed to Ardashīr Khurrah by Khālid b. ‘Abdallah. He fell in battle against the Khārijites in 72 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 725, 822f, 825; Balādhūrī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 168; cf. Gauč, Numismatik, p. 70). ‘Āmir or ‘Amr b. Misma’ was appointed to Sābūr by Khālid (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 822, cf. p. 460). According to Khalīfa he was also head of the sburta in Basra for Hajjāj, which is doubtless a confusion with ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Amir (Ṭa’rikh, p. 410; cf. below).

The next generation is represented by three cousins. Misma’ b. Mālik b. Misma’ was governor of Fāsā and Darabjird for Khālid in 72 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 822); he was loyal to Hajjāj at Rustaqābādh (Balādhūrī, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 286, 288) and died as governor of Sīstān in 86 (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 387; Ya‘qūbī, Buldān, p. 283 = 93; Ta’rikh-i Sistān, p. 118). ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Āmir b. Misma’ was head of Hajjāj’s sburta in Basra, but nonetheless joined the revolt of Ibn al-Ash’ath much to Hajjāj’s disappointment (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1062, 1065; Balādhūrī, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 343, 346). Ziyād b. Muqātīl b. Misma’ was killed either at Rustaqābādh or in the revolt of Ibn al-Ash’ath, probably the latter, but either way on the side of the rebels (Balādhūrī, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 302, 345, 351; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1066f). Thereafter the family remained loyal. Nūh b. Shaybān b. Mālik b. Misma’ commanded the rub‘ of Bakr b. Wā‘il against the Muhallabids in Basra; Mālik b. Misma’ and ‘Abd al-Malik b. Misma’ were both executed by the Muhallabids; ‘Imrān b. ‘Āmir b. Misma’ is said to have joined the rebels, but the passage is garbled (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1381f (where the Yazīd in question would seem originally to have been the caliph), 1396; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 471). But they also lost greatly in importance. Under ‘Umar II ‘Abd al-Malik b. Misma’ was admittedly governor of Sind for a short while, and Sarī b. ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Aṣim b. Misma’ governor of
Appendix I: Ashraf

Sīstān (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 463; Ya’qūbī, Buldān, p. 284 = 94). But their activities scarcely mattered in the power politics of the Syrians and the Khurāsānīs: Mismaʾ b. Muḥammad b. Shaybān b. Mālik b. Mismaʾ is noted in passing to have been an adherent of Marwān in the third civil war; that is all (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 224).

And when ‘Abd al-Malik b. Shihāb al-Mismaʾ emerged on the public scene in 159 it was precisely as a commander of the losers: he was sent to India with a motley army of Asawira, Sayāhiba, local Syrians and Basran volunteers; they conquered Bārbadh with much recitation of the Koran and returned in 160, decimated by gales and disease (ibid., pp. 46of, 476f). ‘Abd al-Malik went to India again in 161 as the deputy of the new governor, but the governorship was cancelled and he had to go home (ibid., p. 491). Āmīr b. Āmīr al-Malik was an authority on Jahdār’s exploits in the wars of Basūs (Aghānī, vol. v, pp. 37, 42ff; cf. Sezgin, Geschichte, vol. i, p. 265, where he is wrongly placed in the Umayyad period).

(29) Rib’ī b. Āmīr al-Riyāḥī. According to Sayf, Rib’ī was made head of his Ḥanzalī following by ‘Umar on the eve of the conquests (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 2188); he participated in the conquest of Syria, crossed over to Iraq after the fall of Damascus (ibid., p. 2154; differently p. 2188f), distinguished himself in the conquest of Iraq and Persia and settled in Kufa together with his son Shabath (ibid., pp. 2269f, 2294, 2479, 2554, 2569, 2619, 2683). Shabath was a man of much religious enthusiasm; he began as a follower of Sajāh, the prophetess, continued as an adherent of ‘Alī, went on to become a Khārijīte, and is soon after found as a fervent ex-Khārijīte (ibid., pp. 1919, 3270ff, 3349, 3380, 3388; Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 100). None of this, however, prevented him from inheriting the chieftainship from his father (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 2188f), and in Kufa he dutifully bore witness against Hujr (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv a, p. 221), commanded the infantry at Karbalāʾ despite an earlier involvement with Husayn (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 325f), combated the Khārijītes (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv a, p. 140), and joined the opponents of Mukhtār (ibid., vol. v, pp. 218, 224, 226f, 232, 234f). After the death of Mukhtār he was head of the sburta in Kufa (ibid., pp. 274f). ‘Abd al-Muʾmin b. Shabath would appear to have fought on the side of Mukhtār (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 654), and later he was certainly one of the rebels with Ibn al-Ashʾath (ibid., p. 1054). Ḥātim b. al-Sharqi b. ‘Abd al-Muʾmin b. Shabath was apparently a local notable; ‘Abdallāh b. Muʿāwiya married one of his daughters (ibid., p. 1880). Azhar b. ‘Abd al-ʿAzīz b. Shabath lived
as a poet in Sistan in the early ‘Abbásid period (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambara, s.v.*).

(30) **Ruwaym b. ‘Abdalláh al-Shaybání.** Ruwaym seems to be remembered primarily for the circumstance that a daughter of his was the mother of Járid b. ‘Amr (Khalifa, *Tabaqát*, p. 61; cf. above, no. 27). Yazíd b. Ruwaym is said to have seen the rise of Islam (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambara, s.v.*). His descendants settled in Kufa. Ruwaym b. al-Ḥaráth b. Ruwaym appears as the commander of the Kufans at Ṣiffin (Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 221). ‘Adi b. al-Ḥaráth b. Ruwaym was governor of Bahurasír for ‘Alí (Dinawarl, *Akbär, p. 163*). Yazíd b. al-Ḥaráth b. Ruwaym was among the *asbār* who bore witness against Ḥujr (Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 221), invited Ḥusayn to Kufa (Ṭabarí, ser. ii, p. 235), and fought against Mukhtár (Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. v, pp. 207, 218, 224, 226, 232); he was governor of Madá’in and Rayy for Muṣ’ab (Ṭabarí, ser. ii, pp. 775f, 817; Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. xi, p. 118); according to some he was also appointed to Rayy by ‘Abd al-Malik, but according to others ‘Abd al-Malik appointed Ḥawshab, his son (Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 354). Ḥawshab, who had also fought against Mukhtár, was head of Ḥajjáj’s *shurta* in Kufa and his deputy governor there for some years (Ṭabarí, ser. ii, pp. 735, 918, 1127, cf. pp. 966, 1121). Khirāsh b. Ḥawshab was similarly head of Yūsuf b. ‘Umar’s *shurta* in Kufa in 122 (*ibid.*, p. 1715, cf. p. 1774), and finally Thumáma b. Ḥawshab was head of Mansúr b. Jumhúr’s *shurta*, apparently in Wāsit (*ibid.*, p. 1850). A qa’id of the Ruwaym family also appears in the entourage of Khálíd al-Qasrí (*ibid.*, p. 1625). ‘Awámm b. Ḥawshab and Shiháb b. Khirāsh b. Ḥawshab were traditionists in Wāsit (Ibn Ḥībān, *‘Ulámā*, p. 176; Ibn ‘Asákir, *Ṭabdhib*, vol. vi, p. 342).

(31) **Sa’id b. Qays al-Hamdání.** Sa’id was supposedly a descendant of one of the kings of Himyar (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambara, s.v.*), and he was certainly one of the major *asbār* in Kufa (cf. Ṭabarí, ser. i, p. 3371). He participated in the wars of conquest (*ibid.*, p. 2619), became governor of Hamadhán and Rayy under ‘Uthmán (*ibid.*, pp. 2927f, 3058), commanded the Kufan seventh of Himyar and Hamdán for ‘Alí in the battle of the Camel and at Ṣiffin, and led another campaign for ‘Alí in 39 (Dinawarl, *Akbär, p. 155*; Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 221; Ṭabarí, ser. i, p. 3446). Under the Sufyáníds he appears as one of the *ru’ús al-Yamaniyya* (Baladhurí, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 218). ‘Abd al-Rahmán b. Sa’id was appointed to Mosul by Mukhtár at the time of the uneasy alliance between the
rebel and the nobles, but he later rebelled against Mukhtar together with the other ashrāf and fell in the attempt to recover control of Kufa (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 620, 631, 635, 643f, 650f, 656, 659). The majority of Mukhtar’s adherents, however, were drawn from ‘Abd al-Rahmān’s own tribe of Hamdān (cf. ibid., pp. 614, 665f). There was thus scarcely any riyāsa for Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān to inherit, and he and his friend Ibn al-Ash‘ath are said to have been merciless in their treatment of the prisoners they took when eventually Kufa was reconquered (ibid., p. 740). Muhammad’s subsequent career followed the usual pattern. He fought halfheartedly for Mus‘ab at Maskin (ibid., pp. 807, cf. p. 804), commanded the rub’ of Tamīm and Hamdān in the wars against the Azāriqa and deserted on the news of the death of Bishr (ibid., pp. 857, 859). In 77 he commanded the right wing in ‘Attāb b. Wāqā’s army against Shabib; he showed much valour, but was defeated, and as he and Ibn al-Ash‘ath walked home on foot with their faces covered in dirt, even a Khārijite could feel sorry for them (ibid., pp. 949, 952, 955). Jarir b. Ḥāshim b. Sa‘id b. Qays joined Ibn al-Ash‘ath’s rebellion (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. xi, p. 340).

(32) Shaqiq b. Thawr al-Sadūsī. This family does not appear to have remembered or acquired a pre-Islamic history; Shaqiq b. Thawr is first met with as the leader of Sadūs in the wars of conquest (Ibn al-Kalbi, Gāmbara, s.v.), and Majza‘a b. Thawr appears at Tustar where he fell (Tabari, ser. i, pp. 2548, 2552, 2556; Baladhurī, Futūh, pp. 308f). The family settled in Basra. Shaqiq commanded the Basran Bakr b. Wā’il for ‘Alī in the battle of the Camel, and he also fought for him at Siffin (Tabari, ser. i, pp. 3174f, 3203, 3311, 3316); under Ziyād he participated in a fray with Khārijites (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv a, pp. 151f; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 264). Shaqiq’s position was threatened by the presence of Mālik b. Misma‘ (above, no. 28), and it was scarcely helped by rampant intrigues in the family (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 92); Ashyam b. Shaqiq did inherit the riyāsa on the death of his father, but he had to go to Yazīd I to get it back from Mālik, and part of the Bakr b. Wā’il refused to accept him (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 448); his role in the tribal feuds in Basra in 64 was accordingly a minor one (ibid., pp. 455, 464). In 75 he was among the mutineers at Rustaqābādhd together, apparently, with his brother Abū Ruhm, who is also said to have joined the revolt of Ibn al-Ash‘ath (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 292, 302). La’y b. Shaqiq, who
Iraq

was in Kerman at the time of Ibn al-Ash’ath, stayed loyal to Hajjaj (ibid., p. 333; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 362). Shaybān b. Zuhayr b. Shaqiq b. Thawr was an expert on genealogy (Ibn ‘Abd al-Barr, Inbāb, p. 56).

(33) Ziyād b. ‘Amr al-‘Atakī/ Azd. ‘Amr b. al-Ashraf al-‘Atakī is supposed to have fallen in the battle of the Camel in defence of ‘Ā’isha (Ṭabarī, ser. i, pp. 3201, 3204), but the ‘Atik were Azd ‘Umān who only migrated to Basra in the Sufyānid period, and there is no mention of the family until the second civil war (Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. ‘Azd’; Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamhara, s.v. “Amr b. al-Asraf”). In 64, however, Ziyād b. ‘Amr was the leader of Azd in the tribal feuds which broke out on the death of Yazīd I (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 461f; Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 98f, 112, 121), in 67 he commanded the khums of Azd in Mus‘ab’s army against Mukhtār (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 720, 726; Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 259), and in 69 he was a member of the Jufriyya who prepared for an Umayyad take-over of the city (Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 156, cf. p. 163). After the second civil war he became head of Ḥajjaj’s shurta in Basra and his deputy governor there (Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 284, 304, 305; differently p. 285), and his sons settled down for a career as assistants to the governor. Ḥafs b. Ziyād fought the Ṣanḍi with the Basran muqāṭila as his father’s deputy (ibid., p. 305); Ḥawārī b. Ziyād fled from Basra on the outbreak of the revolt of Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, and Mughīra b. Ziyād commanded the khums of Azd in the suppression of the revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1387f, 1381; cf. also Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 121, 156 on the rivalry between the families of Muhallab and Ziyād). Mukbir b. al-Ḥawārī was killed in the revolt of ‘Abbālāh b. Mu‘āwiyah (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1885; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 567). Musabīḥ b. al-Ḥawārī was governor of Nishāpūr towards the end of the Umayyad period (Jahshiyārī, Wuzara’, p. 105, where his name is Masīh); after the revolution he was sent by Abū l-‘Abbās to combat a Khārijite as governor of Bahrayn (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 632; De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 163). Tasnīm b. al-Ḥawārī would appear to have been governor of Oman for Mansūr in 158 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 385), and his son, Ḥasan b. Tasnīm, was certainly governor for Hādi there in 169 (ibid., p. 568). Both Tasnīm and Sa‘īd b. Tasnīm appear as transmitters on the revolt of Muḥammad al-Nafṣ al-Zakiyya (ibid., pp. 206, 293).

(34) Zurāra b. ‘Udus al-Dārīmī. The B. Zurāra were chiefs of the B.
Dārīm of Tamīm, and occasionally of all the B. Ḥanzāla, heroes of a large number of pre-Islamic āyyām, men of renowned generosity, and perhaps the most celebrated noble family among the northern Arabs (Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbār, pp. 154, 458; Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Ḥādji b. Zurāra’; Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambara, table 60). They busied themselves with their āyyām into the caliphate of ‘Alī (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambara, s.v. ‘Nuʿaym b. al-Qaʿqā’), and not much is heard about them before the first civil war: Ḥisn/ Ḥusayn b. Maʿbād b. Zurāra is said to have participated in the wars of conquest (Dīnawarī, Akhbār, p. 119; Baladhurī, Futūḥ, p. 354); a descendant of ʿAlqama b. Zurāra is listed among the first settlers in Kufa (Khalīfa, Tābaqāt, p. 141); and ʿUmayr or Muḥammad (b. ʿUmayr) b. ʿUtārid figures as a commander of the Tamīm for ʿAlī at Sīfūn (Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, p. 221; Dīnawarī, Akhbār, p. 183). After the civil war, however, most of the family had come together in Kufa where they continued to flaunt their tribal pride. Labīd b. ʿUtārid having endured the humiliation of having his face slapped in a crowded majlis, Nuʿaym b. al-Qaʿqāʾ promptly assembled his Tamīmīs to slap the offender threefold; but Ziyād the governor, was not impressed, and the heroes were either lashed or had their hands cut off (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 84f). Nuʿaym accordingly became a Zubayrist in the second civil war and was executed as such by Bishr (ibid., vol. v, p. 180). Muḥammad b. ʿUmayr has been endowed with the traditional sharīfian biography: he bore witness against Ḥujr together with Labīd (Tabārī, ser. ii, p. 133), invited Ḥusayn to Kufa together with other asbrāf (ibid., p. 345), and fought against Mukhtar, unless he was in Azerbaijan where Mukhtar had appointed him governor (ibid., pp. 635, 655, 685); next he betrayed Muṣʿab at Maskin as a member of the Marwāniyya, and was appointed to Hamadhān after the victory of ʿAbd al-Malik (ibid., pp. 804, 817). A daughter of his was married to a son of Ziyād b. Abīhi, who had himself married a daughter of Qaʿqāʾ b. Maʿbād (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, pp. 74, 83). Unlike other asbrāf, however, Muḥammad is not said to have held the leadership of the rubʿ a governorship or a major command under the Sufyānids, with the single exception of a campaign against Rayy whose population had rebelled on the death of Yazīd (Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, p. 328). The family would appear to have been just a little too much for the Sufyānids.

In return, however, Ḥājjāj was much too much for the B. Zurāra. Muḥammad b. ʿUmayr disliked Ḥājjāj’s introductory
speech and automatically reached for a pebble, but he never managed to throw it (Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 865; Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. xi, pp. 267, 269); at Rustaqâbâdh he insolently refused to come to Hajjâj’s assistance, though unlike other ashrâf he appears to have escaped execution (Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. xi, pp. 286, 292f). ‘Utârid b. ‘Umayr was given a major command in the Peacock Army and presumably rebelled with Ibn al-Ash‘ath: Halqâm b. Nu’aym b. al-Qa‘qâ’ certainly did; he was executed, confessing that he had fancied becoming caliph (ibid., p. 319; Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1044, 1109, 1111). Thereafter there is silence around the family in Kufa. But a branch of them reappear under the early ‘Abbâsids and that as generals, doubtless made in Khurâsân: ‘Umar b. al-‘Abbâs b. ‘Umayr b. ‘Utârid was appointed to Sîsân by Abû Muslim, who esteemed him highly, and his brother Ibrâhîm was appointed to Sind. The outcome was an unhappy one. ‘Umar made the departure of his brother for Sind an occasion of public festivity, the populace of the city of Sîsân being assembled to see him off. An incident involving a Tamîmî, however, sparked off a mutiny by the Tamûm and next a revolt by the entire city, and both ‘Umar and his brother lost their lives (Târikh-i Sîsân, pp. 136f; Ya’qûbi, Buldân, p. 285 = 96; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, pp. 617, 632). A certain Qa‘qâ’ of Al Zurâra was head of ‘Isâ b. Mûsâ’s shurta in 147 (Tabarî, ser. iii, p. 347).
Since the governors of Syria receive scant attention in the sources, this list is necessarily fragmentary. The pattern, however, should be clear.

'ABD AL-MALIK (65–86)

(1) Abān b. Marwān. A brother of 'Abd al-Malik who was governor of Palestine; Hajjāj began his career as the head of this man's šurta (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 166).

(2) Abān b. al-Walid b. 'Uqba. An Umayyad who was governor of Ḥimṣ, Qinnasrin (which then included the Jazira) and Armenia for both Marwān and 'Abd al-Malik (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 307; id., Futūb, p. 188; Ibn al-Kalbi, Ğambara, s.v.). 'Uthmān b. al-Walid, his brother, was also governor of Armenia, whether as the deputy of his brother or in his own right (Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 205; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 853). One of Abān's subgovernors was Dinar b. Dinar, a mawlā of 'Abd al-Malik, who defeated a Byzantine army in 75 and who was later secretary to his patron (Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 188; Jahshiyārī, Wuzrā, p. 54; Guidi, Chronica Minora, p. 232 = 175f). It is characteristic that it is on the frontier that the first mawlā general appears in Syria.

(3) 'Abdallah b. 'Abd al-Malik. The son of the caliph who was governor of Ḥimṣ for his father according to Khalīfa (Taʾrīkh, p. 394). According to Baladhuri, he was in charge of a summer campaign in 84, but only appointed to Ḥimṣ by Walīd I (Futūb, p. 165; id., Ansāb, vol. xi, p. 156; cf. Guidi, Chronica Minora, p. 232 = 176). He was later governor of Egypt (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. xi, p. 156; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1165, 1200).

(4) 'Abd al-Rahmān b. Umm al-Ḥakam al-Thaqafi. The nephew of Muʿawiyiya who had been governor of Kufa for his uncle (cf. below, note 230), and who was appointed to Damascus by 'Abd al-Malik (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 181, 784; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 269,
'Umar II

337). According to Baladhuri, he had also been governor of the Jazira, Mosul and Egypt (Ansâb, vol. iv a, p. 5; cf. Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 260; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 157; Kindi, Governors, pp. 42, 44).

(5) Abû ‘Uthmân b. Marwân. A brother of the caliph who was governor of Jordan (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 394).

(6) Khalid b. Yazîd b. Mu‘awiyâ. The son of Yazîd I who was governor of Hims (Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. iv b, p. 69).

(7) Maslama b. ‘Abd al-Malik. Maslama, who became one of the most celebrated generals of the Umayyad house, was governor of Qinnasrin for his father according to Michael the Syrian (Chronique, vol. iv, p. 449 = vol. ii, p. 474). Muslim sources only seem to remember his later governorship of the Jazîra, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

(8) Muḥammad b. ‘Umar al-Thaqafî. The brother of Yûsuf b. ‘Umar and a relative of Ḥajjâj, who was himself an affinal kinsman of the caliph (cf. below, note 289). Muḥammad administered the Balqâ (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 394).

(9) Qurra b. Sarîk al-‘Abî. A sharif from Qinnasrin who was governor of his home province (Michael the Syrian, Chronique, vol. iv, p. 449 = vol. ii, p. 474). He later became secretary to Walid and governor of Egypt (cf. Abbott, The Kurrah Papyri from Aphrodito in the Oriental Institute, pp. 57ff; for his sharifian status see Ibn al-Kalbî, Gamhara, s.v. ‘Quarra b. Sarîk’).

(10) Sulaymân b. ‘Abd al-Malik. The future caliph who was governor of Palestine (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 394). ‘Abd al-Malik had similarly been governor of Palestine as heir apparent (Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. v, p. 149).

(11) ‘Ubayda b. ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Sulamî. A Jordanian Sharif of Qays who was governor of Jordan (Aghâni, vol. ix, p. 313). He was the nephew of Abû’l-A’war al-Sulami, the famous conquerer of Syria, general at Siffin and governor of Jordan under Mu‘awiyâ (Yaqût, Wörterbuch, vol. i, p. 326; Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. ‘Abû’l-A’war al-Sulami’), and he was later appointed to North Africa by Hishâm where, sharif or no sharif, he was drawn into the faction (Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. v, p. 142).


Appendix II: Subgovernors of Syria

WALID I (86-96)

(14) 'Abbās b. al-Walid. A son of the caliph who was appointed to Hims (Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, p. 417). Like Maslama he became a celebrated soldier (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v.).

(15) 'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-Malik. An earlier governor of Hims according to Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. xi, p. 156 (cf. above, no. 3).

(16) 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Walid. Another son of the caliph who was appointed to Damascus (Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, p. 417).


(18) Mārthād b. Shāriḳ al-'Absī. The brother of Qurra who was governor of Qinnasrin after Qurra’s appointment to Egypt (Michael the Syrian, Chronique, vol. iv, p. 451 = vol. ii, p. 478).

(19) Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Malik. The future caliph who continued in office as governor of Palestine (Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, p. 417; Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 143).

(20) 'Umar b. al-Walid. A son of the caliph who governed Jordan (Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, p. 417).

SULAYMĀN (96-99)

(21) Muḥammad b. Suwayd b. Kulthūm al-Fīhrī. A relative of Dahhāk b. Qays who was governor of Damascus (Safādī, Umarā', p. 78; cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamhara, table 34). Kulthūm b. Qays was Dahhāk’s brother; but Suwayd (or Sa'id) b. Kulthūm is nonetheless supposed to have been governor of Damascus in the days of Abū 'Ubayda! (Safādī, Umarā', p. 40; Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamhara, s.v. ‘Sa'id b. Kulthūm’). There were perhaps, as Safādī implies, two men of this name. However this may be, Muḥammad b. Suwayd was known as a traditionist (Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdbīb, vol. ix, p. 210).

'UMAR II (99-101)

(22) Dahhāk b. 'Abd al-Rahmān b. 'Arṣab (or 'Arṣam) al-Asb'arī. A Jordanian traditionist who was governor of Damascus on two occasions, at least one of them for 'Umar II (Ibn 'Asākir, Tahdbīb, vol. iv, p. 446; Safādī, Umarā', p. 44).
(23) Ḥārith b. ‘Amr al-Tā’i. One of the few generals to receive office in Syria: he administered the Balqā’ (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 465; Ibn ‘Asākir, Tabdhib, vol. iii, p. 453). His antecedents are not known, but he was later governor of Armenia for Yazīd II (Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 206; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1526, 1532; Ghevond, Histoire, p. 99; Movses Dasxuranči, History, p. 209), and he may conceivably have been in North Africa (cf. Van Ess, ‘Untersuchungen zu einigen ibādītischen Handschriften’, p. 29).


(27) ʿUbāda b. Nusayy al-Kindī. A traditionist of unknown tribal status who governed Jordan (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 465; Ibn al-Kalbi, Ġambara, s.v.).

(28) ‘Umayr b. Ḥāni’ al-‘Anṣī. A general who was appointed to the Thaniyya and Hawrān and whose sons were among the Yamaniyya (cf. Appendix III, no. 43).

(29) ‘Uthmān b. Saʿīd al-ʿUdhri. A general who appears as commander of a ṭābiʿ in the Syrian army which was sent against Shabib in Iraq in 77 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 970) and who was governor of Damascus according to Ṣafādī (Umarāʾ, p. 55). According to Khalīfa, however, the name of the governor was ʿUbayd b. al-Ḥashās al-ʿUdhri (Ta’rikh, p. 465). ʿUbayd is presumably identical with the ʿAbd al-Ḥāmān b. al-Ḥashās al-ʿUdhri who was qādī of Damascus for ʿUmar II (Wakit, Akhbār al- günd, vol. iii, pp. 203f, cf. p. 201); he is also said to have been qādī for Yazīd II (De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 81).


(31) Yazīd b. Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr al-Sakūnī. A Ḥimṣi sharīf who was governor of Ḥimṣ (cf. Appendix I, no. 5).
Appendix II: Subgovernors of Syria

YAZID II (101–105)

(32) ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. ‘Uthā al-Fihrī. A Qurashi who was governor of Damascus (Šafādī, Umārā, p. 48). His father was governor of Egypt for Ibn al-Zubayr and fell in battle against Marwān I’s troops (Kindī, Governors, pp. 41ff). He himself had been in charge of the sadaqāt in Syria under ‘Umar II (Šafādī, Umārā, p. 48).

(33) Masrūr (or Bishr) b. al-Walīd. A brother of the caliph who was governor of Qinnasrīn (Ibn al-‘Adīm, Zubda, vol. i, p. 49).

(34) Walīd b. Talīd al-Murīr. Walīd was head of the shūrtā of Muḥammad b. Marwān while the latter was governor of Mosul, the Jazīra, Armenia and Azerbaijan (Baladhūrī, Futūḥ, p. 332), governor of Damascus for Yazid II (Šafādī, Umārā, p. 95), and governor of Mosul for Hishām from 114 to 120 (Azdī, Ma‘ṣīl, pp. 33, 35f, 38, 40; cf. Walker, Umaiyyad Coins, pp. 283ff). A nephew of his was apparently governor of Mosul in 126 (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1821). According to Azdī, Walīd was not of Murra, but of ‘Abs.

HISHĀM (105–25)


(36) Kūltbīm b. ‘Īyād al-Qushayrī. Governor of Damascus for Hishām (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1814; Šafādī, Umārā, p. 71). In 122 he was sent to suppress the revolt of the Khārijites in North Africa, but was defeated and killed (Baladhūrī, Futūḥ, p. 232; Khalīfa, Ta‘rīkh, pp. 528ff; cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Baldj b. Bishr’). He is sometimes described as a Qasrī, and Dinawarī even has it that he was a cousin (or fellow-tribesman, ibn ‘amm) of Khalīd al-Qasrī (Akhbār, p. 345; similarly Wellhausen, Kingdom, p. 344n). The genealogists, however, are agreed that he was of Qushayrī (Ibn al-Kalbi, Ġambara, table 105; Ibn Hazm, Jambarā, p. 290; cf. also Ibn al-Qūṭiyya, Iffitāḥ, pp. 40ff).

(37) Walīd b. al-Qāqā b. Khuwayd al-’Absī. A sharīf from Qinnasrīn who was governor of Qinnasrīn (cf. Appendix I, no. 15).

(38) Walīd b. Talīd al-Murīr. Yazīd II’s governor of Damascus, who
continued in office under Hishām (Šafādī, *Umarā*, p. 95; cf. above, no. 34).

**WALĪD II (125–6)**


(40) Ḥakam b. al-Walīd. Walīd’s son and heir apparent who was appointed to Damascus (Azdī, *Mawsīl*, p. 51).


(42) Sa‘īd b. 'Abd al-Malīk. Walīd’s uncle who was governor of Palestine (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1831). He had previously been governor of Mosul and commanded summer campaigns (Balādhurī, *Futūh*, p. 352; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1462, 1472).

(43) 'Uthmān b. ‘Abd al-‘Alā’ b. Surāqa al-Azīdī. Governor of Damascus according to Šafādī (*Umarā*, p. 55), but Šafādī is unlikely to be right (cf. above, no. 39). ‘Uthmān, who was perhaps a brother of Hilāl (above, no. 24), was later a general in the service of Marwān II who appointed him to Mosul (De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 162). He never forgave Marwān his ignominious flight from the Zāb (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 98) and repeatedly sought honourable death in battle himself. In 132 he rebelled against ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Ali (ibid., p. 53; differently Azdī, *Mawsīl*, p. 144), and when ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Ali himself rebelled in 137, ‘Uthmān joined in, was appointed to Damascus, killed Muqāṭīl b. Ḥakim for ‘Abdallāh, and held forth on the virtues of fighting to the bitter end (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 94, 98; Azdī, *Mawsīl*, p. 164; Šafādī, *Umarā*, p. 55; Omar, ‘Abbāsid *Caliphate*, p. 185); and having failed to be killed with ‘Abdallāh, he possibly rebelled once more on his own behalf against Mānsūr (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Gambara*, s.v. “‘Uṭmān b. Surāqa”). Thereafter he is no more heard of. According to Šafādī, he was a Damascene and also a qādī (*Umarā*, p. 55).

(44) ‘Uthmān b. al-Walīd. Another son and heir apparent of Walīd II who was appointed to Hims (Azdī, *Mawsīl*, p. 51).

(45) Yāẓīd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī. A general, reputedly of sharifian descent, who was governor of Qinnasrin (cf. Appendix I, no. 17).
This list excludes most governors said to have been appointed by the caliph, all governors of Mecca and Medina (which were dependencies of Iraq under Hajjāj and Yūsuf b. ‘Umar), and all governors between 99 and 102. The last omission is due to the fact that between 99 and 102 Iraq was first shared between two men, ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd b. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd al-Qurashi and ‘Adī b. Artāh al-Fazārī who were appointed to Kufa and Basra respectively, and next given over to Maslama who was in office for less than a year, so that the number of subgovernors appointed by each of the three is very small. Within these limits the list should be reasonably complete.

Hajjāj b. Yūsuf al-Thaqafī/Qays (75-95)

(1) ‘Abdallāh b. Abī ‘Uṣayrīr al-Thaqafī/Qays. Governor of Mada‘ in 76 (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 899). He had apparently been governor there already in the Zubayrid period and possibly stayed on till he was dismissed by Hajjāj in the course of the Shabīb affair in 76 (ibid., p. 929; Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 192).

(2) ‘Abdallāh b. ʿAmīr al-Shaykhānī/Rabīʿa. A local sharīf who was head of the shurta in Basra (cf. Appendix I, no. 28).

(3) ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. Muhammad b. al-Ashʿāth al-Kindī/Yemen. A Kufan sharīf who was governor of Sīstān (cf. Appendix I, no. 21).

(4) ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. Sulaym al-Kalbī/Yemen. A Syrian of ʿAmīr/Kalb and thus probably from either Mīzra near Damascus or Palmyra (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ġambara, table 289). He fought for ‘Abd al-Malik against ʿAmr b. Saʿīd al-Ashdaq and for Hajjāj against Ibn al-Ashʿāth (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 785, 1075), and was appointed to Sīstān, Oman and/or Fars (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ġambara, s.v.; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, pp. 387, 415; Yaʿqūbī, Buldān, p. 283 = 93, where he has become a Kinānī). He was governor of Basra for Maslama (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1417; cf. Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, pp. 474, 483). In 104 he was back in Syria where he conducted a summer cam-

130
paigned (Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 478, cf. p. 487). His son Ya’qub was among the conspirators who planned the revolt against Walid II (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1794, 1799).

5. ‘Abd al-Rahmân b. ‘Ubayd b. Târiq al-‘Abshami/Mudar. A Kufan who was head of Hajjaj’s *shurta* in both Kufa and Basra (Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 410; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1034), and who is said to have been deputy governor of Kufa already under Ziyâd in 50 (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 101). He figures in many of Abû Mikhna’f’s *isnâds*.

6. ‘Adî b. Wattâd al-Iyâdî/Nizâr. One of the rare members of the ancient tribe of Iyâd to appear in the sources, ‘Adî was governor of Rayy in 77 (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 996ff). He was doubtless from Kufa where most of the remaining Iyâd had settled (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambilara*, s.v. ‘Iyâd b. Nizâr’).

7. ‘Amr b. Sa‘îd al-‘Awdhl/Yemen(?). A Damascene subgovernor of Basra, who is otherwise unknown (Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 414). ‘Awdh b. Sûd was a tribe of Azd, ‘Awdh b. Ghâlib a branch of ‘Abs, and ‘Awdh b. al-‘Hârîth counted as Bajila (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambilara*, s.v.), so ‘Amr may well have been a Qaysî, but Bajila seems the most likely tribe for a Damascene.


Appendix III: Subgovernors of Iraq

Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1446, 1485); he was still governor there when Abūl-Šayda' set out to convert the Sogdians in 110 (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1507f).

(13) Hauşhab b. Yazid al-Shaybâni/Rabā‘a. A Kufan šbarif who was head of the shurta in his native city (cf. Appendix I, no. 30).

(14) Ibn al-Hadrâmî. A halif of Quraysh. ‘Amir b. al-Hadrâmî, Ibn al-Hadrâmî’s grandfather, figures in the Sira where his desire to avenge his brother contributes to the decision of Quraysh to fight the disastrous battle of Badr (Ibn Ishâq, Leben Muhammed’s, vol. i, pp. 424ff, 441f = 287ff, 298). ‘Abdallah b. ‘Amir b. al-Hadrâmî is said to have been governor of Mecca for ‘Uthmân and a keen ‘Uthmânî (Tabarî, ser. i, pp. 3057, 3097ff); he was also an agent for Mu‘awiyâ in Basra (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Ibn al-Hadrâmî’). ‘Abd al-Rahmân b. ‘Abdallah b. ‘Amir was ‘amîl of Kufa for Ḥajjâj (Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. xi, p. 353).

(15) ‘Ikrima b. al-Awsâfî or Wassâfî al-Ḥîmyarî/Yemen. An unknown Syrian who was head of Ḥajjâj’s shurta in Wâṣît (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 411).

(16) Jarrâh b. ‘Abdallah al-Ḥakamî/Yemen. Jarrâh is the paradigmatic general. He was a Syrian, doubtless from Jordan (pace Baladhuri, Futûh, p. 206), and must have come to Iraq with the troops of Sufyân b. al-Abrah al-Kalbi and ‘Abd al-Rahman b. Habib al-Ḥakamî in 77 (cf. Ya‘qûbî, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 328); he was certainly there in 82 when he fought against Ibn al-Ash’âth (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1077, 1091). In 87 or a few years later he became governor of Basra for Ḥajjâj, and he stayed in this office until Yazid b. al-Muhallab was appointed to Iraq and Khurâsân in 96 (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1191, 1208, 1266; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 414). Yazid made him his deputy governor in Iraq before going to Khurâsân (Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 1310; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, pp. 427f), and ‘Umar II appointed him to Khurâsân as the successor to Yazid (Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 1346; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 463; Kračkovskaya and Kračkovsky, ‘Dokument’, p. 55). He was dismissed in 100 (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1352ff), seems to have fought with Maslama against Yazid b. al-Muhallab (ibid., pp. 1413f), was appointed to Armenia by Yazid II in 104 (ibid., p. 1453; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 477; Baladhuri, Futûh, p. 102), dismissed by Hishâm in 107 (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 492) and reappointed by him in 111 (ibid., p. 500; Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 1526). He fell in battle against the Khazars in 112 (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1530f; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, pp. 502ff; Theophanes, Chronographia, A.M. 6220;

(17) *Khalid b. ‘Attâb al-Riyâbi/Mudar*. A Kufan *sharif* who was governor of Rayy and Mada’in (cf. Appendix I, no. 23).

(18) *Khiyâr b. Abî Sabra al-Mujâshbi/i/Mudar*. One of Muhâllab’s former generals who was appointed by Hajjâj to Oman and later killed there by Ziyâd b. al-Muhâllab, apparently because he had had a hand in the dismissal of Yazîd b. al-Muhâllab from Khurâsân in 85 (Tabârî, ser. ii, p. 1140; Ibn al-Kalbî, *Gamhara*, s.v.). According to Khalîfa, it was ‘Abd al-Jâbîr b. [Abî] Sabra who was appointed (Taʾrîkh, p. 415).

(19) *Mawdûd (al-Thaqafi/Qays)*. A nephew of Hajjâj who was head of his *shurta* in Kufa (Khalîfa, *Taʾrîkh*, p. 410).

(20) *Misâm b. Mâlik al-Shaybâni/Rabî’a*. A Basran *sharif* who was governor of Sîstân in 86 (cf. Appendix I, no. 28).


(22) *B. al-Mugḥirâ b. Shu’ba al-Thaqafi/Qays*. Three sons of Mu’âwiya’s famous governor were employed by Hajjâj. ‘Urwa was deputy governor of Kufa in the seventies and again in 95 (Tabârî, ser. ii, pp. 873, 916, 960; Khalîfa, *Taʾrîkh*, pp. 385, 414); Hamza was governor of Hamadhân; and Mutarrîf, who became a Khârijite rebel, was governor of Mada’in (Tabârî, ser. ii, pp. 979 ff). They are said to have counted as *ashraf* despite the ignoble birth of their father (ibid., p. 979).

(23) *Muhâllab b. Abî Şufrâ and Yazîd b. al-Muhâllab al-Azdi/Yemen*. Governors of Khurâsân (cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 427 ff). Yazîd later rose in revolt against Yazîd II and was killed with a large number of his relatives (cf. Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 312 ff), but his family was by no means wiped out. Sulaymân b. Ḥabîb b. al-Muhâllab was one of the *ru’âs al-Yamâniyya* who interceded for Thâbit b. Nu’aym in the reign of Hîshâm, governed Ahwâz for ‘Abdallâh b. ‘Umar after the Yemeni take-over, and joined ‘Abdallâh b. Mu’âwiya in Fars after his defeat at the hands of Marwân’s troops (cf. Appendix IV, no. 46). He was later crucified by Abû’ l-‘Abbâs (Ibn Ḥabîb, *Muhabbar*, p. 486). ‘Abd al-Ḥâbîn b. Yazîd b. al-Muhâllab also joined Ibn Mu’âwiya in Fars, fled to Oman after the latter’s defeat, and was killed (in Oman?) despite a grant of *amân* in 133 (Tabârî, ser. ii, pp. 1978 ff, ser. iii, p. 74). Accord-
ing to others Abu Salama sent him to 'Ayn al-Tamar on the arrival
of the Khurāsānīs in Iraq (Akbār al-dawlat al'-abbāsiyya, p. 378).
Sufyān b. Mu‘awiya b. Yazīd rebelled in Basra in 132 on behalf
of Qahtaba, joined the Yamaniyya and Rabī‘a, but was defeated.
After the revolution, however, he was governor of Basra for Mansūr.
But when al-Nafs al-Zakiyya rebelled in 145, Sufyān’s
son and deputy surrendered Basra without resistance, apparently
because of his and his father’s ‘Alid sympathies (Ṭabarānī, ser. iii,
pp. 21f, 126f, 138, 142, 189, 291, 297, 300; Khalīfa, Ta‘rīkh,
general in Šāliḥ b. ‘Ali’s army in Egypt shortly after the revolution
(Kindi, Governors, p. 103). And Khalīd b. Yazīd b. al-Muhallab is
supposed to have lived long enough to have been head of the
shūrta of an equally long-lived Rawḥ b. Rawḥ b. Zanbā‘ in Egypt
in 176 (ibid., p. 135; presumably the less illustrious links in their
genealogies have been omitted).

The most successful Muhallabids of the early ‘Abbasid period,
however, were descendants of Qabīsa b. al-Muhallab. ‘Umar
b. Hafs b. ‘Uthmān b. Qabīsa, nicknamed Hazārmard, was
governor of Basra and Bahrayn for Abū‘l-‘Abbās, and of Basra
and Sind for Mansūr. According to one version he fought under
Īsā b. Mūsā against al-Nafs al-Zakiyya, but another has it that
he stayed in Sind where, having ‘Alid sympathies, he protected
al-Nafs al-Zakiyya’s son until he was dismissed in 151. However
that may be, he was appointed to North Africa in 151 and fell
there two years later in the revolt of Abū Ḥātim al-Ibādī (Ṭabarānī,
ser. iii, pp. 138f, 236, 359ff, 370f; Khalīfa, Ta‘rīkh, pp. 630,
632, 639, 674, 677, 680; Baladhurī, Futūb, pp. 232f, 445; for
the dynasty of governors which the Muhallabids established in
Ḥātim b. Qabīsa participated in the siege of Wāṣīt on the
‘Abbāsid side in 132, campaigned in Tabaristan in 142, governed
Kufa (or Sind) in 159 and Sind in 160–1, received appointment
for a campaign against Byzantium planned by Hādī, governed
Basra in 166, and was appointed to North Africa in 170; he died
there in 174 (Ṭabarānī, ser. iii, pp. 64f, 69, 139f, 461, 482, 484,
487, 491, 537, 569, 606, 609; Baladhurī, Futūb, pp. 191, 338).
Dāwūd b. Rawḥ b. Ḥātim was charged with zandaqa in 166, but he
was soon released (Ṭabarānī, ser. iii, p. 517). Fāḍl (or Mufaddal)
b. Rawḥ was killed in North Africa in 178 when the Muhallabids
were expelled (ibid., p. 630; Baladhurī, Futūb, p. 233). Yazīd
b. Ḥātim b. Ḥāsim is found in the entourage of Abū Ja’far after the surrender of Wāṣit. He campaigned against a Khārijite in 137, governed Egypt from 143 or 144 to 152, and North Africa from 154 to 170 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 67, 120, 142, 189, 313, 353, 370f, 373, 379, 470, 503, 518, 569; Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 233; Kindî, Governors, pp. 11ff; Milis, Glass Weights, pp. 113ff; Grohmann, *Arabic Papyri in the Egyptian Library*, pp. 177ff. Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. Ḥātim was governor of Ahwāz for Amin and fell in the civil war (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 85ff; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 756). Khalīd b. Yazīd b. Ḥātim was governor of Mosul in 190 (Azīdī, Mawsil, p. 310). Dāwūd b. Bishr b. Ḥātim was governor of Egypt and Sind for Hārūn (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 649; Kindî, Governors, pp. 13ff). Bishr b. Dāwūd stayed on in Sind as a rebel governor until he was finally dislodged by Ma’mūn in 216 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 1098, 1100, 1105).

A branch of the Muhallabid family settled in Nishāpūr in the mid tenth century; by the early eleventh century they had become frequent holders of the riyāṣa at Bayhaq where they intermarried with the local sayyids (Bosworth, The Ghurzavids, p. 198).


(25) Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Thaqafi/Qays. A member of Ḥajjāj’s family who was governor of Sind for many years (Baladhuri, Futūḥ, pp. 435ff; Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1200, 1257, 1271). On the accession of Sulaymān he was seized and brought to Iraq where he was tortured together with the rest of Āl Abī ‘Aqīl (Ibn al-Athīr, Kāmil, vol. iv, p. 465; Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1282ff).

(26) Muḥammad b. al-Sā’ā’ā al-Kīlābī/Qays. One of Ḥajjāj’s governors of Bahrayn and Oman (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, pp. 358, 391ff).

(27) Muḥammad b. Yūṣuf al-Thaqafi/Qays. Ḥajjāj’s brother and Hishām’s father in law (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 533). He was governor of Fārs for Ḥajjāj (Le Strange and Nicholson, Fārsnāma, pp. 132, 169f = Le Strange, ‘Description of the Province of Fārs in Persia’, pp. 26, 83f), and later of the Yemen (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, pp. 384, 417). He is hardly identical with the Muḥammad b. Yūṣuf who fell in North Africa in 124 (ibid., p. 530).

(28) Muḥāṣir b. Suhaym al-Ṭā’ī/Yemen. A Syrian from Hims who was head of Ḥajjāj’s sburta in Wāṣit and later one of his deputy governors in Basra (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, pp. 411, 414). It is tempting to
Appendix III: Subgovernors of Iraq

identify him with the Suḥaym b. al-Muhājir who was governor of Aṭrābūlus for ʿAbd al-Malik and who assisted in the suppression of the Jarājima (Ibn ʿAsākir, Taḥdhib, vol. vi, pp. 65f; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 300).

(29) Majāʿa b. ʿSīr ʿal-Tamīmī/Muḍār. One of Ḥajjāj’s governors of Sind. He had held a command in Oman and is said to have been a candidate for the governorship of Khurāsān which went to Qutayba (Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 435; Khalifa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 390ff; Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1140ff).

(30) Muṣā b. al-Wajīb al-Ḥimyārī/Yemen. A Syrian who became head of Ḥajjāj’s shurta in Wāṣit (Khalifa, Taʾrīkh, p. 411). He was still in Iraq in 99 when ʿUmar II’s governor of Basra sent him to seize Yazid b. al-Muhallab, the ex-governor (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1346, 1350); he fell in battle against the Muhallabids in 101 or was executed by them along with other prisoners (ibid., p. 1384; De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 58). A Kalāʾī, he was probably from Hims.

(31) Qatān b. Mudīrīk al-Kīlābī/Qays. Governor of Basra, and probably a Basran himself (Khalifa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 406f, 414).

(32) Qatān b. Qabīṣa b. al-Mukhāriq al-Hālī/Qays. A Basran who was governor of Kerman and Fars (Khalifa, Taḥaqāt, pp. 56, 184; Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 392). According to Ibn al-Kalbi, he was also governor of Sīstān (Gamhara, s.v.). It was, however, not he but his son Ḥarb b. Qatān who was governor there; he was appointed by Yūsuf b. ʿUmar in the reign of Ḥishām or Walid II, dismissed by Mānsūr b. Jumhūr, and reappointed for a short while by ʾAbdallāh b. ʿUmar (Khalifa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 538, 553, 560; Taʾrīkh-i Sīstān, p. 128ff). He then joined the armies of Marwān II, where he is found together with Ibn Nubātā in 129 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1981; compare Ibn al-Aṭhūr, Kāmil, vol. v, p. 284, who has got his nisba right). Muḥammad b. Qatān, doubtless another son of this Basran, was one of the trusted men of Nasr b. Sayyār in Khurāsān where he was killed by Abū Muslim (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1995, cf. pp. 1917, 1921). Muḥammad b. Ḥarb b. Qatān was head of the shurta of Jaʿfar b. Sulaymān and ʾAbd al-Ṣamād b. ʿAlī in Medina and Basra under Mānsūr and Hārūn (Ibn al-Kalbi, Gamhara, s.v.).

(33) Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhili/Qays. Qutayba’s father, Muslim b. ʿAmr, was a Syrian who was greatly esteemed and favoured by the Umayyads, in particular by Yazīd I (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 111, vol. v, p. 341; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 252). He is said to have been
in Basra already under Ziyād and at all events went there under 'Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād, staying on as a supporter of Muṣṣab in the second civil war; he fell at Maskin (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 83 ff, 239 ff, 252, 773, 806; Balādhrū, Ansāb, vol. iv a, pp. 148 ff, vol. v, pp. 342, 345). Whatever his status in Syria, Qutayba was thus no sharīf in his adoptive home, and he is said to have obtained his first command as a protegé of 'Anbasa b. Sa‘īd, Ashdaq’s brother (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 96 ff, 1059 ff); later Ḥajjāj appointed him to Rayy (Ya‘qūbi, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 342), and in 85 he became governor of Khurāsān, where he was killed in his attempt to raise a revolt on the accession of Sulaymān (Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 429 ff).

His family, however, by no means disappeared. Muslim b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Muslim, his nephew, was governor of Balkh and its provinces for Junayd and Naṣr b. Sayyār and a supporter of Naṣr in the faction (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1529 ff, 1664, 1723, 1920, 1927, 1929); Qatān b. Qutayba, his son, was governor of Bukhārā and its provinces for Junayd and Naṣr (ibid., pp. 1529, 1548, 1664); and Salm b. Qutayba, another son, was governor of Basra for Yazīd b. 'Umar b. Hubayra in the third civil war (ibid., ser. iii, pp. 21 ff; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 610, 621). All three are said to have been candidates for the governorship of Khurāsān which eventually went to Naṣr b. Sayyār (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1559 ff, 1663, 1721). Under the ‘Abbasids they rose to even greater prominence. Salm became governor of Basra and Rayy for Mansūr (ibid., ser. iii, pp. 206, 305, 319, 327; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 625, 675; Miles, Numismatic History of Rayy, pp. 27 ff). Miswar b. ‘Abdallāh b. Muslim, presumably one of Qutayba’s nephews, was in charge of the abdāb of Basra in 159 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 466). And Qutayba’s grandsons held an enormous number of offices until the fourth civil war. ‘Amr b. Muslim b. Qutayba and ‘Amr b. Salm b. Qutayba both fought against Ustādhsīs in 150 (ibid., pp. 357 ff). Muḥammad b. al-Ḥajjāj b. Qutayba was governor of Ṭabaristān in 176 (ibid., p. 613; Ibn Isfandiyār, Ta’rikh, vol. i, p. 189 = 132). Muḥammad b. al-Muṭhannā appears in the entourage of Ṭalha b. Tāhir (Ṭayfur, Kitāb Baghdād, pp. 170 ff). Kathīr b. Salm b. Qutayba was governor of Sistān for Ḥādī and later deputy governor of Sind for his brother Sa‘īd (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 745, 746; Ta’rikh-i Sistān, p. 151). Sa‘īd b. Salm campaigned against Yūsuf al-Barm in 160 (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 670), governed Mosul, Ṭabaristān, the Jazīra and Sind at various times under Hārūn, and
participated in the latter’s campaign against the Byzantines in 191 (Azdi, Mawsl, p. 269, cf. p. 291; Ibn Isfandiyar, Ta’rikh, vol. i, p. 189 = 132; Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 645, 647, 746; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 746). Ibrāhīm b. Salm was governor of the Yemen under Hādī (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 568, cf. pp. 576, 587). Muthannā b. Salm appears in the army of the governor of Sīstān in 199, and the Ahmad b. ʿAmr b. Muslim al-Bāhili who fell against Khārijites in Sīstān in 216 was presumably also a member of this family (Tarikh-i Sistan, pp. 173, 183). Ahmad b. Saʿīd b. Salm b. Qutayba conducted an unsuccessful campaign against the rebellious Zutt in the reign of Muʿtaṣim and was later appointed to the ṣaḥb būr by Wāthiq and was responsible for the ransom of Muslim prisoners-of-war from the Byzantines in 231 (Yaʿqubi, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 576, 588; Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 1352ff; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 797). Abūl-ʿAlwās b. Ahmad b. Saʿīd b. Salm b. Qutayba participated in the repression of the Zanj against whom he fell together with his son in 256 (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 1786, 1837; cf. also p. 1809). But Saʿīd b. Ahmad b. Saʿīd b. Salm al-Bāhili, who can scarcely fail to have been his brother, took his cue from the Zanj and set himself up as a highway robber in the marshes with his Bāhili companions; he was executed in 258 (ibid., pp. 1858ff).

(34) Saʿīd b. Aslām b. Zurʿa al-Kilābī/Qays. Saʿīd’s ancestor has something of a pre-Islamic history and may have been a sharīf (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambara, s.v. ‘Zurʿa b. ‘Amr’). Aslām b. Zurʿa was a Basran who went to Khurāsān several times, and who became govern- or there for ʿUbaydallāh b. Ziyād in 55 (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 65, 81, 168, 172); on his dismissal in 59 he had to pay up 300,000 dirhams (ibid., p. 189). Saʿīd b. Aslām was among the men who stayed loyal to Ḥajjāj at Rustaqaʾbād (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 287, 289), and was rewarded with the governorship of Makrān; when he was killed there, Ḥajjāj brought up Muslim b. Saʿīd together with his own children (Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 435; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1457). Muslim was later appointed to Khurāsān by ʿUmar b. ʿUbayrā (ibid.; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 484; cf. Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 415, 454ff).

(35) Saʿīd b. Hassān al-Usaydi/Mudar. A governor of Basra and Oman who appears to be unidentifiable. He was presumably a Basran (Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, pp. 391ff).

(36) Sinān b. Salāma b. al-Muḥabbīq al-Hudhāli/Qays. A Basran muḥaddith who was governor of Sind for Ziyād and ʿUbaydallāh
b. Ziyād, and who was appointed to Bahrayn by Hajjāj. He died there, leaving his son Mūsā as his successor (Ibn Saʿd, Taḥqīq, vol. vii, p. 124; Baladhuri, Futūḥ, pp. 433ff; Khalifa, Taʾrikh, pp. 245, 249f, 391). Mūsā b. Sinān was also governor of Oman for Hajjāj (Khalifa, Taʾrikh, p. 391).

(37) Sufyān b. Sulaym al-ʿAzdi(?) Yemen. A Syrian who was head of Hajjāj’s shurtā in Wāṣīt (Khalifa, Taʾrikh, p. 411). Since the reading of his nisba is conjectural, there are two possibilities of identification. Either he is the Sufyān b. Sulaymān al-ʿAzdi with whom Yazīd b. al-Muḥallab deposited his baggage in Palestine on his escape from prison (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1211), or else he was the brother or possibly the nephew of the Sulaymān b. Sulaym al-Kalbi who was among the Syrian troops in Iraq under Yūsuf b. ʿUmar. Sulaymān commanded the Bukhāriyya and Qiqāniyya in Kufa at the time of Zayd’s revolt (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1708); he was among the few men who protected Yūsuf on the outbreak of the civil war just as Sufyān b. Salāma b. Sulaym, his nephew, was one of the few men who left with Yūsuf (ibid., pp. 1838ff), and he was eventually crucified by Abū l-ʿAbbās (Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbār, p. 486). Back in Syria the B. Sulaym b. Kaysān similarly assisted the beleaguered Walīd II against the Yamaniyya of Yazīd III (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1802). No explanation of their unusual allegiances is offered.

(38) Suwayd b. ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Minqan/Mudār. A Kufan who was appointed to Hulwān and Māsabadhān, where he assisted in the suppression of Muṭarrīf b. Mughīrā’s revolt (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 989ff). He had previously fought against Mukhtār in Kufa under Ibn Muṭī who appointed him to his shurtā (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, pp. 225f), and he similarly fought against Shabīb and Ibn al-Ash’ath under Hajjāj (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 911, 990). Qaʿqāʾ b. Suwayd assisted his father against Muṭarrīf, fought under Maslama against the Muḥallabīds (ibid., pp. 990, 1402), and was appointed by Ibn Hubayra to Sistān (Yaʿqūbī, Buldān, p. 284 = 95; Taʾrikh-i Sistān, p. 125; Khalifa, Taʾrikh, p. 484, where he is appointed by Yazīd II and dismissed by Ibn Hubayra). According to Ibn al-Kalbi, he was a sharīf (Gamhara, s.v.).

(39) Talha b. Saʿid al-Juhānī/Yemen. A Damascene who was deputy governor of Basra (Khalifa, Taʾrikh, p. 414). He later reappears as the commander of Juḥayna in Yazīd III’s revolt (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1792). The longevity seems excessive, and it is possible that two generations have been run together.

(40) Tufayl b. Husayn al-Bahrānī/Yemen. A general who was briefly
Appendix III: Subgovernors of Iraq
governor of Oman (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 391; Ibn al-Kalbi, Gambarra, s.v. ‘Ṭufayl b. Hisn’). Judging from his nisba, he was a Syrian from Hims.


(42) ‘Umdra b. Tamim al-Lakhmi/Yemen. One of Ḥajjāj’s Syrian commanders at Dayr al-Jamajim who was later sent to Sīstān to hunt down Ibn al-Ash’ath (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1076, 1101, 1104, 1123, 1133; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, pp. 375, where it is suggested that he was of Qayn/Yemen; Bosworth, Sīstān under the Arabs, pp. 67f). He celebrated his victory over the rebels in 83 by issuing the last Arab–Sasanian coin so far known (Gaube, Numismatik, pp. 76f).

(43) ‘Umayr b. Hāni’ al-‘Ansī/Yemen. A Damascene who was employed by Ḥajjāj to repress the Kurds, and who was later appointed deputy governor of Kufa (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 385; Baladhuri, Futūb, pp. 323f, where he has become an ‘Absi). Under ‘Umar II he became governor of the Thaniyya and Ḥawrān, and he is said to have survived until 132, when he was killed by one of Marwān’s men (Ibn Hibbān, ‘Ulama’, p. 112). Qays b. Hāni’, his brother, and Ya’qūb b. ‘Umayr b. Hāni’, his son, were both among the supporters of Yazīd III; Ya’qūb commanded the troops of Dārayyā in the revolt against Walīd and was later sent to deal with the disgruntled ashrāf in Hīms (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1792, 1826f); Qays was killed by Marwān II (ibid., pp. 183f). Like so many other followers of Yazīd III they were Ghaylānis (Van Ess, ‘Les Qadarites et la Gailaniya’, pp. 273ff).

(44) Yazīd b. Abī Kabsa Abū ‘Ulāqa al-Saksaki/Yemen. A Syrian general of sharifian descent who was head of Ḥajjāj’s shurta in Wāṣīt and later his successor (cf. Appendix I, no. 3).

(45) Ziyād b. ‘Amr al-‘Atakī/Yemen. A Basran sharif who was head of the shurta and deputy governor in Basra (cf. Appendix I, no. 33).


(47) Ziyād b. al-Rabi’ and Qatan b. Ziyād al-Ḥāriṭhi/Yemen. Governors of Bahrayn (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, pp. 360, 391, 415). Their ancestor, Dayyān, was also the ancestor of the ‘Abd al-Madān family with whom the ‘Abbāsids intermarried, and he is said to have been
chief of Madhhij before Dhu’l-Ghussa in pre-Islamic times (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gamhara*, table 259 and s.v. ‘Yazid b. Qatān al-Daiyān’). They were thus accredited ashrāf. Rabī’ b. Ziyād, however, had settled in Basra where Madhhij were very few, and he had spent most of his time in eastern Iran, where he participated in the wars of conquest together with his brother Muhājir and became governor first of Sistān and next of Khurāsān (Balādhuri, *Futūh*, pp. 377, 382, 391, 393, 397, 410; Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 455ff; Bosworth, *Sistan under the Arabs*, pp. 21ff). After having served Hajjāj, Ziyād b. al-Rabī’ b. Ziyād (or a son of his named Rabī’) was taken prisoner by the Muhallabids during their revolt in 102, but spared execution because of his sharaf and bayt qadîm (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1409; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 58). Thereafter they seem to disappear, though the Yahyā b. Ziyād b. al-Hārith al-Hārithi who was governor of Bahrayn for Khālid al-Qasrī was doubtless a member of this family (Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 539).

**YAZĪD B. AL-MUHANDAB AL-AZDI/YEMEN (96–9)**

(48) ‘Abdallāh b. Hilāl al-Kilābī/Qays. One of Yazid’s governors of Basra and the sole Qaysī in an almost wholly Yemeni staff (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1310; Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 428, where Hilāl has become Bilāl). Kilābī might be a mistake for Kalbi, in which case he would be a Yemeni, but there seems to be no variant in support of this conjecture.

(49) Abīlath b. ‘Abdallāh b. al-Jārud al-Abi/Abi. A Basran sharīf who was governor of Bahrayn (cf. Appendix I, no. 27).

(50) Bashir b. Hassān al-Nahদī (or Mahrī)/Yemen. One of Yazid’s governors of Kufa and, judging by his nisbas, a Syrian (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1314; Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 429).

(51) Ḥabīb b. al-Muhandab al-Azdi/Yemen. Yazid’s brother and governor of Sind; he is said to have been appointed by Sulaymān or Šalih b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān, presumably at Yazid’s request (Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 429; Balādhuri, *Futūh*, p. 441).

(52) Ḥarb b. ‘Abdallāh. Head of Yazid’s shurta in Wāsit (Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 427). He seems unidentifiable. Ibn al-Kalbi does know a Ḥarb b. ‘Abdallāh of Tamīm whose son and nephew joined the ‘Abbāsid troops in Khurāsān (Gambara, s.vv. “Uqba b. Ḥarb” and “Ri’āb b. Shaddād”); but since the head of the Wā siti shurta was invariably a Syrian, they are unlikely to be identical.

(53) Ḥarmala b. ‘Umayr al-Lakhmī/Yemen. Yazid’s first governor of
Appendix III: Subgovernors of Iraq

Kufa; he had apparently been appointed by Yazid b. Abi Kabsha, Hajjaj’s successor in office, and was probably a Syrian (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 429).

(54) ‘Imran b. al-Numan al-Kalā’i/Yemen. One of Yazid’s governors of Sind (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 430). Dhul-Kalā’ having settled in Himṣ, he was presumably a Syrian (cf. Appendix I, no. 2).

(55) Jarrah b. ‘Abdallāb al-Hakami/Yemen. A Syrian general who had been deputy governor of Basra for Hajjaj, and who was appointed deputy governor of Iraq by Yazid (cf. above, no. 16).


(57) Mu‘awiya b. Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/Yemen. Yazid’s son who was appointed to Sistān after Mudrik (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 429; Ya‘qūbī, Buldān, pp. 283f = 94; Tārikh-i Sistān, p. 121).

(58) Mudrik b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī/Yemen. Yazid’s brother and first governor of Sistān (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 429; Ya‘qūbī, Buldān, pp. 283f = 94; Tārikh-i Sistān, p. 121).

(59) Muhhallad b. Yai‘d al-Aydī/Yemen. Yazid’s son who was governor of Khurāsān before his father’s arrival (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 429).

(60) Sufyān b. ‘Abdallāh (or ‘Umayr) al-Kindī/Yemen. A governor of Basra from 96 to 98 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1305, 1335; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 428, where the date is obviously wrong). He is not otherwise known, and the possibilities of identification are endless. If Khalifa’s version of his name is right, he might be a brother of Ḥasan b. ‘Umayr Abi‘l-‘Amaratā al-Kindī who went to Khurāsān with Jarrah (cf. above, no. 12) and intermarried with Azd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1485). But he might as well be somebody else.

(61) ‘Uthmān b. al-Ḥakam b. Tha’lab al-Hunā’i/Yemen. The head of Yazid’s shurta in Basra (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 427). Another version has Yazid appoint him to his shurta at the time of his revolt (De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 59). He appears to be otherwise unknown.

(62) Yazid b. Abi Kabsha al-Saksaqī/Yemen. A Syrian general of sharifian descent who had been Hajjaj’s successor in office and who was appointed to Sind by Sulaymān or Ṣalih b. ‘Abd al-Raḥmān, presumably in concert with Yazid (cf. Appendix I, no. 3).

(63) Ziyād b. Jarir b. ‘Abdallāb al-Bajali/Yemen. A Kufan sharif who was head of the shurta in Kufa (cf. Appendix I, no. 26).
Ibn Hubayra

(64) Ziyād b. al-Muhallab al-ʿAzī/dī/Yemen. Yazīd's brother and governor of Oman (Khalīfa, Tahrīkh, p. 430).

'Umar b. Hubayra al-Fazārī/Qays (102–5)


(66) Hassān b. ʿAbd al-Rahmān b. Masʿūd al-Fāṣārī/Qays. A Damascene who was governor of Basra (Khalīfa, Tahrīkh, p. 483). His father had commanded a summer campaign under Muʿāwiya in 56 and conducted the enquiry into the Iraqi complaints against Ḥajjāj under ʿAbd al-Malik (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 173; Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 295f; Khalīfa, Tahrīkh, p. 268, where the name is somewhat different).

(67) Hawthara b. Suhayl al-Bdhili/ Qays. Hawthara is said to have been head of Ibn Hubayra's shurta in Wāṣīt (Khalīfa, Tahrīkh, p. 488), but that is presumably a doublet of his role under the later Ibn Hubayra in Wāṣīt. He was governor of Egypt for Marwān II from 128 to 131 (Kindī, Governors, pp. 88ff), sent to Iraq to reinforce Yazīd b. ʿUmar b. Hubayra in 131 (Khalīfa, Tahrīkh, p. 601; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 10, 13), and killed by the ʿAbbāsids after the surrender of Wāṣīt in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 69). According to Severus, however, he was killed in Egypt by Marwān himself (Severus, Patriarchs, p. 186, cf. ibid., pp. 117, 160ff, 168, 171, 173, 183).

(68) Ibn Rayyāt. The head of Ibn Hubayra's shurta in Basra. He is completely unidentifiable and his name probably corrupt (Khalīfa, Tahrīkh, p. 488).

(69) Ibrāhīm b. al-ʿArabī al-Kinānī/Mudar. A Syrian who is known only from Muslim aggada. His maternal grandfather had the honour of occasioning a piece of Koranic revelation: the verses on līṭān were revealed because of his adultery. His mother was the nurse of Marwān b. al-Hakam, so she saved him at the time of the murder of ʿUthmān by sheltering him in the bayt al-qarātīs in Medina (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. i, pp. 21ff, vol. v, p. 79). And in precisely the same manner Ibrāhīm saved Walīd b. ʿAbd al-Malik at the time of Ashdaq's revolt by sheltering him in the bayt al-qarātīs in Damascus (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 790, cf. p. 792; Bravmann contrives not to see a doublet here, whence the notorious state archives in Medina, the existence of which has been accepted even by Van Ess (Bravmann, 'The State Archives in the Early Islamic
Appendix III: Subgovernors of Iraq


(70) *Junayd* b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Murri/Qays. A Damascene general who was appointed to Sind (cf. Appendix I, no. 6).


(72) *Muslim* b. Sa’īd al-Kīldī/Qays. Hajjāj’s Basran foster-son who was appointed to Khurāsān (cf. above, no. 34).

(73) *Qa’qā’* b. Suwayd al-Miṅgārī/Mudar. A Kufan who was governor of Sīstān (cf. above, no. 38).

(74) *Sa’īd* b. ‘Amr al-Harashi/Qays. A general from Qinnasrin whose descendants remained prominent far into the ‘Abbāsid period. Sa’īd probably came to Iraq with Maslama in 101 (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1378, but cf. p. 1092), and here ‘Umar b. Hubayra appointed him governor first of Basra and next of Khurāsān in 103–4 (Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 483, where ‘Amr has become ‘Umar; Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1436ff, 1453ff). Having returned to Syria, he was sent to Armenia by Maslama or Hishām (Baladhuri, *Futūh*, p. 206; Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1531), fell into disgrace by making an ill-fated attack on the Khazars, but was restored to favour and later appointed governor of Armenia by Hishām (Baladhuri, *Futūh*, pp. 206f; Ghevond, *Histoire*, pp. 100f). One of his sons, Yazīd b. Sa’īd, was killed on service in North Africa under Kūlūm b. ‘Īyād (Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 529). Another, Nadr b. Sa’īd, was among the leaders of the *Qaysiya* in Iraq in 127, where Marwān had appointed him governor; ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar, the governor appointed by the *Yamaniyya*, refused to relinquish his position and Nadr eventually returned to Syria (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 188f, 1900, 1905, 1913, 1917). A third, ‘Anbasa b. Sa’īd, commanded the troops from Qinnasrin in the Syrian army which Fadl b. Sāliḥ brought with him to Egypt in 169 (Kindi, *Governors*, p. 129, where Jurashi should be emended to Ḥarashi). Yazīd b. ‘Anbasa conducted a summer campaign in 171 (Ya’qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 522). Sa’īd [b. ? b. Sa’īd] al-Ḥarashi is never explicitly identified as a grandson of the Umayyad general, but that he was
one is very likely (similarly von Zambaur, Manuel de généalogie et de chronologie pour l'histoire de l'Islam, vol. i, p. 13). Mahdi employed him in Khurasān where he defeated Muqanna‘ in 163 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 484, 494) and in Ṭabaristān (ibid., pp. 521, 705). ‘Abdallāh b. Sa‘īd was appointed to Ṭabaristān in 185 by Hārūn (ibid., p. 650; Ibn Isfandiyār, Ta’rikh, pp. 196ff, cf. p. 207 = 141ff, cf. p. 147), and to Hims in 194 by Amin (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 795). He and his brother Ahmad both fought for Amin in the civil war (ibid., pp. 831ff, 859). After the civil war he became governor of Wāsīṭ where he was defeated by Abū’l-Sarāya in 199 (ibid., p. 979).

Yahyā b. Sa‘īd al-Harāshi was governor of Egypt in 162 (Kindi, Governors, pp. 122f, where his name is garbled; Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 493), of Isfahan in 163 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 500; differently Kindi, Governors, pp. 122f), of Ṭabaristān, Ruyyān and Jurjān from 164 to 167 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 503, 518, 520; cf. Miles, Numismatic History of Rayy, p. 77), of Mosul from 180 to 181 (Azdī, Mawṣil, pp. 286ff, 290, 293), and of Jabal in 184 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 649). Sīdī b. Yahyā al-Harāshi accompanied Hārūn to Tūs, was sent on to Ma‘mūn, but returned to Iraq where he fought for Amin in the civil war (ibid., pp. 680, 734, 856). A family in Seljuq Nishāpūr claimed descent from a certain Sa‘īd b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Harāshi, supposedly the deputy governor of Ibn ‘Āmir in Khurāsān, whose grandson, Ahmad b. ‘Amr b. Sa‘īd al-Harāshi, died in Nishāpūr in 226 — some 180 years after his grandfather’s dismissal! (Bulliet, Patricians of Nishapur, p. 90). That it was the above family that the Nishapuri Harashis claimed descent from is not in doubt, but the genealogical charter had clearly got into disorder.


(76) Ṣir b. ‘Abdallāh al-Murrī/Qays. Ibn Hubayra’s deputy governor in Kufa (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 483). His name is perhaps more likely to have been Ṣaqr, but he remains unknown.

(77) Suwayd al-Murrī/Qays. The head of Ibn Hubayra’s shurta in Wāsīṭ (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 488). Ziyād b. Suwayd, his son, was later head of the shurta of Yazīd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra, so Khalīfa may be guilty of yet another doublet. However this may be, Ziyād was
Appendix III: Subgovernors of Iraq

among the wujāb of the Qaysiyya in Wāsīt where he fell or was executed by the 'Abbāsids in 132 (ibid., pp. 607, 623; Tabari, ser. iii, p. 68; Dinawarī, Akhbār, p. 371, where he is Ziyād b. al-Hārith al-Muzant).

(78) 'Ubaydallāh b. 'Ali al-Sulami/Qays. A governor of Sind appointed in 103 (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 484). He might be identical with the Kufan of the same name who is found in Khurāsān in 96 (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1291).

KHĀLID AL-QASRĪ/YEMEN (105-20)

(79) Abān b. Ḍubara al-Yażān/Yemen. A Syrian from Ḥims and member of the famous Ḥimyārī family of Dhū Yazan, who was governor of Basra (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1506; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 535; cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, Gumbara, s.v. ‘Ḍū Yazan’).

(80) ‘Abdollāh b. Abī Burda al-Asb’ār/Yemen. A grandson of Abū Mūsā, the celebrated companion, conqueror and arbiter who had settled in Kūfa (cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘al-Asb’ār, Abū Mūsā’). ‘Abdullāh was Khālid’s last governor of Sīstān. On the appointment of Yūsuf b. ‘Umar to Iraq he was seized and sent to Iraq where he was killed under torture (Ya’qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 384; id., Buldān, p. 284; Bosworth, Sīstān under the Arabs, pp. 73f).

(81) ‘Abdallāh and ‘Āṣim b. ‘Amr al-Bajalī/Yemen. Two brothers who were governors of Kufa (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 536). They are not otherwise known.

(82) ‘Abd al-Malik b. Ja’b b. Ḥidrijān al-Aryān/Yemen. A Palestinian who was governor of Kufa for a while (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 535). According to Ibn al-Kalbī, he was a shāri‘ from Damascus who had held office at the time of Ḥājjāj (Gumbara, s.v.; cf. also Tabari, ser. ii, p. 571).

(83) Asd b. ‘Abdallāh al-Qasrī/Yemen. Khālid’s brother and governor of Khurāsān (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v.).

(84) Asfah b. ‘Abdallāh Abū Khālid al-Kindī (?)/Yemen. Governor of Sīstān (Bosworth, Sīstān under the Arabs, p. 73). He is now a Kindī (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 537), now a Kalbī (Ya’qūbī, Buldān, p. 284 = 95; Ibn al-Kalbī, Gumbara, table 285) and now a Shaybānī (Ta’rikh-i Sīstān, p. 126). Since the Basran Kinda counted as Rabī’a, Khalifa and the Ta’rikh-i Sīstān are perhaps both right (cf. Caskel in Ibn al-Kalbī, Gumbara, vol. i, p. 33n). Asfah’s son was governor of Wāsīt under Mānsūr b. Jumhūr, and he must
have participated in the siege, presumably on the Syrian side, for he is an authority on the death of Qahtaba (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambarara*, s.v. ‘Hālid b. al-Asfah’; Tabarī, ser. iii, p. 155). He also transmitted poetry dealing with the faction (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1251).

(85) Bilāl b. Abī Burdā al-Asb‘ari/Yemen. Another grandson of Abū Mūsa. Bilāl was head of the shurta, civil governor and qādī in Basra; on the appointment of Yūsuf b. ‘Umar to Iraq he fled to Syria, but was sent back and killed under torture (Khalīfa, *Tarīkh*, p. 535; Ya‘qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 388; Pellat, *Le Milieu basrîen et la formation de Ḥārîa*, pp. 288f).

(86) Dabis b. ‘Abdallāh al-Bajalī/Yemen. One of Khalid’s governors of Kufa (Khalīfa, *Tarīkh*, p. 536). He is not otherwise known.

(87) Ḥakam b. ‘Awāna al-Kalbi/Yemen. A Syrian who was deputy governor of Khurāsān for Asad al-Qasrī in 109 and governor of Sind for Khalid al-Qasrī some years later (Baladhuri, *Futūḥ*, pp. 428, 444; Khalīfa, *Tarīkh*, p. 538). His son stayed in Kufa where he wrote Umayyad history and died about 150 (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. ‘Awāna b. al-Ḥakam’).

(88) Ḥazzān b. Sa‘īd al-Rubāwī/Yemen. Governor of Bahrayn (Khalīfa, *Tarīkh*, p. 538). He was among the prisoners taken by the ‘Abbāsids after the surrender of Wāṣīṭ in 132, but must have escaped execution, for he later appears as a member of Mansūr’s sabāba (Tabarī, ser. iii, pp. 68f; Azdī, *Mawsil*, pp. 178, 233, where his name is Hazzār and Marār). According to Ibn al-Kalbi, he was a Syrian sharīf (*Gambarara*, s.v. ‘Zahrān b. Sa‘īd’).

(89) Ismā‘īl b. Awsāt al-Bajalī/Yemen. Head of the shurta in Kufa and/or deputy governor there (Khalīfa, *Tarīkh*, p. 536; Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambarara*, s.v.). His father was a Damascene traditionist who had been governor of Himṣ for Yazīd I (Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tabāqāt*, vol. iii, p. 153). He is also said to have been from Himṣ himself (Khalīfa, *Tabaqāt*, p. 308).


(91) Mālik b. al-Mundhir al-Abdil-Rabta. A Basran sharīf who was head of the shurta in his native city (cf. Appendix I, no. 27). Since the Rabī‘a were *hulafā* of Yemen, he is not really an exception.

(92) Muhammad b. Hujr b. Qays al-Kindi(?)/Yemen. A governor of
Appendix III: Subgovernors of Iraq

Sistān (Tārīkh-i Sistān, p. 127). According to Khalīfa, he was appointed by Yūsuf b. 'Umar (Tārīkh, p. 538). Khalīfa also thinks he was an 'Abdī/Rabī'a, but he has the name Hujr and the authority of Ibn al-Kalbi against him (Ǧamḥara, s.v. 'Mūhammad b. Hūǧr'). Presumably, then, he was a Basran Kindī (cf. above, no. 84).

(93) Muhammad b. Ziyād al-Bajali/Yemen. A Kufān sbarīf who was governor of Bahrāyin (cf. Appendix I, no. 26).

(94) Nādīr b. 'Amr b. al-Muqri' al-Himyar/Yemen. A Damascene who was civil governor of Basra (Khalīfa, Tārīkh, p. 535, cf. p. 498). He was later a prominent member of the Yamaniyya: he commanded the troops of Jurash, Ḥādíthā and Dayr Zakkā in Yazīd's revolt and was appointed to Yazīd's shurta, ḥaras, diwān al-kharāj and lesser seal (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 839, 1792; Khalīfa, Tārīkh, p. 562, who has 'jund' for 'shurta'; Ibn Āsākir, Tārīkh, vol. x, p. 257; Jahshiyārī, Wuzūrā, p. 69). Sulaymān b. 'Amr al-Muqri' commanded the troops of Jordan in Khurāsān under Asād al-Qasrī in 119 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1609, where 'Aẓd' is an obvious mistake for 'Urdunn'). That one brother should appear as a Jordanian and the other as a Damascene is not particularly problematic as Jurash was part sometimes of the Jordanian and sometimes of the Damascene jund.

(95) Nāuf al-Asb'arī/Yemen. A governor of Kufa or head of the shurta there (Khalīfa, Tārīkh, p. 536). He is otherwise unidentifiable.

(96) Tamīm b. Zayd al-Qayni/Yemen. A Syrian, presumably a Jordanian, who replaced Junayd b. 'Abd al-Rahmān as governor of Sind (Khalīfa, Tārīkh, p. 538; Balādhuri, Fītūh, p. 443, where Qaynī has become 'Urbī; Ibn al-Kalbi, Ḥamḥara, table 308). He reappears in 126 when he tried to smuggle a pomegranate drink to Khālid, who was being carted back to Iraq as the prisoner of Yūsuf b. 'Umar (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1822, where he is Zayd b. Tamīm al-Qaynī).

(97) Yahyā b. Ismā'il. A governor of Bahrāyin (Khalīfa, Tārīkh, p. 539). Perhaps he was a son of Ismā'il b. 'Abdallāh al-Qasrī, Khālid's brother, but no son of that name appears to be recorded.

(98) Yahyā b. Ziyād b. al-Ḥārīth al-Ḥārīthī/Yemen. Yet another governor of Bahrāyin and probably a member of the Dayyān family (cf. above, no. 47).

(99) Yāzīd b. al-Gharīf al-Hamdānī/Yemen. A Jordanian who was governor of Sistān (Khalīfa, Tārīkh, p. 537; Ya'qūbī, Bulūdān, p. 284 = 95; Tārīkh-i Sistān, p. 126, where his father is 'Arīf).
Yūsuf b. ʿUmar

(100) Ziyād b. ʿUbaydallāh al-Ḥārithi/Yemen. Ziyād was a member of the ʿAbd al-Madān family, the second and more famous branch of the B. al-Dayyān (cf. above, no. 47). They were natives of South Arabia where their memorable deeds are said to have included wars against the B. Zubayd, a delegation to the Prophet, administration of Najrān under ʿAlī, and an unsuccessful battle against Muʿāwiya’s envoy in the first civil war (Ṭabarī, ser. i, p. 3452, ser. ii, p. 384; Ṭabānī, vol. xvi, p. 266; Ibn al-Kalbī, Ḡambarā, s.v. “ʿAbdalhīrī b. ʿAmr (ʿAbdalmadān’). There is no record of when they left for the Fertile Crescent. Rayṭa bint ʿUbaydallāh must have married Muḥammad b. ʿAlī about the turn of the century: she was the mother of Abū l-ʿAbbās (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 88). And in 105 Ziyād b. ʿUbaydallāh appears as a recent recruit in the Syrian army where Khālid picked him up (cf. above, p. 55). He is said to have taught himself to read and write so as to qualify for a full governorship in Rayy, but having been rejected by the fiscal governor, he ended up with the more familiar job of running Khālid’s shurṭa in Kufa (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1475f; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, p. 536). Presumably he stayed in Iraq after Khālid’s fall; he is at all events found among the beleaguered Syrian troops in Wāṣīṭ in 132 when he deserted to the ʿAbbāsids (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 66). In 133 he was appointed to Mecca, Medina, Taʾif and Yamāma, where he stayed until the accession of Mansūr (ibid., pp. 73, 81, 91; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 635f, 672). Muḥammad b. Yazīd b. ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAbd al-Madān was appointed to the Yemen, where he was succeeded by ʿAli b. al-Rabī’ b. ʿUbaydallāh b. ʿAbd al-Madān in 134, and he in turn was replaced by ʿAbdallāh b. al-Rabī’ b. ʿUbaydallāh b. ʿAbd al-Madān under Mansūr (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 73, 80, 81, 265, 318; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, p. 673; Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 489, where Mansūr’s governor is Rabī’ b. ʿAbdallāh). Yazīd b. Ziyād Abū Ghassān became chamberlain to Abū l-ʿAbbās (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 915f). The family appears to have settled in Basra and environs, where a Ḥārith Abū Ghassān of theirs impressed his contemporaries as a soothsayer, and where a number of them were outrageously massacred by a bad-tempered general in 134, a scandal which provided much fuel for residual Yemeni feelings (ibid., pp. 21, 76f).

Yūsuf b. ʿUmar al-Thaqāfī/Qays (120–6)

(101) ʿAbbās b. Saʿīd al-Murri/Qays. The head of Yūsuf’s shurṭa
Appendix III: Subgovernors of Iraq

(Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1702, 1707, 1711, where Murri has consistently become Muzani; De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 99; Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 556, who specifies Murra/Ghatafān; similarly Ibn al-Kalbi, Gambara, s.v. ‘Abbâs b. Sa’d’).

(102) Abdallâb b. Shabîr al-Numayrî/Qays. Governor of Bahrayn (Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 539). He is not otherwise known.

(103) Abî Umayya b. al-Mughîrâ al-Thaqafî/Qays. A member of Al Abî ‘Aqîl, Yûsuf’s own family; he was Yûsuf’s last governor of Kufa (Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 536, 553).

(104) ’Amr b. ‘Abd al-Rahmân al-Qârî/Mudar. The head of the shurta in Kufa at the time of Zayd b. ‘Ali’s revolt; he had probably been appointed by Hâkâm b. al-Salt al-Thaqafī, Yûsuf’s governor of Kufa (Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 556, cf. below, no. 107). The choice is explained by the fact that the B. Qârâ were akhwâl of Qays (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1699).

(105) Bishr b. Sallâm al-‘Abdî/ Rabî’a. Bishr is mentioned as governor of Bahrayn at the time of Walîd’s death and had presumably been appointed by Yûsuf b. ‘Umar; he managed to hang on, apparently without official sanction, until he was confirmed in office by Yazîd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra. He died soon after and was succeeded by his sons, Sayyâr and Salm (Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 617).

(106) Fayd b. Muhammad b. al-Qasîm al-Thaqafî/Qays. Governor of Oman (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1780; Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 553, where his name has been run together with that of Kardamb b. Bayhas, cf. below, no. 111). He was another member of Yûsuf’s family.

(107) Hakâm b. al-Salt al-Thaqafî/Qays. Governor of Kufa in 122 (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1699, 1701, 1712; Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 556). He was yet another member of Yûsuf’s family and had previously served in Khurasân under Junayd; apparently it was Yûsuf’s wish to substitute him for Nasr b. Sayyâr as governor of Khurasân (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1718f).

(108) Harb b. Qatân al-Hilâlî/Qays. One of Yûsuf’s governors of Sîstân (cf. above, no. 32).

(109) Ibrâhîm b. ‘Âsîm al-‘Uqaylî/Qays. A general from the Jâzîra who is found in Khurasân under ‘Âsîm b. Abdallâh al-Hilâlî and Asad al-Qasrî, and who became governor of Sîstân under Yûsuf, on whose behalf he killed and confiscated the property of his predecessor, or, according to others, had him seized and sent on to Iraq where he was killed under torture by Yûsuf. He himself died in Sîstân in 126 (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1579, 1594ff;
Yūsuf b. ‘Umar

Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 538; Tārikh-i Sistān, pp. 127ff; cf. above, no. 80).

Juday’ b. ‘Alī al-‘Azdī/Yemen. On his appointment to Iraq Yūsuf is said to have dismissed Ja’far b. Ḥanzala al-Bahraini/Yemen from Khurāsān with the intention of appointing Salm b. Qutayba/Qays. Hīshām, however, refused to ratify the choice and Yūsuf appointed Juday’ b. ‘Alī instead, evidently as a stop-gap, for he was soon replaced by Nāṣr b. Sayyār al-Laythi/Mudar, Hīshām’s candidate (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1659ff).

Kardam b. Bayhas [al-Kīlābi/Qays (?)]. Governor of Oman (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 553, where his name has been run together with that of Fayd b. Muḥammad, cf. above, no. 106). He was doubtless a son of Bayhas b. Zumayl al-Kīlābi, a Damascene who held Walīd II’s seal and who is found in Walīd’s entourage at the time of Yāzīd’s attack (Ibn ‘Asākir, Ta’rikh, vol. x, p. 396; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1795f; Jahshiyārī, Wuzūrā’, p. 68). There was admittedly another Damascene sharīf by the name of Bayhas b. Suhayb al-Jarmi/Yemen, a man of Basran origin whose son Sa’īd is said to have been imprisoned by Walīd for his failure to support the change of succession (Ibn ‘Asākir, Taḥdīḥ, vol. iii, p. 323; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 54, 1776); but he is evidently a less likely candidate. Both families survived into the ‘Abbasid period.

Ṣāliḥ b. Bayhas al-Kīlābi was sent to Constantinople in 184 to redeem Muslim prisoners-of-war (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 731). Yahyā b. Ṣāliḥ and Muḥammad b. Ṣāliḥ took control of Damascus in the chaotic years after the fourth civil war as supporters of an Umayyad pretender (De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 363; Saḥādī, Umarā’, pp. 78, 97). And a Yemeni Ibn Bayhas was among the ahl al-bu‘aytāt who supported the Sufyānī in his rebellion against Mu’taṣim and Wāṭhiq in 227 according to Ṭabarī (ser. iii, pp. 1320, 1322); according to Ya’qūbī, however, he was yet another Ibn Bayhas al-Kīlābi (Historiae, vol. ii, p. 586). Michael the Syrian supplies no nisba (Chronique, vol. iv, p. 542 = vol. iii, p. 103).

Kathir b. ‘Abdallāh al-Sulāmī/Qays. Governor of Basra from 120 to 122 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1667; Khalīfah, Ta’rikh, p. 535). In 126 he was head of the shurta for ‘Abd al-Malik b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥajjāj, the governor of Damascus (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1789f). He was probably a Damascene like his employers.

Khīrāsh b. Ḥawsab al-Shaybānī/Rabī‘a. A Kufan sharīf who was head of the local shurta (cf. Appendix I, no. 30).
Appendix III: Subgovernors of Iraq

(114) Muhammad b. Hassān b. Sa‘d al-Usaydi/Mudār. A Basran who was governor of Bahrayn (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 539; cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, Ḥambarā, s.v. ‘Hassān b. Sa‘d’).

(115) Muhammad b. Hujr b. Qays al-Kindi (?)/Yemen. A governor of Sīstān who was appointed by Yūsuf according to Khalīfa, but by his predecessor according to the local tradition (cf. above, no. 92).

(116) Muhammad b. Nubāta al-Kīlābī/Qays. Governor of Wāsīt, where he was taken prisoner by the Yamanīyya on the arrival of Mansūr b. Junḥūr in 126 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1837). Muhammad’s father, Nubāta b. Hanzala, was a Syrian who is said to have participated in the bombardment of the Ka‘ba in the second civil war (Ibn Qutayba, Ma‘ārif, p. 184); he came to Iraq in the course of the third civil war, and he and his sons were among the wujūb al-Qaysiyā there in 127 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1885, 1905); Yazīd b. ‘Umar b. Hubayra sent Nubāta to Jurjān where he fell against Qaḥṭāba in 130 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 2003ff; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 591f). Muhammad stayed in Iraq, endured the siege of Wāsīt, and was among the wujūb al-Qaysiyā who were executed by the ‘Abbāsids in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 15ff, 63, 68f; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 607, 610; the names of the various members of the family are hopelessly confused, cf. Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1885 as compared with Ibn al-Kalbī, Ḥambarā, table 94).


(118) Qāsim b. ‘Umar al-Thaqafi/Qays. Yūsuf’s brother and governor of Yemen (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 534). He was still in the Yemen in 129 when he was defeated by the Ibādis; apparently Marwān II had appointed him to either Ṣa‘ā or the entire province (ibid., pp. 582f; Caetani, Chronographia Islamica, p. 1621).

(119) ‘Ubaydallāb b. al-‘Abbās al-Kindi/Yemen. A Kufān who is said to have been governor of Fars for Khālid al-Qasrī, of Kufa for Yūsuf b. ‘Umar, of Qinnasrīn for Abū l-‘Abbās and of Armenia for Mansūr, a wildly improbable career for a Kufān shurtī (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ḥambarā, s.v.). He may have been governor of Kufa for Yūsuf or the head of his shurtā there (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 536, 552). But according to Ṭabarī, he was merely a fairly prominent member of the local shurtā under Yūsuf, and governor of Kufa only under Mansūr b. Junḥūr, the representative of Yazīd’s Yamanīyya, and that is doubtless the correct version (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1699, 1855). Ibn al-Kalbī also advances great claims on behalf of the
founders of the family: Yazid b. al-Aswad was blessed as a child by the Prophet, Jabala b. Sa'd b. al-Aswad also visited the Prophet, and Masruq b. Yazid parcelled out the land of the B. Yazid in Kufa (Gamhara, s.v.v., cf. also table 237). But the family was clearly a product of the local police force. Aktal b. al-'Abbās commanded the archers in Maslama's army against the Muhallabids (thus at least Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamhara, s.v.); 'Ubaydallāh similarly fought together with Syrian troops in 126 when he assisted in the suppression of Zayd's revolt, and in 127 when he fought against the Khārijites (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1699, 1705; Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, p. 569). Ja'far b. 'Ubaydallāh also fought against Zayd, apparently as a commander of Syrian troops; he was head of the shūrta of 'Abdollāh b. 'Umar in 127, when he fell in battle against the Khārijites (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1701f, 1901; Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, p. 570); Silsila b. al-Ḥusayn b. al-'Abbās is credited with the defeat of the Khārijite 'Ubayda, Dahhāk's successor who fell in 129 (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamhara, s.v.; cf. Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1945); and Nu'mān b. al-Masruq b. Yazid fell in Khurāsān at an unspecified time (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamhara, s.v.).

(120) 'Umar (or 'Amr) b. Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Thaqafī/Qays. Yūsuf's governor of Sind and yet another member of the Āl Abī 'Aqīl (Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, pp. 526, 538, 553). His father had been governor of Sind for Hajjāj (cf. above, no. 25). He himself committed suicide on the outbreak of the civil war to avoid torture at the hands of his Yemeni successor (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1839; cf. Appendix IV, no. 24).

(121) Yūsuf b. Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim al-Thaqafī/Qays. A brother of the above and one of the governors of Kufa (Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, p. 536).

(122) Ziyād b. Saḥhr al-Lakhmī/Yemen. A Syrian, presumably from Palestine, who was one of Yūsuf's governors of Kufa (Khalīfa, Ta'rīkh, p. 536). He is the only significant exception to Yūsuf's preference for Qays and Muḍar, and his involvement with the Qaysiyya was permanent: he later held an administrative post in Palestine under Rumāḥīs b. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Kinānī, Marwān II's governor there (Grohmann, Arabic Papyri from Hīrbet el-Mird, nos. 26f, 43, 60f, 87). He is also known as a traditionist (Ibn 'Asākir, Taḥdīb, vol. v, p. 403).
APPENDIX IV
THE YAMANIYYA AND THE QAYSIYYA

This appendix is a list of the Syrian soldiers who conducted the civil war in Syria and Iraq between 126 and 132. It omits all Qurashis (largely Umayyads), all Syrians who fought elsewhere, and, with the exception of no. 46, all earlier representatives who fail to reappear in the civil war itself. Iraqis have been included when they received appointment from the Syrians. The list should have the vast majority of the named protagonists and certainly all who were in the least important.

A. THE YAMANIYYA

(1) 'Abd al-Rahmân b. Thâbit al-'Ansî/Yemen. An adherent of Yazîd III who had served in Khurâsân and who later became a fiscal officer under Mansûr and Mahdi; he was a Qadari (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Gailânîya', p. 273).

(2) 'Abd al-Rahmân and 'Abdallah b. Yarqd al-Sulami/Qays. Another two Qadaris who participated in Yazid's revolt (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Gailânîya', pp. 273, 275). They were doubtless Jordanians.

(3) 'Abd al-Salâm b. Bukayr b. Shamîd b. al-Lakhmi/Yemen. One of the murderers of Walid II (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1800, 1806; Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 549). There is much disagreement on his father's position. He is said to have been head of Yazid III's shurta (Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 562; Ibn ‘Asâkir, Tabdbib, vol. x, p. 257), but others think that it was Yazid b. Shammâkh who enjoyed this position (Ya’qûbî, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 402); he is also said to have been secretary to Yazid III (Ibn ‘Asâkir, Tabdbib, vol. x, p. 257), but others think that he enjoyed this position under Walid II, which seems rather unlikely (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 838). However this may be, the family was Damascene (Ibn ‘Asâkir, Tabdbib, vol. x, p. 257).

(4) 'Abd al-Šamâd b. Abân al-Ansârî/Yemen. One of 'Abdallâh b. 'Umar's governors of Kufa (Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 616). 'Abd al-Šamâd's great-grandfather, Bashir b. Sa’d, was a Medinese com-
Yamaniyya

panion of the Prophet credited with various expeditions in the Prophet’s lifetime, a major role in the day of the saqifa and a minor role in the conquest of ‘Ayn al-Tamr, where he fell (Tabari, ser. i, pp. 1592f, 1597, 1843f; Baladhuri, Fustûb, pp. 244, 248). Nu’mân b. Bashîr, his better known grandfather, was an ‘Uthmânî who refused to give allegiance to ‘Ali and who fought for Mu‘awiya in the first civil war; the sources characteristically send him to ‘Ayn al-Tamr (Tabari, ser. i, pp. 3070, 3255, 3444f). Mu‘awiya appointed him to Hims, where he had settled, perhaps also to the Ḥadramawt, and certainly to Kufa in 59 (Baladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. iv a, p. 137; Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 188, 195). Yazid confirmed him in office on his accession, but replaced him soon after in the course of the Muslim b. ‘Aqîl affair in 60 (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 216, 228, 238f). He is also mentioned among the men who were sent by Yazid to extract an oath of allegiance from Ibn al-Zubayr (Khalîfah, Ta’rikh, p. 316). On the death of Yazid, however, he gave his allegiance to Ibn al-Zubayr, who appointed him to Hims, from where he supplied Dâhîk b. Qays with reinforcements for the battle of Marj Râhît (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 468, 474; Baladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. iv b, p. 59; vol. v, p. 127). He fled from Hims after Dâhîk’s defeat, but was caught and killed by a local Kalâ’î (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 480). At least three of his descendants were known as muḥaddithûn (Ibn ‘Asâkir, Tahdhib, vol. iii, pp. 260f, 270f), but nothing is heard of them outside the world of scholarship until 126, when the B. Nu’mân b. Bashîr came to assist Walîd II against Yazîd III (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1802). How ‘Abd al-Ṣamad ended up on the other side is hard to tell in the absence of further information, but one would guess that he had become a soldier.

(5) ‘Amr b. Ḥuwây y al-Saksakî/Yemen. The descendant of a Damascene sharîf who commanded the rub’ of Kinda for Mu‘awiya at Sîfîn, and who claimed to have felled ‘Ammâr b. Yâsîr (Khalîfah, Ta’rikh, p. 222; Ibn al-Kalbî, Ġambara, s.v. ‘Ḥuwâiyy b. Mâti’); Ibn Ḥabîb, Muhabbah, p. 296). His appearance on Yazîd’s side is a little odd in that an Ibn Huwayy is also listed among the disgruntled asbrâf on whom Yazîd showered honours after having put down their revolt (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1831); but whatever the relationship between the two, ‘Amr commanded Yazîd’s right wing in the attack on Walîd, and Nûh b. ‘Amr figures as an authority on the death of Walîd (ibid., pp. 1797f, 1801). His previous career is unknown.
Appendix IV: Yamaniyya and Qaysiyya

(6) 'Amr b. Yazīd al-Ḥakamī/Yemen. A somewhat shadowy figure who appears in the quintessentially Yemeni, but not very illuminating, roles of bringing amān to Yazīd b. al-Muhallab and advising Yazīd III at the time of their respective revolts (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1387f., 1784). If he is identical with the 'Amr/'Umar b. Yazīd/Zayd al-Ḥakamī who supported Ibn al-Zubayr in Damascus in the second civil war, he must have been extraordinarily long-lived (ibid., pp. 471, 817; Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. v, pp. 133, 354). He was probably a brother of 'Abdallāh b. Yazīd al-Ḥakamī, the head of 'Abd al-Malik and Walīdī shurta (Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 335; Ibn Habīb, Muḥabbār, p. 373; Khalīfā, Ta‘rīkh, p. 395, where his father’s name is Zayd). 'Abdallāh must also have enjoyed unusual longevity, for he is later found in the sahāba of Mansūr (Azdī, Ma‘ṣīl, p. 178). Perhaps two generations have been run together.

(7) 'Anbasa b. Sa‘īd al-Saksakī/Yemen. A participant in Yazīd’s revolt in 126 and apparently a sharīf (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1784, 1799). He is unidentifiable.

(8) Asbahā b. Dhu‘ā’al al-Kalbī/Yemen. A Palmyrene who had served in Khurāsān under Asad al-Qasrī in 119 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1595, 1892f), and who may have been in Kufa in 122 (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ğambarā, s.v.). In 126 he was one of the conspirators against Walīd II and a supporter of Sulaymān b. Hishām (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1878); in 127 he commanded the Yemeni troops in Iraq together with his sons and rebelled against Marwān II back in Syria (ibid., pp. 1892ff, 1900, 1902); and after the ‘Abbāsid revolution he joined forces with Qays and participated in the revolt of Abū‘l-Ward b. Zufar in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 55; cf. Appendix I, no. 19). According to another version he was executed by Marwān (Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbār, p. 484).

(9) Bīshr b. Shaybān, mawlā of the Kināna b. ‘Umayr of Kalb/Yemen. One of the murderers of Walīd II (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1806, 1809). He is not otherwise known.

(10) B. Dhiyā b. Khalīfah al-Kalbī/Yemen. Dhiyā b. Khalīfa was a companion of the Prophet credited with outstanding beauty and a mission to Heraclius; he settled in Mizza near Damascus (Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v.). Three of his descendants figure in the third civil war. Harīm b. ‘Abdallāh b. Dhiyā commanded a minor detachment in Yazīd’s battle against Walīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1794); Sulaymān b. ‘Abdallāh b. Dhiyā also participated, as is indicated
by the presence of a client of his (ibid., p. 1805); and ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Hārūn b. ‘Abdallāh b. Dīhyā was offered the governorship of Iraq, but declined because he had no jund (ibid., p. 1836).

(11) Ḥajjāj b. Artāb al-Nakba’ī/Yemen. A Kufan faqīh who was head of the sburta for Mansūr b. Jumhūr and ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar (Khalīfa, Ta’rikhb, pp. 559, 578). He later entered the service of Abū l-‘Abbās for whom he was briefly qāfī of Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 61; Khalīfa, Ta’rikhb, p. 634). Mansūr made him his kātib and employed him in the construction of Baghdad (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 276, 322; De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 269; Ya‘qūbī, Buldān, pp. 241f, 249 = 17f, 31). He accompanied Mahdī to Rayy, where he died in 150 (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ġambara, s.v.; Khalīfa, Ta’baqāt, p. 167; differently Khalīfa, Ta’rikhb, p. 648).


(13) Humayd b. Ḥabīb al-Lakhmī/Yemen. A rebel against Walīd who commanded the troops from Dayr Murrān, Arza and Sāṯrā (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1792, 1794ff).

(14) Humayd b. ‘Arbāb al-Lakhmī/Yemen. One of the soldiers who planned the conspiracy against Walīd and who participated in the battle against him (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1800).

(15) Hurayth b. ‘Abī-‘Jahm al-Kalbī/Yemen. Hurayth’s father was among the Syrians who were sent with Sufyān b. al-‘Abrād al-Kalbī to Tabaristān in 77 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1020), and from there he must have gone first to Iraq, where he appears as executioner for Ḥajjāj in 83 (ibid., p. 1098), and next to Khurāsān, where he served Yazīd b. al-Muḥallāb (ibid., p. 1328). Hurayth himself was in Iraq at the time of Yazīd’s revolt and became governor of Wāsīṭ for Mansūr b. Jumhūr (ibid., pp. 1836ff, 1839). He was a member of the Kalbī subtribe of ‘Āmir and thus presumably from either Mizza near Damascus or Palmyra (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ġambara, table 288).


(18) Khālid b. al-‘Asfah al-Kindī (?)/Yemen (?). A governor of Wāsīṭ
Appendix IV: Yamaniyya and Qaysiyya

for Mansūr b. Jumhūr who was probably a Basran Kindī (cf. Appendix III, no. 84).

(19) B. Khālid al-Qasri/Yemen. The members of Khālid’s family were among the leaders of the Yamaniyya in the third civil war (cf. Appendix I, no. 11).

(20) Mansūr b. Jumhūr al-Kalbi/Yemen. One of the most important generals of the Yamaniyya. A coarse soldier equally devoid of nobility and piety, Mansūr was shunned by devout contemporaries as an a’rābī possessed of only one genuine feeling, víç anger at the murder of Khālid; religious creeds, by contrast, he regarded merely as tickets of entry to whatever party he found of use at a given time (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1837). He presumably began his career in Iraq together with his fellow-tribesmen of the B. ‘Āmir (cf. ibid., p. 1098), but he first appears in Syria with a Ghaylānī ticket to plan and carry out the murder of Walid (ibid., pp. 1778, 1797f, 1800, 1803f, 1809, 1837). Thereafter he was sent to take control of Iraq, perhaps as the deputy of Ḥārith b. al-‘Abbās b. al-Walid (ibid., pp. 1835ff), but his tenure was of short duration, and he was replaced by ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz in the same year (ibid., pp. 1834f). Apparently he returned to Syria, but he was back in Iraq in 127, when he participated in the faction fighting and combated the Khārijites under Ibn ‘Umar; and since the Khārijites had the upper hand, he pronounced himself a sinner wishing to obey God’s word and became a proselyte (ibid., pp. 1902, 1906f). Allied with the Khārijites he set himself up in western Persia and fought Ibn Hubayra until he and his allies were decisively beaten, whereupon he hastily deposited his money with a sayrafl in Mādā’in and fled to Fars, where a motley crowd of enemies of Marwān had congregated around ‘Abdallāh b. Mu‘āwiyah (ibid., pp. 1915f, 1946f, 1977, cf. p. 1883; De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 165). Meanwhile he forgot tabkīm and adopted love of the qurbā instead (Miles, Numismatic History of Rayy, pp. 15ff). Even in Fars, however, the Yemenis were being rounded up. Defeated by Ibn Hubayra’s generals, the motley crowd dispersed and Mansūr fled to India where he succeeded in setting himself up as governor, apparently with a hurriedly acquired mandate from the ‘Abbāsids (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1979, ser. iii, pp. 72, 75; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 407). But his luck was out. In 134 Mūsā b. Ka‘b was sent to deal with him, and having been defeated once again he fled into the desert where he died of thirst (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 80; cf. Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, pp. 161f).
Several members of Mansūr’s family similarly participated in the civil war. Hībāl b. ‘Amr, his cousin, was among the conspirators (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1880). Jahshana, a nephew of his, fell in battle against the Khārijites at Wāsīt (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 571). Manzūr, his brother, was sent to take control of Khūrāsān, but met with no success (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1846f). He was later murdered in India by rīfā‘a b. Thābit al-Judhāmī who had fled to Mansūr and who was the worst of Thābit’s brood. Mansūr got hold of the murderer and immured him alive in a pillar (ibid., p. 1895; Ya’qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 407, where the story is somewhat different).

(21) B. Maṣād al-Kalbl/Yemen. There were two Kalbl families by the name of Maṣād in Syria if Ibn al-Kalbl is right. B. Maṣād b. Ka‘b of ‘Ulāym were sharifian; Zubayr b. al-‘Awāmm had intermarried with them and Yazīd III likewise took a wife from among them (Ibn al-Kalbl, Ġambara, s. vv. ‘Ribā‘ bint Una‘f and ‘Hadramī b. al-Asbag’; Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 67); there is no evidence that they participated in the third civil war. B. Maṣād b. Qays of ‘Āmir, on the other hand, were scarcely sharifian, though Ibn al-Kalbl describes them as the leading clan of ‘Amīra/‘Āmir (Ibn al-Kalbl, Ġambara, s. v. ‘Maṣād b. Qays’); but they provided several members of the Yamaniyya. Yazīd III took great pains to win over Mu‘āwiya b. Maṣād, the sayyid of the people of Mizza (Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 1789), and presumably he succeeded, for ‘Abd al-Rahmān and Hishām b. Maṣād appear among his followers on several occasions (ibid., pp. 1791, 1793, 1795, 1828). Walīd b. Maṣād is said to have been head of his ḫaras or sburta (ibid., p. 1878, cf. p. 1893), and Yazīd b. Maṣād was among Sulaymān b. Hishām’s men (ibid., p. 1828).

(22) Miswar b. ‘Abdāl al-Habati/Muḍar. Miswar can be adduced as a minor exception to the general rule that the Yamaniyya appointed only Yemenis: he was appointed to the sburta and ḥabāt in Basra by ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Umar (cf. Appendix I, no. 20).


Appendix IV: Yamaniyya and Qaysiya

Sind and Sistan (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1839; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 560; Bosworth, Sistan under the Arabs, p. 75). Muhammad had served in Sind under Hakam b. ‘Awâna al-Kalbî, who designated him his successor; the new governor of Iraq, Yüsuf b. ‘Umar, however, appointed ‘Umar b. Muhammad al-Thaqaftî who sent Muhammad to Iraq where he was asked to pay a large sum of money and subjected to torture which cost him the use of one hand and some fingers (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 538; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1839; Ya’qûbi, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 389). When Muhammad returned to Sind as Mansûr’s governor, ‘Umar b. Muhammad committed suicide in his prison to avoid the torture in store for him (cf. Appendix III, no. 120). Muhammad installed himself comfortably in Sind until Mansûr b. Jumhûr himself arrived and proved deaf to the appeal to the qaraba between them; in the ensuing battle Muhammad was defeated, and according to Ya’qûbi it was this man who was immured in a pillar (cf. above, no. 20; Historiae, vol. ii, p. 407; Ya’qûbi also thinks that Muhammad had been appointed already under Walid, ibid., pp. 399f).

(25) Muhammad b. Râsid b. Khuzech ‘î/Yemen. A Ghaylânî adherent of Yazid III who later developed a soft spot for ‘Alî and ‘Amr b. ‘Ubayd (Van Ess, ‘Les Qadarites et la Gailaniya’, pp. 273f). He figures as a visitor of Yüsuf b. ‘Umar and/or the sons of Walid in their prison and is also Madâ’îni’s râwî on the revolt of Palestine which he himself was sent to suppress (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1832, 1843; De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 146).


(27) Nadr b. ‘Amr al-Himyari/Yemen. A Damascene rebel who had served in Iraq under Khalid al-Qasrî (cf. Appendix III, no. 94).

(28) Qays b. Hâni’ and Ya’qûb b. ‘Umayr b. Hâni’ al-‘Ansi/Yemen. Two Damascenes whose brother/father had served in Iraq (cf. Appendix III, no. 43).


(32) Shabib b. Abî Mâlik al-Ghassânî/Yemen. One of the conspirators
against Walid (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1778). Shabib's father, Harith b. Mu'awiyah, had served in Khurasan under Salm b. Ziyad (ibid., p. 392). He himself had been interim governor of Basra in 102 (Khalifa, Ta'rikh, p. 483). His son, 'Isa b. Shabib, participated in Yazid's revolt as the commander of the troops from Duma and Harastah (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1792). They appear with the nisbas of Harithi, Mazini and Taghlabi in addition to that of Ghassani; Taghlabi should be emended to Thalabl, but they all refer to the same tribe at different levels of segmentation (cf. Ibn al-Kalbi, Gambara, tables 176, 194).

(33) Talha b. Sa'id al-Jubani/Yemen. A Damascene who had been governor of Basra for Hajjaj (cf. Appendix III, no. 39).

(34) Thabit b. Nu'aym al-Judhami/Yemen. One of the chief opponents of Marwan after the outbreak of the civil war. He was a Palestinian of unknown ancestry who had served under Kulthum b. 'Iyad in North Africa; here his career came to an end when Hanzala b. Safwan had him sent back to Syria on the ground that he was corrupting the army, and he was imprisoned by Hisham. The leading Yemenis in Syria, however, interceded with Marwan, who got him out of Hisham's prison and took him to Armenia, where he was stationed at Bab. On the death of Walid, Marwan left Thabit in charge of the Yemenis at Bab; Thabit, however, persuaded them to desert, whereupon they were all intercepted by Marwan, who detained Thabit and let the rest of the Syrians go home (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1871ff). By 127 he was free again, and when the Syrian ajnad were told by Marwan to elect their own governor, the Palestinians chose Thabit (ibid., p. 1892). But no sooner had Marwan left than he rebelled again, assuming the name of al-Asfar or al-Asgar al-Qahfani (Azdi, Mawsil, p. 66; Khalifa, Ta'rikh, p. 566). Marwan returned, put down the revolt, and sent an army against its leader, who was defeated first by Jordan and next in Palestine; apparently, however, he managed to escape to Egypt, where he had been trying to mobilize support for some time (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1892ff; Kindi, Governors, pp. 85ff). But in the end he was caught by Marwan's governor and had his hands and legs cut off (Kindi, Governors, p. 90; cf. Khalifa, Ta'rikb, p. 567, where it takes place in Syria).

(35) Thawr b. Yazid al-Kala'i/Yemen. A Ghaylanî adherent of Yazid III from Hitn who had to flee from his native city at the time of the sharifian revolt against the Yamaniyya (Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Gailaniya', p. 273). Like other supporters of Yazid
he had been in Iraq, though in what capacity is not stated (Ibn Hibbân, 'Ulâmâ', p. 181, where he is a Kindî).

(36) Tufayl b. Hâritba al-Kalbi/Yemen. One of the conspirators against Walîd II and a leading Yemeni in the subsequent events (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1778, 1829f, 1893, 1896). A brother of his served in Armenia shortly before the outbreak of the civil war (ibid., p. 1852).

(37) Tufayl b. Zurâra al-Habashi(?). A commander of Sulaymân b. Hishâm's left wing at Hîms in 126 (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1829, cf. p. 1912). Ibn al-Kalbi thinks him a Harashi/Qays and moreover has his full genealogy (Gâmbara, table 101); but it looks as if his erudition has got the better of him, for he also knows that Tufayl had been a member of Hishâm's haras (ibid., s.v. 'Tufail b. Zurâra'), and the haras was wholly or largely staffed by non-Arabs in the Umayyad period.


(39) 'Umar b. al-Ghaḍbân al-Shaybânî/Rabî'a. A Kufan shurtî who became head of the shurtâ in Kufa under 'Abdallâh b. 'Umar b. 'Abd al-ʿAzîz (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1855, 1902). His father, Ghaḍbân b. al-Qabaṭhâra, had been an arbitrator between the feuding tribes in Basra in 64 (Baladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. iv b, pp. 114, 121), a traitor to Musâb at Maskin (Baladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. v, pp. 341, 344), and a rebel against Hajjâj at Rustaqâbâd, after which he had either escaped to Syria or been imprisoned, but at all events was pardoned in the end (Baladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. xi, pp. 284, 291f, cf. p. 197; Khalifa, Taʾrikh, pp. 347f). 'Umar similarly appears in the role of go-between. In 126 'Abdallâh b. 'Umar's decision to pay stipends to the Kufans occasioned a brawl between the Syrian and Kufan soldiers in the course of which 'Ubaydallâb b. al-ʿAbbâs occupied the castle; Ibn Ghaḍbân, however, managed to get him out and to restore order, whereupon he was richly rewarded and appointed to the shurtâ as well as other offices (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1855, 1882). In 127 he paid homage to 'Abdallâh b. Muʿâwiya (ibid., p. 1883) and/or once more performed the service of getting a rebel out of the castle in Kufa when he obtained a general amân for 'Abdallâh, himself and his people, and the Zaydis (ibid., p. 1887). Whatever his exact involvement with Ibn Muʿâwiya, he was dismissed from the shurtâ for it (ibid., p. 1902).
Yamaniyya

(40) ‘Umāra b. Abī Kulthūm al-Azdi/Yemen. One of Khalīd al-Qasrī’s thiqāt, and a commander in Yazīd’s army against Walīd (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1797, 1819). He was executed by Marwān II (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambara, s.v.).


(42) Yaʿqūb b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Sulaym al-Kalbī/Yemen. A conspirator against Walīd whose father had served in Iraq (cf. Appendix III, no. 4).

(43) Yazīd b. al-ʿAqqār al-Kalbī/Yemen. A participant in the revolt against Walīd. He was head of Yazīd’s ḥaras or shurta and died in Marwān’s prison (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1878).

(44) Yazīd b. Ḥajara al-Ghassānī/Yemen. A participant in the revolt against Walīd who is praised for his religious merit. He is said to have advised Yazīd against the appointment of Mansūr b. Jumhūr to Iraq on the ground that Mansūr was an irreligious bedouin (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1837).

(45) Ziyād b. Ḥuṣayn al-Kalbī/Yemen. A rebel against Walīd II who fell in the battle against him (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1797).

(46) Three ruʿūs al-Yamaniyya are mentioned as having interceded for Thābit b. Nuʿaym al-Judhāmī, the prisoner of Hishām: ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Ḍakhm, Kaʿb b. Ḥāmid al-ʿAbsī, and Sulaymān b. Ḥabīb, his qāḍī (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1871; for Thābit see above, no. 34). Apparently then we have a case of Qaysīs described as members of the Yamaniyya. In fact, however, all three men were of Yemeni descent. The first was of ‘Ansī. Ḍakhm b. Qurra is listed by Ibn al-Kalbī as a sharīf of ‘Ans in Damascus (Gambara, table 272 and s.v.) and ‘Abd al-Rahmān was doubtless his son; a grandson, Yazīd b. Yaʿlā b. Ḍakhm is also found at Hishām’s court: he was head of the shurta (Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 544, where he has become an ‘Absī; Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, p. 374, where he is correctly given as an ‘Ansī). The second was likewise of ‘Ansī. Kaʿb b. Ḥāmid was head of the shurta of ‘Abd al-Malik, Walīd, Sulaymān, Yazīd, and Hishām at various times (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1342; Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, pp. 373f; Yaʿqūbi, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 377, 393, 349, 359). He is all but invariably given as an ‘Absī, but Ibn Ḥabīb has him as an ‘Ansī and there is no doubt that he is right; the change of ‘Ans into the better known ‘Absī is commonplace, and moreover the Syrian ‘Ans are known to have been concentrated in Damascus (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambara, s.v.)
Appendix IV: Yamaniyya and Qaysiyya

'Ans b. Malik). That leaves Sulaymān b. Ḥabib. Now the qādi
of that name was certainly of Muhārib/Qays, and since he died
in 126 he could just be the man envisaged (Khalifa, Ta’rikh,
p. 557; Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1226, 1338). But there was another
Sulaymān b. Ḥabib who was governor of Ahwāz for Ibn ‘Umar in
the civil war and later fled to Ibn Mu‘āwiya in Fars, and this
Sulaymān was of course a Muhallabid, a well-known ra’s al-
Yamaniyya (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1946f, 1977f; cf. also Van Vloten,
‘His qādi’ is evidently a gloss, and that a wrong one.

B. THE QAYSIIYA

known collaborator of Yūsuf b. ‘Umar al-Thaqafi who was executed
by the ‘Abbāsids after the fall of Wāsīt (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1779f; Ibn al-Kalbī, Gambara, s.v.).

(48) ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Ḥātim al-Bāhīlī/Qays. A Meso-
potamian general of sharīfian descent who served under Ibn
Hubatra (cf. Appendix I, no. 14).

(49) ‘Abd al-Malik b. Muhammad b. ‘Atīyya al-Sā’idī/Mudar. A
general, doubtless from the Jazīra, who campaigned against the
Ibāḍīs in Arabia for Marwān in 130 (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 2012ff; Khalifa, Ta’rikh, pp. 595ff). He was accompanied by his nephew,
Wālid b. ‘Urwa b. Muḥammad, who became governor of Medina
in 130f (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 2014, ser. iii, p. 11; cf. Khalifa,
Ta’rikh, p. 603).

for Ibn Hubayra in 127 who was also head of the Kufan s¯urta in
132 (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 1916, ser. iii, pp. 18, 20); after Muḥammad
b. Khālid al-Qasrī’s revolt in favour of the ‘Abbāsids he fled to Ibn
Hubayra in Wāsīt and endured the siege with him (ibid., ser. iii,
p. 64), and he is presumably to be identified with the ‘Abdallāh
b. Bishr who was executed by the ‘Abbāsids (Dinawari, Akhbār,
p. 371). Judging by his nisba, he was a Kufan.

(51) Abū Bakr b. Ka‘b al-‘Uqaylī/Qays. A governor of Khūwār for
Marwān II who ended up among the wujūb al-Qaysiyya in Wāsīt
and was executed after the siege (Tabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1, 68;
Dinawari, Akhbār, p. 371).

(52) ‘Āmir b. Dhū‘āra al-Murūl/Qays. A general who is first met on a
summer campaign against Byzantium in A.D. 726 (Theophanes,
Asid b. Zâfr al-Sulamil Qays. A Mesopotamian general who served both Muhammad b. Marwân and Marwân b. Muḥammad in Armenia (Balâdhurî, Futûh, pp. 205, 207). Nothing is known of his ancestors, but his descendants were around in the area until the end of the third century. Yazîd b. Asîd became governor of Armenia under Abû’l-‘Abbâs and of Mosul, apparently together with the Jazîra, for Mansûr (Tabarî, ser. iii, pp. 81, 84; Azdî, Mawsîl, p. 217; De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 265); in 155 he was appointed to Armenia and Azerbaijan where he campaigned against the Khazars (Balâdhurî, Futûh, pp. 209f; Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 664); and in 157 he conducted a summer campaign (Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, p. 666). He disliked Yemenis and was full of ‘asabîyya against them (Azdî, Mawsîl, p. 259). Khalîd b. Asîd was appointed deputy governor of Armenia by Fâdî b. Yaḥyâ al-Barmakî (Ya’qûbî, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 516), while Ahmad b. Yazîd became governor of Mosul and later also of Armenia thanks to the patronage of Yaḥyâ b. Khalîd al-Barmakî; but Ahmad had to be recalled because the Khurāsânîs could not bear him; he also had to be protected when he ventured to Baghdad and got pelted with stones for his prejudice against them (Azdî, Mawsîl, p. 295). Like his father he thought there were too many Yemenis in the world, but his plans to reduce their number fell through when their wujâh absconded from his camp and returned to Mosul where they refused to let him in; whereupon Ahmad went burning and killing in the environs, refusing to believe that the government could disapprove of this reaction to such manifest insubordination. Apparently he was right, for the caliph sent a cousin of his to reinforce him, though not to much avail (Azdî, Mawsîl, pp. 296f).

After this inglorious affair there is silence for a generation. Under Ma’mûn, however, Yaqzan b. ‘Abd al-‘Alâ b. Ahmad b. Yazîd became governor of Armenia; he fell on Byzantine territory in 210 (Ya’qûbî, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 565; Balâdhurî, Futûh, p. 192). And yet another descendant of Ahmad appears in 281 in the form of Abû’l-Agharr Khalîfa b. al-Mubârak, the lord of Sumaysât and apparently a rebel against the government at the time (Tabarî, ser. iii, p. 2410; cf. Azdî, Mawsîl, p. 295). Abû’l-Agharr later
Appendix IV: Yamaniyya and Qaysiyya

became a great supporter of the caliphs, assisting them against their own insubordinate servants and protecting the pilgrims from bedouin attack on their behalf (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 2191f, 2199, 2216); Muktafi counted him among the wujūb al-qawwād (ibid., p. 2248) and sent him against the Carmathians in Syria in 290, when he had the satisfaction of commanding the Farāqhina and other caliphal troops; but he was nonetheless defeated and is last met on a sā’īfa in 297 (ibid., pp. 2222, 2231f, 2275).

(54) 'Āsim b. 'Abdallāh b. Yazīd (or Burayd) al-Hilālī/Qays. A Mesopotamian who makes his first appearance as governor of Khurāsān in 116–17 (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1482, 1564ff, 1573ff; Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 461f, 466f). Having returned to the Jazīra, he became governor of Armenia for Marwān II in 126, and he was one of the leaders of Qays who joined the latter when he set out for Syria; according to others, he stayed in Armenia where he was killed in 127 (Azdī, Mawsil, pp. 56, 61; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 404f). His son Zufar supported the revolt of ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Alī who appointed him to Aleppo or Qinnasrin and entrusted him with the murder of Humayd b. Qahtaba, which he failed to accomplish (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 94; Ibn al-‘Adīm, Zubdā, vol. i, p. 57; Omar, ’Abbāsīd Caliphate, p. 185, where Zufar has become a Muhallabi). Despite the revolt Zufar’s career was unimpaired. He conducted summer campaigns in 154, 156 and possibly also in 157, became governor of Medina in 160 and was appointed to the Jazīra in 163 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 373, 378, 380, 482, 498ff). Mu‘āwiya b. Zufar conducted summer campaigns in 178 and 180 (ibid., pp. 637, 645) and may have been governor of Rayy (Miles, Numismatic History of Rayy, pp. 56, 65f). ’Abbās b. Zufar was one of Hārūn’s governors of Armenia (Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 519) and also served in Tabaristan (Ibn Isfandiyār, Ta’rikh, vol. i, p. 197 = 141). After Hārūn’s death he was one of the Zawāqil whom Amīn tried to enrol for his war against Ma‘mūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 845) and one of the local rulers who emerged in Syria in the chaotic period after the civil war (De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 363; Michael the Syrian, Chronique, vol. iv, pp. 495, 497, 499f = vol. iii, pp. 27, 31, 36, 38); it was doubtless in this capacity that he protected the Hāshimites of the Aleppo area against marauding bedouins (Baladhūrī, Futūb, pp. 145f).

(55) ‘Aṭīf b. Bishr al-Sulamī/Qays. One of the generals with whom Marwān II reinforced ‘Āmir b. Dubāra in Mosul (Ṭabarī, ser. ii,
p. 1945; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, p. 162, where he is mentioned together with a certain Shaqiq al-Sulami). He was later sent to Rayy to reinforce Nasr b. Sayyār, which he did not do (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 32), and finally he is said to have reinforced Ibn Ḫūbāra once more in 131, this time in Fars (Ḫalīf, *Ṭarḥb*, p. 600).


(57) *Ḥabīb b. Budayl al-Nabshāli/Mudār*. Ibn Hubayra’s governor of Rayy (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 2f; Miles, *Numismatic History of Rayy*, p. 19). He left with the Syrian troops on the approach of the Khurāsānīs and is no more heard (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 3). But his son, Wāddāḥ b. Ḥabīb Abū Budayl, who had been in Khurāsān under Nasr, reappears in the service of Mahdī (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1888, ser. iii, p. 496).

(58) *Ḥabīb b. Murra al-Murnī/Qays*. One of Marwān’s *fursān* and *qawwād* who rebelled against the ‘Abbāsids in the Balqa’ and Hawrān area in 132 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 52f). He is probably identical with the Ḥabīb b. Murra who was head of the *shurta* of Junayd b. ʿAbd al-Rahmān al-Murrī in Khurāsān (ibid., ser. ii, p. 1529). It is true that Tabarî calls this second ʿAbī an ʿAbsi, but he lists him just after another ʿAbsi, so this *nisba* can probably be put down to dittography.

(59) *Ḥakam b. Yazīd al-Usaydi/Mudār*. A Basran who was one of ʿYūsuf b. ʿUmar al-Thaqafi’s candidates for the governorship of Khurāsān in 120, and who was appointed to Kerman by Yazīd b. ʿUmar b. Hubayra under Marwān (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1663, where Asadi should be emended to Usaydi, cf. Ibn al-Kalbī, *Gambara*, table 83). ʿUmar b. Yazīd al-Usaydi, his brother, had been head of the *shurta* and *abdāb* in Basra for Maslama and a fervent anti-Yemeni who paid for it with his life under Khalīd al-Qasrī (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1417, 1468, 1495f; cf. the garbled passage in Khalīf, *Ṭarḥb*, p. 410; De Goeje, *Fragmenta*, pp. 87f).

(60) *Ḥarb b. Qātan al-Hilāli/Qays*. ʿYūsuf b. ʿUmar’s governor of Sīstān who joined Marwān’s troops (cf. Appendix III, no. 32).

(61) *Ḥawthara b. Subayl al-Bābīli/Qays*. Marwān’s governor of Egypt who was executed after the siege of Wāṣīt or in Egypt (cf. Appendix III, no. 67).

(62) *Ḥishām b. ʿAmr al-Ṭaghlabī/Rabīʿa*. A Mesopotamian general who was governor of Mosul for Marwān together with Bishr b. Khuzayma al-Asadī/Mudār; after the battle of the Zab they refused to open the gates for the defeated caliph and deserted to ʿAbdallāḥ
b. 'Ali (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 47; Azdî, Mawsîl, p. 133 where Hishâm is a Zuhayrî; cf. Ibn al-Kalbi, Ğambara, table 165). Hishâm did well under the 'Abbâsids. Mansûr employed him during the construction of Baghdad and appointed him to Sind in 151 (Ya'qûbî, Buldân, p. 242 = 18; id., Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 448f, 462; Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 359; Balâdûrî, Futûb, pp. 444f). His brother Bistâm b. 'Amr was deputy governor of Sind under Mansûr (Khalîfâ, Ta’rikh, p. 678); yet another brother, Sufâyh b. 'Amr, was governor of Sind for Mahdî (ibid., p. 697); and finally a nephew of his, Muhammad b. 'Adî, was governor of Sind for Hârûn (ibid., p. 746).

(63) Ishaq and 'Īsâ b. Muslim al-‘Uqaylî/Qays. Two descendants of a Mesopotamian sharif (cf. Appendix I, no. 16).


(65) Kawthar b. al-Aswad al-Ghanawî/Qays. The head of Marwân’s shurta in 127 (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1910; Ibn Ḥâbîb, Muḥabbar, p. 374). His son ‘Abd al-Malîk was governor of Qinnasrîn (Ibn al-‘Adîm, Zubda, vol. i, p. 50). Kawthar was among the few men who stayed by Marwân after his defeat on the Zâb, accompanying him on his flight to Syria and beyond (Azdî, Mawsîl, p. 136).


(67) Malik b. Adbam b. Muḥrîz al-Bâhiî/Qays. The son of a Ḥimṣî who had fought for Mu‘awiyah in the first civil war and for Marwân in the second, and who had been one of Ḥajjâj’s quwwâd (Ibn ‘Asâkîr, Tabdhîb, vol. ii, p. 364; Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 553). Malik served in Armenia under Maslama in 105 (Khalîfâ, Ta’rikh, p. 480). In the third civil war he sided with Marwân and un-
Qaysiyya

Qaysiyya successfully defended Hamadhan against Qahtaba; having entrenched himself at Nihawand together with his Syrian troops and the refugees from Khurāsān, he finally surrendered with amān for himself and the Syrians, leaving the Khurāsānis to be executed (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 2, 6f; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 600f). In 142 he commanded the Syrian troops at Adhana (Baladhuri, Futūh, p. 168), and he frequented the court of Mansūr (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 439).

(68) Man b. Zā’ida al-Shaybānī/Rabī‘a. A general, doubtless from Mesopotamia, who was sent against ‘Abdallāh b. Mu’āwiya and the residue of the Yamanīyya in Fārs in 129 (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 197ff); he returned to Iraq and fought against the ‘Abbāsids at Wāsit, where he was one of the men who claimed to have killed Qahtaba (ibid., ser. iii, pp. 15, 63). After the ‘Abbāsid victory he kept a low profile until 141, when he came out of hiding to deal with the Rāwandīyya, doing so well that Mansūr gave him amān, incorporated him in his sabāba, and appointed him first to the Yemen and next to Sistān, where he fell in battle against the Khārijites in 152 (Ibid., pp. 131ff, 394, 368f; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 659, 677; Tārikh-i Sistān, pp. 143ff; Baladhuri, Futūh, pp. 401ff). Zā’ida b. Ma’n, his son, succeeded him as governor of the Yemen (Ya’qūbi, Historia, vol. ii, pp. 462f), while another son, Sharaḥīl b. Ma’n, is found on Hārūn’s campaign against the Byzantines in 190 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 709). Ma’n’s maternal uncle was Ibn Abī‘Awija’, the notorious zindiq who was crucified in the 150s (Vajda, ‘Les Zindiqs’, pp. 193ff), but no heresy is attested for the branch of the family that stayed in the army.

It was Ma’n’s paternal nephews rather than his sons who rose to great prominence under the early ‘Abbāsids. Yazīd b. Mazyaḍ had been with his uncle in Sistān (Tārikh-i Sistān, pp. 143ff); under Mahdī he campaigned against Yūsuf al-Barm in Khurāsān, participated in a summer campaign in 165, and was sent with Hādī to Jurjān in 167 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 470, 503, 519; Ya’qūbi, Historia, vol. ii, pp. 478f); Hādī enlisted his support for the annulment of Hārūn’s succession and appointed him to Armenia where he stayed until 172 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 572, 607); Hārūn employed him against a Khārijite in the Jazīra in 179 and appointed him to Armenia and Azerbāyjan in 183; he died there in 183, leaving Asad b. Yazīd as his successor (ibid., pp. 648, 650; Ya’qūbī, Historia, vol. ii, pp. 515ff). Asad b. Yazīd was among the generals who were sent to Ma’mūn in Marw in 193, but he returned
Appendix IV: Yamaniyya and Qaysiya

to fight for Amin in the civil war, fell into disgrace with the latter, and was replaced by his uncle Ahmad b. Mazyad (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 734, 833ff); he may have been governor of Rayy in 181 (Miles, Numismatic History of Rayy, p. 70). Muhammad b. Yazid suppressed a Kharijite revolt in 190 and participated in Harun's Byzantine campaign in 191 (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 711, 712). 'Ubaydallah b. Yazid came to Egypt with the Afshin in 216 (Kindi, Governors, p. 191), and Muhammad b. 'Ubaydallah b. Yazid b. Mazyad, his son, was governor of Alexandria in 252 under Mu'tazz (ibid., p. 205). Khalid b. Yazid was governor of Kufa at the time of Abū'1-Sarāya's revolt for Hasan b. Sahl, campaigned against Egyptian rebels for Ma'mūn and governed Armenia for both Ma'mūn and Wāthiq (Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 543, 555ff, 565, 588; cf. Tabari, ser. iii, p. 1075; Kindi, Governors, pp. 174ff). Ahmad b. Khalid was governor of Damascus for Mu'tazz (Sa'fādī, 'Umarā, p. 5). Muhammad b. Khalid took over the governorship of Armenia on his father's death, was re-appointed by Mutawakkil, and stayed on under Musta'in for whom he fought in Baghdad in 251 (Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 588, 599; Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 1577, 1615). Muhammad and his brothers Haytham and Yazid founded the dynasty of the Yazidis in Shirwan who lasted down to the Seljuq invasions and were among the rare Arabs to exchange their native genealogy for a Persian one (Madelung, 'The Minor Dynasties of Northern Iran', pp. 243ff).

(69) Miswar b. 'Abbād al-Ḥabatil Muḍar. A Basran sharīf who was employed by both Yemenis and Qaysis (cf. Appendix I, no. 20).

(70) Nadr b. Sa'īd al-Harashbi/Qays. A Mesopotamian general who was Marwān's first governor of Iraq (cf. Appendix III, no. 74).


(72) Qatān b. Akama al-Shaybānī/Rabī'a. A Jazīran who was appointed to Mosul by Marwān II in 127 and killed by Dahhāk al-Khārijī in the same year (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1938; Azdī, Mawsīl, pp. 68f).

(73) Rūmābīs b. 'Abd al-'Azīz al-Kīnānī/Mudar. One of the leaders of Marwān's shurta and later his governor of Palestine (Ibn al-Kalbi, Ḡambara, s.v.; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1895; Grohmann, Arabic Papyri from Ḥirbet el-Mird, nos. 43, 87). He fled with Marwān to Egypt and escaped from there to Spain where he became gover-


(76) Sulaymân b. ‘Abdallâh b. ‘Ulâtha al-Uqayli/Qays. A governor of the Jazîra appointed by the son of Marwân in 126 on the news of the murder of Walîd II (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 187of). The nisba is provided by Ibn al-Kalbî, who also knows that Sulaymân had been qaḍî for Hisham (Gambara, table 102 and s.v.). Muhammad b. ‘Abdallâh, his brother, similarly appears in the service of Marwân, who sent him to convey his oath of allegiance to Yazîd III in Syria (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1873). Under the ‘Abbâsids Muhammad became qaḍî in Baghdad under Mansûr and Mahdî (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 462, 472, 529; Ibn al-Kalbî, Gambara, s.v.).

(77) Târiq b. Qudâma. A general in the service of Ibn Hubayra at Wâsît, where he was executed by the ‘Abbâsids (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 68; Dînawarî, Akhbâr, p. 370f). According to Dînawarî he was of Qasr/Yemen; Ṭabarî, however, enumerates him among the wujûb al-Qaysiyya and Muḍariyya; in all likelihood, therefore, he was not a Qasrî, but a Qushayrî.

(78) Tha’laba b. Salâma al-‘Amîlî/Yemen. A general who had commanded the Jordanian troops in Kulthûm b. ‘Iyâd’s North African expedition, and who was governor of Jordan for Marwân II; he fled with Marwân from Syria (Laﬁûnte, Ajbar, p. 30, cf. pp. 44, 46; Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 46; Azdî, Mawsîl, pp. 136f). His Yemeni genealogy is not in doubt (cf. Ibn al-Kalbî, Gambara, table 244), and why he should have thrown in his lot so thoroughly with the Qaysiyya is not clear; it would seem also to have surprised his contemporaries (Azdî, Mawsîl, pp. 136f).


Appendix IV: Yamaniyya and Qaysiyya

(82) Zāmil b. ‘Amr al-Ḥabrānī/Yemen. A somewhat enigmatic figure who became governor of Damascus by local choice after Marwān’s arrival there in 127, but who was wholly on Marwān’s side in the revolt which broke out after Marwān’s departure (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1892, 1894; cf. Ibn Ḥabīb, Ṭuhabbar, p. 485). He is also said to have been governor of Ḥims, where he was wholly on the side of rebels such as Thābit b. Nu‘aym al-Ḏudhāmi (Kindī, Governors, p. 86; Ibn ‘Asākir, Taḥdhib, vol. v, p. 346). It is thus hard to decide on which side he belonged. His nisba also varies a good deal, but most of them are clearly variations on Ḥabrānī (of Himyar), the reading suggested by Ibn al-Kalbī (Ǧamḥara, s.v. ‘Zāmil b. ‘Amr’).

(83) Ziyād b. Ṣakhr al-Lakhmī/Yemen. A Syrian who had been deputy governor of Kufa under Yūsūf b. ‘Umar and who held some administrative office in Palestine under Marwān (cf. Appendix III, no. 122).

(84) Ziyād b. Ṣaʿlīḥ al-Ḥadrī/Yemen. Ziyād’s grandfather is supposed to have fought at Qādisīyya (Ibn al-Kalbī, Ǧamḥara, s.v. ‘al-ʿAswād b. Ziyād’), so Ziyād was presumably an Iraqi. He was governor of Kufa for Ibn Ḥubayra in 132 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 18; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 607, 616; he is not to be confused with the ‘Abbāsid naqīb of the same name who was of Khuzā’ā). When Muḥammad b. Khālid al-Qasrī rebelled in favour of the approaching Khurāsānīs, Ziyād went to Wāṣīt, where he is said to have been among Ibn Ḥubayra’s closest companions and to have been entrusted by him with the harāsa of the city; nonetheless, he was among the generals who responded to the Yemeni propaganda of the future Mansūr and defected to the ‘Abbāsid (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 18, 65f; Dīnawārī, Aḥḥār, pp. 368f). The sources offer no explanation for this unusual companionship.

This appendix is a list of Khurasanis and clients who held office under the early 'Abbāsids. The list is selective, but should include the best known representatives of the two groups. The information is largely restricted to offices and commands. Where possible, the fortunes of the families have been traced beyond 198, but none of the men who make their appearance under Ma'mūn have been included.

A. KHURĀSÂNIYYA (AHL AL-DAWLA AND ABNĀ’)

(1) ‘Abd al-Jabbār b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Azdi. A ḍā’i and general of the revolution who was appointed head of Abū’l-‘Abbās’ shurta on his arrival in Iraq (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 2003f, ser. iii, pp. 76, 100f, cf. p. 67). He kept this position under Mansūr until he was appointed governor of Khurasān in 140; here he began a purge of the army and ended up by rebelling in favour of the ‘Alids (Ya’qūbî, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 469; Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, pp. 205ff; Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Abd al-Djabbar b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān’). His brother ‘Abd al-‘Azīz was governor of Basra for Mansūr (Khalifa, Ta’rikh, p. 674); he is also mentioned as having combated a Kharijite in the Jazira in 128 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 122). ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān, another brother, is said to have been in charge of the shurta of Baghdad at the time of Mansūr’s death, or, alternatively, to have replaced his brother as head of Mansūr’s shurta on the latter’s appointment to Khurasān (ibid., pp. 458f; Ya’qūbî, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 469). On ‘Abd al-Jabbār’s revolt ‘Umar was replaced by Mūsā b. Ka’b (cf. below, no. 16). ‘Abd al-Sallām b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān was appointed to the sawāfi, qata‘i and kharṣa’ in by Abū Salama on the arrival of the Khurasānts in Iraq (Akhbār al-‘dawlat al-‘abbāsiyya, p. 377). ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. ‘Abd al-Jabbār appears as an officer in Ḥātim b. Harthāma’s army in Egypt under Amīn (Kindî, Governors, p. 147); he was still there at the time of Ma’mūn’s designation
of al-Ridā, when he headed the local revolt (ibid., p. 168).

(2) ʿAbū ʿl-ʿAbbās Fadāl b. Sulaymān al-Ṭāʿī al-Ṭūsī. A member of a family long established in Khurāsān (cf. Tabārī, ser. ii, pp. 1422, 1521). He was dāʿi in Abīward and a prominent general in the revolution (ibid., pp. 1950, 1963, 2001, ser. iii, p. 20). In 141 he was appointed head of the harās of Mānṣūr who also entrusted him with his seal (ibid., p. 131, cf. p. 455; Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, p. 684; Jahshīyārī, Wuzūrāʾ, p. 124), and in 142 he became governor of Ṭabaristān (Ibn Isfandiyār, Taʿrīkh, vol. i, p. 189). He retained his leadership of the harās under Maḥdī until 165 or 166 when he was appointed to Khurāsān, where he stayed until the early years of Ḥārūn (Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, pp. 689, 696, 700, 706, 745; Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 483; Tabārī, ser. iii, pp. 517, 521, 740). On his return to Baghdad in 171 he was put in charge of Ḥārūn’s seal, but he died soon after (Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, p. 751; Tabārī, ser. iii, pp. 605f). ʿAbdallāh Abī ʿl-ʿAbbās was head of Maḥdī’s harās after his father’s appointment to Khurāsān (Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, p. 700). Muḥammad b. Abī ʿl-ʿAbbās was a member of Maʿmūn’s army and a brother-in-law of Tāhir (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1040f; Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 569; Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Bagdād, pp. 28f).

(3) ʿAbū ʿAwn ʿAbd al-Malik b. Yaṣīd, mawlā of Hunā’a/Azd. A native of Jurjān whose names reveal a pro-Umayyad background. He joined the revolution in 129, followed Qaḥṭaba to Iraq and ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Alī to Syria and Egypt, where he was twice governor between 133 and 141 (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v.; Kindi, Governors, pp. 101ff; Tabārī, ser. iii, pp. 72, 75, 81, 84; Grohmann, Corpus Papyrorum Raineri, vol. i, part two, nos. 120f; Margoliouth, Catalogue, pp. 28ff; Miles, Glass Weights, pp. 103ff; id., Supplement, pp. 19ff). By 150 he was back in Khurāsān where he participated in the suppression of Uṣṭāhshīṣ and became governor in 159, only to be dismissed in disgrace in the following year (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 358, 459, 477; Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, pp. 676, 696, where he has unaccountably become a Himsī). Though rarely seen there, he had settled in Baghdad together with his ʿashāb, similarly natives of Jurjān (Yaʿqūbī, Buldān, p. 249 = 32).

(4) Abū Ghānim ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd b. Ribʾi al-Taʿī. A dāʿi in Marw and cousin of Qaḥṭaba who fought under the latter in the revolution; he was head of Qaḥṭaba’s shurṭa (Ibn al-Kalbi, Ğambara, table 257; Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, p. 352; Tabārī, ser. ii, p. 2001, ser. iii, p. 15). On his arrival in Iraq he was among the
generals who elected Abū l-‘Abbās when Abū Salama prevaricated (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 28, 36). He participated in the battle of the Zāb, followed ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Ali to Syria, became governor of Damascus, and was among the Khurasānis who supported ‘Abdallāh’s claim to the caliphate on Abū l-‘Abbās’ death (ibid., pp. 38, 53f, 93; Šafadī, Umarā’, p. 50). His subsequent fate appears unknown to the published sources.

His sons seem initially to have stayed in Khurasān. ʿAsrām b. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd was sent from there to Sīstān where he died as governor under Hārūn (Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 745f; Tārīkh-i Sīstān, pp. 152, 155). ʿHumayd b. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd was similarly governor of Sīstān, first as his brother’s deputy and next in his own right (Tārīkh-i Sīstān, pp. 152, 155). It was in his house in Ṭūs that Hārūn died in 193 (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 737f). ʿHumayd, however, came to Iraq as a member of Maʿmūn’s army, and he fought against the rebel Baghdadīs under Ḥasan b. Sahl in 201–3 (ibid., pp. 1005f, 1012, 1018f, 1030, 1032ff). He died in 210 (ibid., p. 1085). Muhammad b. ʿHumayd doubtless came west the same way. He fought against Bābāk together with his cousin, Mahdi b. ʿAsrām, and fell in battle in 214 (ibid., pp. 1099, 1101; Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 564f). ʿGhānim b. Abī Muslim b. ʿHumayd al-Ṭūsī was military governor of Mosul for Wāṭīq in 231 when he suppressed a Khārījīte revolt (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1351). ‘Abdallāh [b. Abī Muslim?] b. ʿHumayd al-Ṭūsī fell together with his son in battle against the Zanj in 236 (ibid., p. 1387).


(6) ʿAsīd b. ‘Abdallāh al-Khwarqī. A daʾī from Nasā who commanded the troops of Nasā and Abīwārd for Abū Muslim and Qaḥtaba during the revolution (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1950, 1963f, 1972, 1987, 2002ff; Omar, ʿAbbāsid Caliphs, p. 73). On his arrival in Iraq he was briefly appointed governor of Basra (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 23; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, p. 616, where ʿAsīd has become Asad). Next he was put in charge of the haras and seal of Abū l-ʿAbbās (Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, p. 635; cf. Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 433,
where it is his son Abū Bakr b. Asad (sic) who held this office. Finally, he was appointed to Khurāsān by Mansūr; he died in office (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 676; Ya’qūbī, Buldān, p. 303 = 130).

(7) The Barmakids. Only a simple enumeration of the offices held by this famous family need be given here; for further details, see Sourdel, Vizirat, pp. 127ff.

Khālid b. Barmak was the son of a leader of a Buddhist monastery in Balkh and a maula islam of Khuza’a; he fought in the revolution under Qahtaba who entrusted him with the distribution of booty (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1964); Abū l-‘Abbās appointed him to the diwan al-kharāj and later to the entire administration; Mansūr appointed him to Fars, Tabaristān and Mosul; and Mahdī appointed him to Fars once more (Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. ‘Barāmika’). He was the foster-father of Raytā, the daughter of Abū l-‘Abbās (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 840). Abū ‘Ubayd Mu‘awiya b. Barmak al-Balkhi, who is mentioned as a settler in Baghdad, was presumably his brother (Ya’qūbī, Buldān, p. 252 = 38).

Muḥammad b. Khālid b. Barmak was governor of the Yemen and the Jazira for Ḥārūn for whom he was also chamberlain (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 742, 747, 752; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 638). Yaḥyā b. Khālid b. Barmak was the foster-father of Ḥārūn, his wife and Khayyurān having exchanged sons, and Ḥārūn addressed him as his father (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 599, cf. p. 545; Jahshiyārī, Wuzara’, p. 177). Having become secretary to Ḥārūn under Mahdī, he was put in charge of the entire administration and the seal on Ḥārūn’s accession (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 491ff, 497, 500, 631; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 751).

Fadl b. Yaḥyā b. Khālid, Ḥārūn’s foster-brother, similarly held the seal and the vizierate under Ḥārūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 603ff, 606). In 176 he was appointed to Armenia, Azerbayjan, Tabaristān, Jībāl and other Persian provinces and fought against the ‘Alid rebel Yaḥyā b. ‘Abdallāh; in 177 he also received Khurāsān, where he campaigned against Ushruṣa, organized Ḥārūn’s Iranian army, and had allegiance taken to Amin, the heir apparent (ibid., pp. 611, 612ff, 629, 631). He was also tutor to Amin (Sourdel, Vizirat, p. 147). Ja’far b. Yaḥyā b. Khālid likewise held the seal at various times under Ḥārūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 609, 644). He was governor of Egypt and Khurāsān which he administered by deputy (ibid., pp. 626, 629, 644; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 745, 747) and also head of Ḥārūn’s haras to which he appointed Harthama b. A’yan deputy (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 644ff;
Khurasaniyya

Khalifa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 751). In addition he was head of the postal service, the Mint and the textile manufacture, and tutor to Ma’mūn (Sourdel, *Vérité*, pp. 150f). Finally, he was commander of the army which was sent to suppress the ‘*asabiyya* in Syria in 180 (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 639ff). Mūsā b. Yahyā b. Khālid was appointed to Syria in 176 on the first outbreak of ‘*asabiyya* (ibid., p. 625). Having been released from prison by Amin, he made a minor political come-back under Ma’mūn who appointed him to India; here he was succeeded by his son, ‘Imrān b. Mūsā, who was killed in office during an outbreak of ‘*asabiyya* under Wāthiq (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzara’*, p. 297; Balādhurī, *Futūb*, p. 445; Ya’qūbī, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 557).

(8) Harthama b. A’yan, *mawla* of B. Dabba. A Khurasānī who makes his first appearance in 153 when he was brought to Baghdad in chains as a result of his support of ‘Īsā b. Mūsā, the heir apparent who had been forced to resign (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 371). He stayed in Baghdad, played a major role in the enthronement of Hārūn (ibid., pp. 599f), and rose to great prominence under this caliph. He was governor of Palestine, Egypt, North Africa and Mosul at various times (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 630, 645; Balādhurī, *Futūb*, p. 233; Khalīfa, *Ta’rikh*, pp. 747, 748; Azdī, *Mawṣil*, pp. 294f, 303), conducted two summer campaigns (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 712; Balādhurī, *Futūb*, p. 169), became head of Hārūn’s *haras*, first as the deputy of Ja’far al-Barmakī and next in his own right (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 645, 667, 704; Khalīfa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 751), assisted Hārūn in the destruction of the Barmakids (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 679f), and finally, in 191 he was appointed to Khurāsān with the title of *mawla amīr al-mu’minīn* which he kept under Ma’mūn (ibid., pp. 716, 927, cf. also p. 913). He was in Khurāsān at the time of Hārūn’s death, and in contrast with the Abnā’ he sided with Ma’mūn in the civil war. Having been appointed to Ma’mūn’s *haras*, he went with Tāhir to Iraq, where he stayed on after Amin’s death to fight Abūl-Sarāya (ibid., pp. 734, 775, 777, 802, 840 etc., 971ff). He then returned to Khurāsān with the intention of denouncing Fadl b. Sahl to Ma’mūn, but Ma’mūn refused to listen and had him thrown in jail where he was killed (ibid., pp. 996ff; cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. ‘Harthama b. A’yan’).

Ḥātim b. Harthama was governor of Egypt for Amin, and later of Armenia and Azerbayjan where he tried to raise a revolt on the news of his father’s death (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 147;
Appendix V: 'Abbāsid servants

De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 350; Azdī, Mawṣil, p. 339). A'yan b. Harthama, who was governor of Sistān in 205, was doubtless also a son of the famous general (Ṭārikh-i Sistān, p. 176; Miles, Rare Islamic Coins, p. 73). Muḥammad b. Ḥātim b. Hartama was governor of Armenia under Mutawakkil (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1380). Ahmad b. Muḥammad b. Ḥātim b. Harthama was governor of the right bank of Baghdad under Mustaʿīn in 249 (ibid., p. 1511; the text has Khālid for Ḥātim). Yet another relative of Harthama's is known in 'Abd al-Wāḥīd b. Sallāma al-Ṭahlāzī, who was one of the leaders of Maʾmūn's harās (Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 574). But Yaʿqūbī notwithstanding, the Muḥammad b. Harthama who appears in Barqa and Fustāt under Ibn Ṭulūn cannot have been a grandson of this general (ibid., p. 623, cf. Kindī, Governors, p. 216. His grandfather was doubtless Naḍr, cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1603).

(9) ‘Īsā b. Māḥān. ‘Īsā was daʿī in Marw, deputy naqīb and probably the brother of Bukayr b. Māḥān, the chief daʿī in Kufa; if so, he was a mawṣūla of the B. Musliya (Omar, 'Abbasid Caliphat, pp. 74, 349). A fifteenth-century source, however, calls him a mawṣūla of Khuzāʾa (Kaʿbī, 'Les Origines tahirides', p. 161). Whatever his antecedents, he mutinied after the revolution and was put to death at the order of Abu Muslim (ibid., pp. 160f). Nonetheless he was the founder of a celebrated Banawī family. ‘Alī b. ‘Īsā b. Māḥān was head of the harās of Mahdī in 163, for Ḥādī both before and after his accession, and for Ḥārūn for a while (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 456, 494, 519, 548; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 709, 751). Under Ḥādī he was also chamberlain, director of the treasuries and head of the diwān al-jund (Jahshiyārī, Wuzaraʾ, p. 167; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 548; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, p. 709). Ḥārūn appointed him to Khurāsān where he misgoverned the province for eight years, accumulating vast wealth and fighting a spate of rebels until he was finally replaced by Harthama (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 648f, 702ff, 713ff and passim; Yaʿqūbī, Buldān, pp. 304f = 133; Khalīfa, Taʾrīkh, pp. 737, 738, 745). His disgrace notwithstanding, Aḥmān honoured him as shaykh bādbibliʾ-dawla (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 810), put him in charge of the affairs of his heir apparent (ibid., p. 794), and appointed him to the eastern provinces. He set out with 50,000 Baghdadi troops and reached Rayy where he was defeated and killed by Ṭāhir (ibid., pp. 796ff). Approximately, he fell with a cry for the Abnaʾ (ibid., p. 824).

‘Īsā b. ‘Alī b. ‘Īsā was deputy governor of Sistān for his father
(Tārīkh-i Sīstān, pp. 155ff); he also assisted him in Khurāsān, where he was killed by supporters of Rāfī' b. Lāyth in 191 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 650, 708, 712). Husayn b. 'Alī b. 'Īsā was similarly deputy governor of Sīstān for his father (Tārīkh-i Sīstān, p. 155; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 745). Amin sent him to Syria in 195 to suppress the revolt of the Sufyānī, and he was back in Syria in the following year during the attempt to recruit the Syrians for Amin (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 830, 844; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 532). On his return to Iraq he switched allegiances, attempted a coup in favour of Ma‘mūn, and managed to throw Amin into jail; the Baghdadī troops, however, freed Amin and killed Husayn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 846ff). ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Alī, Yahyā b. ‘Alī and Muhammad b. ‘Alī all appear to have surrendered to Tāhir towards the end of the siege of Baghdad (ibid., pp. 882, 904). ‘Abdallāh, who had participated in the battle at Rayy, was later subjected to hadd punishment by Ḥasan b. Sahl, a humiliation which greatly enraged the Abnāʾ and contributed to their proclamation of Mansūr b. al-Mahdī as caliph in 201 (ibid., pp. 824f, 1001). And Yahyā, who had also been in the field against Tāhir, is duly found among Mansūr b. al-Mahdī’s supporters (ibid., pp. 821, 827f, 1006; Dinawārī, Akhbār, p. 394). Hamdawayh b. ‘Alī first appears in 200 when he was sent to Mecca and Medina to deal with the Tālibīds; having been appointed to the Yemen, he proceeded to make himself independent and had to be dislodged by force (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 986, 995, 1002; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 544, 553f; cf. Van Arendonk, Débuts, pp. 94f, 100f).

(10) Jibrīl b. Yahyā al-Bajjāli. A Khurāsānī who had probably participated in the revolution; at least he is found in Syria under Ṣālīh b. ‘Alī already in 140 or 141 (Baladhurī, Futūh, p. 166; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 135). Under Mansūr he was sent with troops from Syria, Mesopotamia and Mosul to reinforce Yazīd b. Asīd al-Sulami in Armenia (Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 446f; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 328). In 150 he was back in Khurāsān where he campaigned against Ustādhsīs (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 354), in 159 he was appointed to Samarkand, and in 161 he was in action against Muqanna‘ (ibid., pp. 459, 484). He had settled in Baghdad (Ya‘qūbī, Buldān, p. 252 = 37). Maslama b. Yahyā, his brother, commanded the Khurāsānīs on an expedition with the Syrians under Ṣālīh b. ‘Alī and governed Egypt under Hārūn (Baladhurī, Futūh, p. 168; Kindī, Governors, p. 133). Ibrāhīm b. Jibrīl, his
Appendix V: ‘Abbāsid servants

son, was governor of Sīstān in 178 for Fadl b. Yahyā al-Barmakī and also head of the latter’s shurta and ḥaras (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 634; Tārikh-i Sīstān, p. 154; Jahshiyārī, Wuzara’, p. 192). Sulaymān b. Ghalib b. Jibrīl was head of the shurta in Egypt on several occasions and also governor of Egypt himself under Ma’mūn (Kindī, Governors, pp. 146, 148, 165ff). Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. Ghalib b. Jibrīl was head of the shurta in Egypt in 236f (ibid., p. 199). ‘Abbās b. Muḥammad b. Jibrīl administered the right bank of Baghīdād in 231 under Wāthīq (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1346).

(11) Khūzayma al-Tamīmī. A deputy naqīb, apparently from Marw al-Rudh, who was one of the most important generals of the revolution (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1959, 1964, 2001, ser. iii, pp. 2f, 9, 12f, 20, 62, 68f; Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, p. 354). After the revolution he was endlessly in the field, campaigning against ‘Abbāllāh b. ‘Alī in Syria in 137 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 96), a Khārijī in the Jazīrā in 138 (ibid., pp. 123f), ‘Abd al-Jabbar in Khurāsān in 141 (ibid., pp. 134f), the Isphābād of Ṭabarīsṭān in 141f (ibid., pp. 136, 139; Balādhurī, Futūḥ, p. 338), Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abbāllāh in Basrā in 145 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 305f), and Ustāḏhsīs in Transoxānī in 150 (ibid., pp. 354ff). Unlike his son he does not appear to have held any governorships. Khūzayma b. Khāzīm participated in the revolution with his father (ibid., ser. ii, pp. 1956f, 1997). He is said to have been appointed to Ṭabaristān by Maḥmūd b. Walī in 143 (Dinawarī, Akhbār, p. 381), but his main career fell under Hārūn whom he had helped to the throne (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 602f). Under Hārūn he campaigned in Armenia, where he became governor (ibid., pp. 648, 705; Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 515). He was also governor of Basrā (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 740; cf. Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, p. 743), and of northern Syria and the Jazīrā on behalf of Qāsim b. Hārūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 730; Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, p. 747; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, vol. i, p. 64). In addition he was head of Hārūn’s shurta (Khalīfa, Taʿrīkh, p. 750; Ibn Ḥabīb, Mubabbar, p. 375; Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 520). Under Aḥmād he remained governor of northern Syria and Mesopotamia, first as the deputy of Qāsim b. Hārūn and next in his own right (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 775f; Ibn al-ʿAdīm, Zubda, vol. i, p. 64). He was against Aḥmād’s decision to depose Maḥmūd, but fought for the caliph until 198 when he sought amān from Tāhir (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 809f, 856, 903ff). In 201 he was among the leaders of the Baghdādi revolt under Mansūr b. al-Mahdī (ibid., pp. 1002, 1004, 1006, 1011). Ibrāhīm b. Khāzīm was governor
Khurāsāniyya

of Nisibis for Hārūn; he was killed by a Khārijite in 178 (ibid., p. 631). 'Abdallāh b. Khāzim was head of the shurta for Mahdī on the latter's summer campaign in 163, for the future Hādī during his campaign in Jurjān, and for Amīn at the end of his reign (ibid., pp. 495, 519; Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 537; Ibn Habīb, Muḥabbār, p. 375). Under Hārūn he was governor of Tabaristān (Ibn Isfandiyār, Taʾrikh, p. 189 = 132). In the civil war he fought for Amīn until 197 when he fled to Madāʾin with his family (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 826, 899). Shuʿayb b. Khāzim b. Khuzayma was governor of Damascus for Hārūn (Ṣafādī, Umarāʾ, p. 41; the text has Ḥāzim for Khāzim, a mistake which recurs elsewhere). Hubayra b. Khāzim appears as a Banāwī general shortly after the civil war in which he had clearly fought for Amīn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 935). Nahshāl b. Ṣakhr b. Khuzayma b. Khāzim was still a member of the 'Abbāsid army in 251 when he deserted from Mustaʾīn to Muʿtazz (ibid., p. 1631).

(12) Mālik b. al-Haytham al-Khwzāʾī. One of the twelve naqibs (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1358, 1988). Mālik became head of the shurta of Abū Muslim on the outbreak of the revolution, fought under him in Khurāsān and elsewhere and almost shared his death (ibid., pp. 1968, 1987, 1989, 1993, 2001, ser. iii, pp. 64, 71, 116ff). In 142 Mansūr appointed him to Mosul where he stayed until 145 (Azdī, Mawsil, pp. 177ff, 194). 'Awf b. al-Haytham, his brother, similarly fought in the revolution (Ibn al-Kalbī, Gamhara, s.v.). Ḥāmza b. Mālik, his son, was head of the caliph's shurta (as opposed to the shurta of Baghdad) under Mansūr and Mahdī (Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, pp. 683, 699; Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbār, pp. 374ff; Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 483). He was appointed to Sistān by Mahdī in 159 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 459; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 696 (garbled); Taʾrikh-i Sistān, p. 149; Miles, Numismatic History of Rayy, pp. 40f), to an expedition against the Byzantines by Hādī in 169 (Baladhurī, Futūḥ, p. 191), and to Khurāsān by Hārūn in 176; he stayed for a year (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 626, 629, 740). He was also among the men who held Hārūn's seal (Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 751). He died in 181 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 646).

'Abdallāh b. Mālik was head of the shurta under Mahdī, Hādī and Hārūn (ibid., pp. 548, 583, 602, 692; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, pp. 699, 709, 750; Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 483, 491, 520), and according to Khalīfa he was also governor of Khurāsān under Mansūr (Taʾrikh, p. 676). Hārūn appointed him to Mosul in 173, dismissing him in 175 (Azdī, Mawsil, pp. 271,
Appendix V: ‘Abbasid servants

273, 275), and to Tabaristan, Qumis, Hamadhán and other Persian provinces in 189 (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 705; Azdi, Mawṣil, p. 307). In 190–1 he participated in Harūn’s campaign against Byzantium (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 709, 712); in 192 he campaigned against the Khurramiyya of Azerbayjan (ibid., p. 732); and in 193 he accompanied Harūn to Khurāsān, travelling on to Ma‘mūn in Marw (ibid., pp. 734, 772f). His prominence under Harūn is all the more remarkable in that he had supported Ḥādi’s attempt to exclude Harūn from the succession (ibid., pp. 571f, 603). He stayed in Marw during the civil war, but was one of the ru’asā’ who excused themselves when offered the position which ultimately went to Fadl b. Sahl, and his relations with Ma‘mūn were not particularly happy (ibid., pp. 713f; Jahshiyārī, Wuzūrā’, pp. 278, 313, 315f).

‘Abbas b. Abdallāh b. Mālik was governor of Rayy for Ma‘mūn in 194, but was dismissed for his sympathies with Amin (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 777f; Miles, Numismatic History of Rayy, pp. 93f). Muṭṭalib b. Abdallāh b. Mālik administered the oath of allegiance to Ma‘mūn in Mosul in 196 (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 857) and governed Egypt for this caliph in 198 and again in 199f (Kindi, Governors, pp. 152f, 154ff; Grohmann, Corpus Papyrorum Raineri, vol. i, part two, pp. 142f). But in 202 he administered the oath of allegiance to Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī in Baghdad, horrified by the news of Ma‘mūn’s designation of an ‘Alid heir (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 1016; compare his previous attitude, p. 1011; cf. also Lapidus, ‘Separation of State and Religion’, p. 373).

Qāsim b. Nasr b. Mālik was head of the shūrta of the future Ḥādi at the time of Maṁṣūr’s death and later for Harūn (ibid., p. 455; Ibn Ḥabīb, Muhābbar, p. 375). Thābit b. Nasr b. Mālik was in charge of the Syrian frontier provinces between 192 and 197; here he ransomed Muslim prisoners-of-war in 192, conducted a number of summer campaigns, and made himself independent during the civil war; he died or was killed soon after Ma‘mūn’s accession (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 730, 732; Ya’qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 537, 541, 553). Ahmad b. Nasr b. Mālik was a Baghdadi who frequented the ḥabar al-hadīth and was violently opposed to the tenet of the created Koran; his traditionist friends incited him to revolt, stressing the role of his father and grandfather in the ‘Abbasid dawla, and his own role in Baghdad in 201 when he had been the leader of the populace of the eastern bank during Ma‘mūn’s absence. The revolt came to nothing, but
Ahmad was brought before Wathiq's inquisition and executed (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 1343ff; cf. Laoust, *La Profession de foi d'Ibn Battûta*, pp. xxxivf; Lapidus, 'Separation of State and Religion', pp. 381ff). A namesake of his who appears as 'āmil of Kufa in 251 (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 1617) was presumably a member of the same family.

Muhammad b. Hamza b. Malik was head of the *shurta* for Amin (Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbār*, p. 375; Ya‘qūbi, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 537). Naṣr b. Ḥamza b. Malik was appointed to the eastern bank of Baghdad by Ḥasan b. Saḥl in 201 (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 1002); he was sent to deal with the revolt of his kinsman Thābit b. Naṣr, whom he is said to have poisoned, and he became governor of Damascus for 'Abdallāh b. Tāhir (Ya‘qūbi, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 533; Ṣafādī, *Umarā*, p. 91). He was still in the army under Wathiq (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 1357).

Muhammad b. Naṣr b. Ḥamza b. Malik was taken prisoner during the war between Musta’in and Mu’tazz in 251; as a Baghdadi he had supported the former (ibid., p. 1595, cf. p. 1732). Mansūr b. Naṣr b. Ḥamza was governor of Wāsīt and a custodian of Musta’in in 252 (ibid., p. 1670, cf. p. 1657). 'Abdallāh b. Naṣr b. Ḥamza, though never explicitly identified as such, was doubtless his brother; he was a general in the service of Muhammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Tāhir whom he assisted in the suppression of a Zaydi revolt in 250 and he fought for Musta’in in 251 (ibid., pp. 1518, 1573, 1588, 1602f). Muhammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Naṣr b. Ḥamza was sent from Baghdad to conciliate mutinous troops in Fars under Musta’in (Ya‘qūbi, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 609).

Ja‘far b. Mālik and Dāwūd b. Mālik are both said to have been appointed to the *shurta* of early 'Abbāsid caliphs (Ibn al-Kalbī, *Gambara*, s.vv.). Naṣr b. Mālik was head of the *shurta* under Mahdī (Khalīfa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 699; Ibn Ḥabīb, *Muḥabbār*, p. 375; Ya‘qūbi, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 483). He died in 161 (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 491).

(13) Mu‘ādb b. Muslim, *mawloud* of the B. Dhuhl. A native of Khuttal or Rayy who settled in Baghdad (Ya‘qūbi, *Buldān*, p. 253 = 39; *id.*, *Historiae*, vol. ii, p. 455; Ibn ‘Asākir, *Tabdhib*, vol. ii, p. 455). He is first mentioned in 149–50 when he was among the troops from Marw al-Rudh who were defeated by Muqanna‘ (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 354; Khalīfa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 656). In 160 he was appointed to Khurāsān, in 161 he was once more in the field against Muqanna‘, and in 163 he was dismissed (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 477, 484, 500;
Appendix V: ‘Abbasid servants


In 169 he fought against the ‘Alids at Fakhkh (*Tabari*, ser. iii, p. 538); he probably died soon after. Husayn b. Mu‘ādh b. Muslim, his son, was a foster-brother of Hādi (*ibid.*, p. 586).

Yahyā b. Mu‘ādh b. Muslim, another son, was governor of Syria in 191—2 and campaigned against a local rebel (*ibid.*, pp. 711, 732; Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 143f). He accompanied Hārūn to Khurāsān, was sent on to Ma‘mūn in Marw and stayed there during the civil war, but excused himself when offered the position which was taken by Fadl b. Sahl (*Tabari*, ser. iii, pp. 734, 770, 772, 773f, 1026; Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā*, p. 278). He became governor of the Jazīra and Armenia for Ma‘mūn, campaigned against Bābak, and died in 206 (*Tabari*, ser. iii, pp. 1033, 1039, 1045; Ya‘qubi, *Historiae*, vol. ii, pp. 554, 563). Ahmad b. Yahyā b. Mu‘ādh appears in the service of Ma‘mūn as one of the prison guards of Ibn Hārūn b. al-Mahdī (*Tabari*, ser. iii, p. 1075).


(14) Muhammad b. al-‘Ash‘āth al-Khurā‘ī. A deputy *naqīb* (Omar, *‘Abbāsid Caliphate*, p. 354). He was appointed to Tabasayn, Fars and Kerman by Abū Muslim in 130 (*Tabari*, ser. ii, pp. 1978, 2001; *Dinawarī, Akhbār*, pp. 373f; differently Khalīfa, *Ta’rikh*, p. 632, where he is appointed to Sistān, doubtless a mistake), fought against Sunbād at Rayy in 137 and/or against Jahwar b. Marār at Rayy in 138 (*Khalīfa, Ta’rikh*, p. 637; *Tabari*, ser. iii, p. 122), governed Egypt from 141 to 143.
Ja'far b. Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath was head of Ḥarūn's ṣhūrta (Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 520; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 751); he also held Ḥarūn's seal until it was made over to Abūl-ʿAbbās al-Ṭūsī in 171 (Ṭabārī, ser. iii, pp. 605f); in 173 he was appointed to Khurāsān (ibid., pp. 609, 740; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 745). Naṣr b. Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath was governor of Palestine for Maḥdī in 161 (Ṭabārī, ser. iii, pp. 46, 485); he was appointed to Sīnīn the same year and died there in 164 (ibid., pp. 491, 501, 502; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 697). ‘Abbās b. Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad was governor of Khurāsān after his father (Ṭabārī, ser. iii, pp. 609, 740; Khalīfa, Taʾrikh, p. 745); he participated in a summer campaign in 187 and was among the generals who accompanied Ḥarūn to Tūs, from where he was sent on to Maʾmūn (Ṭabārī, ser. iii, pp. 694, 734). He probably did not stay there. ‘Uqba b. Jaʿfar b. Muḥammad, at least, was an opponent of Maʾmūn (Khāṭīb, Taʾrikh, vol. i, p. 81 = Lassner, Topography, p. 62). If the Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath whom Maʾmūn appointed to Sīstān in 197 was a grandson of his Khūzāʾī namesake, he was of a branch of the family that had stayed in the east, for he is described as a Tārābī, sc. a native of one of the villages of Bukhārā; he ended up by fighting on the side of one of the many rebels in Sīstān and was executed by Layth b. al-Fadl (Taʾrikh-i Sīstān, pp. 171ff; cf. Yaḡūt, Wörterbuch, vol. iii, p. 487). The Muḥammad b. al-Ash'ath al-Khūzāʾī who was saḥīb al-barād in Diyar Bakhri under Muʿtaẓz was perhaps also a member or a client of this family (Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 612).

Muḥtār b. Ḥaḍīm al-ʿAkkī Dāʾi in Nasā (Omar, ʿAbbāsid Caliphate, p. 73). He fought under Qaḥṭaba in the revolution (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1972, 2001ff, ser. iii, pp. 4, 20), was appointed to the Jazīra by Maḥsūr in the reign of Abūl-ʿAbbās, assisted in the suppression of the revolt of the Sufyānī, and was killed by ʿAbdallāh b. ʿAlī in 137 for his refusal to join the latter’s rebellion.
Appendix V: ‘Abbasid servants

Muhammad b. Muqāṭīl was not only a son of one of the kibār of the abī al-dawla, but also a foster-brother of Hārūn who appointed him to North Africa (Ibn ‘Idhārī, Bayān, vol. i, p. 89). ‘Īsā b. [Muqāṭīl] al-‘Akki was appointed deputy governor of Syria by Ja’far al-Barmakī in 180 (Tabārī, ser. iii, p. 641; his brother is similarly known as Ibn al-‘Akki, cf. Balādhurī, Futūḥ, p. 234).

*Mūsā b. Ka‘b al-Tamīmī. A qa‘īb and general of the revolution (Tabārī, ser. ii, pp. 1358, 1586f, 1952, 1964, etc.). He participated in the battle of the Zāb, went on to Syria with ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Alī, became deputy governor of the Jazīrā in 132, and fought against Abūl-Ward and the pro-Umeyyad rebels (ibid., pp. 39, 56; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 611; Balādhurī, Futūḥ, p. 186). Abūl-‘Abbas appointed him to his shurta and then sent him to India to subdue Mansūr b. Jumhūr (Tabārī, ser. iii, pp. 80, 81; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 632; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 429). He returned on the death of Abūl-‘Abbas, resumed his position as head of the shurta and then gave it up again to become governor of Egypt for a short while; he died in 141 (Tabārī, ser. iii, p. 138; Kindī, Governors, pp. 106f; Miles, Glass Weights, p. 108). The Mūsā b. Ka‘b who is said to have been governor of the Jazīrā under Mansūr is in fact Mūsā b. Muṣ‘ab (Tabārī, ser. iii, pp. 378, 381, 383; Azdī, Mawsil, p. 222; cf. below, no. 37).

‘Uyayna b. Mūsā, who had also been a dā‘ī, was deputy governor of Sind for his father, but rebelled and was killed by local Yemenis (Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, pp. 208f; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 448).

Musayyab b. Zubayr al-Dabbī. A deputy qa‘īb who fought under Qahtaba in the revolution (Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, p. 354; Tabārī, ser. ii, pp. 2003f, ser. iii, pp. 3, 21). In 134 he was appointed to the shurta, first as the deputy of Mūsā b. Ka‘b and next in his own right; most of the time he held only the ‘adwa (Tabārī, ser. iii, p. 80, 138, 195, 384; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 682f (garbled); Ibn Ḥabīb, Muḥabbar, p. 374). In 145 he is described as the head of Mansūr’s haraṣ which is doubtless wrong (Tabārī, ser. iii, p. 293). He was head of the shurta of Muḥammad b. Ibrāhīm on the latter’s expedition to Malatya in 141 (Balādhurī, Futūḥ, p. 188), governor of Khurāsān for Mahdī in 163–6 (Tabārī, ser. iii, pp. 500, 503, 517; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 687,
692, 696), governor of the Jazīra for the same caliph (Khalifa, Ta’rikb, p. 697), commander of an expedition to Ḥadath under Ḥādī (Baladhuri, Futāb, p. 191), and once more head of the shurta under Ḥārūn (Khalifa, Ta’rikb, p. 750; Ibn Ḥabīb, Muhābbar, p. 375; Ya’qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 520). He was a friend of Khālid b. Barmak (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 382). Muhammad b. al-Mūsāyyab was head of the shurta (ʿadwa) of Ḥārūn according to Khalīfa (Ta’rikb, p. 750). Amīn transferred him to the hirba and later appointed him to Armenia (Ya’qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 537; Ibn Ḥabīb, Muhābbar, p. 375). Zuhayr b. al-Mūsāyyab sided with Ma’mūn in the civil war. He was governor of Sīstān for him (Ta’rikb-i Sīstān, p. 170), participated in the siege of Baghdad under Ṭāhir (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 868, 890; Khalīfa, Ta’rikb, pp. 756, 757), campaigned against Abū’l-Sarāyā, administered the eastern bank of Baghdad and Jūkḥā for Ḥasan b. Sahl, participated in the suppression of the revolt of the Ḥarbiyya, and was killed in prison by the leader of the rebels in 201 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 977f, 999, 1001f, 1004). Ḥārūn b. al-Mūsāyyab was sent with Ḥāmdawayh b. ‘Alī b. Ḥisā to Mecca, Medina and the Yemen to deal with the Ṭalibids after Abū’l-Sarāyā’s revolt (ibid., pp. 986, 993). Azhar b. Zuhayr b. al-Mūsāyyab fought with his father in Iraq (ibid., pp. 976, 1002). ‘Amr b. Zuhayr, his brother, was governor of Kufa from 155 to 158 (ibid., pp. 375, 377, 384, 458; Khalīfa, Ta’rikb, p. 676). Azhar b. Zuhayr, a brother of Musayyab’s, is mentioned as a settler in Baghdad, but is not otherwise known unless he is in fact the grandson (Ya’qūbī, Buldān, p. 243 = 20).

ʿAbdallāh b. al-Mūsāyyab b. Zuhayr was head of the shurta (hirba) for Maṃṣūr at the time of the latter’s death, presumably as his father’s deputy (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 455; cf. Khalīfa, Ta’rikb, ser. iii, p. 455; cf. Khalīfa, Ta’rikb, p. 683); he was also governor of Egypt under Ḥārūn as the deputy of Ja’far al-Barmakī and others between 176 and 179 (Khalīfa, Ta’rikb, p. 747; Kindī, Governors, pp. 135, 137, 388). ‘Abbās b. al-Mūsāyyab is said to have been head of the hāras, doubtless a mistake for shurta, of Mahdī in 163 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 495); he was later head of the shurta of Ja’far al-Barmakī on his expedition to Syria, and of that of Ma’mūn at the time of Ḥārūn’s death (ibid., pp. 639, 772). He appears to have retained his office until Ma’mūn’s return to Baghdad when the family’s traditional association with the hirba came to an end: ‘Abbās was dismissed and replaced, not, as he had hoped, by his
Appendix V: ‘Abbāsid servants

son Muḥammad, but by Tāhir b. al-Husayn (Ṭayfur, Kitāb Baghdād, pp. 9, 11, 23).

(18) Qaḥṭaba b. Shabīb al-Ṭa’i. A naqib of Kufan origin and next to Abū Muslim the most important general of the revolution (cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Ḵaḥṭaba b. Shabīb’). He himself fell in Iraq, but his sons like Abū Muslim counted as members of the ahl al-bayt (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 64).

Hasan b. Qaḥṭaba had been deputy naqib in Khurāsān (Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, p. 354). After the revolution he became deputy governor of Armenia for the future Manṣūr (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 95, 99, 101), fought against ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Alī in Syria (ibid., pp. 93, 95ff), and conducted summer campaigns in 149, 162 and 163 (ibid., pp. 353, 493, 495). He died in 181 (ibid., p. 646). Ḥumayd b. Qaḥṭaba had similarly been deputy naqib (Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, p. 354). He followed ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Alī to Syria, where he briefly supported the latter’s claim to the caliphate on Abū’l-‘Abbas’ death, changed his mind and escaped (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 53, 93ff). In 137 he was governor of the Jazīra where he was hard pressed by a Khārijite (ibid., pp. 120ff; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 679); in 142–3 he was governor of Egypt (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 141ff; Kindī, Government, pp. 110ff); in 145 he assisted in the campaign against Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 225, 238, 246, 310, 313); in 148 he campaigned in Armenia (ibid., p. 353); and in 152 he was appointed to Khurāsān where he died in 159 (ibid., pp. 369, 458, 459; Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 676; Ya’qūbi, Balḍān, p. 303 = 130).

Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan participated in his father’s summer campaign in 162 and became deputy governor of Khurāsān for Ja’far al-Barmaki in 180 (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 686; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 644). ‘Alī b. al-Ḥasan was similarly deputy governor of Khurāsān for Ja’far (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 740); he was also governor of Sīstān for ‘Alī b. ʿĪsā and of Damascus for Hārūn (Ta’rīkh-i Sīstān, p. 155; Ṣafadī, Umarāʾ, p. 57). Saʿīd b. al-Ḥasan was appointed to the western bank of Baghdad by the Ḥarbīyya in 201 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1002). All Ḥasan’s descendants had fought for Amin and surrendered to Tāhir in 197 (ibid., p. 882).

‘Abdallāh b. Ḥumayd b. Qaḥṭaba was interim governor of Khurāsān after his father’s death in 159 (Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, pp. 677, 696). Under Hārūn he was governor of Sīstān (thus at least Khalīfa, Ta’rīkh, p. 745) and of Ṭabaristān (Ibn Ḡisandiyār, Ta’rīkh, vol. i, p. 189 = 132, where his name has been shortened).
In the civil war he was one of the chief supporters of Amin who described him to the Abnā’ as *ibn kābir dā'watikum wa-man ‘alā yaday abibi fakhrukum* (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 931). He had been sent to Ma’mūn in Marw in 193, but returned together with other generals, was appointed to Hamadān by ‘Alī b. ‘Isā and commanded 20,000 Abnā’ against Tāhir in 196; he surrendered in 197 (ibid., pp. 790, 798, 840, 882). Shabīb b. Humayd b. Qaṭṭaba was head of the *haras* of Ja’far al-Barmakī during the latter’s campaign in Syria (ibid., p. 639). He was sent to Marw together with his brother in 193 and presumably returned with him (ibid., p. 772). Nonetheless, he is said to have been head of Ma’mūn’s *haras* for a while, and to have been appointed by him to Qūmīs (Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 574).


Having served under Qaṭṭaba, he was appointed to the *haras* of the future Mansūr in 132 (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 2001, ser. iii, pp. 20f, 65); after Mansūr’s accession he held both the *haras* and the seal until his death in the Rāwandīyya incident in 141 (ibid., p. 131; Khalīfah, Taʿrīkh, p. 684; Dīnawarī, Akhbār, p. 377). ‘Īsā b. Nahīk, who had also been *dāʿī* in Abīward, succeeded his brother as the head of Mansūr’s *haras* (Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, pp. 73f; Tabari, ser. iii, p. 131; Khalīfah, Taʿrīkh, p. 684).

Ibrāhīm b. ‘Uthmān b. Nahīk is said to have been head of Hārūn’s *shurta* followed by his son Wahb (Ibn Habīb, Muḥabbar, p. 375). He conducted summer campaigns in 183, 185, 186 and 187 (Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 522f), and was killed by Hārūn after the fall of the Barmakids in 187 (Ibn Habīb, Muḥabbar, p. 375; Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 523, but cf. p. 512; Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 699ff). All the members of the family fought for Amin in the civil war. ‘Uthmān b. ‘Īsā b. Nahīk was placed in charge of the *haras* of Amin’s son and heir apparent (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 794); he had previously been governor of Ṭabaristān for Hārūn (Ibn Isfandiyar, Taʿrīkh, vol. i, p. 189 = 132, where his name has been shortened). Muḥammad b. ‘Īsā b. Nahīk was placed over the *shurta* of Amin’s son (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 794; on p. 881 he appears as the head of Amin’s own *shurta*), and he was one of Amin’s most influential advisers (ibid., pp. 778, 797, 813, 881f, 912). He deserted to Ma’mūn in 198 (ibid., pp. 914, 916). ‘Alī b. Muḥammad b. ‘Īsā b. Nahīk was a commander in Amin’s service (Yaʿqūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 534f).
Appendix V: 'Abbāsid servants

B. MAWALĪ


(21) Abū’l-Khasib Marzūq. A Sindi client of Muthannā b. al-Ḥajjāj [b. Qutayba b. Muslim] according to Ibn Isfandiyār (Ta‘rikh, vol. i, p. 176 = 120; his name is garbled in the translation); other sources, however, identify him as a mawla of Mansūr so that if Ibn Isfandiyār is right, Mansūr had presumably purchased the wala’. He makes his appearance in 137 when he was sent to count the booty taken from ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Ali’s camp, an act of interference which greatly annoyed Abū Muslim (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 98, 102f). In 140 or 141 he was sent to Ṭabaristān together with a number of generals, tricked the Ispahbadh into defeat, and became the first governor of the province (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 136, 139; Baladhurī, Futūb, p. 338; Ibn Isfandiyār, Ta‘rikh, pp. 176, 178 = 120, 122). He was one of Mansūr’s chamberlains (Khalīfa, Ta‘rikh, p. 684; cf. Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 112).

(22) Abū Sulaym Faraj al-khāḍīm, mawla of Hārūn. A Turkish eunuch who rebuilt ʿArsūs for Hārūn in 170 and Adhana for Hārūn or Amīn in 193–4; he was civil governor of the tbugbur for both caliphs (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 604; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 495, where he is Abī Sulaymān; Baladhurī, Futūb, pp. 168f; Yāqūt, Wörterbuch, vol. i, p. 179). After the civil war he is mentioned in a context which suggests that he had been a supporter of Ibārīm b. al-Mahdī (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1076).

(23) Faraj al-Rukhbajī. A prisoner-of-war from Sīstān who became a slave of Hārūn’s daughter and eventually a client of Hārūn, who appointed him to Ahwāz (Jahshiyārī, Wuzurā, pp. 27of). Under Ma‘mūn he administered the caliph’s private estates, accompanied Khālid b. Yazīd b. Mazyad on his expedition to Egypt, and became one of the a‘yān al-kuttāb together with his son ‘Umar (Sourdel, Vizirat, p. 732; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 555f; Yāqūt, Wörterbuch, vol. ii, p. 770). ‘Umar remained prominent in the administration until he was disgraced by Mutawakkil in 233 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1350, 1362, 1370, 1377; Khatīb, Ta‘rikh, vol. i, p. 94 = Lassner, Topography, p. 79).

(24) Fārābā. A mawla of Mahdī’s who was governor of Dunbāwand and Qūmis for Mahdī from 164 and of the same provinces plus Jūrjān from 167; he bore the title mawla amīr al-mu‘minin
Mawdli (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 503, 518, 520, 521). Mahdī later sent him to Tabaristan with 10 000 men; he was defeated, taken prisoner and executed by the Ispahbadh (Ibn Isfandiyar, Ta’rikh, vol. i, pp. 185f = 128f). With that name he must have been a freedman. Ishāq b Farāsha, presumably his son, was in the service of Amin (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 960).

(25) Ghażwān. A slave of the Qa’qa’ b. Dirār family who had been bought and freed by Mansūr. In 145 he was given command of some troops to attack a number of merchant ships suspected of complicity in the revolt of Ibrāhīm b. ‘Abdallāh in Basra (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 29f). He also appears to have been a civil servant (Ya’qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 462). The Yazīd b. Ghażwān who conducted a summer campaign in 178 was probably his son (ibid., p. 522).

(26) Hajjāj. A mawlā of Hādī and governor of Jurjān in 169 (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 568). Fath b. Hajjāj, a mawlā of Hārūn who was appointed to Sistān by Ma’mūn, was presumably his son (Ta’rikh-i Sistān, p. 170).

(27) Hamawayb. A eunuch and client of Mahdī who was postmaster in Khurāsān under Hārūn; his deputy in Baghdad was his own client Sallām Abū Sulaym (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 712, 718, 764; cf. Ya’qūbī, Buldān, p. 252 = 38).

(28) Ḥammād al-Barbarī. A freedman of Hārūn’s who was appointed to Mecca and the Yemen in 184; he stayed in office for thirteen years, subduing local rebels and ruling with such harshness that the Yemenis sent a deputation to Hārūn imploring him to dismiss him (Ya’qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 498; Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 649, 712; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 742, 743). Muhammad b. Ḥammād al-Barbarī was one of Amin’s generals in the civil war (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 857f). The Ibn Ḥammād al-Barbarī who appears as an authority on the events of 255 was presumably a grandson rather than a son of Ḥammād (ibid., p. 1700).

(29) Ḥasan or Husayn b. Jamīl. A mawlā amīr al-mu’minīn who was governor of Basra and Egypt for Hārūn (Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 744, 747; Tabari, ser. iii, p. 740; Kindi, Governors, pp. 142ff). Muhammad b. Jamīl was director of the diwān al-kharāj in Iraq for Hādī (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 548; Jahshiyārī, Wuzūrā, p. 167).

(30) Ibrāhīm b. Dhakwān al-Ḥarrānī, mawlā of Mansūr. The son of a freedman of ‘Abdallāh b. ‘Alī who was vizier and finance director under Hādī (Sourdel, Vizīrāt, pp. 121ff).
Appendix V: 'Abbāsid servants

(31) 'īsā, mawlā of Ja'far. Mahdī's governor of Rayy in 165 (Ṭabari, ser. iii, p. 505).

(32) Layth, mawlā amīr al-mu'mīnīn. A general who makes his first appearance under Maṃṣūr who sent him to Kashgar to subdue the king of Farghānā (Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 465). Mahdī employed him against Muqanna' (Ya'qūbī, Buldān, p. 304 = 131; Ṭabari, ser. iii, p. 484) and later appointed him to Sind; he was recalled by Ḥādī, but reappointed by Hārūn (Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 480; Khalīfa, Ta'rikh, pp. 697, 707, 746; Ṭabari, ser. iii, p. 505; Aghānī, vol. vi, p. 240). Barthold suggested that he was a son of Naṣr b. Sayyār (Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, pp. 205f); in fact, however, he was the son of a certain Ṭārīf, possibly Maṃṣūr's client of that name, who was also the father of Mu'allā (Ḵaṭībī, Ta'rikh, vol. i, p. 96 = Lassner, Topography, p. 81; Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 480; Aghānī, vol. vi, pp. 239f; cf. below, nos. 36 and 44). According to the Aghānī (vol. vi, pp. 239f), he and his brother had been acquired as slaves by Maṃṣūr and given to Mahdī who freed them. He is not to be confused with Layth b. al-Fadl who was governor of Egypt and Sistān for Hārūn and Ma'mūn respectively (Ḵindi, Governors, pp. 139ff, 148, 402; Margoliou, Catalogue, p. 105; Khalīfa, Ta'rikh, p. 747; Ta'rikh-i Sistān, pp. 174ff, cf. p. 153). One of the two would seem to have been governor of Dinawar in 180 (Ḵhalīfa, Ta'rikh, p. 725).

'Abdū b. al-Layth, mawlā amīr al-mu'mīnīn was among the generals who returned to Amin on the death of Hārūn in Tūs to fight against Ma'mūn in the civil war; like his father he was known as a mawlā of Mahdī (Ṭabari, ser. iii, pp. 790, 801).

(33) Manāra. A client of Maṃṣūr who was sent to Baghdad with the news of Maṃṣūr's death in 158, and who is also said to have been one of his 'ummāl. He is described as a wasīf and was evidently a freedman (Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 462, 472; cf. id., Buldān, p. 241 = 16; Ṭabari, ser. iii, p. 456).

(34) Masrūr al-khādīm al-kabīr Abū Ḥāšim. A eunuch who is mentioned already at the time of Mahdī's death, but who makes his first appearance in public life as one of Hārūn's agents in the downfall of the Barmakids; Hārūn also appointed him to the barīd (Ṭabari, ser. iii, pp. 524, 678, 680, 683; Jahshiyārī, Wuzūrā, pp. 234ff, 265). In 191 he accompanied Ḥarthama b. A'yan on a summer campaign as general manager (Ṭabari, ser. iii, p. 295) and in 199 he campaigned against the 'Alīds in Mecca (ibid.,
Mawalî 193

p. 532). He was arrested by Ma'mûn after the civil war, presumably for having sided with Amin, but was apparently released, for he is said to have guarded Muḥammad b. al-Qāsim in 219 (Jaḥshiyārī, Wuzarā', p. 317; Taḥbīrī, ser. iii, p. 1166).

(35) Maṭar. A slave bought by Abū Ayyūb and presented to Mansûr who freed him and appointed him postmaster of Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia at an unknown date, and fiscal governor of Egypt in 157; he was dismissed in 159 (Jaḥshiyārī, Wuzarā', p. 101; Taḥbīrī, ser. iii, pp. 380, 467; Miles, Glass Weights, pp. 120, 124).

(36) Mu'allâ, mawlā amîr al-mu'minîn. The brother of Layth b. Ṭarîf (above, no. 32). A freedman, general and drinking companion of Mahdî's, he directed the post and the tîrâz of Khurâsân for the latter, fought against Yusuf al-Barm and administered the districts of the Tigris, Kaskar, Awâz, Fars, Kerman, Bahrayn, Yamâma and Ghaus from 165 to 167 (Khatib, Ta'rikh, vol. i, p. 96 = Lassner, Topography, p. 81; Aghâni, vol. vi, pp. 239ff; Taḥbīrī, ser. iii, pp. 505, 514, 518, 521; Jaḥshiyārī, Wuzarā', p. 160).

(37) Mūsâ b. Muṣ'ab. A mawlā of the Khath'am whose nisba he often bears. Rabî', his grandfather, was apparently a Palestinian freedman and/or convert; Muṣ'ab, his father, was a secretary of Marwān II's who had sought amân from 'Abdallâh b. 'Ali in 132; he himself was the foster-brother of Mahdî (Taḥbīrī, ser. ii, p. 839, ser. iii, p. 46; Azdī, Mawsîl, p. 227). He was governor of Mosul and the Jazîra with the title of mawlâ amîr al-mu'minîn on several occasions under Mansûr and possibly also under Mahdî (Khalīfa, Ta'rikh, pp. 679; Azdī, Mawsîl, pp. 225ff, 247ff, where he has become a Khawlānî; Poole, A Catalogue of Oriental Coins in the British Museum, p. 197; Chabot, Chronique de Denys de Tell-Mahrî, pp. 108ff, 131ff, 146ff, 195ff and passim = 91ff, 110ff, 122ff, 161ff and passim; cf. above, no. 16; cf. also Cahen, 'Fiscalité, propriété, antagonismes sociaux'). In 167 he was appointed to Egypt, where he was killed in the following year (Kindī, Governors, pp. 124ff, cf. p. 108).

(38) Rabî b. Yûnus b. Muḥammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Abī Farwa. A client of Mansûr who evidently affected descent from a secretary of Muṣ'ab (cf. Ibn Qutayba, Ma'ârif, p. 87), but who was either a foundling or a freedman or both (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v.). He began his career as a servant of Abû ʿl-Khasîb, rose to the position of chamberlain under Mansûr and Mahdî, and became a commander of the caliph's mawâli under Hârûn (Taḥbīrī, ser. iii,
Hasan b. al-Rabi' was similarly chamberlain to Mahdi while Fadl b. al-Rabi' held the same office under Hadi with whom he is said to have been extremely influential (Khalifa, Ta'rīkh, pp. 700, 709; Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 491). Fadl received the title of mawla amīr al-mu'minīn under Hārūn, inherited the position of the Barmakids, and became a foster-brother (?) of Ma'mūn (Sourdel, Vīṣṣat, pp. 183ff; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1068, where the rīḍā'a may not be meant literally). On Hārūn's death he became counsellor to Amin while his son 'Abbas assumed the office of chamberlain, and he was the prime agent behind Amin in the fourth civil war. After his defeat he was also among the supporters of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī. Ma’mūn did not find it easy to forgive him, and though eventually he was pardoned, he and his family disappeared from the public scene (Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. ‘al-Fadl b. al-Rabi'; Jahshiyārī, Wuzūrā, p. 289; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1068).

(39) Sā'd, mawla amīr al-mu'minīn. Mahdī's governor of Rayy from 166 to at least 168 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 518; Miles, Numismatic History of Rayy, pp. 47f).

(40) Šāliḥ b. al-Haytham. A client of Abū l-'Abbas and/or Rayṭa bint Abī l-'Abbās who was a foster-brother of Mansūr. He was doubtless a freedman or the son of one: women rarely if ever had free male clients. Abū l-'Abbās employed him as chamberlain, and Mansūr appointed him head of the diwan al-rasā'il (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 840, ser. iii, p. 101; De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 215).

(41) Sālim al-Barallusi/Burnusi/Yūnusi. A client of Ismā'il b. ʿAlī who was in charge of the maṣālim court for this caliph (Khalifa, Ta'rīkh, p. 700; Ya'qūbī, Buldān, p. 253 = 39).

(42) Sallām. A client of Mahdī who was in charge of the maṣālim court for this caliph (Khalifa, Ta'rīkh, p. 700; Ya'qūbī, Buldān, p. 253 = 39).

(43) Sindi b. Shābak. A servant and client of Mansūr who bore the title of mawla amīr al-mu'minīn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 98, 145, 146, 306). He would seem to have been sent to Syria to deal with the outbreak of factionalism in 176 (Ya'qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 493; the Sindi could of course be Sindi b. al-Ḥarashi), and he is
mentioned as governor of Damascus for Mūsā b. ‘Isā (Ṣafadī, Umara’, p. 39). Later he was appointed to the shurta of Baghdad and assisted in the destruction of the Barmakids (Ibn Habīb, Muḥabbār, p. 375; Tabarî, ser. iii, p. 297, cf. p. 713). In the civil war he supported Amīn (Tabarî, ser. iii, pp. 912, 915); after the civil war he was an eager adherent of Ibrāhīm b. al-Mahdī (ibid., p. 1016). Ibrāhīm b. al-Sindi b. Shāhak was employed in Ma’mūn’s intelligence service (Ṭayfūr, Kitāb Baghdaḍ, pp. 66ff; the khayr on p. 66 is to be emended to khabar as on p. 70).

(44) Ṭarīf. A client of Mansūr’s who was appointed to the barid of Egypt, Syria and Mesopotamia (Jahshiyārī, Wuzara’, pp. 100f). It is presumably this Ṭarīf who was the father of Layth and Mu’alla (above, nos. 32 and 36).

(45) Ṭayfūr, mawla of Mahdī. A son of Mansūr’s Himyarite wife by her previous marriage to a North African tailor (Ibn Ḥazm, Jamhara, p. 21). He was Mahdī’s half-brother and is possibly identical with the Ṭayfūr whom Mansūr is said to have ‘given to’ Mahdī, though the phrase would imply that the latter was a freedman (Baladhurī, Futūḥ, p. 310); and he is probably identical with the Ṭayfūr, mawla of Hādī, who was governor of Isfahan in 169 (Tabarî, ser. iii, p. 568). Muḥammad b. Ṭayfūr al-Ḥimyarī, mawla amīr al-mu‘minīn, was governor of Sind for Harūn according to Khalīfa, but according to Ya’qūbī the governor was Ṭayfūr b. ‘Abdallāh b. Mansūr al-Ḥimyarī, that is a descendant of Mansūr’s brother-in-law (Ṭarih, p. 746; Historiae, vol. ii, p. 493).

(46) Ṭamara b. Ḥamzā b. Maymūn. A client of Mansūr and Mahdī whose grandfather had apparently been a freedman of ‘Abdallāḥ b. ‘Abbās; he claimed descent from a client of the Prophet (Jahshiyārī, Wuzara’, pp. 90, 147; Qaṭīb, Ta’rikh, vol. i, pp. 87, 96 = Lassner, Topography, pp. 70, 82). He was governor of the districts of the Tigris, Ahwāz, Fars, Yamāma, Bahrayn and Ghaṣ in 156–7, director of the diwan al-kbaraj in Basra in 158, and in charge of the abdāth of Basra in 159 (Qaṭīb, Ta’rikh, vol. i, p. 96; Tabarî, ser. iii, pp. 379, 380, 459, 466, 469; Jahshiyārī, Wuzara’, pp. 134, 149). He had also assisted in the construction of Baghdad where he received a plot (Ya’qūbī, Buldân, pp. 242, 252 = 18, 38). A collection of his correspondence was known to Ibn al-Nadîm (Fihrist, p. 118 = 258).

(47) Waddāḥ, mawla amīr al-mu‘minīn. A director of the arsenal under one of the early caliphs, probably Mansūr (Ya’qūbī, Buldân, p. 245 = 24). He is doubtless identical with Waddāḥ b. Shabā
Appendix V: 'Abbasid servants

al-Sharawi, a member of Muhammad b. 'Ali's Sharawiyya and client of Mansur (Khaṭīb, Ta’rikh, vol. i, pp. 80, 89; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 517).

(48) Wadīh, mawla amīr al-mu'mīnīn. A mawla of Mansur, Mahdī and Šāliḥ b. Mansūr and the ancestor of Ya'qūbī. Mansūr employed him during the construction of Baghdad and later appointed him to Armenia (Ya'qūbī, Buldān, p. 242, cf. p. 247 = 18, 28; id., Historiae, vol. ii, pp. 447, 462); Mahdi appointed him governor of Egypt (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 493; Kindl, Governors, p. 121; Miles, Glass Weights, pp. 128f; Grohmann, Corpus Papyrorum Raineri, vol. ii, no. 133); and under Hārūn he was postmaster in Egypt where he helped Idrīs escape to North Africa, a deed for which he was executed (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 561; cf. also Wiet in his introduction to his translation of Ya'qūbī, Buldān, p. vii).

(49) Yahyā b. Muslim b. 'Urwa. A black mawla and foster-brother of the 'Abbāsids who was appointed to Armenia by Mansūr in 137 according to some (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 99). Apparently, he sided with 'Abdallāh b. 'Alī in the latter's revolt and was subsequently put to death (Goitein, Studies, p. 18on).
APPENDIX VI

MAWLĀ IN THE SENSE OF 'KINSMAN'

A number of passages relating to the Sufyānid period and second civil war at first sight suggest that client retinues were quite common already in the sixties. On closer inspection, however, it is clear that this impression is misleading. Most of the passages employ the term mawla in its old sense of 'kinsman' and/or 'supporter', while the two passages in which the word certainly does mean 'client' are of dubious historicity.

(1) The sources are agreed that the Umayyads were expelled from Medina in 63 together with their mawālī. These mawālī were later understood to have been clients; thus Abū Mikhnaf has an Umayyad freedman relate the events as an eye-witness (Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 405ff); and the mawālī of Mu'āwiya, who according to one source played a crucial role in the events leading up to the expulsion, were doubtless freedmen (Kister, 'The Battle of the Ḥarrā', pp. 45ff). But those who left with the Umayyads were not. Thus according to 'Awāna the Umayyads were expelled hi-iyalatihim wa-nisaihim (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 469), and according to the Hispano-Muslim chronicle cum omnibus liberis vel suis propinquis ('Continuatio Byzantia Arabica', p. 346). Abū Mikhnaf himself enumerates the Umayyads wa-mawālīhīm wa-man ra'ā ray 'ahum min Quraysh (Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 405), which reappears as mawālīhīm wa-man 'urīsa bi'l-mayl ilaybīm min Quraysh in Baladhurī (Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 32). What the variants enumerate are thus Umayyad relatives on the one hand and Qurashi supporters on the other, and the mawālī clearly overlap with both (cf. also Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 406, 407, where they are concatenated with ansār).

(2) After the expulsion Ibn Ziyād advised Marwān to expel Daḥhāk with the help of the people of Palmyra 'and those who were with him of the Umayyads, their mawālī and their following' whereupon Marwān received the homage of 'the Umayyads, their mawālī, their following and the people of Palmyra' (Baladhurī, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 141). It is scarcely credible that these mawālī, placed second
Appendix VI: Mawlá in the sense of ‘kinsman’

only to the Umayyads themselves, should have been clients, and in fact they were not, for in Wahb b. Jarir’s version Marwān is advised to marry the widow of Yazid so as to win over the mawālī of Mu‘awiya and their following (ibid., p. 156). Here it is clear that the mawālī in question were Qurashīs and ashrāf and that it was their following which it would be so advantageous to win over.

(3) Slightly later Dahhāk b. Qays decided to switch allegiance from Ibn al-Zubayr to the Umayyads, and he therefore apologized to the Umayyads, displaying his gratitude for the favours they had shown ‘to his mawālī and himself’ (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 472). Balādhurī apparently found these mawālī incomprehensible, for he omitted them (Ansāb, vol. v, p. 133), and the context certainly militates against taking them as clients. But kinsmen and supporters make perfect sense.

(4) On a few occasions we find Umayyad mawālī as a fighting force. Thus Walīd b. ‘Abd al-Malik is said to have fought against Ashdaq’s brother with the mawālī of ‘Abd al-Malik (Mas‘ūdi, Murūj, vol. v, p. 239); similarly Khālid b. Yazid is said to have fought against Zufar b. al-Hārith with mawālī of Mu‘awiya and others, or with Kalb (Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. v, pp. 301f); and finally, in the wars against the Jārijima we find a jāsh of mawālī of ‘Abd al-Malik and the Umayyads and a jund of ibiqāt jundībi, both under the command of Suhaym b. al-Muhājir (ibid., p. 310). There can be little doubt that the first two passages refer to kinsmen (Kalb certainly were the kinsmen of Mu‘awiya). The third passage, however, is less clear-cut. If the commander was a client, as his name suggests, so presumably were the troops; but he may have been a Ṭā’i (cf. Appendix III, no. 28).

(5) Ḥusayn b. ‘Ali is said to have assembled his ahl bayt and mawālī when asked to pay homage to Yazid I (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 218); the variant version has ahl baytibī wa-man kāna ‘alā ra’īyibī (Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 13), and these mawālī were thus also relatives and other adherents. Later versions predictably interpreted them as freedmen and slaves (Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 14; Dinawarī, Akhbār, p. 231).

(6) ‘Amr. b. Sa‘īd al-Ashdaq is said to have performed the pilgrimage surrounded by a jamā‘a of his mawālī for fear of Ibn al-Zubayr (Balādhurī, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 21). That these mawālī were in fact clients is supported by the story that some 300 of his mawālī and ghilmān were arrested on his dismissal by his successor in
Mawla in the sense of 'kinsman'  

office or the Medinese (Kister, 'The Battle of the Ḥarra', p. 46). Nonetheless, the mawali who appear in connection with his death are of dubious historicity. Abū Mikhnaf's version does not have them; according to him, ‘Amr surrendered, was put in chains, tried to speak with his followers outside the castle, but was handed over to Abu Zu‘ayzi'a for execution (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. iv b, p. 139). All other versions, however, have some time elapse between the surrender and the execution with the result that the followers, whose presence is required by the story, are no longer assembled outside the castle. A substitute thus had to be found. Some equip ‘Amr with a hundred ashāb, others give him a hundred mawali, still others have his brother arrive with ashāb, with ashāb and mawali, with mawali from Ḥims or with slaves (ibid., pp. 141, 143, 145; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 787, 789). These stories neatly array the types of retinues which were available to a soldier in the late Umayyad and early ‘Abbasid periods, but they scarcely furnish evidence for the existence of retinues maintained on a permanent basis at the time of the transition from Sufyānid to Marwānid rule.

The mawali of ‘Abbad b. Ziyād are similarly of dubious historicity. There are three relevant episodes. First, we are told that when ‘Abbad was dismissed from Sīstān he distributed the contents of the treasury among his slaves, a thousand of whom joined him on his departure (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 392). Secondly, it is said that at the time of Marj Rāḥit ‘Abbad went with 2000 of his mawali and others apparently to join the battle (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 136). Finally, after the battle we find him on his way to Dūma in search of neutrality; Mukhtār, however, sent an army against him on the ground that he was ras al-fitna, and in the ensuing battle ‘Abbad’s army consisted of 700 mawali and slaves in addition to the rest of his following (ibid., pp. 267f). The third episode can be discounted. For one thing, it makes not the slightest sense: ‘Abbad could scarcely be characterized as a ra’s al-fitna, and if he had gone to Dūma in search of neutrality it is hard to see why Mukhtār should have gone out of his way to fight him. For another, it is manifestly a doublet of a previous battle between Mukhtār and Ibn al-Zubayr in the region: Mukhtār sent precisely the same man on the two occasions, Mukhtār’s man quoted precisely the same poetry, and moreover he had gone with an army which was a precise mirror image of ‘Abbad’s troops, vir, mawali and 700 Arabs as against ‘Abbad’s Arabs and 700 mawali (ibid.,
Appendix VI: Mawla in the sense of 'kinsman'

p. 246f). That leaves the first two episodes. It is not of course in the least implausible that ‘Abbād should have made use of slaves in the emergency situation in Sīstān, and it is tempting to assume that he formed them into a permanent bodyguard; but whether there actually is a connection between the two episodes is anybody’s guess.
NOTES

Where page references are given in the form ‘p. 5 = 67’, the first figure refers to the original text and the second to the translation.

1. HISTORIOGRAPHICAL INTRODUCTION


2 One can of course play up the fact that something was written, but Sezgin’s argument that the tradition was basically written from the time of the Prophet, if not the jähiliyya, is very unconvincing (F. Sezgin, *Geschichte des arabischen Schrifttums*, vol. i, Leiden 1967, pp. 53ff, 237ff; cf. M. A. Cook, ‘Monotheist Sages. A Study in Muslim and Jewish Attitudes towards Oral Tradition in the Early Islamic Period’, unpublished typescript, note 17).


4 For the titles of Umayyad books see Sezgin, *Geschichte*, under the relevant headings. Most of it was concerned with Arabian antiquities. For the transition to a basically written transmission see N. Abbott, *Studies in Arabic Literary Papyri*, vol. i, Chicago 1957, p. 24; vol. ii, Chicago 1967, pp. 184, 196 and *passim*. Whether the late Umayyad fragment on the battle of Badr comes from a book or private notes, one cannot tell (A. Grohmann, *Arabic Papyri from Ḥirbet el-Mird*, Louvain 1963, no. 71).


6 Compare the fact that three generations complete the transition from slave to freeborn, non-Arab to Arab, tribal conqueror to effeminate dynast, immigrant to American in search of his origins.
As Mani chose to do. That Muhammad did the same has recently been argued by J. Burton, *The Collection of the Qur'an*, Cambridge 1977.


Compare also the transition from Jesus the Jew to Jesus the God within two generations. That Christian scholars have some hope of being able to trace this transition is due entirely to the good luck that Christian doctrine was reduced to writing fairly rapidly.

Ibn Ishāq died ca 150 — about 130 years after the Prophet; and his work survives only in the recension of Ibn Hisbām who died in 213 or 218 — about 200 years after the Prophet. Consider the prospect of reconstructing the origins of Christianity on the basis of the writings of Clement or Justin Martyr in a recension by Origen.

The refusal of the Koran to yield its secrets comes across very strongly in J. Wansbrough, *Quranic Studies*, Oxford 1977. Less original scholars have been content to conclude that it has no secrets.

What the rabbis remembered, or rather managed to forget, about Jesus and his time is a typical example (cf. R. Travers Herford, *Christianity in Talmud and Midrash*, Edinburgh 1903). Cf. also the contrast between the focused account of Paul given in the Judeo-Christian source of ‘Abd al-Jabbār, and the woolly version of the same story which the rabbis preserved in the *Toledoth* (P. Crone, ‘Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm’, forthcoming in *Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam*).


The Constitution of Medina unambiguously depicts a society of Muhājjirūn, Arab tribes and Jewish allies preparing for war in the name of a creed to which there is only the most cursory reference. The *Sīra* nonetheless has Muhammad arrive as a peacemaker in Medina, where he spends a substantial part of his time expounding Islam to the Arab tribes and disputing with Jewish rabbis. A number of traditions even have him set up a major educational industry (for these see Abbott, *Studies*, vol. i, p. 28; for the Prophet as a teacher see also M. M. Azmi, *Studies in Early Hadith Literature*, Beirut 1968, pp. 183f).


As has been done by Schacht (*Origins*), by J. Van Ess, *Zwischen Hadit und Theologie*, Berlin and New York 1975, and by Cook, ‘Monotheist Sages’.


I owe both this point and the following example to M. A. Cook.

Nu‘aym b. Ḥammād, *Kitāb al-fītan*, British Museum Or. no. 9449, f. 97bff.


Thus the min between al-muslimin and Quraysh in the opening line has fallen out, min dunihas become duna (both p. 291), umma ma'a al-mu'minin has become umma min al-mu'minin (p. 293), and daba'ama Yathrib has become rababa'ama Yathrib (p. 294).

In Ibn Ishaq the document is issued by Muhammad al-nabi, in Abu 'Ubayd by Muhammad al-nabi rasul Allah; kullu ta'ifa is glossed by minhum; Banu'l-Harith is glossed by b. al-Khaṭraj, (p. 291); a blessing follows the mention of God, and that following Muhammad's name is more elaborate (p. 294). Ibn Ishaq has 'believers and Muslims' once, but Abu 'Ubayd twice.

Most strikingly a large number of clauses on p. 343 in Ibn Ishaq are missing from the corresponding p. 294 in Abu 'Ubayd; but two famous clauses are also missing from p. 292, and one from p. 293. There are also several minor differences.

From Zuhrī. Ibn Abi Khaythama (d. 279) similarly provided the document with an isnad, but brought it all the way back to Kathīr b. 'Abdallāh al-Muzani from his father from his grandfather (Ibn Sayyid al-Nās, 'Uyun al-atbar fir fana 'in al-maghāzi wa'l-shamā'il wa'l-siyar, Cairo 1336, vol. i, p. 198; cf. M. Gil, 'The Constitution of Medina: a Reconsideration', Israel Oriental Studies 1974, p. 47). Ibn Hishām knew of another recension which may well have been Abu 'Ubayd's: he tells us that some have al-birr al-muṣīn for al-birr al-mahd, which is precisely what Abu 'Ubayd has (Ibn Ishaq, Leben Muhammeds, p. 343; Abu 'Ubayd, Amwāl, p. 294). And in some respects Abu 'Ubayd's version is the more archaic. It lacks the invocation (p. 291); where Ibn Ishaq later qualifies Muhammad as rasul Allah, Abu 'Ubayd by contrast calls him nabī (p. 294); and it was presumably Ibn Ishaq who omitted the Jews from the clause on sulh rather than Abu 'Ubayd who put them in (ibid.).

A. J. Wensinck, Muhammad and the Jews of Medina, Freiburg 1975, pp. 64ff; cf. Gil, 'The Constitution of Medina', p. 48. The Shi'i references to the Constitution are even vaguer, if indeed they are references to it at all (cf. R. B. Serjeant, 'The "Constitution of Medina"', Islamic Quarterly 1964, pp. 51).


Cf. below, p. 32.

The Islamic tradition on this battle describes in profuse detail how the last legitimate caliph defeated Mu'āwiya, the governor of Syria, only to be bitterly cheated of the fruits of his victory. It does not emerge from this tradition that the Syrian side regarded itself as having won: a Syriac source casually refers to Siffin as the battle in which Mu'āwiya defeated Abu Turab (S. Brock, 'An Early Syriac Life of Maximus the Confessor', Analecta Bollandiana 1973, p. 313 = 319; cf. p. 329), and the Syriac tradition used by Theophanes was similarly innocent of the knowledge that Mu'āwiya had been defeated (Theophanes, Chronographia, ed. C. De Boor, Leipzig 1883-5, a.m. 6148). In fact the Syrians may very well have won, for the story of the Korans on their lances is certainly apocryphal (for a possible
Vorlage see A. Noth, Quellenkritische Studien zu Themen, Formen und Tendenzen frühablischer Geschichtsüberlieferung, Bonn 1973, p. 154). Nor does it emerge that the Syrians never recognized 'Ali as caliph and that it was only in mid-third-century Iraq that the *ahl al-sunna wal-jamaa* accepted him as the fourth of the *Rāshidūn* (cf. W. Madelung, Der *Imam al-Qāsim ibn Ibrāhīm und die Glaubenslehre der Zaiditen*, Berlin 1965, pp. 223ff). 'Ali is, however, omitted from the mid-Umayyad Syriac 'king-lists' and the Hispano-Muslim chronicle (P. N. Land (ed.), *Anecdota Syriaca*, vol. ii, Leiden 1868, p. 11 of the 'Addenda'; I. Guidi et al. (eds. and trs.), *Chronica Minora* (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, third series, vol. iv), Louvain 1903–7, p. 155 = 119; 'Continuatio Byzantia Arabica' in T. Mommsen (ed.), *Chronica Minora*, vol. ii (Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Auctores Antiquissimi, vol. xi), Berlin 1894, p. 343; cf. p. 368). On the Muslim side the refusal to count him among the caliphs is attested only in the ninth-century work of the Damascene Abu Zur'a (Rotter, 'Abū Zūr'a', pp. 94f).

31 Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 177, note 60.

32 Mukhtar's *mabdi* hardly knew that he was the messiah, let alone how to behave when he was told, and Mukhtar's *kursi* was just an old chair of 'Ali's he had got out of Umm Ja'da's attic. Both points can still arouse the merriment of students. (See the account in Baladhuri, *Ansāb al-āshrāf*, vol. v, ed. S. D. F. Goitein, Jerusalem 1936, pp. 214ff.)


34 For the references see below, part II; C. Van Arendonk, *Les Dēbuts de l’imāmat raṣīdīt au Yemen*, Leiden 1960, pp. 25ff; *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Leiden and London 1960–, s.vv. 'Abd Allāh b. Mu‘āwiya', 'Dahhāk b. Kays al-Shaybānī'. The accounts of these rebellions are of course both biased and confused, but that is a different and far more familiar problem.

35 Notably Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya and Husayn, the rebel at Fakhkh (Van Arendonk, *Dēbuts*, pp. 45ff, 57f).

36 The longest is that relating to Mulabbad, who was clearly made of the same stuff as Shabib, but who nonetheless gets only three pages in Tabari (ser. iii, pp. 120, 122ff). For others see *ibid.*, pp. 631, 645, 649, 688, 711.

37 Needless to say, modern historians have adopted a determinedly materialist approach to the migration of the Icelanders: even the prospect of trade (with the Eskimos?) has been held out as a more plausible motive than mere dislike of state structures (G. Jones, *A History of the Vikings*, Oxford 1973, pp. 280f). Contrast the complete break-down of materialism in the account by an Icelandic Marxist, for whom the withering away of the state is clearly a restoration of the Icelandic past (E. Olgeirsson, *Fra Ættensamfunn til Klassestat*, Oslo 1968, pp. 49ff). The Marxist account is in this case by far the more persuasive. Had overpopulation or the like been all there was behind the exodus, it is odd that Iceland did not become a Norwegian colony or an independent monarchy. Monarchy was by now as indispensable an ingredient
of civilization as was Christianity, and the oddity of the Icelanders was noticed (cf. Adam of Bremen's surprise that 'with them there is no king except the law', cited with approval by Olgeirsson, *Ættasamfjöln*, p. 43, or the thirteenth-century cardinal who 'thought it unreasonable that this country would not serve a king even as all other countries in the world', cited with scathing comment by E. O. Sveinsson, *The Age of the Sturlungs*, Ithaca 1953, p. 14). The Icelanders themselves felt the attraction of the Norwegian kings, whose hirdmen they became, whose institutions they imitated, and whose sagas they wrote. But though they did not long resist the coming of Christianity, it was only in A.D. 1264 that the collapse of their archaic society brought them to surrender to kings.

The contrast between the evolution of the conquerors of Normandy and the settlers in Iceland is well brought out by Olgeirsson, *Ættasamfjöln*, pp. 42f. Note also the role of physical isolation in the preservation of the Irish jāhiliyya.

The Icelanders collected the *Edda* and wrote the *Heimskringla* and fornaldasögur about the Scandinavian past. The Arabs collected the *Mu'allaqat* and wrote *akhbār* about Arabia (ayyām, āsnām, ansāb and *amthāl al-'arab*).

The *Landnámabók* of the Icelanders, the *kutub al-futūh* of the Arabs.

The *Íslendingabók* and *Íslendingasögur* of the Icelanders, the ansāb and *akhbār*—literature of the Arabs.

It might have been different if the Icelanders had decided to remain pagan: Snorri's *Heimskringla*, a universal chronicle beginning with Odin, has all the aspirations of a *Ṭa'rikh al-rusul wa l-mulūk*.

To that extent the sagas are comparable with the *Shābīnāmeh*. Whereas the *Iliad* or the *Mahābhārata* were literary remains from the heroic age handed down by oral tradition, the sagas and the *Shābīnāmeh* were literary creations about the heroic age composed on the basis of literary records. And the forcefulness with which these dirges for the past conjure up the lost society testifies to the bitter loss which the authors felt.

Sayf’s long account of the conquest of Damascus, for example, is told under a single *isnād* (*Tabari*, ser. i, pp. 214 f, 2150ff). But his much longer account of the battle of Qādisiyya consists of a mass of smaller pieces (*ibid.*, pp. 2212 ff).

Contrast the way in which a saga written almost 250 years after the Christianization of Iceland turns on the working of inexorable fate (A. M. A. Madelung, *The Laxdala Saga: its Structural Patterns*, Chapel Hill 1972, pp. 17f, 158ff).

It is not for nothing that anthropologists have completely failed to use the *Sira* for information on tribal Arabia, though they have had no inhibitions about combing the *Secret History* for information on Mongolia.

A. Noth, *'Isfāhān-Nihāwand. Eine quellenkritische Studie zur frühislamischen Historiographie*, *Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft* 1968; *id.*, *Quellenkritische Studien*, pp. 24ff, 182ff and passim. To some extent the narrative technique analysed by Noth is that characteristic of epics (or fairy tales) rather than of rabbinic literature, that is to say stock themes have been
Notes

put together in a variety of ways to form coherent narratives, and the historical contents of the tradition have been worn away and replaced by a wealth of details providing general verisimilitude, but little fact. To that extent the futuh belong to the tradition of ayyám rather than hadith. But the 'rabbinic' influence is manifest in the insistence on 'Umar's guiding hands, the exposition of the Islamic creed in the da'was to Islam, the searches for martyrdom and so forth. It is also evident in the restraints placed on the narrative imagination: the futuh, despite their roots in the ayyám, do not often make exciting reading.

48 Who participated in the battle of Siffin is as loaded a question as who participated in that of Badr.

49 The typical Syrian sharif fights against 'Ali at Siffin, goes to the Hijaz to persuade Ibn al-Zubayr to pay allegiance to Yazid I, and reappears at Jābiya and/or Marj Rāḥīt. The typical Iraqi sharif fights against Mu'āwiyah at Siffin, deserts Husayn at Karbalā', fights against Mukhtar under Muṣ'ab and deserts Muṣ'ab for 'Abd al-Malik at Maskin (cf. Appendix I). A man to whom a career of this pattern is attributed is a sharīf.

50 W. Caskel, 'Aijām al-'arab', Islamica 1930 (Supplement).

51 Thus for example Sayf's accounts of the 'irdfas or the land exchange under 'Uthmān, which are so strangely free of halakhic interests (Ṭabari, ser. i, pp. 2496, 2854ff). It is thanks to the survival of this kind of material, and above all thanks to Sayf, that Hinds' reconstruction of the situation in the provinces at the time of the civil war carries conviction (for the references see the bibliography).

52 Thus the accounts of the shifting genealogies of Qudā'a, the tribal feuds in Basra, the participants at Jābiya or the wars between the Syrian tribes after Marj Rāḥīt (below, ch. 4). What the tribesmen remembered of the politics of Mukhtar was likewise genuine.

53 Ibn Ḥabīb, Kitāb al-Muḥabbar, ed. I. Lichtenstädter, Hyderabad 1942. In it the interested reader will find the answer to questions such as who wore turbans in Mecca to hide their beauty from women (pp. 232ff), who was the father-in-law of four caliphs (p. 243), what women could count ten caliphs within their forbidden degrees (pp. 404ff), who had Christian or Ethiopian mothers (pp. 305ff), and what asbrāf lost an eye in battle, were crucified or had their heads put on a stake (pp. 261ff, 478ff, 490ff). Noth was also struck by the absurdity of this book (Quellenkritische Studien, p. 90).

54 The phrase was coined by E. L. Petersen, 'Ali and Mu'āwiyah in Early Arabic Tradition, Copenhagen 1964, p. 24.

55 That the Muslims sensed this themselves comes across in the reason which 'Abida b. Qays, a Kufan tābi', is said to have given for his refusal to engage in tafsīr: 'those who knew what the Koran was revealed about have died' (Ibn Sa'd, al-Ṭabaqāt al-kubrā, Beirut 1938–60, vol. vi, pp. 94ff; for the doctrinal point at issue see H. Birkeland, Old Muslim Opposition against Interpretation of the Koran, Oslo 1955).

For his Syrian origins see Appendix III, no. 87. That he was biased in favour of the Umayyads was first maintained by Yaqūt (Irshād al-arīb ilā maʿrifat al-adīb, ed. D. S. Margoliouth, London 1923–31, vol. vi, p. 94); it was endorsed by the latter's editor (D. S. Margoliouth, Lectures on Arabic Historians, Calcutta 1930, pp. 52f), and again by Duri, though with the qualification that he also has anti-Umayyad material (Duri, 'The Iraq School of History', pp. 48f). S. A. El-Ali saw no evidence of bias in favour of either the Umayyads, Kalb or Kufa (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. "Awāna b. al-Hakam"), and Petersen claimed that on the whole he is anti-Umayyad ("Ali and Muʿāwiya, p. 53f). In short, 'Awāna had material in favour of contradictory views, precisely as had the other compilers.

Noth, 'Der Charakter'; id., Quellenkritische Studien, pp. 13ff; Nasr b. Muzāhim's Waqʿat Siffin is not really an exception. It is indeed thoroughly Shiʿite, but then it does not belong among the first compilations: most of it is based on Abū Mikhnaf (cf. U. Sezgin, Abū Mihnaf, Leiden 1971, pp. 128ff.). It thus belongs in the same category as Yaʿqūbī (cf. note 60). For the forms of Islamic historiography see F. Rosenthal, A History of Muslim Historiography, Leiden 1952.

Cf. G. Richter, Das Geschichtsbild der arabischen Historiker des Mittelalters (Philosophie und Geschichte, vol. xliii), Tübingen 1933, pp. 19f. Yaʿqūbī is largely a digest of Abū Mikhnaf (Petersen, "Ali and Muʿāwiya, p. 169), and to the extent that Abū Mikhnaf and most of the other first compilers were Shiʿite sympathizers, one can claim with equal validity that the Sunni sources do not give us the Sunni experience of Islamic history. But whereas the abī al-sunna eventually made the tradition their own, the Shiʿites acquired theirs only by repeating the process whereby the mainstream tradition had been created, that is to say blurring the old contours and creating new ones. Where Yaʿqūbī merely intersperses his selections from Abū Mikhnaf with curses, Nasr b. Muzāhim embroiders his with exaltations of 'Ali, Shiʿite piety and sentiments (Waqʿat Siffin, ed. 'A. M. Hārūn, Cairo 1946), and in Ibn Aʾtham al-Kūfī secondary material of this kind tends to swamp the Sunni history behind it (for his authorities see Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v., where his Kitāb al-futūḥ is dated 819; for an estimate placing it almost a century later see Sezgin, Geschichte, vol. i, p. 329). Ibn Aʾtham's work is stuffed with letters to and from the caliph expounding the principles of Islam, deliberations in which 'Ali invariably distinguishes himself, elaborate invitations to the enemy to convert, and lengthy descriptions of battles yielding a minimum of information; and in his account of the conquest of Jerusalem virtually everything that the mainstream tradition remembered has given way to Shiʿite reconstruction: Abū 'Ubayda begins by appointing a Kufan Companion governor of Damascus (Ibn Aʾtham al-Kūfī, Kitāb al-futūḥ, Hyderabad 1968—, vol. i, p. 289; cf. Khalīfa b. Khayyat, Kitāb al-tābaqāt, ed. A. D. al-'Umāri, Baghdad 1967, p. 127 (Saʾid b. Zayd)); 'Umar complies with the request that he come to Syria thanks to 'Ali's advice (Ibn Aʾtham, Futūḥ, p. 292); the treaty, which they have preserved to this day, but the text of which
Notes

is not given, was negotiated by a supposed ‘musta’rib whose kunya was Abū l-Ju’ayd’ (ibid., p. 296); ‘Umar goes, not to the temple rock, but to the cathedral: it is here that Ka‘b al-Ahbar converts from Judaism and makes his speech which has now lost its messianic content and Biblical flavour to become Arab saj’ (ibid., pp. 296f; contrast Tabarî, ser. i, pp. 2408f). The account of the conquest of Jerusalem is by no means an isolated example: Sunnī history is once and Shi‘ite history twice removed from reality (cf. also the Shi‘ite ‘memory’ of the Constitution of Medina referred to above).

Kindi’s recollection of an iconoclast edict clearly derived from a local tradition (cf. Crone, ‘Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm’, note 45), and Abū Zur‘a’s refusal to count ‘Ali among the caliphs presumably also represents local tradition, not just doctrinal choice (cf. above, note 30). But such examples are rare.

Cf. Noth, Quellenkritische Studien, p. 15; Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, p. 90.

Just how much information can be brought together by combing sources early and late, printed and manuscript is superbly demonstrated by Kister’s work (for a recent example see M. J. Kister, ‘The Battle of the Ḥarrā’ in Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet, ed. M. Rosen-Ayalon, Jerusalem 1977).

For a striking exception see the description of the Roman nobles who cover their heads with their cloaks and await death refusing to survive the ignominy of defeat (Tabarî, ser. i, pp. 2099; cf. M. De Goeje, Mémoire sur la conquête de la Syrie, Leiden 1900, p. 62). But such exceptions are very few indeed.

Compare J. H. W. G. Liebeschuetz, Antioch: City and Imperial Administration in the Later Roman Empire, Oxford 1972, or P. Brown, ‘The Rise and Function of the Holy Man in Late Antiquity’, Journal of Roman Studies 1971, two vivid portraits of the Syria which the Arabs conquered, and H. Lammens, Études sur le règne du Calife Omeyyade Mo‘āwiya Ier, Paris 1908, or P. K. Hitti, History of Syria, London 1951, two portraits of the Syria which the Arabs saw. In part, of course, the contrast arises from the different dates and very different historical and literary talents of the authors, but basically it arises from the sources: it is no accident that one of the most successful sketches of the encounter between the Arabs and late antiquity comes from a scholar to whom these sources are not accessible (P. Brown, The World of Late Antiquity, London 1971, pp. 189ff).

Noth, Quellenkritische Studien, pp. 128ff.


The examples of takbirs adduced by Noth certainly are topoi and legends. In the same way the invitations to conversion issued to the enemy clearly are schematic and over-elaborate, and the promises of complete equality often do bear all the signs of being arguments for a gentile Islam (Noth, Quellenkritische Studien, pp. 131ff). But precisely such an invitation was issued with precisely such a promise to the garrison at Gaza (H. Delahaye (ed.), ‘Passio sanctorum sexaginta martyrum’, Analecta Bollandiana 1904, p. 302:
'et estis sicut nos, et habetis honorem sicuti unus e nobis'). And Noth's dismissal of Sebeos' account of Mu'awiya's letter to the Byzantine emperor is certainly wrong: the fact that it does not sound like a classical Islamic da'wa ilā-l-islām hardly proves that it was a Christian topos (Noth, Quellenkritische Studien, pp. 146f). What the Muslim sources do not tell us is that those who refused the da'wa in the days of the early conquests were liable not just to be defeated and subjected to the jiyya, but also to be martyred.


71 Thus W. M. Watt, Muhammad at Mecca, Oxford 1953; id., Muhammad at Medina, Oxford 1956. Watt's desire to find social malaise in the desert would have been more convincing if the Meccans had been members of OPEC rather than the hîlî al-fudûl. Similarly M. A. Shaban, The 'Abbásid Revolution, Cambridge 1970; id., Islamic History, a New Interpretation, Cambridge 1971–6, through whose work runs the conviction that the Arabs were eminently modern-minded people who did not allow religious or tribal side-issues to cloud their grasp of the realities of politics in general and trade in particular; even the East African slaves in the salt marshes of Basra have here become pioneers of a trade as all-explaining as that which supposedly led the Norwegians to flock to Iceland (Islamic History, vol. ii, pp. 101f).

72 One of the rare exceptions is R. B. Serjeant, 'Haram and Hawtah, the Sacred Enclave in Arabia' in A. Badawi (ed.), Mélanges Taha Husain, Cairo 1962. The disappearance of the unreality which is so striking in this sketch arises from the fact that it is based on tribal studies in modern South Arabia, plus the Constitution of Medina, to the exclusion of the rest of the Sīra. (The South Arabian model does not, of course, fit very well in the north, still less does it explain why the holy man should preach a new religion; but then Serjeant, like Arsuzî, sees only what was pre-Islamic in Islam.)

73 Watt's Muhammad at Mecca, and Medina, Serjeant's 'Haram' and M. Rodinson, Mohammed, London 1971, merely happen to be about the same subject; Watt's book has found favour among historians, Serjeant's article among anthropologists, and Rodinson's book is good for students to read, but nobody works on them: in fact modern scholars tend not to work on the Prophet at all (contrast the situation before the First World War). Similarly, it was not the cumulation of previous research which led Shaban to write his new interpretation of Islamic history.

Given the immense period covered by the Pentateuch, even the most credulous scholar will probably never know as much about the origins of Judaism as even the most sceptical scholar knows about those of Islam; but what the Biblical scholar knows makes infinitely better sense.

For a fair critique of the Scandinavian *jacquerie* against Wellhausen see the chapter by C. R. North in H. H. Rowley (ed.), *The Old Testament and Modern Study*, Oxford 1951. The application of the rabbinc model in Islamic guise to the Pentateuch is not a little anachronistic, and the basic trouble of the Graf—Wellhausen hypothesis was clearly that it threatened to create work shortage in an overpopulated field.

Noth, 'Der Charakter'; *id.*, *Quellenkritische Studien*, pp. 9ff. For the Syrian school see Rotter, 'Abū Zur'a'. For an attack on Wellhausen from a somewhat different point of view see Sezgin, *Abū Mihnaf*, pp. 10ff.

Sellheim, 'Prophet, Chalif und Geschichte'. Sellheim identified two strata consisting of miracle stories and 'Abbasid propaganda respectively; all the rest is labelled *Grundschicht* and characterized as *Felsbrocken* (p. 48). It is, however, this layer which is in need of analysis, and the assurance that it reflects the events of history more or less directly is hardly borne out by the soundings on pp. 73ff.

Noth, 'İsfahān-Nihāwand'.

Noth, *Quellenkritische Studien*; for the warning see p. 29. Noth does not deny that Islamic history can be written: his work is meant as a practical guide (*ibid.*, p. 28). But he himself writes none.


H. Lammens, *Fatima et les filles de Mahomet*, Rome 1912; C. H. Becker, ‘Prinzipielles zu Lammens’ Sīrastudien’, *Der Islam* 1913 (also published as ‘Grundsätzliches zur Leben-Muhammed-Forschung’ in his *Islamstudien*, Leipzig 1924–32, vol. i). Lammens saw the *Sīra* as nothing but a Midrash to the Koran, but nonetheless proceeded to a hazardous interpretation rather than a rejection of the Islamic tradition; Becker formally reinstated the historical recollection behind the *tafsir* and *hadith* of which he saw the *Sīra* as composed, but knew of no method other than subjective intuition for deciding which was which; Levi Della Vida was accordingly free to reinstate the historicity of the Medinan period of Muhammad’s life (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Leiden 1913–38, s.v. ‘*Sīra’*); and Watt proceeded to reinstate that of the Meccan one as well, so that by 1953 Islamic studies were back to square one. Schacht himself seems to have regarded Lammens’ theories as responsible for the blackslash (for the reference see the following note), but Islamic scholarship in general seems to have stalled about 1914–20 at the very moment when it was about to take off, and however many sins Lammens may have had on his conscience, he certainly was not responsible for that (cf. the fate of Wellhausen’s theories and the separation of Syriac and Islamic studies about the same time; cf. also Cook, ‘Monotheist Sages’, note 264).

J. Schacht, ‘A Revaluation of Islamic Traditions’, *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1949. Schacht’s misgivings as regards the effects of Lammens on
Islamic scholarship are found on p. 143n. Despite the general reluctance to accept the implications of his theories, his success in structuring an amorphous mass of traditions makes it unlikely that a reaction of quite the same magnitude could ever recur.

Schacht, Origins; id., An Introduction to Islamic Law, Oxford 1964, part one, a somewhat easier survey of this evolution.

H.-P. Raddatz has applied Schacht’s theories in his own field (Die Stellung und Bedeutung des Sufyân at-Taurî, Bonn 1967; Frühislamisches Erbrecht nach dem Kitâb al-farâ‘îd des Sufyân at-Taurî, Die Welt des Islams 1971); in the neighbouring fields Van Ess (Zwischen Hadîth und Theologie), Wansbrough (Quranic Studies), Burton (The Collection of the Qur’ân), and Cook (‘Monotheist Sages’) are similarly indebted to Schacht (and Goldziher). Considering the deference with which Schacht is usually cited, it is surprising that no more work has been carried out under his aegis.


J. Schacht, ‘The Kitâb al-Târîkh of Halîfa b. Ḥâyyât’, Arabica 1969; cf. ‘Mûsâ b. ‘Uqba’, p. 293. Schacht’s conclusions were confirmed not only by the late Umayyad fragment on the battle of Badr (Grohmann, Arabic Papyri from Hirbet el-Mird, no. 71), but also by the archaic third-century chronicle of Abu Zur’a (Rotter, ‘Abû Zur’a’).

Watt disposes of Schacht by casuistry (W. M. Watt, ‘The Materials used by Ibn Ishâq’ in B. Lewis and P. M. Holt (eds.), Historians of the Middle East, London 1962, p. 24). Gibb defends the authenticity of a narrative relating to the mid-Umayyad period with reference to its superior ismâd (H. A. R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, London 1962, p. 53). Shaban pretends never to have heard of Schacht, or for that matter any other critic of the sources (see in particular his Islamic History, vol. i, p. 1). The reactions of the Arabists are very similar. R. Paret, ‘Die Lücke in der Überlieferung über den Islam’, Westöstliche Abhandlungen Rudolf Tschudi, ed. F. Meier, Wiesbaden 1954, takes Schacht seriously, but nonetheless ends by endorsing the soundness of the Sîra. A. Guillaume seems to be under the impression that the only attack ever made on the historicity of the Sîra is that by his own research students in respect of the Sîra’s poetry (see his introduction to his translation of the Sîra; similarly his ‘The Biography of the Prophet in Recent Research’, Islamic Quarterly Review 1954). Sellheim’s innocence of Schacht has already been noted. Abbott and F. and U. Sezgin are of course anything but deaf, but their method consists in believing what the Muslims said about the formation of their own tradition while abstaining from too close an analysis of the character of this tradition which so flagrantly contradicts it: the conclusions of Schacht (and now also Noth) are denied, but not disproved. The only serious attempts to refute Schacht are those of N. J. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law, Edinburgh 1964, pp. 64ff (who accepts the essentials of Schacht’s conclusions), and Azmi, Studies (who disagrees fundamentally with both Goldziher and Schacht).

Nor for that matter by anyone else.
That, of course, was precisely the inference which Lammens and Becker drew from Goldziher's theories.

For example, we are told that Muḥammad's grandfather vowed to sacrifice his son and had to ransom him (Ibn Ishaq, Leben Muhammed's, vol. i, pp. 97ff = 66ff). The story is modelled on Abraham and Isaac and presumably once had a point, but as it stands it is remarkably pointless, and except for a general Pentateuchal obsession, the doctrinal structure to which it belonged has utterly gone. It is, so to speak, a case of naskh al-hukm dūna al-tilāwa.

J. M. B. Jones, "The Chronology of the maghāzī — a Textual Survey", Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 1957 (the chronology of Muḥammad's campaigns becomes gradually improved); Wansbrough, Quranic Studies, pp. 38ff (the chronology of the revelation is arbitrary); Crone and Cook, Hagarism, p. 157, note 39 (there is disagreement on the number of years Muḥammad spent in Medina).

Sellheim, 'Prophet, Chalif und Geschichte', pp. 75, 77f (every year has one major event, Muḥammad was born, performed the hijra and died on Monday 12th Rabī' 1).

E. Mittwoch, 'Muhammeds Geburt- und Todestag', Islamica 1926 (Moses also was born and died on the same day). The doctrinal inspiration is, however, particularly clear in the tight synchronization of Muḥammad's relations with the Jews and Koranic revelation in the first years after the hijra, and in the date of the Prophet's death (cf. the following note).

Viz. the year of the death of the Prophet (Crone and Cook, Hagarism, pp. 4, 24).

Sellheim's view that falsifications are as good as unthinkable in the prosopographical lists is flatly contradicted by his own research: if the lists could be manipulated to include and exclude ʿAbbas and Abū Sufyān in accordance with political demands after A.D. 750, it is somewhat gratuitous to assume that they were stable until then (Sellheim, 'Prophet, Chalif und Geschichte', pp. 73ff). In fact, lists of first converts (Abū Bakr, 'Alī, 'Umar) clearly reflect discussions of the imamate; similarly lists of commanders: in Sunnī tradition it was 'Amr b. al-ʿĀṣ whom the Prophet charged with the expedition to Syria, but in Shiʿite tradition it was 'Alī (Kister, 'On the Papyrus of Wahh b. Munabbih', pp. 557ff). Lists of those who became brothers in Medina not only pair Muḥammad and 'Alī as one might expect (cf. above, note 70), but also include Salmān al-Fārisī, a figure whose genesis can to some extent be followed (J. Horovitz, 'Salmān al-Fārisī', Der Islam 1922; cf. also Crone, 'Islam, Judeo-Christianity and Byzantine Iconoclasm', especially note 179). In general, who participated in the events of the Prophet's life was so loaded a question that it would be more interesting to know how and why the relevant men came to be included in the lists than whether they actually did participate: even if we knew the historical names, we would still not have the historical information required to identify the men behind them.

And that despite the fact that in 1954 Cahen used a Syriac source to draw a vivid picture of the Mesopotamian countryside quite unlike anything one
can get out of Muslim fiscal manuals (C. Cahen, ‘Fiscalité, propriété, antagonismes sociaux en Haute-Mésopotamie au temps des premiers ‘Abbasides’, Arabica 1954): his first worthy follower in this field is M. G. Morony (cf. the bibliography). Cahen was also the first to turn to these sources for religious information (C. Cahen, ‘Note sur l’accueil des Chrétiens d’Orient à l’Islam’, Revue de l’Histoire des Religions 1964); but there seems to have been a general consensus that non-Muslim sources could teach us nothing about Islam as a religion, and even Cahen used them only for the Christian reaction to Islam. (Cahen’s question whether the Christians really saw Islam as an opponent or rival to Christianity has to be answered with an emphatic yes: quite apart from the fact that they suffered martyrdom at the hands of the Muslims, the Christians never described Islam as a Christian heresy (cf. Crone and Cook, Hagarism, chh. 1ff and p. 120). That John of Damascus saw it as such hardly follows from his inclusion of it in his book of heresies, cf. his inclusion of pagan, Jewish and Samaritan sects.)


99 The chronology and prosopography of the Rashidūn was analysed by Noth, Quellenkritische Studien, pp. 40ff, 90ff, and on the whole rejected. The discussion is, however, somewhat unsatisfactory because Noth (who mysteriously does not know Schacht’s work on this topic) treats the two separately and dismisses the ta’rikh as secondary (that the combination of ta’rikh and akhbār is secondary is obviously true, but that is another matter). Equally, he makes no distinction between lists of different types: those of governors and other magistrates clearly belong to a different tradition from those of ‘ulama’ or those of participants and fallen in battles. It is certainly true that the chronology of the conquests is confused (Noth, Quellenkritische Studien, p. 41), that the Rashidūn are given Umayyad magistrates (ibid., p. 43; one might add Ibn Qunfudh, ‘Uthmān’s supposed sāhib shurta’), and that the lists of participants in battles testify to Namenmanie (ibid., p. 96). And perhaps the Grundschichten of this period is as unsatisfactory as it is for the Prophet. But the case of ‘Umayr b. Sa’d (cf. below), and the order which has emerged from Hinds’ prosopographical studies of the rebels against ‘Uthmān, suggest that there is more to be said about this subject.

100 Cf. Noth, Quellenkritische Studien, p. 96.

101 Anyone who has gone through the papyrological, numismatic or epigraphical publications must have been struck by this agreement, but it is scarcely less striking that ‘Umayr b. Sa’d, the obscure governor of Ḥims and Damascus in the 640s a.d., ‘Abdallāh b. Darrāj, the fiscal agent and mawlawi of Mu‘āwiya, and Dimār b. Dinār, a subgovernor in northern Syria under ‘Abd al-Malik, should have been confirmed by Syriac sources (Crone and Cook, Hagarism, pp. 160, note 57, 162, note 11; see also Appendix II, no. 2). Not all the gover-
nors of the Umayyad period can, of course, be checked in this way, and not everything fits when they can (cf. the aberrant chronology of certain Arab-Sasanian coins in A. D. Mordtmann, 'Zur Pehlevi-Münzkunde', Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 1879, especially p. 97; the problem is not discussed by H. Gaube, Arabosasanische Numismatik, Braunschweig 1973). But enough has been confirmed to make rejection of the unconfirmed extremely difficult.

Lists of caliphs are attested from the mid-Umayyad period onwards in the form of Syriac 'king-lists', which probably reflect Arabic models, and next in Zuhri's book of asnān al-mulūk (Rotter, 'ʿAbū Zurʿā', p. 91; for the first 'king-list' see Land, Anecdota, vol. ii, p. 11 of the 'Addenda'). Lists of governors and qādis must have been composed about the same time (cf. the unique and presumably archaic title of Kindr's work in which the earliest material on qādis dates from the early part of the second century (Schacht, Origins, p. 100), and note that ʿAbū Zurʿā got his lists of caliphs and most of his lists of qādis from the same informant (Rotter, 'ʿAbū Zurʿā', pp. 99f)). Lists of commanders of the summer campaigns are not attested until early 'Abbāsid Syria (ibid., p. 101), but it is hard to believe that they had not been compiled before: the evidence would indicate that taʾrikh originated in Syria (cf. ibid., p. 92), and that the contents of the Syrian lists were caliphs and magistrates. Lists of muhaddithun, on the other hand, attesting to the rabbinicization of Islam, are of later origin (pace ibid., p. 92) and first appear in Iraq: we are told that Shuʿba, who died in Basra in 160, was the first to occupy himself with the study of traditionists (Ibn Ḥajar, Tabādhīh al-tabādīh, Hyderabad 1325–7, vol. iv, p. 345), and in the archaic work of ʿAbū Zurʿā these lists are still only vaguely chronological, not annalistic (ibid.). That leaves the lists of participants and fallen in battle and other lists relating to the ashrāf, which clearly belong to the tribal tradition and which are the most difficult to check for authenticity. As an ingredient in the maghārī they are attested in the Khirbet el-Mird fragment (above, note 4), but there is nothing to indicate that they were part of a specifically Syrian tradition, and they are unlikely always to have been dated.

Sebeos, for example, confirms the complicity of Egyptians in the murder of ʿUthmān and the subsequent proclamation of a new 'king'; though his designation of what was clearly ʿAlī as a king would indicate that his informants were not Syrians, he also has Muʿāwiyah not only defeat but also kill ʿAlī 'in the desert', presumably by compression of the events (Sebeos, Histoire d'Heracle, tr. F. Macler, Paris 1904, p. 149; he also states that the Egyptians were allied with those in Arabia, and that Muʿāwiyah later sent a victorious expedition to Arabia, both statements which could be taken at their face value; it is, however, possible that Arabia is a mistake for Iraq (mistranslation of Beth ʿArbāyē?)�

 Cf. below, note 647.

Below, note 572.

Notes 215


108 Most of the information in Appendix I is to be taken in this sense.

2. THE NATURE OF THE ARAB CONQUEST


111 The advice of the Celestial Turks had of course been to stay there physically (cf. V. Thomsen, *Inscriptions de l’Orkhon déchiffrées*, Helsingfors 1896, p. 117).


113 ibid., pp. 672ff; cf. also pp. 220ff for other evidence of cultural assimilation.

114 It is of course also a land of desert and mountain, but no conqueror ever came forth from the Takla Makan or the Tien Shan, and it is no accident that the Tibetan Tanguts owed both their ruling house and their political tradition to the Turkish To-pa (W. Eberhard, *A History of China*, London 1950, pp. 230ff; cf. id., *Conquerors and Rulers, Social Forces in Medieval China*, Leiden 1952, pp. 69ff).


116 Largely restricted to the desert, the Central Asian camel is used only as a beast of burden on the steppe (R. Patai, ‘Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian’, *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 1951, p. 406).


118 Cf. Krader, *Ecology*, p. 320. Whereas the high density of humans and flocks per square kilometre in certain areas of Central Asia is clearly a fact about the steppe (ibid., pp. 315ff), the ratio of flocks to humans must be a fact about the animals: presumably horses are not very labour intensive because they have...
Notes

a natural herding instinct, thus requiring few herdsmen (cf. note 158; I owe this point to Elizabeth O'Beirne-Ranelagh).

Sheep have a market, but not much of a price, and camels have a price, but much less of a market, whereas horses had both until quite recent times. It is true that pastoralism is likely to have been less market-orientated in the past, and in modern Arabia there seems to be no appreciable difference of herd size between the Murra who do not sell their camels and the Rwala who do (cf. below, note 159). But the Chinese did purchase horses from the barbarians (cf. J. R. Hamilton, Les Ouïghours à l'époque des cinq dynasties, Paris 1915, pp. 106ff; Jing-shen Tao, The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China, Seattle and London 1976, pp. 15f; D. Sinor, 'Horse and Pasture in Inner Asian History', Oriens Extremus 1972, p. 175), and Istakhri's claim that the wealth of Chorasmia was based on trade with the nomads also suggests that the Central Asian pastoralists were not entirely orientated towards subsistence: in modern Arabia it is only the wealth of a few families which is based on such trade (W. Barthold, Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, London 1968, p. 247; A. Musil, The Manners and Customs of the Rwala Bedouins, New York 1928, pp. 278f).

F. Barth, Nomads of South Persia, Oslo 1964, pp. 103ff; cf. W. Irons, 'Variation in Economic Organization: A Comparison of the Pastoral Yomut and the Basseri' in W. Irons and N. Dyson-Hudson (eds.), Perspectives on Nomadism, Leiden 1972, pp. 96ff. Unlike the Yomut, the Basseri are reluctant to use hired shepherds and do not call upon kinsmen in other camps for assistance, clearly reflections of the extent to which the cessation of tribal warfare has turned the Basseri camps into isolated worlds of their own (cf. Barth, Nomads of South Persia, pp. 46f; contrast Irons, 'Variation', pp. 93, 103). But the fact that the Basseri also lack the Yomut mechanisms for concentrating labour resources in the household suggests that there may be ecological reasons why large flocks do not pay here. Barth's point, however, remains unaffected, for even among the Yomut the very wealthy and the very poor feel the pull towards sedentarization (Irons, 'Variation', pp. 99, 101). The process is delayed, and its effects are counteracted by the fact that the proximity of settled and nomad on the one hand, and the need for military strength on the other, enable those who settle to remain members of the tribe. But it cannot be suspended, and the Yomut may thus be taken to represent the limit of the social differentiation that sheep-nomadism will permit. There are no comparable analyses for horse- or camel-rearers (D. Cole, Nomads of the Nomads, Illinois 1975, p. 102 asserts the existence of a point of diminishing returns among the Murra bedouin beyond which the bedouin themselves choose not to go; but no evidence is offered).

Among the sheep-nomads who are, so to speak, dealing in cheap currency, the Yomut will accumulate up to 1000 head per household (Irons, 'Variation', p. 99), the Basseri up to somewhere between 200 and 800 (Barth, Nomads of South Persia, p. 103), while the Brahui will keep theirs below 500 (W. W. Swidler, Some Demographic Factors Regulating the Formation of Flocks...
and Camps among the Brahui of Baluchistan' in W. Irons and N. Dyson-Hudson (eds.), Perspectives on Nomadism, Leiden 1972, p. 72. But the Brahui case clearly turns on the availability of wage-labour as an alternative source of income: the Brahui do not herd their own flocks, but place them with a hired shepherd, and their flocks, though pooled in units of about the 500 which a single shepherd can control, are commonly below the minimal size required for subsistence. Among the horse-nomads of Mongolia, however, it is worth accumulating up to several thousand head per household (Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao*, p. 119). In other words, although the denomination is higher, the maximum figures are also higher. It is worth noting that the Mongols use or used the same methods for concentrating labour resources in the household as do the Turkish Yomut, that is ultimogeniture whereby the youngest son is kept at home, adoption, and slavery, but not, apparently, deferred independence for the elder sons. (For the far lower figures among camel-reefers see below, note 159.)


123 O. Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*, New York 1940, pp. 452f. The migration of Siberian pastoralists into the steppe is elegantly illustrated in the Pazyryk burials of horses disguised as reindeer.

124 R. Grousset, *The Empire of the Steppes*, New Brunswick 1970, pp. 18, 25. The extent to which Central Asia was criss-crossed by such traffic is highlighted by the facts that the Uighurs imported their Manichaeism from China, while the Chinese conversely got their Buddhism, *inter alia*, from a Parthian (ibid., pp. 49, 121).

125 Cf. ibid., pp. 29ff on the havoc wrought by the first known turmoil of this kind.


128 The two major exceptions, Timur Lenk and the Manchus, were both synthetic imitations of the Mongols.

129 L. Krader, 'Principles and Structure in the Organization of the Asiatic Steppe-Pastoralists', *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 1955, pp. 84f.


Krader’s evidence is of course largely post-Chingizid and modern, but it fits very neatly with the analysis of pre-Chingizid Turkish tribes given by a Sinologist (Eberhard, *Conquerors and Rulers*, pp. 69ff). Compare also the early attestation of social differentiation and thus presumably political organization at Pazyryk (S. I. Rudenko, *Frozen Tombs of Siberia*, London 1970, p. 215), and contrast the far more rudimentary organization of the Turks and Kirghiz of the mountains and the Mongols of the forests (Krader, ‘Principles’, p. 85; Vladimirtsov, *Life of Chingiz Khan*, p. 4).

A. Waley (tr.), *The Secret History of the Mongols*, London 1963, p. 125 = P. Pelliot (ed. and tr.), *Histoire secrète des Mongols*, Paris 1949, section 33. The wisdom finds concrete illustration in the fate of the acephalous tribe at the hands of Bodonchar and his brothers: ‘those people have no chief to rule them; they make no difference between great and small; such a people would be easy to take. Let us go and make prisoners of them’ (Waley, *Secret History*, p. 220 = Pelliot, *Histoire secrète*, section 35).

O. Lattimore, ‘Feudalism in History’ (review article), *Past and Present* 1957, pp. 51ff.


The precedent for Chingiz’s *Yasa* goes back at least to the Celestial Turks (Thomsen, *Inscriptions de l’Orkhon*, pp. 97ff).

Spectacularly illustrated by the Goths who are said still to have spoken Gothic there in the thirteenth century A.D. (A. A. Vasiliev, *The Goths in the Crimea*, Cambridge Mass. 1936, p. 166).


Krader, *Social Organization*, pp. 122ff, 201ff (on the Kazak and Kalmuk states). Note also how the Oirots reversed the traditional direction of tribal
movements in Central Asia when they made their exodus from Russia in A.D. 1770ff not to Hungary, but to the Ili: like the Israelites the Oirots were fleeing from an oppressive civilization (M. Courant, *L'Asie Centrale au XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles*, Paris 1912, pp. 134ff).

144 Thus the Cimmerians who occupied Urartu, the Scythians who took the Dobrudja, and the Bulgars who crossed the Danube to become Slavs.

145 It is important for their survival there that in southern Russia, as not in Mongolia and still less Arabia, there was an agricultural region outside the imperial borders, partly in the steppe itself and more particularly to the north: for all that they stayed in the steppe, the Mongols of the Golden Horde could thus feed off the agricultural revenues of Russia (cf. P. Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, London 1974, p. 227).

146 Aptly illustrated by the Ch'i-tan who, though refugees from the Jurchen, were nonetheless able to found the irredentist state of the Kara-Khitai in western Turkestan, whereas the Huns, Avars, Cumans and others who reached Europe appear to have lost most of their state structures on the way.


148 Thus the Belagines of the Goths, if Jordanes is to be believed (Jordanes, *Getica*, in Th. Mommsen (ed.), *Monumenta Germaniae Historica, auctores antiquissimi*, vol. v, Berlin 1882, p. 74). But in practice the Germanic codes all appear after the barbarians have settled down in their Roman homes.

149 This is of course even more true of the Slavs, whose invasion of the Balkans turned on the arrival of the Avars.

150 What these horsemen would have thought of the Franks is clear from the dictum of a fifth-century To-pa king: 'the Chinese are footsoldiers and we are horsemen. What can a herd of colts and heifers do against tigers or a pack of wolves?' (Grousset, *Empire*, p. 62).

151 Less so, of course, on the eastern frontier which was more exposed. But thanks to the ecological potential the Slavs were peasants who periodically lost their state structures to Central Asian invaders, not pastoralists who periodically created them (cf. Anderson, *Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism*, pp. 217ff).

152 The Hsiung-nu fell to the Hsien-pi, the Celestial Turks to the Uighurs, the Uighurs to the Kirghiz, the Tanguts to the Mongols, and so forth; Roman Gaul today is France, but it is only in the archaic usage of foreigners that northern China is Tabghatch or Cathay. Contrast the viability of Korea and Vietnam.


154 Already the Hsiung-nu ruler boasted of having united 'all the nations of the archers' (W. Samolin, *East Turkestan to the Twelfth Century*, The Hague 1964, pp. 20ff), the Orkhon Turks very nearly did so (they lacked southern Russia), and the desire to control the entire steppe has been plausibly adduced in explanation of Chingiz's strategy (O. Lattimore, *The Geography of Chingiz Khan*, *Geographical Journal* 1963; I am indebted to Dr D. O.
For the Ch’i-tan in north China conquest of south China equalled unification of the whole world (Wittfogel and Feng, *Liao*, p. 537), but already Attila had seen himself as destined to conquer a world which was primarily Roman (Jordanes, *Getica*, pp. 105f), and the political horizons of the Turkish kaghans included China, Byzantium and Iran. (The passage in Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, ed. and tr. J.-B. Chabot, Paris 1899–1910, vol. iv, p. 568 = vol. iii, p. 150 is not, however, a prophecy that the Turkish kaghans will conquer the world as maintained by O. Turan, ‘The Idea of World Domination among the Medieval Turks’, *Studia Islamica* 1955, pp. 78f: the ancestral spirits have foretold that the world will be devastated, and the kaghan is accordingly in tears, not rejoicing (cf. the fuller version in Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, vol. iv, p. 350 = vol. ii, p. 315, and the original in John of Ephesos, *Historiae Ecclesiasticae pars tertia*, ed. and tr. E. W. Brooks (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vols. livf), Louvain 1953f, pp. 322f = 244f.).

Precisely what Chingiz had in mind when he began his conquest is of course hard to tell: as against Gregory of Akner’s conviction that he had been supernaturally bidden to rule many countries, we have the failure of the *Secret History* to betray any awareness of non-Chinese civilizations (Grigor of Akanc’, *History of the Nation of the Archers (Mongols)*, ed. and tr. R. P. Blake and R. N. Frye, Cambridge Mass. 1954, p. 291). But the crucial point remains that right from the start he struck out in two directions: insofar as the awareness was not there, it soon arrived.

Horses in the desert are as great a luxury as tomatoes in the Negev.

She-camels require differential herding, so that where one shepherd can look after a flock of 4–500 sheep (Barth, *Nomads of South Persia*, pp. 6, 22; Swidler, ‘Demographic Factors’, p. 74), it takes two full-time and one part-time herders at least to look after an average herd of fifty camels (Cole, *Nomads of the Nomads*, pp. 36ff); and watering them is even more labour-consuming (Musil, *Rwala*, p. 345). The Rwala thus hire shepherds as a matter of course (ibid., p. 336), while the Murra dispense with them only by recourse to the extended family (cf. Cole, *Nomads of the Nomads*, pp. 65f).

Murri herds consist of forty to seventy-five female camels with an average around fifty and twenty to thirty-five males per household, each household consisting of about seven persons (Cole, *Nomads of the Nomads*, pp. 24, 36f). For the Rwala and other great tribes further north Raswan estimates forty to fifty camels per household, each household consisting of about five persons, but only twenty to thirty among the lesser tribes (C. Raswan, *The Black Tents of Arabia*, London 1935, p. 248). In 1959 the Dosiri tribesmen of Kuwait regarded as well-off families owning eighteen female camels, two baggage camels and a few riding camels (L. E. Sweet, ‘Camel Pastoralism in North Arabia and the Minimal Camping Unit’ in A. P. Vayda (ed.), *Environment and
Cultural Behaviour, Austin and London 1969, p. 161). It may be added that for grazing purposes the Rwala distinguish between herds of different sizes up to eighty, but not beyond (Musil, Rwala, p. 336).

Similarly in modern times, where in Central Asia only Outer Mongolia has preserved a precarious independence, in Arabia only the coast has a colonial history.


Which is why one can write a history of Central Asia, but only about events in pre-Islamic Arabia (cf. S. Smith, ‘Events in Arabia in the 6th Century A.D.’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 1954).

Thus in the famous formulation of Abūl-Faraj al-Isbahānī, Kitāb al-aghānī, Cairo 1927–, vol. xix, pp. 128f.


Compare the illuminating account of decision-making in a Basseri camp by Barth, Nomads of South Persia, pp. 43ff and A. Jaussen, Coutumes des Arabes au pays de Moab, Paris 1948, p. 140. The chief of an Arab ‘asbāra and the leader of a Basseri camp are evidently in very much the same position, but there is no Arab equivalent to the autocratic Basseri chief (Barth, Nomads of South Persia, pp. 71ff; cf. Jaussen, Coutumes, p. 127).

As it does today (Jaussen, Coutumes, p. 144).

Note the contrast between the orphanages of Muḥammad and Chingiz. Whereas Muhammad is traditionally described as having been brought up within the tribal framework by his uncle and grandfather, Chingiz barely survived outside it and could only return to it as an adventurer in the service of foreign chiefs; the same pattern recurs in the career of Muḥammad Shaybānī, the founder of the Uzbek state.

Compare also the lighthearted vein in which pre-Islamic wars are described in the Aghānī and elsewhere as against the dead seriousness of the Secret History; a comparable gravity appears in the Arab tradition only when the tribal past is of religious significance.

The Turks, by contrast, went out of their way to annihilate their former suzerains, the Yüan-yüan; three thousand of them were executed on extradition from China at the demand of the Turks (Samolin, East Turkestan, p. 55), and their alliance with the Byzantines had Tardu vow that he would send them
fleeing into the bowels of the earth: 'not with our swords shall we exterminate that race of slaves; we shall crush them like the meanest of ants beneath our horses' hoofs' (Grousset, Empire, p. 173).

Similarly, the Hsiung-nu and the Mongols practised collective hunting, a training for battles, whereas the Arabs hunted individually, a training for raids (Rudenko, Kultur der Hsiung-Nu, p. 56; Vladimirtsov, Régime social, pp. 48f, 102; G. Jacob, Altarabisches Beduinenleben', Berlin 1897, pp. 113ff).

Grousset, Empire, p. 546, note 13.


The *sana'ī* of the Kindi kings are the nearest equivalent (G. Olinder, The Kings of Kinda, Lund 1927, p. 73).

In Zenobia's case, moreover, the alternative to dependence on Rome was dependence on the Persians.

Not much of course, but the longevity of the Yemeni mukarribates, the Zaydi and the Ibadi imamates, and for that matter also the Ethiopian monarchy, testify to the fact that only extreme ecological poverty prevented the Arabs from forming similar types of states elsewhere.

Cf. Olinder, The Kings of Kinda.


Cf. J. J. Saunders, 'The Nomad as Empire Builder: a Comparison of the Arab and Mongol Conquests', Diogenes 1965, p. 81. It had of course been possible for desert tribes to conquer civilization in the remote past when civilization was an extremely vulnerable structure: no extravagant show of strength was required to overrun the petty states of the ancient Near East. Sheep- and goat-nomads such as the Hebrews and the Amorites could thus cross the Jordan and the Euphrates, while mountain tribes such as the Guti and Lullubi could conquer the valley of Babylonia. It was still possible for the Hyksos to conquer Egypt and the Kassites to conquer Babylon thanks to their possession of horses. But long before the seventh century A.D. desert tribes had ceased to be a match for civilization, and mountain tribes conquered valleys only in the Yemen.

When the conquests began, the Persians are said to have been convinced that the Arabs would never get beyond the Euphrates or Tigris (A. Scher (ed. and tr.), Histoire nestorienne, part two, in Patrologia Orientalis, vol. xiii, p. 580).

Barthold, Turkestan, p. 410. The same applies to the various peoples now known as Turks (id., 12 Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens, Berlin 1935, pp. 33f).
So at least by the time of the Nemara inscription, but doubtless before. It is thus no accident that where Central Asia has social stratification, Arabia has pariah tribes (Patai, ‘Nomadism: Middle Eastern and Central Asian’, pp. 410ff).

For the Arabs as a Kultur nation rather than a Staatsnation see von Grunebaum, ‘The Nature of Arab Unity’.

Though not of course from the point of view of the cultural history of the Middle East.

Given the regularity with which Christians persecuted Jews on the one hand, and the prominence of the desert fantasy among the Jews on the other, it could of course be argued that had it not happened then, it would have happened later.

The claim that if Muhammad had not had the idea, somebody else would is rather large. Few peoples can have stood in greater need of a programme of state formation and conquest than the Amerindians after the European conquest; Judaism was certainly around, and so even was Islam: there were Crypto-Muslim refugees from the Spanish inquisition just as there were Crypto-Jews, and Muslim slaves were later imported to Brazil. But no Amerindian ever did have the idea.

As the Manchus and the Mongols restaged the conquest of China in the name of their common barbarian way of life, despite their different languages, so the Jews and the Arabs restaged the conquest of Palestine in the name of their common monotheist descent, despite their different cults (D. M. Farquhar in J. K. Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order, Cambridge Mass. 1968, p. 199; Sebeos, Histoire d’Heracle, p. 95).

Note how the Prophet’s career is not reenacted in Central Asia: the Seljuqs, for all that they were Muslims, were no Almoravids, and it was Chingiz, not Muhammad, that Timur chose to imitate.


When Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism came to be seen as three versions of the same message in China, it was the Mongols who were Confucianized; but when Christianity, Judaism and Islam were regarded as basically the same truth in the Middle East, it was the Christians who were Islamized (I. de Rachewiltz, ‘Yeh-li Ch’u-ts’ai (1189—1243): Buddhist Idealist and Confucian Statesman’ in A. F. Wright and D. Twitchett (eds.), Confucian Personalities, Stanford 1962, pp. 209ff; Crone and Cook, Hagarism, pp. 84ff).


This is of course only half of the explanation. For the other half, the character of the conquered civilizations, cf. ibid., pp. 79ff.
Notes

3. THE SUFYÁNID PATTERN, 661–84 [41–64]

196 Contrast the translation of the Chinese classics into Tangut (E. I. Kychanov, Ocherk istorii tangutskogo gosudarstva, Moscow 1968, pp. 237ff.; I owe this reference to M. A. Cook). Eventually, of course the translation of the Sásánid records had a similar effect (witness the works of Ibn al-Muqaffa’), but not until the capital had been moved to Iraq.

197 For these dodges (ranging from the suggestion that China be turned into grazing grounds to the cumbrous system of double administration) see Eberhard, Conquerors and Rulers, pp. 76ff.

198 That of the Ch’i-tan lasted from A.D. 922 to 1125, that of the Mongols from 1127 to 1368 without major internal upheavals.

199 Rachewiltz, ‘Yeh-lü Ch’u-ts’ai’, pp. 204f.


203 Ibid., pp. 361f.

204 Cf. below, note 210. The tribal basis of the kingdom of Híra had been far less solid: the tribes there were afnā al-arab (Abū ‘Ubayd, Annwāl, p. 39).

205 He married a daughter of the Quḍā’i chief, whose sons rose to great prominence under the Sufyānids (cf. Appendix I, no. 1).

206 Subtribe is used here for ‘ashira, a unit which though seen as a descent group is in fact defined by its possession of a common chief (for a parallel in modern usage see Jaussen, Coutumes, p. 127; though commonly translated as such, it is certainly not a clan in the anthropological sense of the word). The small size of the ‘ashira is indicated among other things by the many mosques which even minor tribes in Kufa possessed (see for example Ibn al-Kalbi, Gamharat an-nasab, das genealogische Werk des Hisām b. Muhammad al-Kalbi, translated and rearranged with a commentary by W. Caska and G. Strenziok, Leiden 1966, vol. ii, s.vv. ‘Āmir, Hārith, ḍājdāma Subbān and Wahbl b. Sa’d’ for the five mosques of the small Nakha’ in Kufa; cf. also Caska’s comments, ibid., vol. i, pp. 23f).


208 Taḥbārī, ser. i, p. 2495, where one seventh is missing. For the complete list see H. Djāt, ‘Les Yamanites à Kufa au Ier siècle de l’hégire’, Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 1976, p. 154. Compare also Nasr b. Muzāḥим, Waqat Siffin, pp. 131f. Abū MikhnaT’s assertion that the Kufans were once divided into fifths must represent a confusion with Basra (Taḥbārī, ser. ii, p. 1382).

Notes 225


211 Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Khitâ‘a’.

212 Cf. the elaborate military and administrative hierarchy described by Sayf in Tâbarî, ser. i, pp. 2225, 2496 (both of which must refer to a somewhat later date than Sayf indicates). Cf. also Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘‘artîf’’.


214 Cf. Appendix I.


217 Tâbarî, ser. ii, pp. 68, 190, 196; Bâladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. iv a, p. 93.


219 This was very clear in 64, when the death of Yazîd I deprived ‘Ubaydallâh of caliphal backing at a time when the tribal disturbances caused by the immigration of Azd were coming to a head: ‘Ubaydallâh had no option but to flee (Tâbarî, ser. ii, pp. 433 ff; Bâladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. iv b, pp. 97ff).


221 Tâbarî, ser. ii, p. 448.

222 Cf. Appendix I, nos. 9, 10, 32.

223 Muḥammad b. al-‘Ash‘arî, Mundhir b. al-Jârûd, and the Zurâra family all provided daughters from Ziyâd and his sons (Appendix I, nos. 21, 27, 34); similarly Asmâ‘ b. Khârîja al-Fazârî (Bâladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. iv b, p. 82).

224 Cf. Appendix I, nos. 21, 22, 27; for early Marwânîd examples see nos. 23, 26, 28, 30.

225 Bâladhûrî, Ansâb, vol. v, p. 32 (cf. also the introductory section, p. 11).

226 Cf. above, note 219. For another episode, see Tâbarî, ser. ii, pp. 129ff, 148ff.

227 Tâbarî, ser. ii, pp. 214, 256.

228 The ‘asbâf of Iraq bear witness against Hujr, betray Hûsâyn, and desert Muḥ’âb at Maskîn (cf. Appendix I, nos. 21ff).

229 In addition there were the Arabian provinces which were usually dependencies of Syria. But they scarcely mattered politically.
Thus ‘Abdallah b. ‘Amir, the governor of Basra and Khurāsān who, quite apart from being a Qurashi and a maternal cousin of ‘Uthmān, married a daughter off Yazid I and married a daughter of Mu‘āwiya himself (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, *s.v.*; Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambara*, table 13; Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 62; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 69); ‘Abdallah b. Khalid b. Asid, an Umayyad who was governor of Kufa (Ibn al-Kalbi, *Gambara*, table 8; Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 162, 166, 170); ‘Uthba b. Abi Sufyān, Mu‘āwiya’s brother who was governor of Egypt (Kindi, *The Governors and Judges of Egypt*, ed. R. Guest, Leiden and London 1912, pp. 34ff); ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Umm al-Hakam, a son of Mu‘āwiya’s sister by a Thaqafi, who was governor of Kufa and other provinces (Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, p. 5; cf. Appendix II, no. 4); Sa‘īd b. ‘Uthmān b. Affān, an Umayyad who was governor of Khurāsān (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 177f); Ziyād b. Abīhi, a Thaqafi adopted by Mu‘āwiya as his brother who became governor of the entire east (Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 119ff); Ubaydallāh b. Ziyād, his son who was governor of Khurāsān, Basra and later the entire east (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, *s.v.* ‘Ubaid Allāh b. Ziyād’); ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Ziyād, another son who was appointed to Khurāsān; he was married to a daughter of ‘Uthba b. Abi Sufyān (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 188ff; Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. iv b, p. 75); Salm b. Ziyād, a third son who was governor of Khurāsān and Sīstān for Yazid (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 391ff).

Thus ‘Amr b. al-‘Ās, Mu‘āwiya’s first governor of Egypt (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, *s.v.*) and Dāhhāk b. Qays al-Fihri, one of his governors of Kufa (*ibid.*, *s.v.*). But Ibn al-Zubayr’s reliance on Quraysh was of course far more systematic.

In addition to Ibn Umm al-Ḥakam, Ziyād, and the sons of Ziyād, who were both Thaqafis and Umayyads, there is the famous Mughīra b. Shu‘ba, Mu‘āwiya’s first governor of Kufa (Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, pp. 113ff).

Thus Nu‘mān b. Bashīr, an Ḍaʾīrī from Ḥimṣ who was appointed to Kufa (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 188, 216, 228; cf. Appendix IV, no. 4) and Maslama b. Mukhallaḍ who was governor of Egypt and North Africa (Kindi, *Governors*, pp. 38ff; Tabari, ser. ii, p. 94). In the same bracket one may put ‘Uqba b. ‘Āmir al-Juhānī, a member of the small Hijāzī tribe of Juhayna who was governor of Egypt (Kindi, *Governors*, pp. 36ff), and Sa‘īd b. Yazīd, a Palestinian of Azd (viz. Azd Sarāt, a small tribe before they merged with Azd ‘Umān) who was similarly governor of Egypt (*ibid.*, pp. 40ff).

As governor of Syria the caliph led the way in this respect. Thus the Bahdal family, his affinal relatives, governed Jordan, Palestine and Qinnasrin (see Appendix I, no. 1); ‘Abd al-Rahmān b. Khalid b. al-Walid, a Qurashi, was governor of Ḥimṣ and its dependencies in the thirties (Tabari, ser. i, pp. 2913ff, 2921, 3057); he was succeeded by Nu‘mān b. Bashīr, an Ḍaʾīrī (see Appendix IV, no.4); Dāhhāk b. Qays al-Fihri, a Qurashi, was governor of Damascus (*Encyclopaedia of Islam*, *s.v.*). In the same fashion Ibn ‘Āmir employed two consanguine relatives of his as subgovernors of Khurāsān,
that is the cousins Qays b. al-Haytham and 'Abdallâh b. Khâzim (Ibn al-Kalbi, 
Gamhara, s.v. 'Dağâğa bint Asma' b. al-Šalt'; Wellhausen, Kingdom, p. 414): 
in Sîstân he relied on 'Abd al-Rahmân b. Samura of 'Abd Shams (Baladhuri, 
Ziyâd employed one Umayyâd, 'Abdallâh b. Khâlid b. Asîd, who was governor
of Fars or Ardâshîr Khurrah (Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. iv b, pp. 151f); two ashrâf
of tribes sparsely represented in Basra, that is Hakâm b. 'Amr al-Ghifârî who
was governor of Khurâsân (Tabârî, ser. ii, pp. 79ff) and Rabî' b. Ziyâd al-
Hârîthi who was governor first of Sîstân and next of Khurâsân (see Appendix
III, no. 47); and one Thaqâfî, 'Ubaydallâh b. Abî Bakra, in Sîstân (C. E. 
Bosworth, Sîstân under the Arabs, Rome 1968, p. 21). Thereafter the eastern
dependencies were all but monopolized by the sons of Ziyâd (cf. Wellhausen, 
Kingdom, p. 415).

235 Thus two of the interim governors of Basra, Samura b. Jundub al-Fazârî and
'Abdallâh b. 'Amr al-Thaqâfî, were both local men who had previously been
in charge of the shurta (Tabârî, ser. ii, pp. 71, 158, 162, 166; Baladhuri, 
Futûh, p. 100). But Hârîth b. 'Amr/Abd 'Amr/Abdallâh, who was also
interim governor there was a Persian Azdî (Tabârî, ser. ii, pp. 68, 71; cf.
Khalîfa, Ta'rîkhî, pp. 222, 241). He is doubtless identical with the Hârîth
b. 'Abd who appears as governor of Palestine under Mu'âwîya in seven
bilingual entageîa dated 54—7 A.H. (P. Colt 60—6 in C. J. Kraemer, Non-

236 Silat al-rahîm in the contemporary phrase.

237 'Ubaydallâh b. Abî Bakra gave the contents of the treasury in Sîstân to a
Qurashi who was his guest or deputy governor (Baladhuri, Ansâb al-ashrâf, 
vol. i, ed. M. Hâmîdallâh, Cairo 1959, p. 498). He was later outdone by
Tamîm b. Zayd, the most generous Arab, who found eighteen million dirhams
in the treasury in Sind and hastened to dispose of them (id., Futûh, p. 443).
Yazîd I honoured a deputation of Medineî whose faltering loyalties were
in need of buttressing, with gifts in the range of 100 000 dirhams (Tabârî, ser.
ii, pp. 402ff), and the same method was later adopted by Ibn 'Umar in Iraq 
(ibid., p. 1881). Early Marwânîd poetry sold at the rate of 100 000 dirhams
(Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. v, pp. 175, 177); Sufîyânîd poetry was scarcely less
expensive.

238 Cf. the size and the fate of the sums involved in the following note.

239 Mu'âwîya gave Ibn 'Âmir the choice between dismissal with permission to
keep what he had taken and renewal of office at the cost of paying up
(Tabârî, ser. ii, p. 69; he opted for dismissal); 'Abdallâh b. Khâlid b. Asîd
protested at the mubâsâba of his son Umayyya at the hands of Ziyâd, whereupon
Ziyâd let Umayyya keep half of the 50 000 dirhams he had embezzled as
governor of Sûs (Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. iv a, pp. 174ff); 'Abd al-Rahmân b.
Ziyâd admitted having made a profit of twenty million dirhams as governor
of Khurâsân, but Yazîd let him keep it (Jahshiyârî, Wuçârî, p. 29); Ibn
Zubayr, however, got five million dirhams out of Salm b. Ziyâd on the
latter's arrival from Khurâsân (Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. iv b, p. 76).
Notes

4 SYRIA OF 684 [64]

240 Cf. Crone and Cook, Hagarism, p. 32.

242 Cf. above, note 210.

243 Kinda even has a Maʿaddī genealogy (cf. Kister and Plessner, 'Notes', pp. 58f). Ibn al-Kalbī may of course be right that this genealogy is merely the outcome of scholarly confusion arising from the fact that Kinda had lived in Maʿaddī territory (Olinder, The Kings of Kinda, p. 32); but in fact the Yemeni origin of Kinda was so firmly imprinted on scholarly minds that this genealogical articulation of Kinda's part is more likely to reflect Hassān's attempt to consolidate the Qudāʿi confederacy.

244 Shaban, Islamic History, vol. i, pp. 82f. Cf. also Appendix I, nos. 13f, 16, 19. The immigrants were not of course all of Qays, but the predominance of this confederacy in Qinnasrin and the Jazīra is manifest.

245 Baladhuri, Fūtūḥ, p. 132.
248 Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 468ff; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 132.
249 Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 474ff; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, pp. 134f.
250 Cf. Encyclopaedia of Islam', s.v. 'Dahhāk b. Kays'.
251 Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 469; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 132.
253 Tabarī, ser. ii, p. 468; Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 132; cf. also Appendix I, no. 19.
258 Tabarī, ser. ii, pp. 473f.
259 Note that there is no Zubayrite sect in Islam.

5 THE MARWĀNĪD EVOLUTION, 684-744 [64-126]

160 The first Syrians abroad are the troops sent against the Azārida in Ţabaristān
in 77 under Sufyān b. al-Abrad al-Kalbi (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1018; Baladhuri, Ansāb al-asbāb, vol. xi (Anonyme arabische Chronik), ed. W. Ahlwardt, Greifswald 1883, pp. 338f), against Shabib in Iraq under the same commander and under Ḥabib b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Ḫakamī in the same year (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 943f), and against Ibn al-Ash’āth in Iraq under the same two commanders and others in 82 (ibid., pp. 1060, 1064, 1069f, 1072, 1076; the three events are hopelessly confused, and the muddle culminates in the Mutasarrif affair where all the participants are brought together in unlikely constellations). In Khurāsān they are first met under Yazīd b. al-Muhallab when they are said to have numbered 60,000 (ibid., pp. 1318, 1327; Baladhuri, Futūb, pp. 335f). They likewise appear in Sind from the time of Ḥajjāj onwards (Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 436; id., Ansāb, vol. xi, p. 313). Emergency troops were sent to North Africa under Kultūm b. ‘Īyāḍ by Hishām, but Syrians had presumably been stationed there before; there were still Syrians in North Africa in 183 (E. Lafuente y Alcantara (ed. and tr.), Ajar mancmuṣ, Madrid 1867, pp. 30f; Ibn al-Qūṭiyya, Ta’rikh istīḥāb al-Andalus, ed. ‘A. A. al-Ṭabbā’ [Beirut 1958], pp. 40f; Ibn ‘Idhārī, Kitāb al-bayān al-mughrīb, ed. G. S. Colin and E. Lévi-Provençal, Leiden 1948–51, vol. i, pp. 89f).

Notes
261 That is to say the troops of Khurāsān, Sīstān, Sind, Spain, North Africa and Syro-Mesopotamia. The Syro-Mesopotamians had three frontiers to defend, viz. Armenia and Azerbayjan, the Mesopotamo-Byzantine frontier (the so-called right sa’ifa) and the Syro-Byzantine frontier (the so-called left sa’ifa). Qinnasrin and to a lesser extent Hims were thus in the unusual position of being both field and frontier troops.

262 There were two exceptions. In Armenia and Khurāsān the non-Muslim rulers continued to be subject to forced levies; and the Medinese may have been subject to conscription until the end of the period (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1192, 1983). Neither affects the argument.


264 First it mutinied at Rustaqabadh, the centre of mobilization (Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. xi, pp. 266ff), and next it rebelled under Ibn al-Ash’āth, whose troops only wanted to go home (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1054, 1059; cf. also ibid., pp. 870f and Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. xi, p. 271). Henceforth the old muqāṭila was only a local police force (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1381, 1702).


266 Baladhuri, Futūb, p. 429; Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1545. Baladhuri’s version makes it quite clear that ghāya means limit here, not purpose; the instruction is thus that Junayd may recruit fifteen thousand or more (pace Shaban, ‘Abbāsid Revolution, p. 116).
Notes

267 Kindī, *Governors*, pp. 84ff; cf. above, p. 54.
272 This is the kind of servant intended when we are told that the Basrans under ʿAlī numbered 60,000 men, not counting the children, slaves and *mawālī*, that the Kufans numbered 57,000 Arabs and 8,000 slaves and *mawālī*, or that Ibn al-Asḥāʾī disposed of 10,000 regular soldiers ‘and a like number of mawālī’, while Yazīd b. al-Muhallab had 100,000 men, ‘not counting the mawālī, slaves and volunteers’ (Tabārī, *ser. i*, pp. 3370ff, *ser. ii*, pp. 1072, 1318). The slaves rarely participated in battle. They accompanied their masters as ordinary servants (*cf. ibid.*, *ser. ii*, p. 45) and were unarmed: a Kufan mortally wounded in battle against Shabīb handed over his weapons and horse to his slave, who continued in his place (*ibid.*, p. 937). They were in charge of the camp, but had only tent-poles to defend it with, and being non-combatants, they were spared execution in defeat (*ibid.*, pp. 368, 1547, 1910, 1941, *ser. iii*, p. 39). This is the situation Wāqīḍī projects back to the Prophet’s Arabia when he has an informant say that because in those days he was a slave, he was left behind in the camp, only two slaves participating in the battle itself (Wāqīḍī, *Kitāb al-magbūţ*, ed. M. Jones, Oxford 1966, vol. i, p. 230). The freedmen, on the other hand, commonly fought side by side with their masters (thus, among countless examples, Tabārī, *ser. i*, pp. 3190, 3293, 3302, *ser. ii*, pp. 335, 596, 737), particularly as standard-bearers, a role in which slaves occasionally also appear (*ibid.*, *ser. i*, pp. 3203, 3427, *ser. ii*, pp. 326, 990, 998ff, 1582, 1705; Dinawārī, *Akhbār*, p. 267). The use of slaves and freedmen as standard-bearers were clearly new (*cf. ibid.*, *ser. i*, pp. 3175), but is again projected back to the Prophet’s Arabia (*ibid.*, pp. 1940, 1945).
273 Both the *mawālī* quarters and the alternative procedure are ascribed to ʿUmar I (Balādhurī, *Futūḥ*, p. 458). The fact that the *mawālī* were put in a *gabiya* of their own obviously does not mean that they were segregated: one might as well accuse the Umayyads of having segregated the Azd from the Tamīm.
274 ʿAbd al-Malik set up a *rub* consisting of runaway slaves (Balādhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. v, p. 300). No other *mawālī* quarters are heard of in Syria, and it is possible that here the non-Arabs were integrated in the Arab divisions, presumably from the time when the Syrian quarters themselves disappeared (*cf. below, note 288 and Appendix IV, no. 9*).
275 Two *mawālī* commanders in charge of two thousand and a thousand men (at least in the one case similarly *mawālī*) appear in 76 (Tabārī, *ser. ii*, p. 919). These commanders are quite distinct from Hajjāj’s own *mawālī* and slaves whom he armed for the occasion (*ibid.*, p. 958).
Notes 231

276 Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1290f; Baladhurî, Futuh, p. 423; Ḥayyān al-Nabatî is their ra’s al-qabila. Compare also the poem in which the mawlā are enumerated as a sixth qabila along with the akhmās (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1303; Madhhij is poetic licence for abī al-‘ālîya).


278 Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1268, 1306, 1893; Khalîfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 423, 567, 597; Yaqût, Wörterbuch, vol. iv, p. 932. The Waddâhiyya was unusual in having its own hereditary commander.


280 GUIDI, Chronica Minora, p. 72 = 36.


282 The hierarchy was fāris, qa’id, ra’s al-gawm (cf. Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1074). On mobilizing the Syrians Marwān II put a qa’id over every jund (ibid., p. 1893; cf. Kindî, Governors, p. 84). Thābit b. Nu‘aym gathered his jund and his gawm (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1894; for the gawm, see above, p. 53). A Syrian refused the governorship of Iraq on the ground that he had no jund (ibid., p. 1836). A general took hostages min kulli jund min quwwādibim (Lafuente, Ajbâr, p. 38). And so forth.


284 When Asad b. Yazîd b. Mazyad was imprisoned in 192, the dafâtir ashab Asad were passed over to the new commander (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 838f). In 123, however, Maqhra’s b. ‘Ahmar seems to have been transferred from Khurāsān to Iraq only with his abī (ibid., ser. ii, p. 1722).


286 Ibid., pp. 1954, 1957. The quarter of Kharaqân was clearly geographically defined: we are told that a certain village was located in it (ibid., pp. 1953, 1957). So presumably the same was the case with the quarter of Saqādûm (differently Shaban, ‘Abbâsid Revolution, p. 158).

287 In 159 the Basrans were mobilized min jamî’il-ajnûd, not min jamî’il-akhmâs; similarly the Khurāsānis in 163 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 460, 494).

288 The Syrian arba’ are last mentioned in 77 (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, pp. 969f) and must have become somewhat de trop when the Syrians began to be stationed abroad: the division into five ajnûd would have sufficed. Instead, however, the grouping of these arba’ into Qays and Yemen appears to have been given official sanction: thus a Qinnasrînî in Khurāsān in 120 is described as ra’s Qays (Ṭabarî, ser. ii, p. 1637), and on his departure from Armenia Marwān II appointed a ra’s to both Qays and Yemen (ibid., p. 1871; Khalîfa, Ta’rikhb, p. 564; cf. Appendix I, no. 16. Compare also the disappearance of the mawlā quarter(s) (above, note 274) and Marwān II’s interest in reviving Judhâm’s Asadi genealogy (below, note 312)).
He appointed one brother to Egypt (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Marwân’), another to Kufa and later the whole of Iraq (ibid., s.v. ‘Bishr b. Marwân’), and a third, Muḥammad b. Marwân, to the Jazîra, Armenia and Azerbayjan (Khalifa, Ta‘rikh, p. 393). Khâlid b. ‘Abdallâh, an Umayyad, was appointed to Basra (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 818). Umayya b. ‘Abdallâh, his brother, was appointed to Khurāsân and Sistân, and he in turn appointed his son ‘Abdallâh b. Umayya to Sistân (Bosworth, Sistân under the Arabs, pp. 49ff; Baladhuri, Ansâb, vol. iv b, p. 153). On Bishr’s death Iraq was made over to Ḥajjâj b. Yûsuf, a Syrian whose daughter married a son of Walîd I while his niece married Yazîd II and became the mother of Walîd II (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1810; M. J. De Goeje (ed.), Fragmenta Historicorum Arabicorum, Leiden 1871, p. 13; Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Hadjdjâdj b. Yûsuf’).


Mûsâ b. Nuṣâyr is said to have been an Arab, an Arab prisoner-of-war, a non-Arab prisoner-of-war, or a slave; but at all events a client (Tabari, ser. i, p. 2064; Baladhuri, Futûh, p. 230; Lafuente, Ajbar, p. 3).

Wellhausen, Kingdom, p. 427; Shaban, ‘‘Abbâsid Revolution, pp. 54f.

Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1209.

Muhallab’s sons were Mu‘awiya, Yazid, ‘Abd al-Malik, ‘Abd al-‘Azîz, Marwân, Muḥammad and Ḥajjâj (Ibn al-Kalbî, Gamhara, table 204). Mûsâ’s were ‘Abd al-‘Azîz and Marwân after his patron ‘Abd al-‘Azîz b. Marwân (Kindi, Governors, index).

Cf. Appendix III, no. 33; note that Qutayba also named a son Hajjâj.

Cf. Appendix I, nos. 6 and 11 (Junayd al-Murri and Khâlid al-Qasrî), Appendix III, nos. 16 and 74 (Jarrâḥ al-Hakamî and Sa’îd al-Ḥarashi), Appendix IV, no. 54 (‘Âṣîm b. ‘Abdallâh al-Hilâlî).

Cf. Appendix II. The Jazîra was of course similarly governed by kinsmen, viz. Muḥammad b. Marwân, Maslama, and Marwân b. Muḥammad, but since the Jazîra was a frontier province, all three were generals (note the comparable tendency for the Umayyad princes to become generals in Qinnasrin and, to a lesser extent, Hims).

Especially in the event of disintegration. The crucial role of chaotic fighting in the spread of the conquest ethnicity is neatly demonstrated by the contrasting case of Frankish Gaul against Visigothic Spain, or Turkish Anatolia against barbarian China.

There is of course no telling how this might have happened. It is easy to imagine ‘Abd al-Malik as a Reccared or Mansûr as a Charlemagne; but the Persians might well have expelled the Arabs as the Chinese expelled the Mongols, just as the Byzantines might have reconquered Syria as they reconquered Ostrogothic Italy and Bulgaria.
It is striking that whereas the Arabs had the Judaic and the Mongols the barbarian tradition, the Goths could make neither a Mecca nor a Karakorum of their ‘hallowed grave’ and ‘ancient seat’ (cf. Maenchen-Helfen, The World of the Huns, pp. 152f).


The peculiarity of this situation can also be brought out by contrasting the evolution of the later Roman empire, where the militarization of power did not stop short of the metropolis. The generals having risen to the imperial office, the senatorial aristocracy was displaced, the special status of Italy abolished, the provinces reorganized, subdivided and subjected to close control: in short, the military revolution meant the transition from Principate to Dominate. But just as ‘Abd al-Malik was no Reccared, so not even Hisham was a Diocletian.

6 THE MARWĀNĪD FACTION

This comes out very clearly in the case where a governor, contrary to the normal pattern, is succeeded by a man of his own factional background: ‘Āşim b. ‘Abdallāh al-Hilālī did not hesitate to imprison and torture the appointees of Junayd b. ‘Abd al-Rahmān al-Murūr (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1564f). Clearly, had one faction succeeded in eliminating the other, it would have split into two itself.

It is thus hard to accept the suggestion that Qays and Yemen were political parties (cf. Shaban, Islamic History, vol. i, pp. 120ff).

See Appendix IV. Out of eighty-five cases there are eight certain exceptions and two uncertain ones (nos. 2, 12, 22, 37, 77–9, 82–4; cf. also Appendix I, no. 8 and Appendix III, no. 37).

This is clear in the civil war (see below, note 326); but one certainly never hears about factional merchants.

One of the instigators of the Yemeni brawl in Marw in 126 was a mawla of Azd (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1856). Similarly, one of the Mu‘taris who remained faithful to Kirmānī was a mawlā of Sulaym (ibid., p. 1934). And a mawlā of Layth was included in Naṣr’s Mu‘ārī wahd to Abū Muslim (ibid., p. 1895). Since the mawlā units were subdivided into regiments by the tribes in which the mawālī had their wahd, the mawālī had no troubles in aligning (cf. Kindi, Governors, p. 51).

It would have been very different if the competitors had been the authorities. In republican Rome where the old aristocracy fought in the metropolis with provincial resources, factio and amicitia were as legitimate titles to power as sharaf and qaraba, however deplorable their excesses.

Outside Syria there were the three groups of Mudar, Rabi‘a and Yemen, but though in theory the Rabi‘a could swing both ways, in practice their alignment was fixed: in Basra they fought with Yemen, in the Jazīra with Qays.
In contrast to the *asbrāf* of the Sufyānid period, the generals took not the slightest interest in genealogy except for the purpose of abuse. It was Marwān II, not a *ra’s al-qabila*, who tried to revive Judhām’s old Asadi genealogy (Baladhuri, *Ansāb*, vol. i, p. 36; cf. above, p. 34. As Asadis the Judhām would now have belonged to Muḍar, a genealogy that would have aligned them with Marwān’s Qaysi army instead of setting them against it). And it was because the generals had no knowledge of genealogy that one general could maintain that Naṣr b. Sayyār had the *bayt* of Kināna while another maintained that on the contrary he was a mere *mulṣaq* (Dinawari, *Akhbār*, p. 356; Ibn al-Kalbī, the professional genealogist, has nothing to say about Naṣr’s father and grandfather, cf. his *Gambarā, s.vv.* ‘Saiyār b. Rāfī’ and ‘Rāfī’ b. Judayī’).

‘Never did I see such *’asabīyya*,’ as a Syrian Yemeni said on hearing of Naṣr b. Sayyār’s uniformly Mudarī appointments (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1664).

Cf. Appendix III, nos. 1–47.

Cf. above, note 260.

Cf. Appendix III, nos. 48–64.

Cf. above, note 260.

Cf. Appendix III, nos. 65–122.

Cf. Yuṣuf’s visions of getting a hundred million dirhams from Khālid’s governors after Khālid had readily paid nine (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1654).

See for example Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1419f, 1564f; Wellhausen, *Kingdom*, p. 334; Appendix III, nos. 80, 85; Appendix IV, no. 24.

Cf. the graphic account of the preparations for Khālid’s removal (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1649ff).

When Naṣr b. Sayyār was threatened with dismissal his subgovernors raised about a million each (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1920). When Khālid was in the same situation his fiscal agent suggested the same solution, but Khālid refused on the ground that he could not ask back what he had allowed his subgovernors to take (*ibid.*, p. 1651).

It is not that there were no cases of desertion: Šālīh b. ’Abd al-Rahmān, Ḥajjāj’s fiscal agent, is an obvious example. When the accession of Sulaymān made the fall of Ḥajjāj’s family a certainty, Šālīh avoided falling with them, doubtless by guaranteeing to pay what they were deemed to have embezzled while in office: that would explain why he was appointed to the *kbarāj* and was given a free hand with the family whom he subjected to torture (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1282f; Ibn al-ʿAṯrār, *al-Kāmil fī l-ʻaʿrīkh*, ed. C. J. Tornberg, Leiden 1851–76, vol. v, p. 465). But he paid for his treachery in the end: when Ibn Hubayra was arrested, he was killed under torture for a debt of 600 000 dirhams (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā*, p. 58). Šālīh’s behaviour can be reconstructed by a comparison with Ţariq, the fiscal agent of Khālid al-Qasrī, who was accused of having schemed to take Iraq in *qabāla* on Khālid’s fall (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 1651); in fact he didn’t: he died on the rack (Jahshiyārī, *Wuzarā*, p. 63).

Ḥajjāj had demanded six million dirhams from Yazīd and got three before Yazīd and his family managed to escape to Palestine, where he sought refuge
with local Azdls and got in touch with Sulaymân, the governor of Palestine at the time. Sulaymân, who was threatened with exclusion from the succession, assumed liability for the remaining three, secured amân for Yazîd and, when in fact he did succeed, appointed Yazîd to Iraq and Khurâsân (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1208ff). Compare the flight of Mûsâ b. Nuṣayr to 'Abd al-'Azîz as reported by Ibn 'Idhârî, Bayân, vol. i, pp. 39f.

335 Cf. Appendix IV.
336 The Syrian ashrâf who rebelled against Yazîd were all Yemenis by descent, but all opponents of the Yamanîyya. Note also how the sharifian descendant of Bâḥdal was head of Walîd II's shurta while a descendant of Ḥuṣayn b. Numayr joined Marwân II (Appendix I, nos. 1 and 3).
337 Appendix I, no. 3; Appendix IV, nos. 5 and 7.
338 Appendix I, nos. 2, 4, 5, 9f (cf. also Appendix IV, no. 5).
339 For a particularly striking contrast compare the descendants of Rawh b. Zanbâl and Thâbit b. Nu'aym (Appendix I, no. 9 and Appendix IV, no. 34).
341 Tabarî, ser. ii, 1836ff. The few Syrians who left with Yûsuf b. 'Umar are enumerated on p. 1841.
342 Cf. the account of the war in Wellhausen, Kingdom, ch. 7.
343 The very first troops to arrive in Iraq had probably been drawn from Damascus and Jordan: they were commanded by a Kalbî and a Hakami (cf. above, note 260). And the subsequent predominance of the Yemenis in Iraq is clear from Appendix IV: of the Qaysîyya only nos. 67 and 71 have served in Iraq. The Jazîra was certainly exempt from the duty of garrisoning Iraq, and Qinnasrîn almost certainly was: it appears to have supplied fewer troops than the other ajnad even for emergencies (Lafuente, Ajar, p. 31). Hîms was in an intermediate position in that it provided troops for both the frontier and Iraq.
344 Note the interchangeability of Qays and Qinnasrîn in Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 1637.
346 Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 1883. Here as elsewhere the Syrians appear to have stayed on after the revolution (cf. ibid., ser. iii, p. 460).
347 Cf. Wellhausen, Kingdom, pp. 317ff; Appendix III, nos. 65ff.
348 The extent to which Khâlid’s governorship protected Yemeni interests is neatly illustrated in Khurâsân: when Khurâsân was attached to Iraq Khâlid appointed his brother Asad, a protector of Yemenis like himself; when it was detached from Iraq the caliph appointed two Qaysîs from the Jazîra, Ashras al-Sulamî and ‘Âsîm al-Hilâlî (for the latter see Appendix IV, no. 54). For his other governors see Appendix III, nos. 79ff.
349 Cf. the use of Khâlid’s name as a slogan in the rebellion, which is presented as a grand act of revenge (Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1809, 1823f).
350 Appendix III, no. 37; Appendix IV, nos. 78, 82–4. Two are uninteresting:
Appendix IV, nos. 12 and 22 were both appointed by a Qurashi and one was moreover a local sharif.

341 Compare 'Ubayda b. 'Abd al-Rahmân al-Sulami, a Jordanian sharif who joined the Qaysi faction as governor of North Africa, and the sons of Yazid al-Sulami, doubtless also Jordanians, who joined Yazid III's Yamaniyya (Appendix II, no. 11 and Appendix IV, no. 2). 'Uthmân b. 'Abd al-Âlâ al-Azdi may have been a Damascene, but his (and his brother's) career had clearly been enacted in the north, whence his appearance among the Qaysiyah (Appendix II, nos. 24 and 43). Similarly the case of Qays b. Thawr al-Sakûni (Appendix I, no. 8).


343 For a convenient list of the leaders of the revolution see ibid., pp. 352 ff.


345 Note that the list of persons whom the Muslim convert to Christianity has to abjure includes Mu'awiya and even Yazid I as well as Zubayr and Ibn al-Zubayr (E. Montet, 'Un Rituel d'abjuration des Musulmans dans l'église grecque', Revue de l'Histoire des Religions 1906, p. 149; 'Abdallâh' clearly is Ibn al-Zubayr, not Muhammad's father as suggested by Montet, ibid., p. 156). Wellhausen also has it that the 'Abbâsid avengers spared Mu'awiya's grave (Kingdom, p. 552), but he gives no source and those used by Omar do not confirm it ('Abbâsid Caliphate, p. 263). But even 'Abd al-Malik could be invoked to authorize a legal doctrine on a par with the Prophet and the a'immat al-budâ by qâdis as late as the 750s A.D. (C. Pellat (ed. and tr.), Ibn al-Muqaffâ', 'Conseiller du Calife, Paris 1976, § 35 (translation of al-risâla fi'l-sâhaba)).

346 Qum yâ amîr al-mu'mînîn râshídân mahdiyyan, as one of the Yemeni generals said to Yazid III (De Goeje, Fragmenta, p. 136; cf. Van Ess, 'Les Qadarites et la Ghâlânîya', p. 279).

347 Or, for a more spectacular example, the Japanese.

348 Cf. the Mu'tazilite recognition of Yazid III as a rightful imam (Encyclopaedia of Islam', s.v. 'imâma'). The righteousness of the Yemenis also comes across very strongly in Shaban, Islamic History, vol. i, in which their Qaysi opponents are described in the vocabulary of modern political abuse.

8 UMAYYAD CLIENTAGE

349 The two were distinguished as 'upper' and 'lower mawlâ'. I hope to deal with the legal aspects of wâlâ in an article entitled 'The Roman Origin of Islamic Clientage'.

350 Nor individuals and groups. When a man is described as a mawlâ of Tamîm it means that he is a mawlâ of a Tamîmî.

351 Thus Marwân II distinguished between the mawlâ sibâ'a and mawlâ 'isâqa (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1852f). Compare Sulaymân b. Hishâm's maw'lîya wâman ittaba'ani (ibid., p. 1913) and Nuṣayb's muttakhidh mawlâka mawlâya.


354 Ağbändi, vol. xii, p. 44. The mawála khidma is all but identical with the eastern šbâkîrî (cf. for example Tabârî, ser. ii, p. 1695).

355 Wálâ’ al-muwâlât is the technical term for voluntary clientage in legal literature, but it is also quite common in non-legal texts (see for example Ağbändi, vol. v, p. 278).


357 Crone and Cook, Hagarism, pp. 120ff.

358 Even in law conversion was no condition for the validity of wálâ’, be it of manumission or commendation, and in practice many non-Muslim mawâli are known. Yuhannas, the mawála of Zubayr, was presumably a Christian freedman (Khâlîfa, Tabaqät, p. 242); Sarjûn b. Mansûr was a Christian mawâla muwâlât of Mu‘âwiya (Balâdhrî, Ansâh, vol. iv b, pp. 2, 60, 81f; Tabârî, ser. ii, pp. 228, 239; D. J. Sahas, John of Damascus on Islam, Leiden 1972, pp. 17ff, 26ff); Târkûn, the mawâla of Qutayba, and Dîwastî, the mawâla of Jarrâh, were non-Muslim rulers of eastern Iran (Tabârî, ser. ii, p. 1249; V. A. Kračkovskaya and I. Y. Kračkovský, ‘Drevnejsší arabské dokument z Srednej Azie’, Sogdiyskij sbornik (Akademiya Nauk SSSR, Institut Vostokovedeniya), Leningrad, 1934, p. 55 (I owe this reference to M. A. Cook); compare also Írâk, a Sogdian prince who was munqati an ilâ Sulaymân and who appears in the latter’s Dhâkwañîyâ (Tabârî, ser. ii, p. 1204). Karbeas, the leader of the Paulicians, was a mawâla of the Tâhirids (Mas‘ûdî, Kitâb al-ânbîb wâl’-ishrâf, ed. M. J. De Goeje (Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabicorum, vol. viii), Leiden 1894, p. 183 = id., Le Livre de l’avertissement et de la revision, tr. B. Carra de Vaux, Paris 1896, p. 248); but Photius has it that Karbeas pretended to follow the religion of the Arabs, so this spectacular example may in fact be none (Ch. Astruc et al. (eds. and trs.), ‘Les Sources grecques pour l’histoire des Pauliciens d’Asie Mineure’, Travaux et Mémoires 1970, p. 171 = 170).

359 Whence, of course, mawâla in the sense of non-Arab Muslim.

360 With the notable exception of eastern Iran where the laboriousness of the conquests forced the Arabs to come to terms with the existing power structure (cf. Crone and Cook, Hagarism, pp. 130ff).

361 Thus, for example, Ibn al-Muqaffa’. Note also how a descendant of the Iranian gentry becomes a musician training slave girls for an Arab caliph (above, p. 52 and Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘Ibrâhîm al-Mawṣîlî’).

362 Thus Sarjûn b. Mansûr (above, note 358) and the Asâwîra. The sources are unanimous that the latter converted on joining the Arabs in 17 (Tabârî, ser. i, p. 2563; Balâdhrî, Futâb, p. 373), but when they reappear in the second civil war almost fifty years later, their leader is called Mâh Afsîdhrûn (Tabârî, ser. ii, pp. 452, 454), while another member of their ranks, Yazîd b. Siyâh al-Uswârî, clearly represents the first generation of Muslims (ibid., p. 579). The
Asawira who were transferred from Basra to Antioch by Mu‘awiya appear likewise to have been non-Muslims at the time: Ḥassān b. Māhawayh al-Antāki represents the first generation of converts here at the time of Hishām (Balādhurī, Futūḥ, p. 166, cf. p. 117).

Crone and Cook, Hagarism, p. 90.


The commonly reiterated view that the Persian aristocracy converted in order to maintain its position and escape the poll-tax after the conquest is very misleading. There is a case for it in eastern Iran (cf. B. Spuler, ‘Der Verlauf der Islamisierung Persiens. Eine Skizze’, Der Islam 1948, where the evidence comes overwhelmingly from the east; most of it, however, is late Umayyad and early ‘Abbāsid). But as far as western Iran and Iraq are concerned, the evidence consists of legal proof-texts on poll-tax (cf. Dennett, Conversion and Poll-tax, pp. 32f); the fact that dibqāns are the protagonists in these hadiths does indeed show that some dibqāns converted at some stage in the Umayyad period, but it shows no more than that. The evidence which Morony (‘The Effects of the Muslim Conquest’) adduces from Christian sources provides an important corrective to the accepted view, and his conclusion that it needs to be ‘qualified in several ways’ is certainly correct.

Just how many is presumably beyond calculation, but the huge numbers which were taken in Armenia give a good idea of the scale involved (Sebeos, Histoire d’Héraclius, p. 101; cf. pp. 100, 110, 146). Note also the extent to which Kufa was flooded with such prisoners-of-war at the time of Mukhtār’s revolt (Bar Penkaya in A. Mingana (ed. and tr.), Sources syriaques, Leipzig n.d. [1907] pp. *156–68 = *183–93).

Ibn Ishāq was the grandson of a Christian prisoner-of-war from ‘Ayn al-Tamr, Abū Ḥanīfa the grandson of a pagan prisoner-of-war from Kabul, but for all one can tell it might as well have been the other way round.

Cf. S. Treggiari, Roman Freedmen during the Late Republic, Oxford 1969.

The equivalent of Oriental cults in Rome is Shi‘ite ghuluu in Islam.

Not so, of course, in Syria and Mesopotamia where there were no garrison cities and where the Arabs had been settled on the land from the start. Pseudo-Dionysius testifies to the existence of an Arab peasantry in Mesopotamia in the early ‘Abbāsid period (cf. Cahen, ‘Fiscalité, propriété, antagonismes sociaux’, pp. 140ff), and the Arabs who took to cultivating their own land on losing their stipends in the 760s doubtless illustrate precisely how this peasantry had come into being (ibid., pp. 143f; the date given should of course be A.D. 767f, not 667f).


Balādhurī, Futūḥ, pp. 67, 293; cf. Morony, ‘The Effects of the Muslim Conquest’, p. 56. Note that the dibqān who appears under Khalid al-Qasrī in 120 is no longer a tax-collector, but a private agent of Khalid’s (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1647).

Thus it was Maslama who benefited from the reclamation of swamps under
Hajjaj, just as it had been Mu'awiya who benefited from it after the first civil war (Morony, 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', p. 36; Dennett, *Conversion and Poll-tax*, pp. 29f). It was Khalid al-Qasri, a Syrian governor and general, who acquired vast estates in Iraq, just as it had been Ziyād and his sons, the governors and kinsmen of the caliph, who acquired them under the Sufyānids (Tabārī, ser. ii, p. 1647; M. G. Morony, 'Landholding in Seventh Century Iraq', unpublished paper prepared for the Conference on the Economic History of the Near East, Princeton 1974, p. 32).

For a list of Iraqi landowners see Morony, 'Landholding', pp. 33f. Morony's views on this subject are somewhat contradictory. On the one hand, he explicitly states that the tribal aristocracy of Iraq did not become a landed one, most of the land passing into the ownership of the state (*ibid.*, p. 33). On the other hand, he concludes that the second half of the seventh century saw the emergence of a class of Muslim Arab landed aristocrats assimilated to the local dāhāqīn (*ibid.*; similarly 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', p. 56), and in both articles *taljī‘a* is presented as an important mechanism in the formation of this class ('Landholding', p. 23; 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', p. 56). Morony's second view represents what we would have expected to happen, but the evidence is on the side of the first. (Neither of the two examples cited in fact concerns *taljī‘a*. The *dībqān* who sells his land to Ibn Mas‘ūd, but continues to pay *khbarāj*, clearly illustrates the point that *khbarāj* land cannot be transformed into *‘ushr* land: it is hard to see how this *dībqān* can epitomize a search for protection. And no local landholders put their land under Maslama’s protection: Maslama is the subject and the verb is in the fourth form.)


376 'Degenerate heirs appear, who adopt boorish ways and forsake noble manners and lose their dignity in the sight of people. They busy themselves like tradesmen with the earning of money, and neglect to garner fair fame', as Tōsar has it in his account of aristocratic decay (M. Minovi (ed.), *Tansar’s Letter to Goshsnap*, Tehran 1932, p. 19 = M. Boyce (tr.), *The Letter of Tansar*, Rome 1968, p. 44). For the priestly reasons why 'the lowest activity is commerce' see the passage from the Denkart cited by M. Molé, *Culte, mythe et cosmologie dans l'Iran ancien*, Paris 1963, pp. 424f. For the reappearance of such sentiments among the Muslim *kuttāb* see Goitein, 'Bourgeoisie', p. 597.


379 There were fugitives in the later Roman empire just as there was *taljī‘a* even under the Umayyads, but the shift of primacy is undeniable (cf. F. de Zulueta, 'De Patrociniis Vicorum' in P. Vinogradoff (ed.), *Oxford Studies in Social and Legal History*, vol. i, Oxford 1909; C. Cahen, 'Note pour l'histoire de la himāyā`, *Mélanges Louis Massignon*, vol. i, Damascus 1936).

380 Dennett, *Conversion and Poll-tax*, pp. 79, 110ff; cf. also C. Cahen, 'Histoire économismo-sociale et islamologie. Le problème préjudiciel de l'adapta-
tion entre les autochtones et l'Islam', Colloque sur la sociologie musulmane, actes, Brussels 1962, pp. 205ff.


382 Note how the Persian who killed Mas'ûd b. 'Amr in 64 was either an Uswârî or an 'ilj who had converted and migrated to Basra (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 461, 465). Companion hadîths on clientage of conversion also assume that the convert is a rajul min ahl al-ârâd (Shâfî'i, Kitâb al-umm, Bâlâq 1321–5, vol. vii, p. 121; Sarakhshî, Kitâb al-mabsût, Cairo 1324–31, vol. viii, p. 91). That people converted in order to escape the jîjâ was perfectly well known to the lawyers (cf. Abû 'Ubâyda, Amwâl, pp. 66f).


386 Cf. above, pp. 37f.

387 Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1354.

388 Cf. above, note 281.

389 Cf. above, note 272.

390 Despite the abundance of prisoners-of-war, such retinues do not appear to have been very common in the Sufyânîd period. Apart from the Bukhârîyya of 'Ubaydallâh b. Ziyâd, there is some rather weak evidence for slaves and freedmen in the retinues of 'Abbâd b. Ziyâd and 'Amr b. Sa'id al-Ashtâqî in the second civil war (cf. Appendix VI, nos. 6f), and there are many examples of people arming both their own and other people's slaves and freedmen in the same civil war (cf. below notes 646f;) but most of the passages suggesting the existence of standing retinues have to be discounted (cf. Appendix VI, nos. 1–5).

391 Already Yazîd b. al-Muwallâb fought with mawâli in his revolt (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1381, 1403); he is reputed to have wondered why Mûsâ b. Nuşayr, who also had a great many, did not similarly rebel (Ibn al-Qûṭiyya, Ifsitaq, pp. 161f). Khâlid al-Qasîf also had a fair number, though whether they were ...

392 The Yemeni in Iraq gathered thirty companions and clients, but he may of course have had more (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1839); ‘Abbas b. al-Walid had about 150 sons and clients (ibid., 1803).


394 Thus doubtless the mawālī who appear in the seventies and who do not yet form permanent retinues (as for example those of ‘Uthmān b. Qatān, Tabari, ser. ii, p. 919); similarly Muslim b. Dhakwān, the commander of the Dhakwāniyya who was a freedman of Yazīd III (ibid., pp. 1852f), and Yazīd al-Aslāmī, the mawla who was sent against Abū Muslim and who was a freedman of Naṣr b. Sayyār (ibid., pp. 1057ff). The sources certainly tend to take it for granted that a client is a freedman unless otherwise specified.

395 Thus the four hundred slaves of ‘Abdallāh b. Iṣbahānī in the second civil war (Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 366), and the retinue of ghilman belonging to Tāriq, the fiscal agent of Khalīd al-Qasrī (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1653). When Naṣr b. Sayyār faced dismissal, he bought a thousand slaves whom he armed and mounted (ibid., p. 1765); cf. Appendix VI, no. 7). Note also the hadith ‘man iṭazza bi-l-‘abid adhallahu Allāh’ (Abū Nu’aym al-Isfahānī, Hilyat al-aṭwiyya’, Cairo 1932–8, vol. ii, p. 174. I owe this reference to Professor M. J. Kister).


397 The ‘Abd Rabīḥ b. Sīsān who appears as the agent of Naṣr’s sāhib shurta was
presumably Yunus' father (ibid., pp. 1923f). Yunus himself is described as one of Nasr's trusted companions (ibid., p. 1995). He was later killed by Abu Muslim (ibid., pp. 1989, 1995).

Compare the Persian mawlay of Quraysh who changed his wala' on taking military service with the B. Fahm (R. Guest, 'Relations between Persia and Egypt under Islam' in A Volume of Oriental Studies presented to E. Browne, Cambridge 1922, p. 165).

Табари, ser. ii, p. 1024.

Severus b. al-Muqaffa', History of the Patriarchs of the Coptic Church of Alexandria, ed. and tr. B. Everts in Patrologia Orientalis, vol. v, p. 116; cf. R. Basset (ed. and tr.), Le Synaxaire arabe-jacobite (rédition copte) in Patrologia Orientalis vol. xvi, p. 233. It is not clear in Kindi (Governors, pp. 84ff) that the recruits were converts, though presumably the mysterious magamisa were some non-Arab group (for a somewhat implausible suggestion as to their identity see Shaban, Islamic History, vol. i, p. 158). On his flight to Egypt Marwan II similarly promised to enrich all converts, and many converted (Severus, Patriarchs, pp. 158ff). A few years after the revolution the 'Abbāsids themselves promised tax-remission to converts, but by now the purpose was scarcely military (ibid., p. 189).

Cf. Hardy, Large Estates, pp. 60ff.

Тарих-i Sistân, ed. M. Sh. Bahâr, Tehran 1314, p. 91 is commonly adduced as an example of forced conversion under Mu'āwiya. But the people whom Rabi' b. Ziyād forces to learn 'ilm, Qur'an and tafsir are evidently Arabs, and the 'many Zoroastrians' who converted are said to have done so voluntarily, impressed by his good conduct. Governors were supposed to teach the people of the ʿamsar their religion and the sunna of their Prophet (Abū Yusuf, Kitâb al-kharâj', Cairo 1352, p. 14 = A. Ben Shemesh (tr.), Taxation in Islam, vol. iii, Leiden and London 1969, p. 47).

Note also how the Arabs could afford to discriminate against their subjects with dhimmi regulations where the Jurchen and the Manchus desperately tried to impose barbarian hair-styles and clothes on the Chinese.

In Iraq, where the presence of the highest echelons of the Persian nobility was politically intolerable, it was the lower ranks that survived longest (cf. Morony, 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', p. 54), but on the plateau, where the nobility could stay out of sight, it appears to have been members of the lower echelons such as Māhān and his in-laws that went first.

Morony, 'The Effects of the Muslim Conquest', pp. 57ff has scraped the barrel for the contribution of the dibqāns. Though the case is overstated (the Arabs evidently did not acquire the 'attitudes and lifestyle appropriate to a landed aristocracy' (p. 59)), it is clear from it that there would not have been much of a Persian heritage in Islam without the kuttâb.

When ʿUmar II allowed Jarraḥ b. Abdallah to keep the 10,000 or 20,000 dirhams he had taken from the treasury while in office, Jarraḥ spent them on stipends to his qaum (Tabart, ser. ii, p. 1355); two Kufans spent the 100,000 dirhams they had received from Ibn ʿUmar in the same way (ibid., pp. 1855, 1883); Nasr b. Sayyār recruited men from among his qaum of B. Salama and
others (ibid., p. 1919); and Syrian generals appear with their qawm in the
civil war (ibid., pp. 1894, 1899).

407 This is clear not only in the examples in note 406 above, but also in the
case of Nuṣayb, who was allowed to give farād to his qawm by way of reward
(Aghānī, vol. i, p. 373), and Hārūn b. Sha’sh who in the early ‘Abbāsid
period was told to recruit 200 men of his qawm on his receipt of amān
(Tabarî, ser. iii, p. 304).

408 If the recruits were paid 60 or 70 dirhams, one could get a sizeable retinue for
100 000 (cf. Tabarî, ser. iii, pp. 1855, 1883).

409 Cf. Tabarî, ser. ii, p. 1628; ser. iii, pp. 52, 126.

410 Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1468f; Azdí, Ta’rikh al-Mawṣil, ed. ‘A. Ḥabība,
Cairo 1967, pp. 22f.

411 Both Tabarî and Azdí have ‘iqtarādu which makes no sense and is clearly
to be emended to ‘iftarādu’.

412 Cf. Appendix III, no. 100.

413 Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1885ff.

414 As they were to avenge Khālid (cf. above, note 339).

415 Tabarî, ser. iii, p. 85.

416 Ibid., p. 117.

417 Cf. below, note 610.

418 For clients (free or freed) avenging their patrons see Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1049,
1849, 1890; Baladhuri, Anṣāb, vol. v, p. 338.

419 And note that the clients in point are either Transoxanian princes (thus

420 For Māhān see above, p. 52 Muslim b. Yassār, evidently a non-Arab, was a
Muslim, the governor of North Africa under Yazīd II, was likewise a mawāla
and foster-brother of Ḥajjāj (Jahshiyārī, Wuzura’, p. 42; cf. Baladhuri,
Futūḥ, p. 231).

421 Thus the Bukhārkhudā named a son Qutayba and the Samānkhudā named one
Asad after their patrons (Narshakhī, Description, pp. 8, 57 = 10, 59); Ḥāyyān al-Nabaṭī, a freedman of Maṣqalā b. Hubayra who had become a
client of Muqāṭīl b. Ḥāyyān al-Qurashī, named one Muqāṭīl (ibid., pp. 56f,
cf. p. 61 = 58, cf. 63; Tabarî, ser. ii, pp. 1204, 1330, 1504 etc.); a client of Maṃṣūr named a son Ja’far (Aghānī, vol. xii, p. 44). Compare Mūsā b. Nuṣayr
and Muḥallab, above, notes 295f.

422 Though there had of course been Arab freedman in the past.

423 In due course the lawyers were to turn all the mawāli into naturalized Arabs
by their interpretation of walā’ as a kinship tie, and the idea was taken up by
the mawāli themselves. But for Jāḥiz mawāli claiming as much were still a
recent sprout (‘Risāla fi bani Umayya’ in H. al-Sandūbī (ed.), Rasā’il al-
Jāḥīz, Cairo 1933, p. 299).

424 There is of course also such a thing as private ties which are parasitical upon
the state apparatus, but the emotional character of such ties is a far cry from
what we have to do with here.

425 Note that these ties developed no further under the ‘Abbāsids with whom the
moral vacuum disappeared: ‘Abbāsid companionship and clientage were public ranks (cf. below, part III).

9 THE ABORTIVE SERVICE ARISTOCRACY


427 Ṣabīl 64, p. 1974; cf. the poem by Nasr b. Sayyār in Dīnawarī, Akhbār, p. 360. In Ṣabīl 64, p. 1937 and ser. iii, p. 25 the instruction is only to kill every speaker of Arabic in Khorāsān, presumably the Syrians and their local sympathizers, and this is of course more likely to have been the original instruction, if such an instruction was given at all. But the point is unaffected: the Khorāsānīs were foreigners who saw Arabic as the language, not of the common past, but of the common oppressor.

428 Cf. the outburst of the people of Mosul on the appointment of Muhammad b. Șīl: ‘are we to be ruled by a mawlā of Khath’ām?’. In this case the Arabs did indeed end up by being exterminated (Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, pp. 312ff). The view that Abū Muslim had instigated the slaves of Khorāsān against their masters reflects the same paranoia, though it was not of course entirely untrue (Ibn ‘Asākir, Tabābīt ta‘rīkh Ibn ‘Asākir, ed. ‘A.-Q. Badrān and A. ‘Ubayd, Damascus 1911–32, vol. ii, p. 291; Theophanes, Chronographia, A.M. 6240; cf. Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, p. 96).


430 See for example Khalīfa, Ta‘rīkh, pp. 630, 673ff, 695, 706, 743ff.

431 For a stray accusation of ‘asabiyya in Khorāsān in 135 see Ṣabīl, ser. iii, p. 83. The charge is unlikely to have been true.

432 Local factionalism is attested in Syria under Hārūn and Mu’tamid (Ṣabīl, ser. iii, pp. 625, 639; Ya’qūbī, Histories, vol. ii, pp. 495, 623; cf. Appendix I, nos. 1, 6), in Mesopotamia under Hārūn (Appendix IV, no. 53), in Egypt under Ma’mūn (Ya’qūbī, Histories, vol. ii, p. 567) and in Sind under Mānsūr, Hārūn and Mu’tasim (ibid., pp. 448, 494; Baladhuri, Futūh, p. 446). That it also continued in Sīstān is clear from the Tārīkh-i Sīstān, p. 191.


435 R. Levy, The Social Structure of Islam, Cambridge 1969, pp. 362. As Levy points out, it was by no means a consistent policy (see for example Kindī, Governors, pp. 110, 111, 120, 121 as against ibid., pp. 117, 118, 119, 121 etc.), though there was a distinct tendency for the Iraqi governorships to be even further subdivided (Khalīfa, Ta‘rīkh, pp. 675; Ṣabīl, ser. iii, pp. 465f).

436 Encyclopaedia of Islam’, s.v. ‘harid’.


Pellat’s suggestion that the title of the qāḍī’l-quḍāt is modelled on dāṭvaran dāṭvar rather than mōbedbān mōbedb is unlikely to be correct (C. Pellat (tr.), Le Livre de la couronne attribué à Gāhizq Paris 1954, p. 44n). It was the mōbedbs who worked as judges, their judicial functions were comparable to those of the qāḍīs, and qāḍī is a standard translation for mōbedb in Muslim sources (cf. M.-L. Chaumont, ‘Recherches sur le clergé zoroastrien: le hērbd’, Revue de l’Histoire des Religions 1960, pp. 166, 169).

And note that they were also debarred from perpetuating the image of the polity that had collapsed in the civil war: where Augustus could pose as a princeps, the Marwānids had gone on too long for Mansūr to masquerade as a protosymboulos.

It is with reference to this concept that Sarakhsi justifies rulings on wālā’ (Mabsūt, vol. viii, pp. 89, 96).

Coulson, Islamic Law, pp. 117f. The Imāmīs, as Coulson points out, took the opposite view.

As indeed it often is in modern works. Consider the idea of blaming the decay of the Merovingians on their failure to retain the simple ways of their tribal past.

Or more correctly proto-Sunnīs. I use ‘Sunni’ here to mean adherents of the traditionists who were eventually to emerge as the abl al-sunnwa l-jamā’a, as opposed to adherents of heresy and theology.


The Yamanīyya were Ghaylānīs and Ḥārith b. Surajy perhaps a Murji’ite; his secretary was certainly a mutakallim (Van Ess, ‘Les Qadarites et la Gailānīya’; Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. ‘al-Ḥārith b. Surajy’).

Thus Qutayba could flatter his soldiers as ‘dihqāns of the Arabs’, while Asad could let himself be flattered as a paradigm of katkhudānīyya (Ṭabārī, ser. ii, pp. 1247, 1636f).

As they were to say in no uncertain terms when they became Shuṭūbīs.

For the syncretic potential which this implies see Crone and Cook, Hagarism, pp. 131ff. Cf. also above, note 441 for the Shi’ite attitude to the Shari’a. Note also that there were Shi’ites who could accept the Bāyid use of the title King of Kings, whereas the Sunnīs pelted the khatibs with pieces of brick...
when it was read in the Friday sermon (W. Madelung, "The Assumption of the Title Shahanshah by the Buyids and the "Reign of Daylam (Dawlat al-Daylam")", Journal of Near Eastern Studies 1969, pp. 175f, 181).

S. Pines, 'A Note on an Early Meaning of the Term Mutakallim', Israel Oriental Studies 1971. (The two supposedly further passages adduced by J. Van Ess, Anfänge muslimischer Theologie, Beirut 1977, p. 2on, are in fact both to be found in Pines' article (pp. 239n and 240n).)

Pellat, Ibn al-Muqaffa, § 12. This passage suggests that the mutakallims played the role not only of disputants and propagandists vis-à-vis outsiders, but also of official religious instructors inside the army itself (cf. Pines, 'Note', p. 239n): were the caliph to make the outrageous demand, it would clearly be transmitted through them. (Pellat's translation is unusable here in that it omits the crucial word.)

For a typical Sunni view of the Isma'ili see S. M. Stern, 'Abu'l-Qasim al-Busti and his Refutation of Isma'ilism', Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 1961, p. 25. It was only Naṣr b. Ṣayyār who saw the 'Abbāsids as a threat to Islam (Dinawari, Akhbār, p. 360).


The 'Testament of Abū Hāshim', of course, leaves no doubt that the ‘Abbāsids had staged the revolution in the name of the imamic rights which they had inherited from a son of Ibn al-Ḥanafīyya (Akbār al-dawlat al-‘abbāsiyya, p. 165; Nawbakhti, Kitāb firāq al-shī‘a, ed. H. Ritter. Istanbul 1931, p. 42; J. Van Ess, Frühe mut’azilitische Häresiographie, Beirut 1971, pp. 31ff), but this is certainly an imamic revision of a story that originally had a different point; for inasmuch as Ibn al-Ḥanafīyya was the mabdi, there was nothing for his son to inherit, let alone bequeath. The story establishes a doctrinal connection between Mukhtar and the 'Abbāsids, and virtually the only thing they can have shared is a belief in the coming of the mabdi. Now just as Mukhtar's mabdi was known as Ibn al-Ḥanafīyya, so we find Abū'l-'Abbās predicted as Ibn al-Ḥārithīyya (Akbār al-dawlat al-‘abbāsiyya, pp. 167f, 169); and just as Mukhtar assumed the title of waṣīr of the mabdi, so Abū Salama was known as waṣīr of the family of Muḥammad from among whose ranks he presumably expected the mabdi; it was similarly as waṣīr to the mabdi that Sunbāḏh, an ex-'Abbāsid soldier, expected Mazdak to return (G. H. Sadighi, Les Mouvements religieux iraniens au IIe et au IIIe siècles de l'hégire, Paris 1938, p. 159; contrast the completely non-messianic use of the title in the writings of a contemporary Iraqi secretary (Pellat, Ibn al-Muqaffa', §§ 32f, 44). It looks, in other words, as if the 'Abbāsids began by expecting the return of a redeemer, whoever he might be. All this does not, of course, do much to solve the enigma of the role which Ibrāḥīm al-Imām was expected to play. He bore neither the names nor the title of the mabdi, and yet his death clearly meant that the redemption failed; or to put it the other way round, he bore the title of imām, and yet his death left the succession question completely
open, not only to Abū Salama, but also to other supporters of the ‘Abbāsids (cf. *Akbbar al-dawla al-‘abbāsiyya*, p. 403).

417 Abū’l-‘Abbās and Dāwūd b. ‘Alī both claim the caliphate as their birthright in the accession speeches of 132 (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 29ff.; there is no reference to the Testament of Abū Hāshim). Similarly Mansūr in his correspondence with Muhammad al-Nafs al-Zakiyya (*ibid.*, pp. 21ff.).

418 ‘There has not been a caliph between you and the Prophet except ‘Alī b. Abī Ṭalib and the man behind me’, as Dāwūd b. ‘Alī put it to the Kufans on the accession of Abū’l-‘Abbās (*ibid.*, p. 37; contrast the more diplomatic avoidance of *rafd* in Abū’l-‘Abbās’ own reference to the first three caliphs on p. 30).


423 Jāhiz, *Managib al-turk*, p. 8 = 642f (where they are explicit); for Khurāsān as a *dār al-bijra* see above, p. 61.

424 Ṭabarî, ser. iii, pp. 531, 931, 1068.


426 As they do in Jāhiz, *Managib al-turk*.

427 D. Ayalon, ‘The Military Reforms of Caliph al-Mu’tasim, their Background and Consequences’, unpublished paper read at the Congress of Orientalists, New Delhi 1964, pp. 4ff (I am indebted to Prof. Ayalon for letting me have a copy of this paper). Note in particular *abnā’ al-sbi’a al-khurāsāniyya* and *abnā’ al-jund al-khurāsāniyya* (Aghdānī, vol. xx, pp. 14, 188) and *ibn dawlatika wa l-mutaqaddim fi da’warika wa’bn man sahaqa ila ba’atiqa* (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 531). The ‘Abbāsids themselves are never known as *abnā’ al-dawla*.


429 Ayalon, ‘The Military Reforms’, pp. 7f. In the fourth civil war they numbered 20 000 men or more (Ṭabarî, ser. iii, p. 826).

430 Notably the Barmakids and the sons of Qaḥṭaba and ‘Īsā b. Māhān (Appendix V, nos. 7, 9, 18).

431 Appendix V, nos. 1–19.


433 The phrase is Jāhiz’s (*Managib al-turk*, p. 15 = 651); cf. the Banawī’s boast
that his root is Khurasan and his branch Baghdad (ibid.). For the identification of the abl Baghdađ and the Abnâ’ see also Ayalon, ‘The Military Reforms’, pp. 6ff.

474 Appendix V, nos. 1, 11f, 14, 16f. Primarily, the shurta in question was clearly not the urban police force, but rather the military division which fought in the vicinity of the caliph, prince or general in battle under the leadership of a commander who was responsible for discipline, the hearing of complaints, the meting out of punishments and the amr al-‘askar in general (cf. ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yahyā, ‘Risāla ft naṣḥat wa’ll-ʻabd’, pp. 181, 193f, 199, 200, 205); apparently he was also responsible for recruitment (cf. Tabari, ser. iii, p. 555). The leadership of this shurta was symbolized by the javelin (hirba), and ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yahyā recommends that the post should be filled with men from among the abl buyutāt al-sbaras, as in fact it was in both the Umayyad and early ‘Abbasid period (‘Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yahyā, ‘Naṣīḥa’, p. 199). Baghdad of course also had a shurta in the sense of police force, doubtless drawn from the army settled there, and the leader of this shurta seems likewise to have been concerned with the administration of justice, for the office was known as the ‘adwa, ‘redress’ (cf. Ibn Ḥabīb, Muhābar, pp. 374f; Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, pp. 683, 750), and it was as leader of the ‘adwa that Sindī b. Shāhak was instructed to enforce the dbimmî regulations under Ḥārūn (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 713, cf. Appendix V, no. 43); but unlike the hirba this office was open to usurpation by clients such as Sindī himself.

475 Appendix V, nos. 2, 6f, 13, 19. Note that although the Umayyad ashāb al-haras had usually been mawālī, they were not usually mawālī of the caliph himself (as were the hujjāb), an indication that the office was not a menial one. It is in keeping with this that the ‘Abbasīd ashāb al-haras were in charge not just of the caliph’s bodyguard, but also of the general supervision of the army and at least sometimes also of the kharga’in (cf. Tabari, ser. iii, p. 654; ‘Abd al-Ḥamīd b. Yahyā, ‘Naṣīḥa’, p. 208); thus it was in his capacity of sāhib al-ḥaras that Muḥrīz b. Ibrāhīm was responsible for fitting out the troops which were sent to India in 159 and proved acceptable as a guarantor of pay to the mutinous troops on Mahdi’s death in 169 (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 461, 547, cf. Khalīfa, Ta’rikh, p. 700. Muḥrīz was also one of the abl al-dawla, cf. Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1955ff, 2001, ser. iii, p. 1).

476 Appendix V, nos. 2, 6f, 12, 14, 19.

477 Appendix V, nos. 1, 3–8, 10–18.

478 Appendix V, nos. 1–3, 6–9, 12–14, 18.

479 See the lists of governors in, for example, Khalīfa’s Ta’rikh under the years of the caliphs’ deaths.

480 Both Abū Muslim and Ḥasan b. Qaḥṭaba were said by the ‘Abbasīds to be mimnā abl bayt (Tabari, ser. ii, pp. 1949, 1952, ser. iii, p. 64). According to W. Ivanow, The Alleged Founder of Isma’ilism, Bombay 1946, pp. 165ff, the expression is simply a hackneyed compliment paid to worthies, and in the examples he cites there certainly is no question of spiritual adoption (cf. also below, note 484). In the case of Abū Muslim and Ḥasan, however, the point of
the expression was not to flatter the men thus designated, but to justify their position of power (it was said of them, not to them, in both cases to men who had asked for a member of the ‘Abbāsid house’); spiritual adoption may not be quite what the expression amounted to, but it clearly established a rank.

Thus the Barmakids, Muḥammad b. Muqāṭil and Husayn b. Mu‘ādh (Appendix V, nos. 7, 13, 15); cf. also Jāḥīz, Manāqīb al-turk, p. 16 = 653.

Jāḥīz, Manāqīb al-turk, p. 16 = 653.

Khālīd b. Barmak identified himself to Abūl-‘Abbās as mawlāka (Jahshiyāri, Wuṣṣara’, p. 89), but the Barmakids never appear as mawāli of the caliph on their coins, so his terminology was hardly technical.

Thus the Barmakids, Muhammad b. Muqatil and Husayn b. Mu‘ad (Appendix V, nos. 7, 13, 15); cf. also Jahiz, Manaqib al-turk, p. 16 = 653.

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Notes

‘Abbasid Harashis might not be descendants of the Umayyad ones), ‘Īsā b. Qays al-Sakūnī (Appendix I, no. 8), and Hishām b. ‘Amr al-Taghlabī and his relatives (Appendix IV, no. 62).


494 Though whether Mahdi’s successors thought that the institution had accomplished his purpose or that it never would is anyone’s guess.

495 If the order in which the various members of the ‘Abbāsīd court are enumerated in the sources is to be trusted, the *mawālī* ranked below the ‘Abbāsīds and the *ṣahāba*, but above the *quwwād* (cf. El-Ali, ‘The Foundation of Baghdad’, p. 96).

496 Appendix V, nos. 37f, 40, 49.


498 Rabī’ b. ‘Abdallāh was certainly an Arab (see the note above), but few other cases are so clear-cut: despite their *nisbas*, men such as Jawwās b. al-Musayyab al-Yamānī and Abū l-Sarī al-Shāmī may very well have been non-Arabs (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 323; Ya‘qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 244 = 21; differently Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. ii, p. 10).

499 Only by the most wilful reading of the sources could one get around this fact.

Several *mawālī* are explicitly said to have been slaves (Appendix V, nos. 23, 25, 28, 30, 32f, 35f, 38, 46), and even when it is not stated, their fancy names and by-names (*ibid.*, nos. 21, 24, 33, 47f), their description as eunuchs (*ibid.*, nos. 22, 27, 34) and their lack of patronymics are incontrovertible evidence of their servile origin.

500 ‘And if you do not know their fathers they are your brothers in religion and *mawālī*’ (33:5), a verse which clearly provided the Islamic rationale for the ‘Abbāsīd clients. Compare Ya‘qūb b. Dāwūd, the secretary and *mawālī* of Sulaym, who rose from prison to the status of Mahdi’s ‘brother in God’ (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 461; Sourdrel, *Virīrat*, p. 106).

Rabī’ b. ‘Abdallāh al-Hārithī was a Yemeni noble (cf. Appendix III, no. 100), but Ṭayfūr was ‘the son of the tailor’ (Appendix V, no. 45). Compare Ghiṭrīf b. al-‘Aṭā’, Harūn’s maternal uncle who likewise held office on behalf of his kinsman (though apparently without the title of *mawālī*), and who was the brother of a Yemeni slave-girl (Khaṭīb, *Ṭarīkh*, p. 83 = Lassner, *Topography*, p. 66; Khalīfa, *Ṭarīkh*, pp. 742, 743; Ya‘qūbī, *Buldān*, p. 304 = 132).

501 Cf. Appendix V, nos. 20ff. The domestic origin of the clients is well caught in expressions such as ‘ḥaram, *bitāna*, *mawālī* and *ghilmān*’ or ‘*mawālī* and *ḥabām*’ (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 744, 809).

502 For recommendations of the use of freedmen attributed to Mansūr and Mahdi, see *ibid.*, pp. 414, 448, 531f; similar sentiments are attributed to Mu‘āwiyah in Baladhurī, *Ansāb*, vol. iv a, pp. 23f. Marwān II’s preference for freedmen rather than free clients (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, pp. 1852f) may be more historical. It ought, however, to be clear that the Barmakids were not technically freedmen as suggested by S. D. Goitein, *Studies in Islamic History and Institutions*, Leiden 1968, p. 180.
Notes

251

104 They were grooms, attendants, chamberlains and the like (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 392, 429, 531; Ibn Habib, Muhabbar, pp. 259f; Appendix V, nos. 21, 38).


106 Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 461, 766, 1166.

107 Appendix V, nos. 21, 25, 32f, 40, 46–9.

108 The same is of course true of Spain, where mamlûks appeared in the army shortly after the secession (Lévi-Provençal, Espagne musulmane, vol. i, pp. 129f).

109 Cf. above, note 456.


114 The Sunnî chroniclers give ample and sympathetic attention to the ‘Abbasid revolution, though they leave the ‘Abbasid imamate to the heresiographers.


116 ‘The children of the Prophet must be the successors of the Prophet’, as he said when he started his revolt in Bukhârâ in the aftermath of the revolution (Omar, ‘Abbasid Caliphate, p. 158).

117 The Shi’îtes can get just as worked up about the martyrdom of ‘Ali al-Ridâ as they can about that of Husayn; but what is the grandeur of Mansûr to that of ‘Umar among the Sunnîs?


119 I owe the point that ‘Mansûr and the mihna’ would have made as good or better sense than ‘Ma’mûn and the mihna’ to the independent observations of Drs F. W. Zimmermann and G. M. Hinds.
Thus it is only the imam who is empowered to execute the hudud and ahkām according to the kitāb and sunna, to deal with matters of war, appointments and revenues, and to use his discretion where there is no athar; and whoever disobeys him in these matters loses his soul (Pellat, Ibn al-Muqaffā', §17; the translation of athar as 'disposition scriptuaria' is very odd: Shaybānī's Kitāb al-āthār is a book of traditions, not of Koranic legislation). Similarly, it is only the wulūt al-amr who have received ra'y from God, the people having no business to do other than give advice when asked (ibid. §20). Hence both 'āmma and khāṣṣa are in need of the imam for their ṣalāḥ, and it is for their good that God has placed among them khawāṣṣ min ahl al-dīn wa'l-'uqūl to whom they may turn (ibid. §§57f).

Thus the caliph is advised not to appoint soldiers to the administration of taxes, partly because it corrupts the army and partly because it is a degrading occupation for a man of military dignity (ibid. 23). Cf. also the attention military nobility in §§47ff. Reliance on such persons dishonours power (kāna li'l-sūlān shānī'an, §48).

He even contrives to cite Arabic poetry in defence of aristocracies (§46).

Or if he did, it was only in very minor ways such as the separation of fiscal and military authority and the creation of a Syrian šabāba. And that despite the fact that both the lay-out of Baghdad and the idea behind the Abnāʿ testify to a similar vision.


Ibn al-Muqaffā' seems to have written shortly after these events; he refers to people who had shared in the caliph's power 'alā ghayr tariqatihi wa-ra'yibī, but whom God has now eliminated for him (Pellat, Ibn al-Muqaffa', §8), and the good wishes for the future also give the impression that we are at the beginning of Mansūr's reign (§9). Ibn al-Muqaffā' apparently saw the liquidation of Mansūr's rivals as an appropriate moment for the execution of his plan, and it is of course possible that another caliph would have taken the opportunity. But given the youth of the regime and the magnitude of what Ibn al-Muqaffā' suggested, it is not altogether surprising that Mansūr did not dare.

b. Hilal, who had been governor of Sarakhs under the Umayyads, was a missionary in the dia wa. For Muhammad b. Hanbal as one of the abn'a quwwād Kburāsān see W. M. Patton, Ahmed Ibn Hanbal and the Mihna, Leiden 1897, p. 10.


For this interpretation of the fall of the Barmakids see Sourdel, ‘Politique religieuse’.

And note the complete assurance with which Abū Yūsuf preaches hell-fire to Hārūn, dwelling on the terrible responsibilities he has as a ruler, while at the same time serving him traditions playing down his political role; the imam is merely a shield, or he is a scourge of God (Kitāb al-kharaj, pp. 9f = 42f). It is a far cry from the gingerly manner in which Ibn al-Muqaffa’s suggested to Mansūr that he was the source of all religious authority.


Ibid., pp. 183ff.


Omar, ‘Abbāsid Caliphate, pp. 316f.

Bosworth, Sistān under the Arabs, pp. 87ff.


Sadighi, Mouvements religieux iraniens.

Bartholm, Turkestan, p. 205.


Talbi, Emirat Aghlabide, pp. 369ff.

Ibid., pp. 107ff.

Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 842ff; cf. Appendix IV, no. 54.


Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 1319ff; Michael the Syrian, Chronique, vol. iv, pp. 541f = vol. iii, p. 103.

Cf. E. J. Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, Manchester 1959, p. 22.

Tarikh-i Sistān, pp. 162ff; G. Scarica, ‘Lo scambio di lettere fra Hārūn al-Rashid e Ḥamza al-Khārījī secondo il “Ta’rikh-i Sistān”’, Annali dell’Istituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli 1964. Hārūn evades the question of the imamate, harps on the theme of obedience and holds out the prospect of material rewards: no wonder Ḥamza was disgusted.


Note also how Ya’qūb the Coppersmith used to say that the dawla of the ‘Abbāsids was founded on treachery, the ‘Abbāsids having killed Abū Salama,
Notes

Abū Muslim, the Barmakids and Fadl b. Sahl: it did not escape contemporary notice that all the victims were Persians (Tārikh-i Sistān, pp. 267f).

11 Cf. V. Lanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed, London 1963, a helpful survey of nativist movements in which the syncretic prophets of both the Iranians and the Berbers ought to have been included. Note in particular the Congolese conviction that ‘Christ is a French God’, whence the trinity of the ‘Father, Simon Kimbangu and André Matswa’, which compares so well with Sunbād’s trinity of Mazdak, Abū Muslim and the mabdi (Lanternari, Religions of the Oppressed, p. 16; Sadighi, Mouvements religieux iraniens, p. 139).

15 ‘At first we had the land and you had the Bible; now we have the Bible and you have the land’ is a statement which the Iranian rebels could with appropriate modifications have made their own (Lanternari, Religions of the Oppressed, p. 5).

17 The very fact that the revolts took the form of nativist millenarism, as opposed to national restorationism, testifies to the fact that the local aristocracy had defected to the conquerors. But at least one member of it, the prince of Bukhārā, decided to make common cause with the ‘āmmī insurgents (Sadighi, Mouvements religieux iraniens, p. 169).

18 He was the grandson of Naṣr b. Sayyar, the last Umayyad governor of Khurāsān.


20 So Tabarî, ser. iii, pp. 707ff. If this story is not true, it is certainly well told. It is set in the remote frontier town of Samarqand, where a woman has been left behind by a husband who has gone to Baghdad. The woman finds it hard to be without a man and Rāfī’ fancies both her and her wealth, so they use the trick of letting her feign apostasy, which immediately dissolves her marriage, whereupon she converts and marries Rāfī’. Outraged, the husband in Baghdad makes use of his access to the caliph to have the marriage dissolved, and Rāfī’, though he escapes the statutory lashing, is paraded around in the streets on a donkey and thrown into jail. Having escaped, he eventually kills the governor who had administered the humiliation and becomes a rebel. It is the combination of the deep insult to Rāfī’‘s omerta and a state that insists on imposing its own rules that makes this story so eminently plausible (compare Hobsbawm, Primitive Rebels, pp. 15f; id., Bandits, Harmondsworth 1972, esp. p. 43).

21 Ya’qūbī, Historia, vol. ii, p. 528. According to Shaban, Islamic History, vol. ii, p. 38, Rāfī’ enjoyed the support of the ‘chiefs and princes’ of Sogdiana, Transoxania and Tukhrāstān, but apart from the Qarluq chief whose help Rāfī’ invoked, Ya’qūbī mentions only the people of these areas.

22 Ya’qūbī, Historia, vol. ii, p. 528; for Muqanna’ see Sadighi, Mouvements religieux iraniens, p. 170. The Qarluq chief is described as a convert, but other Turks such as the Toghuz-Oghuz were clearly not, and for Ya’qūbī the revolt consisted in qitāl al-sultan wa-qatl al-muslimīn.

23 M. Kaabi, ‘Les Origines tahirides dans la da‘wa `abbāside’, Arabica 1972,
Notes 255

p. 163; Ya'qubi only mentions that Ra‘fi ‘called to others than B. Háshím’ (Historia, vol. ii, p. 529).

Tabarí, ser. iii, p. 732.

Cf. above, p. 46.


The ‘Abbásid Middle East and Salian Germany are thus inverse cases. The Salian use of ministeriales turned on the entrenched character of the German aristocracy, the ‘Abbásid use of mawalī on the insecurity of the Islamic equivalent; in Germany the aristocracy eventually absorbed the ministeriales, whereas in the Middle East the infami and vilissimi homines eventually ousted their noble competitors.

101 THE EMERGENCE OF THE SLAVE SOLDIERS


Appendix V, nos. 24, 31f, 36f, 39, 41, 46, 48.

Tabarí, ser. iii, pp. 495, 531.

Appendix V, nos. 20, 22f, 26, 28—30, 32, 38, 41, 45.

Chabot, Chronique de Denys de Tell-Mahré, pp. 84ff = 72. Note also that Mansür had a Khuwārīzmiyya (Khatib, Ta’rikh, p. 85 = Lassner, Topography., p. 68; cf. Ya‘qūbī, Buldān, p. 246 = 27).

Tabarí, ser. iii, p. 631; cf. Chabot, Chronique de Denys de Tell-Mahré, p. 85 = 72, where Chabot’s translation of mwyly as ‘plénitude’ is clearly wrong; the context indicates that an Arabic term is being reproduced, and in Chabot’s second edition of Pseudo-Dionysius the word is marked with plural signs: it is certainly to be read mawliy = mawalī (cf. J.-B. Chabot (ed.), Incerti auctoris Chronicon pseudo-Dionysianum vulgo dictum (CSCO, Scriptores Syri, vol. liii), Louvain 1933, p. 229).

Tabarí, ser. iii, p. 631; cf. above, note 469.

That comes across very strongly in Mahdí’s explanation of his preference for mawalī: they can be made to do the meanest jobs (Tabarí, ser. iii, pp. 531ff).

Talbi, Emirat Aglabide, pp. 136, 150.

Lévi-Provençal, Espagne musulmane, vol. iii, pp. 71ff; there had been slaves already in ‘Abd al-Rahmán I’s armies (cf. ibid., vol. i, pp. 129ff), but Hákam was the first to enrol them in the palace guard which formed the nucleus of all the classical slave armies.

Michael the Syrian, Chronique, vol. iv, p. 513 = vol. iii, p. 59. ‘Ubaydalláh was governor of Egypt between 822 and 826 when he was finally dislodged by ‘Abdalláh b. Táhir, but the black slaves may well have been recruited by his father who distrusted the leaders of the jund and had a number of them disposed of (Kindi, Governors, p. 171).

Tabarí, ser. iii, p. 740, cf. Appendix V, nos. 2, 7, 9, 12, 14, 18.

Tabarí, ser. iii, p. 740; Ghitrif b. ‘Atá was the brother of Hárún’s mother, a Yemeni slave-girl (cf. above, note 501); Mansür b. Yazíd b. Mansür was a
descendant of Mansūr's Himyari brother-in-law (cf. Appendix V, no. 45).

181 Appendix V, no. 8.
183 Though typically enough by a slave-girl: there were no dynastic marriages between the caliphs and Iranian princesses.
184 Cf. the elaborate clauses in the succession document designed to avert it (Gabrieli, 'La successione di Hārūn').
185 Cf. Amin’s solemn reference to their being abl al-sabq ilā’l-budā (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 931).
186 The term applied to the Syrians whom Amin had so unsuccessfully tried to enrol (cf. Ayalon, 'The Military Reforms', pp. 18ff).
187 A Banawī denigrated Tāhir’s forces as just that (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 829).
188 Cf. Appendix V, nos. 2, 4, 7, 10, 12, 13.
189 Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 618; cf. also Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1510.
190 Cf. Ma‘mūn’s sentiments in Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1068; and note the inconsequentiality of the commander who vaunts the virtues of the Abnāʾ in Tayfūr, Kitāb Baghdād, p. 143: they defeated the Turks, led the revolution, rebelled against Ma‘mūn and later submitted to him.
192 The practice is well described in Minovi, Letter of Tansar, p. 9 = 34f.
193 Narshakhī, Description, p. 8 = 10.
194 Ibid., p. 57 = 59, where the city in question is wrongly given as Balkh, Asad’s capital.
196 Cf. Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 478; Barthold, Turkestan, pp. 206f. It is not clear, however, that Mahdi asked these rulers to convert as much as to submit.
197 Baladhuri, Futūḥ, pp. 438f; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 550. The throne and the crown which the Kābulshāh sent to Ma‘mūn on his conversion were put on display in Mecca (Sourdel, Viṣṇut, pp. 204ff). Note also Ma‘mūn’s attempt to make the Qārinwandid ruler of Ṭabaristān convert so that he could call him mawla amīr al-mu‘minīn and make him governor of Ṭabaristān, as eventually happened after Māzyār b. Qārīn had lost his kingdom to rival members of his family (Ibn Isfandiyār, Ta‘rikh-i Ṭabaristān, ed. A. Iqbāl, n.p., n.d. [Tehran 1941], vol. i, pp. 205ff = E. G. Browne, An Abridged Translation of the History of Tabaristan, Leiden and London 1905, pp. 145ff; Ya‘qūbī, Historiae, vol. ii, p. 582; cf. Baladhuri, Futūḥ, p. 339). It also appears to have been in the time of Ma‘mūn that the Khwārīzmshāh adopted Islam (E. Sachau, Zur Geschichte und Chronologie von Khwārīzm, part one (Sitzungsberichte der phil.-hist. Classe der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. lxxiii), Vienna 1873, p. 32jn, cf. p. 33).
198 Thus Harthama, an intermediary figure between the Abnāʾ and the new Khurāshānīs, and, more to the point, Fadl and Hassan b. Sahl (Encyclopaedia of Islam², s.v. 'al-Fadl b. Sahl b. Zādhānfarūkh'). Fadl was a mawla islam of Ma‘mūn (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 709).
Thus for example Hasan b. 'Ali al-Ma'muni, a native of Bādghīs who became governor of Armenia; he was clearly a mawla of Ma'mun (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 985; Ya'qubi, Historie, vol. ii, p. 566). Similarly Kaydar Nasr b. 'Abdallāh al-Ushrūsāni who was governor of Egypt at the time of Ma'mun's death and responsible for the removal of the Arabs from the diwan (Kindī, Governors, p. 193); he was a mawla amir al-mu'minīn (A. Grohmann (ed.), Corpus Papyrorum Raineri Archiducis Austriae, III, vol. i, part two, Vienna 1924, p. 145). Note also the appearance of 'Abbās b. Bukhārkhdā among Tahir's men in Iraq (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 852). Tahir himself, the descendant of a mawla islām of Khuzā'ā, was likewise new to caliphal service.

Cf. Ma'mun's views on class structure (Kister and Plessner, 'Notes', p. 50) and on the ignominy of trade (Goitein, 'Bourgeoisie', p. 600; Goitein's attempt to explain away these statements is somewhat unconvincing).

Tabari, ser. iii, p. 777.

Gabrieli, 'La successione di Harūn', p. 396. Ma'mūn was both ibn ukbstinā and ibn 'amm al-nābī to the Persians, as were the Husaynids (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 774; cf. G. Le Strange and R. A. Nicholson (eds.), The Fārsnāma of Ibn 'l-Balkhī, London 1921, p. 4).

For their overwhelmingly negative reaction see Madelung, al-Qāsim, pp. 78f. It is not in the least unlikely that some Shi'ites were jubilant, though by no means won over (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. 'Ali al-Riḍā'), but it is hard to see how one can tell, inasmuch as the Shi'ite sources are all wise after the event. Ya'qūbī is brief and dispassionate (Historie, vol. ii, pp. 545, 550f). Abū 'l-Faraj and Ibn Babūyeh are agreed that al-Riḍā had the choice between compliance and death, and Ibn Babūyeh is particularly anxious to exonerate al-Riḍā from participation in what to him was a cunning plot to taint the imams with lust for worldly power (Abu'l-Faraj al-Isbahani, Kitāb maqātil al-Ṭalibiyin, Najaf 1353, pp. 368ff; Ibn Babūyeh, 'Uyun akhbār al-Riḍā, ed. M. M. Kharsān, Najaf 1970, vol. ii, pp. 137ff). The explanations advanced in justification of al-Riḍā's behaviour clearly became more extravagant in time, but there is not much trace of a view that his succession might have been a good thing: the analogies drawn in Ibn Babūyeh with Joseph's rule in Pharaonic Egypt and with 'Ali's participation in the shūrā are the closest one comes to it.

Faḍl b. Sahl, the evil spirit behind Ma'mūn, claimed descent from the Sāsānid kings, adopted Sāsānid practices, was a majūsī, and wanted an 'Alid heir in order to restore the Sāsānid monarchy (Jahshiyārī, Wuzgarā', pp. 313, 316f; Tabari, ser. iii, p. 1006; Ibn al-Tiqtaqa, al-Fakhri, ed. H. Derobourg, Paris 1895, p. 304); Ma'mūn continued the power and religion of Kiswa while the Muslims were humbled (Mottahedeh, 'The 'Abbāsid Caliphate in Iran', p. 72); hence Yahyā b. 'Āmir b. Ismā'il, a quintessential Banāwī, greeted Ma'mūn as amir al-majūs or amir al-kāfīrin (Tabari, ser. iii, p. 1001; Ibn Ḥabīb, Muhabbār, p. 488; cf. Jahshiyārī, Wuzgarā', p. 318). Yahyā's father was Marwān II's killer; on his death Mansūr had prayed over him and accorded him burial in the cemetery of the Hāshimites (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 46, 49ff, 390f).
605 Gabrieli, *Ma'mun e gli 'Alidi*, pp. 48ff.
606 Ibid., pp. 55ff. It is of course just possible that al-Riḍā died a natural death, but if so his death was very opportune; Ma'mūn did not designate another 'Alid (though some Shī'ites say he planned to, cf. Madelung, *al-Qāсим*, p. 75), and his order that the minbars on which al-Riḍā's succession had been proclaimed should be washed certainly suggests that the unfortunate 'Alid had been deliberately removed (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 170). There is of course not the slightest reason to doubt that Ma'mūn was genuinely grieved.

607 Sourdel, 'Politique religieuse', pp. 38ff. It is not quite correct that Ibn al-Aktham dissuaded Ma'mūn from having Mu'āwiya publicly cursed by pointing out that it would cause discontent in Khurāsān. The text referred to has Ibn al-Aktham say *inna'l-āmma lá tahtamilu dbālika siyyamā abl Khurāsān*, which clearly means that the populace in general and the Abnā' in particular would not put up with it (ibid., p. 39; compare Madelung, *al-Qāсим*, pp. 223ff).

608 Patton, *Ahmed ibn Hanbal and the Mihna*. Why did Ma'mūn choose the dogma of the created Koran? There is of course no longer any question of seeing an attempt at a compromise between Shī'ites and Sunnis here; neither Zaydis nor Imāmīs had adopted Mu'tazilite theology at this stage (Madelung, *al-Qāsim*; id., 'Imāmīsm and Mu'tazilite Theology' in *Le shīisme imāmite*, Paris 1970, as against Sourdel, 'Politique religieuse'), and the whole point of the inquisition was clearly to undermine the position of the 'ulama' by showing up the stupidity of the vulgar 'āmma who were too blind to see the reality of God's religion because of their weak minds (cf. Ma'mūn's letter in Patton, *Ahmed ibn Hanbal and the Mihna*, pp. 57ff). Ma'mūn's interest, then, lay in finding a theological dogma that would demonstrate this weakness of the traditionist mind; and had he chosen free will, which was really the only alternative, the traditionists would have found it far too easy to harp on the theme of divine omnipotence (free will and divine omnipotence may be compatible to theologians, but the doctrines whereby this compatibility is achieved never make simple shibboleths).

609 Cf. Kaabi, 'Les Origines tāhirides', from which it emerges that the ancestors of Tāhir may very well have been non-Khurāsānis, that they rose to prominence by joining the 'Abbāsid da'wa, and that they took their reward in the form of a hereditary governorship of Būshang and Herat, as opposed to Banawi status in Baghdad. The fact that it was *not* as Abnā' that they received their appointment to Khurāsān neatly illustrates the extent to which the *dawla* had lost its legitimating force.

610 Tāhir appears as *mawūla'l-'Alī 'Alī* on his coins (G. C. Miles, *The Numismatic History of Rayy*, New York 1938, pp. 96ff), 'Abdallah b. Tāhir is addressed as 'my brother and mawūla' in a poem by Ma'mūn (Kindī, *Governors*, p. 181), and Muhammad b. 'Abdallah b. Tāhir appears as *mawūla amīr al-muʾminīn* in a letter of Muntasīr (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1489). Tāhir's use of the caliph's name in the construction of his title was doubtless an indication of the particular intimacy of his bond. The more formal version of the title was later held by the Sāmānids, the Karakhānids and the Būyids (C. E. Bosworth, 'The Titulature
of the Early Ghaznavids', *Oriens* 1962, pp. 214, 222; Madelung, 'The Assumption of the Title Shahanshah', p. 105). But note how even when read as caliphal vassalage, the title had too strong connotations of dependence for Mazyār and Maḥmūd to accept it without modifications (Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 277 = 81; Bosworth, 'The Early Ghaznavids' p. 218).

611 Ibn Habīb, *Muhābbār*, pp. 375 ff. Tāhir himself had of course also held the *shurta* before his appointment to Khūrāsān.


613 The idea of the arrangement was doubtless to prevent the Tāhirids from losing interest in the unitary state, not just by giving them a highly honoured position at the centre, but also by selecting the Khūrāsānī governors from among members of the Baghdādī branch: a similar system had been adopted for Muhallabīd North Africa (Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, p. 76). In fact, however, as the caliphs ran into troubles with their Turkish slaves, the Tāhirids preserved their interest in the caliphate largely by inheriting what was left of it. Only Tāhir and ʿAbdallāh b. Tāhir, Maʿmūn’s adopted brother (or son according to Shābūshtī), went to Khūrāsān from Iraq: another two were supposed to go, but did not. But from Iraq to the eastern border it was the Tāhirids who maintained order, and more revenues soon went to Khūrāsān than came from there (C. E. Bosworth, 'The Tāhirids and the Safāfīrīds' in R. N. Frye (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. iv, Cambridge 1975, pp. 94 ff; Yaʿqūbī, *Buldān*, p. 308 = 138).

614 Ayalon, 'The Military Reforms', p. 24, citing Maqrīzī, *Die Kämpfe und Streitigkeiten zwischen den Banū ʿUmajjā und den Banū Hāṣim*, ed. G. Vos, Leiden 1888, p. 63. No early source confirms Maqrīzī’s contention. It is clear that Maʿmūn received large numbers of Turkish slaves as tribute and gifts, and that some of these were put to military use (H. Töllner, *Die türkischen Gärten am Kalifenhof von Samarra, ihre Entstehung und Machtübereignung bis zum Kalifen al-Muʿtadīd*, Bonn 1971, pp. 181), but the practice was still unsystematic, and no slaves appear to have been bought.

615 Töllner, 'Die türkischen Gärten', pp. 21 ff.

616 Thus, among others, the Afshīn who had converted in the days of Maʿmūn, but was known as a *mawāla* of Muʿtaṣīm (Baladhūrī, *Futūḥ*, pp. 430 ff; Dinawārī, Aḵbār, p. 398); Barzand b. al-Marzūbān, a *mawāla* of Muʿtaṣīm who fought under the Afshīn (Dinawārī, *Aḵbār*, p. 398); ‘Amm al-Farghānī who commanded the *abnāʾ al-mulūk* at Amorium in 223 (Ṭabarī, ser. iii, p. 1246); Muhammad b. Khālid Buhkārhudā who fought under the Afshīn against Bābāk (*ibid.*, p. 1203; Dinawārī, *Aḵbār*, p. 398); the Qārin wandids of Ṭabaristān who had converted under Maʿmūn and who are found in ‘Abbāsid service long afterwards (Baladhūrī, *Futūḥ*, p. 134; Yaʿqūbī, *Historie*, vol. ii, pp. 605, 607; Ṭabarī, ser. iii, pp. 1276, 1288, 1534, 1622, 1663 ff; the Bundār b. Mūsā al-Ṭabarī, *mawāla amīr al-muʿminīn* who appears on p. 1573 and elsewhere, was perhaps also one of them); cf. also Shaban, *Islamic History*, vol. ii, p. 64 (the presence of these and other *abnāʾ al-mulūk*
rightly impressed Shaban, but his attempt to wish away all slaves from the 'Abbasid armies and the Muslim world in general is somewhat farfetched).

617 Cf. the account of his trial (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 1309ff).


619 Whenever soldiers are described as mawâlî one may take it that they have been manumitted, and there are also stories assuming that this was normal procedure (see for example Z. M. Hassan, Les Tulunides, Paris 1933, p. 27). Of the Aghlabid slaves we are explicitly told that they were manumitted (Balâdhu rî, Futûh, p. 234). There is no example of unconverted slaves in the 'Abbasid armies.

620 Already Dionysius of Tell-Mahrê, as preserved in Michael the Syrian, Chronique, vol. iv, pp. 536ff = vol. iii, pp. 98ff, speaks of Mu’tasim’s black and Turkish slaves (‘abdê) at Amorium without ever calling them mawâlîyê.


622 Even in the 'Abbasid armies manumission was no condition for service, for we are explicitly told that some of the Maghribîba were slaves at the time of Mutawakkil’s accession, and ghîbân are frequently mentioned (Tabari, ser. iii, pp. 1370, 1385, 2185, 2204 etc). Sâmânîd and Ghaznavid soldiers are consistently known as ghîbân, and that in fact they were unfree is clear from the story of the general who wished to be manumitted before his death (C. E. Bosworth, ‘Ghaznevid Military Organization’, Der Islam 1960, p. 42). All Janissaries were the sultan’s slaves and the free men who eventually usurped their position ipso facto acquired the same status (R. C. Repp, ‘A Further Note on the Devshirme’, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 1968; H. A. R. Gibb and H. Bowen, Islamic Society and the West, Oxford 1950–7, part one, p. 45). It was only in Mamlûk Egypt, where there was no sultan above the mamlûks to own them, that the slaves were systematically freed before being allowed to fight (D. Ayalon, L’Esclavage du mamelouk (Oriental Notes and Studies published by the Israel Oriental Society, no. 1), Jerusalem 1951, pp. 17ff).

623 But even conversion was sometimes omitted. The Franks, Slavs and Galicians who made up the guard of Hakam I in Spain doubtless remained Christians, for they were commanded by the (free) Christian comes Rabi b. Teodulfo, who appropriately also collected the uncanonical taxes (Lévi-Provençal, Espagne musulmane, vol. iii, p. 73). Ibn Abî ‘Amir also used Christian soldiers (R. Dozy, Histoire des musulmans d’Espagne, Leiden 1932, vol. ii, p. 232), and even the zealous Almoravids ended up by importing Christian troops complete with churches and chaplains to Morocco (H. Terrasse, Histoire du Maroc, Casablanca 1949f, vol. i, p. 248). Further east the Zirids also made use of Christian slaves (H. R. Idris, La Berbérie orientale sous les Zirides, Xe–XIIe siècle, Paris 1962, p. 530). And most of the Indians in the service of Mahmûd of Ghazna were pagans (thus the Târikh-i Sistân, p. 355; they may
have been mercenaries, but they are more likely to have been slaves, cf. Bosworth, ‘Ghaznevid Military Organization’).

624 Patton, Ahmed ibn Hanbal and the Mihna, p. 91. The two things were the shabāda and the caliph’s kinship with the Prophet, so that for Bughā Islam was largely Shinto.

625 Cf. Ya‘qūbi, Buldān, pp. 258f = 49f. The immediate cause of Mu‘tasim’s withdrawal to Samarra may well of course have been the hostility of the Baghdadi populace in general and the Abnā’ in particular to the new soldiers (cf. O. S. A. Ismail, “The Founding of a New Capital: Sāmarrā”, Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 1968, pp. 3ff).

626 Female emancipation consists in giving women a public status as men.

627 As was said of al-Malik al-Sāliḥ (D. Ayalon, ‘Aspects of the Mamlûk Phenomenon (Part II)’, Der Islam 1977, p. 26). The comparison of the relationship between slave and master to that between father and son is, of course, quite common (see for example G. Forand, ‘The Relationship of the Slave and the Client to the Master or Patron in Medieval Islam’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 1971, pp. 6ff).

628 Thus Ibn Tulūn and Maḥmūd of Ghazna were great zealots on behalf of the caliph. The acquisition of sovereignty of course had a similar effect: the Mamluks of Egypt, for all that they were first-generation slaves, could not afford to be as ignorant of Islam as Bughā. But zealotism was largely restricted to their sons.

629 The tenuous position of the awlād al-nās between their Turkish fathers and the Egyptian society they had to join has been well described by U. Haarmann, ‘Mamluks and awlād al-nās in the Intellectual Life of 14th Century Egypt’, unpublished paper read at the Colloquium on the Islamic World after the Mongol Conquest, Oxford 1977.

630 The Bektashi affiliation of the Ottoman Janissaries was a subculture better designed to seal them off against Muslim society at large than to draw them into it. It can be seen as a substitute for the considerable tribal and ethnic homogeneity which the Egyptian Mamluks enjoyed.

It was because the Janissaries were just soldiers that they could not assimilate European warfare when it ceased to be a mere craft (cf. V. J. Parry, 'La Manière de combattre' in V. J. Parry and M. E. Yapp (eds.), War, Technology and Society in the Middle East, London 1975, pp. 255 ff).

Whence the Muslim stereotype of the Turk as stupid and good for nothing except warfare (Haarmann, 'Mamluks and awlād al-nās').

Though not necessarily a more cherished one. 'Whom do I meet when I look around? Apes riding on saddles', as Ibn Landak put it (Goldziher, Muslim Studies, vol. i, p. 152).

Though they certainly came very close to doing so at times, particularly in Mamluk Egypt, where ideally they were tolerated only for such tasks as handling the disreputable firearms (D. Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluk Kingdom, London 1956, pp. 63 ff).

They were still employed by the Qu'ayṭī sultans in the 1940s (D. Ingrams, A Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in the Aden Protectorate, Eritrea 1949, p. 52).

The popularity of mamlûks in the Middle East thus does not rest on any intrinsic superiority of the institution (pace D. Ayalon, 'Aspects of the Mamluk Phenomenon (Part I)', Der Islam 1976, p. 206).

It is thus difficult to explain the spread of the institution with reference to the superior qualities of the Turks, for all that Turks were clearly preferred (pace Ayalon, 'Aspects of the Mamluk Phenomenon (Part I)', p. 206).

When potential slave soldiers were available in the form of Saxons and Slavs, they failed to be used: the Slavs became mamlûks only among the Muslims. Conversely, when the Europeans went out of their way to get slaves, the purpose was economic, and despite the intense unpopularity of military service among the colonial aristocracy in Latin America, nobody thought of enrolling the slaves. Slaves did participate (on both sides) in the Portuguese wars against the Dutch and the French in Brazil, and in the American war of independence, but their enrolment turned on the outbreak of an emergency and was usually preceded or followed by manumission (C. R. Boxer, The Dutch in Brazil, Oxford 1957, p. 140; id., The Golden Age of Brazil, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969, pp. 89, 96, 101 ff; J. H. Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom, New York 1964, pp. 130 ff). In precisely the same way slaves had been manumitted and enrolled in times of extreme crisis in antiquity (K.-W. Welwei, Unfreie im antiken Kriegsdienst, erster Teil: Athen und Sparta, Wiesbaden 1974; Y. Garlan, War in the Ancient World, London 1975, pp. 78 ff; I owe my knowledge of Garlan's study to Dr Th. Wiedemann). There is also at least one example from the period of the Umayyads (Tabari, ser. ii, p. 1543).

Thus Benedikt Churipechitz, a sixteenth-century Austrian official (J. W. Bohnstedt, 'The Infidel Scourge of God', Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 1968, pp. 38 ff). But note that for Churipechitz imitation of the Ottomans reduces to elimination of the aristocracy: it is the fact that neither the sipābis nor the Janissaries are privileged aristocrats that impresses
him, not that the Janissaries are slaves. And Ivan Peresvetov, his con-
temporary, took slaves to mean serfs, so that for him the creation of an
Ottoman-style army meant the emancipation of the Russian peasantry!
(W. Phillip, Ivan Peresvetov und seine Schriften zur Erneuerung der Moskauer
Reiches, Berlin 1935, pp. 17ff). The centralized state which both dreamed
about eventually emerged without recourse to servile ties.

641 The German ministeriales, the Teutonic Knights and the French Foreign
Legion are comparable to the mamlük institution in terms of recruitment or
organization, though they were responses to quite different problems (cf.
above, note 567; M. A. Cook in id. (ed.), A History of the Ottoman Empire to
1730, Cambridge 1976, p. 7n). The Russian Oprichnina was a response to
a similar problem, but lacked the slaves (Cook, History of the Ottoman Empire,
p. 8).

642 Thus also Ayalon, 'Aspects of the Mamluk Phenomenon (Part I)', p. 196.

643 The kings of Muslim Java, unlike those of Muslim Persia, had aristocracies
instead of slaves.

644 Thus the employment of female mamlûks in Mauryan India in the form of
Greek women purchased for armed service in the palace guard (V. Smith,
The Early History of India, Oxford 1914, p. 123) is clearly related to the alien
character of imperial state structures in pre-Asokan India: the Mauryan
empire (ca 320–183 B.C.) was a state more Achaemenid than Indian in
inspiration; it was founded by a man who lived in constant fear of assassina-
tion and maintained by an elaborate security system; and the political
tradition represented by the Arthasastra is marked by a striking divorce of state-
craft from religion and morality. A ruler of the Hunnish invaders of China
in the fourth century A.D. similarly created a palace guard of 10,000 women,
all expert archers who fought on foot and on horseback; the background was
no doubt uncertainty as to ethnic allegiance, these Huns being neither
barbarians nor Chinese (Macgovern, Early Empires of Central Asia, p. 341;
cf. the subsequent massacre of the Hunnish subjects on p. 350). The kings
of Dahomey likewise had a formidable army of Amazons who guarded the
palace and constituted the crack troops (J. Argyle, The Fon of Dahomey,
Oxford 1966, pp. 63ff); and here too the problem was one of ethnicity, the
Dahomeyans having none (that surely is why the Dahomeyan state almost
swallowed Dahomeyan society). The use of slaves for military purposes is
widely attested in West Africa (cf. J. F. A. Ajayi and M. Crowder (eds.),
History of West Africa, vol. 1, London 1971, pp. 146ff, 216, 280ff, 396, 399,
456ff); it is invariably associated with the slave trade, and though Islam was
present in the area, it clearly was not an Islamic institution: slaves here
replace private ties in the tribal synthesis of state structures. In at least
one case, however, it is directly comparable with the Islamic institution.
In Senegal the Wolof kings preyed upon their own subjects for purposes of slave
trade with the Europeans; when citizens have to pay protection money to
avert enslavement at the hands of their own kings, the destruction of political
meaning can hardly be more total; and here the kings relied almost exclusively

There is in other words no need to look for the root in pre-Islamic Arabia. That slaves participated in warfare then just as they did in recent times need not, of course, be doubted: we are explicitly told that the bedouin who martyred the monks of St Saba in A.D. 797 were accompanied by armed Ethiopians (Acta Sanctorum, ed. J. Bollandus et al., Paris 1863—, vol. iii, p. 172 (20 March); cf. Musil, Rwala, p. 227). But after the conquests attitudes predictably changed (cf. above, note 272). Arming slaves was now something which individuals might do, usually for illicit purposes, but not an activity in which the state engaged until the early ‘Abbasid period, and it is not for nothing that the ‘Abbasids at first systematically freed their slaves. But the jahiliyya does of course do something to explain why the Muslims should have opted for slaves rather than Amazons, for if the settled Muslims found the idea of armed slaves a repugnant one, that of armed women would certainly have been even more alien to them. (With the Dahomeyans it was apparently the other way round; there was no lack of slaves and yet it was for female armies that they opted.).


There is no need to belittle the role of foreign slaves and freedmen in Mukhtār’s revolt, as does Shaban (Islamic History, vol. i, p. 95). For one thing, his involvement with the prisoners-of-war of Kufa is superbly attested not only in the Islamic tradition, but also in a contemporary Syriac source (Bar Penkaya in Mingana, Sources syriques, pp. *156ff = *183ff). For another, he was hardly the only person in the civil war to get the idea of using other people’s slaves: as Mukhtār took Kufa with the help of Kufan prisoners-of-war, so Ibn Abīl-Nims is said to have taken Damascus with those of the Damascenes (Ṭabarī, ser. ii, p. 477; the parallel version in Baladhuri, Ansāb, vol. v, p. 136, however, omits the slaves, and the late version in Masʿūdi, Kitāb murūj al-dbabāb, ed. and tr. A. C. Barbier de Meynard and A. J.-B. Pavet de Courteille, Paris 1861—77, vol. v, p. 224 omits Ibn Abīl-Nims). Promising freedom to slaves who would join one’s cause — man jā’anā min ‘abd fa-huwa hurr — was an obvious way to undermine the position of one’s opponent, and like everything else it is said to have been used by the Prophet himself (Ibn Sa’d, Tabaqāt, vol. ii,
Notes 265

p. 160); it is attested for the 'Abbāsids (above, note 428) and for the 'Alid rebel at Fakhkh (Tabarī, ser. iii, p. 556); and the technique was eventually put to startling use when 'Ali b. Muhammad raised the Zanj (A. Popovic, *La Revolte des esclaves en Iraq au IIIe/IXe siècle*, Paris 1976). It was also used in the Americas. On the outbreak of the American war of independence in 1775 Lord Dunmore, the British governor of Virginia, promised freedom to all slaves who would join His Majesty's troops (Franklin, *From Slavery to Freedom*, p. 132); and in 1793 Sonthonax, the French commissioner in Haiti, similarly promised freedom to those who would take up the cause of the République (T. O. Ott, *The Haitian Revolution*, Knoxville 1973, p. 71; Sonthonax was an 'Ali b. Muhammad manqué: the slaves had begun their revolt before he arrived and had no need of him in the long run).

11 THE EMERGENCE OF THE MEDIEVAL POLITY

648 Cf. the caliphate of Nāṣir (A.D. 1180–1225).
649 Merovingian faînéance meant Carolingian consolidation, just as 'Abbāsid faînéance was in due course to mean Seljuq unification.
650 Not all the Samarran soldiers were Turks, but neither the Iranians nor the Maghāriba were able seriously to rival the Turks, cf. the envious observation of the Maghāriba that the Turks made and unmade caliphs and viziers every day (Tabarī, ser. iii, pp. 168ff).
651 The systematic exclusion of sons of mamlūks from the army is likely to have been a Mamluk innovation, but the strong tendency to heredity in the Ayyūbid armies clearly turns on the fact that slaves did not predominate in them (cf. R. S. Humphreys, ‘The Emergence of the Mamluk Army’, *Studia Islamica* 1977, p. 92).
652 The importance of ethnic diversity is stressed in the ‘mirrors for princes’ (Bosworth, *Ghaznevid Military Organization*, p. 51).
653 It is, however, likely that the Aghlabids committed the same beginners’ mistakes as the 'Abbāsids without suffering the same fate (cf. Talbi, *Emirat Aghlabide*, pp. 136, 150; *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. ‘al-'Abbāsiyya’).
655 The restoration began with Muwaffaq’s assumption of the command against the Zanj who were threatening to conquer the metropolis itself. It was in other words warfare against rebellious slaves which enabled the caliphs to regain control of their mutinous slaves.
657 Sourdel, *Vijñānat*, pp. 365ff. Ibn al-Mu‘tazz, the adult candidate for the throne, might not have made a very forceful ruler (cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v.), but then power might have revealed unexpected talents in this poet, as it did in Julian the Apostate.
658 Compare H. A. R. Gibb, ‘Government and Islam under the Early ‘Abbāsids,

In this respect Iraq is on a par with Egypt. The Tulunid, Ikhshidid, Fatimid and Mamluk regimes were all created, restored and toppled by armies coming from outside, whereas Syro-Mesopotamia could produce its own Hamdanids and Ayyubids.


When Muttaqi offered him the position of Tüzün, the chief emir in Baghdad, he offered Muttaqi a caliphate in Fustat (Canard, Histoire, p. 500). For the brief emirate of the Hamdânid Naṣir al-Dawla see ibid., pp. 427ff.

Note also that the only evidence that Yusuf b. Abi'l-Saj had designs on Iraq comes from his alleged confession to being an adherent of the Fatimids (M. Canard, L'Impérialisme des Fatimides et leur propagande', Annales de l'Institut d'Études Orientales de l'Université d'Alger 1942–7, p. 177).

As for example the Tulunids, Ikhshidids, Hamdânids or Sâjids.

Such as the Khârijites, Saffârids, Carmathians and Fatimids.

R. McC. Adams, Land Behind Baghdad, Chicago and London 1965, ch. 8. Adams' analysis leaves no doubt as to the crucial role of the 'Abbâsid failure to create an imperial state in the agricultural decline of Iraq. It is scarcely surprising that the Arab conquest society had a detrimental effect on agricultural production here and, presumably, elsewhere: it was in the last resort the peasantry which had to pay for the squandering of resources by Sufyânid kinsmen and Marwânid factions. But the 'Abbâsids could have been expected to reverse this trend, partly by creating a more stable administration, and more particularly by favouring the growth of a landed aristocracy which would have been both interested in long-term investment and capable of protecting its local possessions against such outbreaks of chaos as might still occur at the centre. It was the combination of extreme instability on the part of the state and total political and economic vulnerability on the part of the countryside which made for such steep and irreversible decline. The same of course applies to the provinces: insofar as they did at all better, it was thanks to less fragile economies and/or less exposed location.

There were of course a few exceptions. A scatter of local rulers still survived in northern Iran, and the local populace could still band together in the isolated province of Sîstân, first against the Khârijites and next against the governor (Madelung, 'The Minor Dynasties of Northern Iran'; Bosworth, Sîstân under the Arabs, ch. 5). But the Islamic heartlands were as devoid of local power structures as the medieval west was full of them.

‘Uthmân b. Thûmâma who took control of Qinnasrîn, Antioch and Apamea was the descendant of a highly distinguished local šabarif (Appendix i, no. 15), as were the members of the Bayhas family who emerged as the rulers of Damascus (Appendix III, no. 111). Similarly, no doubt, the Banû'l-Sîmâ who took over in Hîms (Appendix i, no. 10). 'Abbâs b. Zufar, the ruler of Qûrus,
was the descendant of a local Marwanid general (Appendix IV, no. 54); and the same is likely to be true of Ḥabīb b. al-Jahm, who entrenched himself in Kafartūthā and Ra’s ‘Ayn. (Ya’qūbī, Historia, vol. ii, p. 541; Michael the Syrian, Chronique, vol. iv, p. 494 = vol. iii, p. 27; cf. Tabarî, ser. iii, p. 865). Note the friendliness of both ‘Uthmān and Nasr b. Shabath, another local warlord, towards the Christians (Michael the Syrian, Chronique, vol. iv, pp. 507, 513 = vol. iii, pp. 49, 60f). In Egypt the descendants of Mu‘āwiya b. Ḥudayj al-Sakūnī, a famous conqueror and sharīf, likewise survived into the reign of Ma‘mūn, largely as heads of the local šurta, though they also counted a governor (Kindi, Governors, pp. 98, 101, 102, 116–18, 121, 139, 148f), but here the bid for succession typically came from ‘Ubaydallāh b. al-Sari, an imported soldier whose father had arrived in Egypt under Hārūn (ibid., pp. 148, 173ff).

669 The parallel with the mululq al-tawa‘if who ruled between Alexander and Ardashir is explicitly drawn by Mas‘ūdī in one of his moving complaints of Islamic decline (Murājī, vol. ii, p. 73).
671 Birūnī, Chronologie orientalischer Völker, ed. C. E. Sachau, Leipzig 1923, p. 213 = id., The Chronology of Ancient Nations, tr. C. E. Sachau, London 1879, pp. 196f; cf. Madelung, ‘The Assumption of the Title Shahanshah’, p. 87. Birūnī’s account leaves no doubt that such predictions, at least as far as political restoration was concerned, were the order of the day. Note also that the Zoroastrians took the Būyid claim to the title ‘King of Kings’ seriously. A passage in the Denkart implores a ruler addressed in the Sasanid style as divine majesty and King of Kings to take upon himself the traditional royal task of protecting the Zoroastrian religion from heretics and all others who do not acknowledge the Avesta, the Muslims excepted: the writer clearly envisaged the ruler in question as a sort of ‘Emperor of the Two Religions’ in the style of Alfonso VI (J. C. Tavadia, Die Mittelpersische Sprache und Literatur der Zarathustrier, Leipzig 1956, p. 62).
673 The negative component in the make-up of the notable is not usually stressed; there seems to be a general feeling that since the notables did enjoy local power, the fact that this power was not formally acknowledged is of no importance. But formal and informal power engender very different kinds of behaviour, as any academic should know, and if we simply put the local notables in the category of local aristocracies, gentries and patriciates on the ground that power is power wherever it occurs, we can hardly expect to bring out what was so peculiar about the organization of power in Islam: the comparison is certainly worth making, but it is the contrasts that are particularly illuminating.
674 For descendants of ashraf who became muhhaddithūn, nussāb and rāwīs see
Appendix I, nos. 9, 12, 20, 22, 27f, 30, 32f; for the Muhallabids who survived as notables at Bayhaq see Appendix III, no. 23; for another family of governors and generals from whom a notable family in Nishāpūr claimed descent see ibid., no. 74.


677 Abū Dulaf, the lord of Karaj who became a virtually independent ruler of Hamadhān and its surroundings in the 830s A.D., was a Shi‘ite, but ‘Abd al-‘Azīz b. Abi Dulaf (d. 873) ostentatiously called two of his sons Abū Bakr and ‘Umar; and sure enough, Hasanids turn out to have arrived, bringing a fortune with which they acquired land and financed the erection of various buildings in the city; later some of them went on to Isfahān (B. Fragner, *Geschichte der Stadt Hamadhān und ihrer Umgebung in den ersten sechs Jahrhunderten nach der Hīra*, Vienna 1972, pp. 40f, 52f, 55f).

678 R. Mottahedeh, ‘Administration in Buyid Qazwīn’ in D. S. Richards (ed.), *Islamic Civilization 950–1150*, Oxford 1973, p. 34; the ‘Ijlīs at whose expense the sayyids rose here were members of the same Dulafid family as in Hamadhān; in both cities the sayyids were favoured by the Buyids, especially the Sāhib b. ‘Abbād, and in both they had acquired immense prestige and wealth by Seljuq times.


681 They are more common in Iran than in Arab countries, clearly because whoever is an Arab in Iran might as well be the very best sort of Arab.


684 A point repeatedly made by Lambton for Persia and likely to be true elsewhere (see for example A. K. S. Lambton, ‘The Internal Structure of the Seljuq Empire’ in J. A. Boyle (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Iran*, vol. v, Cambridge 1968, p. 203).

685 Cf. Crone and Cook, *Hagarism*, p. 227, note 46. For the stock image of the astrologers and the Christian physicians with whom the bad man surrounds himself, see A. K. S. Lambton, ‘Islamic Mirrors for Princes’, *Atti del convegno*

686 Thus the Mikalis of tenth-century Nishapur (who served at the court of the ruler and held the riyaṣa of Nishapur before it fell to the notables) did not intermarry with the notables and traced their genealogy to the Sasanids (Bulliet, Patricians of Nishapur, p. 67; Bulliet's claim that they did not pursue religious sciences is not, however, correct, cf. C. E. Bosworth, The Ghaznavids, Edinburgh 1963, pp. 179ff).


689 One can certainly see them as 'politicians without a polity' from the point of view of the city (Bulliet, Patricians of Nishapur, p. 61), provided one remembers that they were non-politicians in the polity to which they actually belonged (in this case the Seljuq state). Unlike the Italian cities, those of the Muslim Middle East had no autonomy, and unlike the Italian patricians, the Muslim notables were ruled by their condottieri. Their lack of accredited political status comes out well in Hourani's account of notables' behaviour as between the city, from which they drew their social standing, and the state, whose ear they wished to gain: this anxiety to steer a middle course between appearing as the instruments of authority to the former and as the enemy of authority to the latter is characteristic of men under conditions of indirect rule, not of men possessing power in their own right (Hourani, 'Ottoman Reform and the Politics of Notables', p. 46).

690 Cook in id., History of the Ottoman Empire, pp. 7f.

691 Ibid., pp. 8f.

692 The respect for 'old families' and 'local rights' which the Buyid government, in particular the Sāhib b. 'Abbād, displayed vis-à-vis Qazvin suggests a real attempt to integrate the notables into the Buyid state; but it does not represent a general Islamic pattern (Mottahedeh, 'Administration in Buyid Qazvin').

693 Thus the notables of Nishapur certainly went beyond the limit when they destroyed themselves and their city in a suicidal conflict of factions (Bulliet, Patricians of Nishapur, pp. 76ff), while those of Tripoli fell short of it when they took over local power, founding a successful dynasty of qādis (Encyclopaedia of Islam, s.v. 'B. 'Ammār' (first article)). In general, local politics in Fatimid Syria seem to have been much less entropic than they were in Seljuq Iran. Note also the contrast between Ottoman Anatolia, which appears to have been relatively free of factionalism, and Ottoman Syria and Egypt, which were full of it; the fact that the local power structure in Anatolia was an Ottoman creation, whereas those in Syria and Egypt were not, is surely relevant here.
For this type of statement see Lambton, *Quis custodiet custodes?*; id., *Islamic Mirrors for Princes*.


Cf. his claim to be a mujtāhid and his hopes of recognition as the mujaddid of the century (*ibid.*, pp. 61ff).


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state and people. And Qubilai received the answer that foreign dynasties which adopted Chinese institutions enjoyed longer rule in China than those that did not (Tao, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China*, pp. 71, 92ff).


711 Cf. *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, s.v. "Ibn Khaldün".


*Kitāb maqātil al-Tālibiyān*, Najaf 1353.


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Numbers in italics refer to the notes.

'Abbasids
dilemma of, 62ff
imperial rationale of, 65
servants of, 65ff, 173ff
and the 'ulama', see 'ulama'
loss of power of, 82ff

'Abbâsiyya, 74
Abnâ', 66f, 70, 73, 75ff
Aghlabids and slave soldiers, [71], 653
Alans, 21, 74
Almoravids, 89, 623
Ansâr, 32
Arabia, 22ff
Asâwira, 38, 362
abdâl al-nâs, 629
Ayyûbid armies, 651

Badr, fragment on the battle of, 4, 87
Bajîla, 23
Basra, 35
Bayhaq, 86, 674
Becker, C. H., 14
Bucellarii, 54
Buddha, Buddhism, 4, 19, 26
Bukhârîyya, 271
Bayâds, 83f, 671
Byzantium, Byzantine, 21, 24, 29, 80, 85

Central Asia, 18ff
China, 18ff, 26, 29, 37, 89ff
female soldiers in, 644
Chinâg Khan, 22f, 26, 154, 168

Dhî Qâr, 24
Dùbãm, 51, 385, 405, 448
Dunmore, Lord, 647
Edessa, 24

Ch'i-tan, 18, 146, 155
Churipechitz, Benedict, 640
clientage (wala'), 49, 56f, 66, 74ff
clients (mawâli), 49ff
in the Umayyad army, 37f, 52f
in the faction, 42
in private retinues, 53f, 197ff
avenging their patrons, 418
of the 'Abbasids, 67f, 74, 78, 190ff
as caliphal vassals, 76, 78
unconverted, 318
see also slaves, freedmen

Companions
of generals (as'ab), 38, 55f
of 'Abbasids (sa'aba), 67; Syrian members of, 489

Constitution of Medina, 7f, 9
conversion
clientage of, 49, 76f
as tax-evasion, 52ff
forced, 402
converts, see clients

Crimea, 20

Dahomey, 644
Dâlîqûya, 353
Damascus
jund of, 34, 37; quarters of, 210
city of, 71
local factionalism in, 94
dâ'wa ilâ'l-islâm, 47, 68
dawla, 65ff, 74, 76f
Dennett, D., 16
Dhâkâwâniyya, 53, 394
dimâmis, 52, 86f, 383, 403
Dhû Qâr, 24

Edessa, 24
General index

Egypt
  in the fourth civil war, 667
  local factionalism in, 432
  Coptic revolts in, 71
  first mamluks in, 75
  regimes from outside, 639
  Mamluk, 82, 88f, 622, 628ff, 633
  Emesa, see Hims
  Engnell, I., 13
  Europe, 21f, 80, 86f

  faction, factionalism
    emergence of, 43f
    character of, 42f
    roles and mechanics of, 43ff
    odd men out in, 47f
    non-Arabs in, 309
    end of, 61
    local, 432
    flocks, sizes of, 121, 159
    fosterage, 52, 56, 66
  Franks, 22, 48, 49f, 37, 299, [442], [649]

  freedmen
    the first converts, 50f
    as servants in the army, 38, 53
    armed by patron, 275, 646
    in private retinues, 53, 197f
    see also slaves, clients

  Gaza, martyrs of, 26, 68
  Ghassân, 24, 34f
  Ghaylanls, 48
  ghulat, ghuluw, 63, 369
  gladiators, 80f
  Goldziher, L., 14
  Godhs, 21, 22, 25, 139, 301

  Hamadhân, 86
  Harân, 16, 37, 47
  Hashimites, 65, 68f, 76, 166
  Hims
    pre-Islamic (Emesa), 24
    jund of, 34f, 37, 281, 298, 333; quarters of, 210
  Himyar, 34f
  Hira, kingdom of, 24, 204
  Hsùng-mu, 20f, 23, 26, 115, 127, 152, 154, 171
  Huns, 21f, 25, 146
  hunting patterns, 171

  Iceland, Icelanders, 8f, 10

  India, female slave soldiers in, 644
  Indians as mamluks, 623
  indirect rule, 30ff, 39
  Iran, eastern, see Khurâsân and Transoxania
  Iraq
    and location of capital, 30, 46f
    eastern Iran, 61f, 66, 72, 75f
  Jewish, 24, 25
  jihâd, 88f
  Jordan, jund of, 34f, 37
    quarters of, 210
  Judâhâm, 34, 312
  jund
    (regiment), 38, 287
    (military district), see under individual names
  Jurchen, 403, 705, 708
  Kalb, 35
  Kalmuks, 21
  Karbeas, 358
  Kazakhs, 21
  Khârijites, 63, 71f
  Khurâsân and Transoxania
    faction in, 45, 48
    in Iraq, 61f, 66, 72, 75f
    syncretic prophets in, 71f
    as metropolis, 76f
    autonomy of, 78
    Khwârirzmiyya, 597
    Khwârirzmshâh, 572
  Kinda, kingdom of, 24, 174
  tribe of, 34f; Maʾadd genealogy of, 243
  Kirghiz, 127, 131, 152
  Kufa, 30
  kustab, see secretaries

  Lammens, H., 14
  Liûyân, 24
  lists, 14ff
  Maʾadd, 34f
  Maghâriba, 622, 650
  mamluks, see slave soldiers
General index

Mamluks, see Egypt
Manchus, 20, 128, 133, 188, 403
Manichaeans, 19, 23, 86
(rindisp), 70, 71
maqṣūmīt, 400
Mary Kābit, battle of, 35
mawallī, see clients
maqāmāt, 400
Manchus, 20, 128, 188, 403
Manichaeans, 19, 23, 86
maqāmāt, 400
Marj Rahit, battle of, 35
mawallī, see clients
mawallī amir al-muminin, 65, 75, 78, 610
mercenaries, 74, 78f, 80, 82, 84, 87
Merovingians, 442, 649
mīhna, 519, 608
ministerials, 567, 641
Mongolia, 19f, 22
Mongols, 19ff, 29, 57, 127, 133, 171, 188
of the Golden Horde, 143
Chinese report on, 707
Mosul, 428
mutakallimūn, see theologians
mutattawwūn, 38, 53
Nabateans, 24
naming patterns, 40, 56, 66
Nṣḥḇūr, 86, 676, 686, 693
nūkū, 20, 136
non-Arabs, see clients, abīmmūn
notables, local, 8ff
Nolh, A., 12, 13, 14
Oirats, 127, 143
Ottomans, 82f, 89, 693
Palestine, jund of, 34f, 37, 72
quarters of, 270
Palmyra, 24, 35
peasants, 51ff, 84, 71
Peresvetov, Ivan, 640
prisoners-of-war, see slaves
qadās, qadā', 62, 71, 86, 88, 693
Qahṭān, 34f
qa'id, 38
Qārīnwardīs, 397, 616
qawm
(tribal unit) 31
(retinue) 55
Qays
(tribecary) 34f
(faction) 42f
Qxvvin, 86, 693
qibla, 12, 64
Qinnasmūn, jund of, 34f, 37, 261, 296, 333f
Qitarīyā, 38
quarters and fifths, 31, 38
of mawallī, 38
Syrian, 210, 288
Qud'a, 30, 34f, 39
Quraish, 32, 54, 68
Rabī'a, allegiances of the, 311
ra'is al-qaṣfīt, 31f, 58
Rasālidīyya, 393
riyāda, 31f, 54, 59
Russia, southern, 20f, 145
Rustāqābādī, 264
sābiqa, 65
sahāba, see Companions
Ṣahābīyya, 398
Samarra, 79
Sarmatians, 20f, 11f
Sasānid Iran, 21, 24, 29, 62, 80
vs medieval Islam, 86f
fears of restoration of, 61, 64, 85, 604
Saxons, 22, 639
Schacht, J., 14f, 82
Scyths, 20, 24
seal of the caliph, 66
secretaries (kuttāb), 64, 83, 86f
Seljuqs, 84, 189
Sellheim, R., 14
Senegal, 644
Serjeant, R.B., 72
Shaban, M.A., 71, 88
Sharīʿīyya, 391
Shart'a, 51, 62f
shabīf (descendant of the Prophet), 86
(triunal noble), see ashrāf
Sh'ite historiography, 60
Sūfa'īs, 63f, 68f, 76f
shu'ara, 311, 474
Ṣifṭ, 8, 12, 50, [103]
Sura, 4f, 6f, 9, 14f
Skandahān, 4f
slave soldiers
components of institution, 74
nature of, 79, 82, 84
incidence of, 8of
ethnic origin of, 80
unmanumitted, 622
unconverted, 623
non-Islamic parallels to, 644
slaves
prisoners-of-war, 38, 30f, 81
in pre-Islamic warfare, 643
non-combatants in Umayyad armies, 272
servants and batmen, 38, 53
enrolled in emergencies, 659
enrolled in power struggles, 80f
subversion of, in Khurasan, 428; else-
where, 647
armed by owner, 277; in bodyguards and
retinues, 53, 198ff, 390, 391
in the Ancient and the New World,
639, [640], 647
Slavs, 149, 151, 639
Sonthonax, 647
Spain, 45, 61, 71
mamluks in, 75, 623
Visigothic, 299
standard-bearers, 272
state archives in Medina, 143f
syncretic prophets, 71f
Syria
and location of the capital, 30, 46f
in second civil war, 54f
weakness of imperial culture in, 41
Umayyad legitimist revolts in, 71f;
'Abbásid fears of, 549
Syrian field army
geographical basis, 37, 47
first appearance abroad, 43f, 260
excluded from government of Syria, 40
relationship with Iraq, 46f
sakkis as battle cries, 12
talif, 374, 379
tarikb, 14, 99, 102
Tawwabun, 8
Testament of Abū Hashim, [68], 76, 456
Thaqif, 32
theologians (mutakallims), 63, 64
Timur, 128, 189
trade, attitudes to, 51, 70
Turks
tribal structure of, 19f
and Byzantium, 21
political tradition of, 22, 23
in Transoxania, 72
in Mansūr's army, 74; in Ma'mūn's, 614
as mamluks, 78, 80
Muslim stereotype of, 633
'ulama'
and historiography, 4ff
urban locus of, 51
and the 'Abbásids, 62ff, 69f, 77f
become local notables, 85f
Vedas, 3f
Vikings, 22, 23
Waddābīya, 38
wala', see clientage
warlords, 85
Watt, W.M., 71, 73, 82, 88
Wellhausen, J., 13f
women as soldiers, 644
Yazidis (dynasty), 170
Yemen, (country) 23, 24, (faction) 33,
42ff, 63, 73
Zanj, 647, 651
Zawaqil, [71], 76, 166
zindiqs, see Manichaeans
Zirids, 623
Zoroastrians, 77, 402, 671
This index contains only Arabic personal names (and Arabicized ones such as Māhān); it includes all such names regardless of whether the person is of prosopographical or other interest (e.g. 'Alī, Mu'tasim). Numbers in italics refer to the notes.

Abān b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Numayrī, 164
Abān b. Dubārā al-Yazānī, 146
Abān b. Marwān, 124
Abān b. al-Walīd b. 'Uqba, 124
'Abbād b. al-Abraq al-Riyahi, 113
'Abbād b. al-Husayn al-Hasbātī, 109
'Abbād b. Miswar al-Habatti, 109f
'Abbād b. Ziyād (b. Abīthī), 199f
'Abdās b. 'Abdallāh b. Malik, 182
'Abdās b. Būkhārkudā, 599
'Abdās b. Ja'far b. Muhammad, 185
'Abdās b. Jarir al-Bajāli, 115
'Abdās b. 'Abd al-Malik, 528
'Abdallah b. 'Abd al-'Azīz b. Hatim, 105
'Abdallah b. 'Abd al-Malik, 528
'Abdallah b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Ehrfī, 128
'Abdallah b. Abl Burdā al-Ash'arī, 115
'Abdallah b. al-Isbahanī, 528
'Abdallah b. al-Jurdāl al-'Abdī, 115
'Abdallah b. Khalīd b. Asūd, 236, 234, 239
'Abdallah b. Khāzīm b. Khuzayma, 181
'Abdallah b. Khāzīm [al-Sulami], 234
'Abdallah b. Malik al-Khuzā'ī, 181f
'Abdallah b. Mas'udā al-Fazārī, 98f
'Abdallah b. Mu'āwiyah, 8, 56, 113
'Abdallah b. al-Musayyab b. Zuhayr, 187
'Abdallah b. Nasr b. Hamza, 183
'Abdallah b. al-Rabī' al-Hārithī, 149
'Abdallah b. Sa'id al-Harashi, 145
'Abdallah b. Sharik al-Numayrī, 150
'Abdallah b. Sulaymān al-Jūrūdī, 116
'Abdallah b. 'Umar b. 'Abd al-'Azīz, 528
'Abdallah b. Umayya, 289
'Abdallah b. Yazdāl al-Bajālī, 102
'Abdallah b. Yazdāl al-Hakamī, 156
'Abdallah b. Yazdāl al-Jūdāhātī, 101
'Abdallah b. Yazdāl al-Sulamī, 154, 341
'Abd al-'Azīz b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Azḍī, 173
'Abd al-'Azīz b. Hārūn al-Kalbī, 156
'Abd al-'Azīz b. Hātim al-Bāhili, 105
'Abd al-'Azīz b. Marwān, 38, 289
'Abd al-'Azīz b. al-Walīd, 126
'Abd al-Jabbār b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Azḍī, 173
'Abd al-'Hāmid b. Rūbī' al-Tā'ī, 174f
'Abd al-Madān, 140, 149
'Abd al-Malik (A.D. 663–705), 37ff, 345

governors of, 289
'Abd al-Malik b. Jaz' al-Azḍī, 146
'Abd al-Malik b. Kawthar al-Ghanawī, 168
'Abd al-Malik b. Misma' al-Shaybānī, 117
'Abd al-Malik b. Muhammad b. 'Atiyāyya, 164
'Abd al-Malik/Saman b. Muhammad b. al-Hajjāj, 129
'Abd al-Malik b. Muslim al-'Uṣayli, 106
'Abd al-Malik b. al-Qa'qa' al-'Abst, 105
Habib b. al-Muhallab, 141
Hasan b. 'Ali al-Ma'muni, 599
Habib b. Murra al-Murri, 167
Hasan b. Husayn b. Jamil, 191
Habib b. Quarra al-Harithi, 37, 54
Hasan b. Qahtaba, 188, 480
Hafṣ b. al-Walid [al-Hadrami], 37, 38
Hasan b. al-Rabit', 194
Hajib b. al-Muhallab, 141
Hasan b. Tasnim al-Ataki, 121
Hajib b. Murra al-Murrā, 167
Hasan b. 'Umayr al-Kindi, 131, 142
Hajib b. Qurra al-Harithi, 11
Hassān b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Fazzār, 143
Hajib b. al-Muhallab, 141
Hasan b. (Mālik b.) Bahdāl, 34ff, 93f
Hajib b. Arṭāb al-Nakha'i, 117
Hātim b. Barthama, 177f
Hajjaj b. Yusuf al-Thaqafi, 37, 38, 40, 43, 51, 124, 289
Hātim b. al-Nu'mān al-Bāhili, 104f
Hajjaj b. Yusuf al-Thaqafi, 43, 44, 96, 125, 129, 131, 133, 135, 150, 152f
Hajjaj b. Ziyad al-'Ataki, 121
Hātim b. al-Shargī al-Riyāhis, 118
Hajjaj (mawla of Hadi), 191
Hawāris b. Ziyād al-'Ataki, 121
Hajjaj b. Artah al-Nakha'i, 157
Hawshab b. Yazid al-Shaybānī, 119
Hajjaj b. Ziml al-Saksaki, 104
Hawshah b. Suḥayl al-Bāhili, 143
Hakam I (A.D. 796–822), 75, 625
Hakam b. 'Amr al-Ghifari, 234
Hakam b. 'Awana al-Kalbi, 147
Hakam b. 'Abd Allah, 141
Hakam b. Dab'an al-Judhami, 100
Hakam b. Zayd al-'Ataki, 121
Hakam b. 'Awana al-Kalbi, 147
Hakam b. al-Mundhir b. al-Jārūd, 115
Hakam b. Utayba al-Asadi, 157
Hakam b. 'Abd Allah b. Dihya, 156
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. al-Walid, 129
Hakam b. al-Mundhir b. al-Qayni, 96
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. al-Salt al-Thaqafi, 150
Hakam b. al-Walid, 129
Hakam b. Yusuf al-Thaqafi, 43, 44, 96, 125, 129, 131
Hakam b. Zayd al-'Ataki, 121
Hakam b. al-Mundhir, 100
Hakam b. Utayba al-Asadi, 157
Hakam b. 'Abd Allah b. Dihya, 156
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. al-Walid, 129
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. Utayba al-Asadi, 157
Hakam b. 'Abd Allah b. Dihya, 156
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. al-Walid, 129
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. Utayba al-Asadi, 157
Hakam b. 'Abd Allah b. Dihya, 156
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. al-Walid, 129
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. Utayba al-Asadi, 157
Hakam b. 'Abd Allah b. Dihya, 156
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. al-Walid, 129
Hakam b. Yazid al-'Amiri, 108
Hakam b. Utayba al-Asadi, 157
Prosopographical index

Ibn Huwayy, 155
Ibn Ishâq, 4, 6f, 10, 367
Ibn Jamâ’a, 697
Ibn al-Kalbi, 10
Ibn Khaldûn, 89ff
Ibn Mu’âwiya, 8, 56, 51f
Ibn al-Muqaffâ’, 67, 69, 71, 196, 361
Ibn al-Mu’tazz, 67?
Ibn Rayyât, 143
Ibn al-Simt b. Shurahbil, 101
Ibn Tûlûn, 628, 631
Ibn ‘Umar, 56f
Ibn Umm al-Hâkam, 124f, 230, 64f
Ibn al-Zubayr, ‘Abdallah, 34f, 48, 23f, 345
Ibrâhîm b. ‘Abdallah, 125
Ibrâhîm b. ‘Abdul-loh b. ‘Umâr, 111
Ibrâhîm b. ‘Abdul-loh b. ‘Uthmân, 31f, 633
Ibrâhîm b. al-‘Arabî, 143f
Ibrâhîm b. ‘Asim b. Uqaylî, 150
Ibrâhîm b. Dhakwân b. Harrânî, 191
Ibrâhîm b. Humayd b. al-Mawarrîdî, 175
Ibrâhîm b. ‘Imâm, 65, 45f
Ibrâhîm b. Jibrîl b. Bajalî, 179f
Ibrâhîm b. Khâzîm b. Khazâyma, 180f
Ibrâhîm b. Mawsîlî, 52, 361
Ibrâhîm b. Salm b. Qatayba, 138
Ibrâhîm b. ‘Uthmân b. Nâhîk, 189
Ibrîs, 71
Ikhshîd, the, 84
‘Ikrima b. al-Awšâf/Wasâfî al-Himyarî, 132
‘Imrân b. ‘Amîr b. al-Shaybânî, 117
‘Imrân b. al-Fadîl/Fasîl b. Bujumî, 114
‘Imrân b. Mûsâ b. Yahyâ, 177
‘Imrân b. al-Nu’mân al-Kalâ’î, 95, 142
‘I’sa (maqâlî of Jâ’far), 192
‘I’sa b. ‘Alî, 136
‘I’sa b. ‘Alî b. ‘I’sa, 178f
‘I’sa b. ‘Amr al-Sakûnî, 99
‘I’sa b. Mahân, 178
‘I’sa b. Muslim al-Uqaylî, 106
‘I’sa b. Nâhîk b. ‘Alî, 189
‘I’sa b. Shâbîl b. al-Taghlabî [Ghassânî], 161
Ishâq b. Muhammad al-Kindî, 110
Ishâq b. Muslim al-Uqaylî, 106
Ishâq b. Qabîsâ b. Dhu’ayb, 128
Ishâq b. al-Sâbîh b. Bajalî, 110
Ishâq b. Yahyâ b. Mû‘âdh, 184
Ishâq b. Yahyâ b. Sulaymân, 184
Ismâ’îl b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasîr, 102f
Ismâ’îl b. Awzar al-Bajalî, 147
Jabala b. ‘Sa’d al-Kindî, 133
Jâ’far b. Mâlik al-Khuza’î, 183
Jâ’far b. Muhammad b. al-Asbîth, 185
Ja’far b. ‘Ubaydallah al-Kindî, 133
Jahdâm b. ‘Abbâs al-Habâtî, 109
Jahdår b. Dubah’a al-Shaybânî, 116
Jahshâna al-Kalbi, 139
Janâh b. Nu’aym b. al-Kalbi, 157
Jarîr b. ‘Abdallah b. Bajalî, 114
Jarîr b. Hâshim al-Hamdânî, 120
Jarîr b. Yazîd b. Bajalî, 115
Jarrah b. ‘Abdallah al-Hakamî, 40, 132f, 406
Jarûd b. ‘Amr al-‘Abdî, 115
Ja’wâna al-Harithî, 168
Jibrîl b. Yahyâ b. Bajalî, 179
Jûdây b. ‘Alî al-Azdi, 151
Jûnayd b. ‘Abd al-Rahmân al-Murri, 98, 305
Ka’b b. Hâmid al-‘Anst, 163f
Kardâm b. Bayhâs, 151
Kathîr b. ‘Abdallah al-Sulâmî, 151
Kathîr b. Salm b. Qatayba, 137
Kathîr b. Shâhâb b. Hârithî, 111
Kawthar b. al-Aswâd b. Ghanawî, 168
Kawthar b. Zafar al-Kilâbî, 108f
Kaydar Nasr b. ‘Abdallah, 159
Khâlid b. ‘Abdallah, 289
Khâlid b. ‘Abdallah al-Qasîr, see Khâlid al-Qasîr
Khâlid b. ‘Abdallah al-Asfah, 146f
Khâlid b. ‘Abd al-Rahmân al-Sulâmî, 165
Khâlid b. ‘Ali b. al-Riyahî, 151
Khâlid b. Barmak, 67, 70, 176, 483
Khâlid b. ‘Amir b. Bajalî, 114
Khâlid b. Ma’dân b. al-Kalâ’î, 95
Khâlid al-Qasîr, 44, 102, 373
and Ziyad b. Hârithî, 55f
and the Yamânîyya, 47, 319, 321f
and and the Yamânîyya, 47, 339
and mawâlî, 351
Khâlid b. ‘Amr al-Harîthî, 112
Khâlid b. ‘Umayr al-Sulâmî, 108
Khâlid b. ‘Uthmân b. Sa’d, 94
Khâlid b. Yazîd b. Hâtim, 135
Khâlid b. Yazîd b. Mu’âwiya, 35, 125
Khâlid b. Yazîd b. al-Muhallab, 134
Khâlid b. Yazîd b. Shaybânî, 170
Khâzîm b. Khuzaymâ al-Tamîmî, 180, 391
Khîrâsh b. Hawshab al-Shaybânî, 119
Khîrîr b. Abî Sabra al-Mujashî‘î, 133
Khuraym b. Abî Yahyâ, 98
Khuraym b. ‘Amr al-Murri, 98
Khuzaymâ b. Khâzîm al-Tamîmî, 180, 393
Kindî, 111
Kulthûm b. ‘Iyâd al-Qushayrî, 128, 260
Prosopographical index

Kurayb b. Abraha al-Himyari, 94
Labid b. 'Utārid al-Dārid, 122
La'y b. Shaqiq al-Sadusi, 120f
Layth, 126
Layth [b. Tarif], 192

Māhān, 52
Mahdi (A.D. 775–85), 67, 69, 70, 74
Mahdi b. al-Asram al-Ta'i, 175
Mahmud of Ghazna, 84, 623, 628, 631
Majza'a b. Thawr al-Sadusi, 120
Malik b. Adham al-Bahill, i68f
Malik b. al-Haytham al-Khuza'i, 181
Malik b. Misma' b. Malik, 117
Malik b. Misma' b. Shihāb, 113, 116f
Malik b. al-Mundhir al-'Abdi, 116
'Māmūn (A.D. 813–33), 75
'Mān b. Za'ida al-Shaybāni, 169, 391
Manāra, 192
Manṣūr (A.D. 714–75), 67f, 70f, 83
Manṣūr b. Ja'ana al-'Aмир, 168
Manṣūr b. Jumhūr al-Kalbi, 118f, 160
Manṣūr b. Nāṣr b. Hamza, 183
Manṣūr b. Yazīd b. Manṣūr, 180
Mānẓūr b. Jumhūr al-Kalbi, 159
Marthad b. Sharīk al-'Abbās, 126
Marwān I (A.D. 684–90), 34
Marwān II (A.D. 744–50), 37, 46, 48, 55
Marwān b. 'Abdallāh b. 'Abd al-Malik, 129
Marwān b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi, 142
Masād b. Ka'b al-Kalbi, 119
Mas'āda b. Hakama al-Fazzār, 98
Maslama b. 'Abd al-Malik, 47, 53, 108, 125
Maslama b. Mukhallad al-Ansāri, 233
Maslama b. Yahyā b. Bajāli, 179
Masrūq b. Yazīd al-Kindī, 153
Masrūr b. Khādīm, 192f
Masrūr b. al-Walid, 128
Māṭar, 193
Mawdūd [al-Thaqafī], 133
Māzāyr b. Qatīn, 197
Mīṣma' b. Mālik al-Shaybānī, 117
Mīṣma' b. Muhammad al-Shaybānī, 118
Mīṣma' b. Shihāb al-Shaybānī, 116
Mīsawr b. 'Abdād al-Ḥabṣi, 109
Mīsawr b. 'Abdallāh b. Muslim, 137
Mū 'ād b. Muslim, 183f
Mū'alla [b. Tarīf], 193
Mū'awiyah I (A.D. 661–80), 30, 34, 345
Mū'awiyah II (A.D. 683), 34
Mū'awiyah b. 'Abdallāh al-Saksaki, 159
Mū'awiyah b. Yazīd b. Husayn, 97, 101
Mū'awiyah b. Yazīd b. al-Muhallab, 142
Mū'awiyah b. Zufar al-Hilālī, 166
Mūdīj b. Miqdad al-'Udhrī, 103
Mūdīrī b. al-Muhallab al-Azdi, 142
Mūfaddāl/Fadl b. Rawḥ b. Ḥātim, 134
Mūghirah b. 'Abdallāh al-Fazzār, 99
Mūghirah b. 'Abdallāh al-Thaqafī, 133
Mūghirah b. Shūba, 133, 232
Mūghirah b. Ziyād b. al-Atākī, 121
Mūhājir b. Ziyād al-Ḥārithī, 141
Mūhājirah b. Abl b. Sufrā al-Azdi, 39, 133
Muhammad, 4ff, 12f, 25f, 168
Muhammad (govorner), 126
Muhammad b. 'Abdallāh b. Nāṣr, 183
Muhammad b. 'Abdallāh al-'Uqaylī, 171
Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Malik, 96
Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Hamdānī, 120
Muhammad b. Abī l-'Abbās al-Tūsī, 174
Muhammad b. Abī, 168
Muhammad b. 'Abl b. 'Īsā, 179
Muhammad b. al-As'ath al-Khuza'i, 184f
Muhammad b. al-As'ath al-Ṭārībī, 185
Muhammad/Yazīd b. Azzār/Arār b. al-Kalbi, 156f
Muhammad b. Ḥamzah b. Malik, 183
Muhammad b. Ḥarb b. Qatān, 136
Muhammad b. Ḥarthama, 178
Muhammad b. Ḥūrūn al-Numayrī, 135
Muhammad b. al-Hasan b. Qahtaba, 188
Muhammad b. Ḥassān al-Usaydī, 152
Muhammad b. Ḥātim b. Ḥarthama, 178
Muhammad b. Ḥujr al-Kindī, 147f
Muhammad b. Ḥumayydh b. 'Abd al-Ḥamīd, 175
Muhammad b. 'Īsā b. Ḥakīb, 189
Muhammad b. Ishāq al-Kindī, 111
Muhammad b. Jamīl, 191
Muhammad b. Jarīr b. Bajāli, 114
Muhammad b. Khalīd b. Barmak, 176
Muhammad b. Khalīd b. Bukhārkhudā, 616
Muhammad b. Khalīd al-Qāsīrī, 102f, 391
Muhammad b. Mansūr al-Asadī, 144
Muhammad b. Marwān, 289
Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Kindī, 111
Muhammad b. Muqṭīl al-Akktī, 186
Muhammad b. al-Masayyab b. Zhayyār, 187
Muhammad b. al-Muthanna b. al-Haṣajī, 137
Muhammad b. Nāṣr b. Ḥamzah, 183
Muhammad b. Nūbata al-Kalbi, 132
Muhammad b. Qāsim al-Thaqafī, 96, 135
Muhammad b. Qatān al-Kalbi, 136
Muhammad b. Rashid al-Khuza'i, 160
Muhammad b. Sa'id al-Khalaf, 160
Muhammad b. Salihi al-Kilabi, 151
Muhammad b. Sa'id al-Kalbl, 160
Muhammad b. Salih al-Kilabi, 151
Muhammad b. al-Sa'asa'a al-Kilabi, 135
Muhammad b. Sulayman b. Ghalib, 180
Muhammad b. Sufwiyd b. Kulthum, 126, 127
Muhammad b. Tayfur al-Himyar, 195
Muhammad b. 'Ubaydallah b. Yazid, 170
Muhammad b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi, 125
Muhammad b. 'Umayr al-Darimi, 125
Muhammad b. Yazid al-Harithi, 149
Muhammad b. Yazid b. Hātim, 135
Muhammad b. Yazid b. Mazyad, 170
Muhammad b. 'Ubaydallah b. Yazid, 170
Muhammad b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi, 125
Muhammad b. 'Umayr al-Darimi, 125
Muhammad b. Yazid al-Harithi, 149
Muhammad b. Yazid b. Hātim, 135
Muhammad b. Yazid b. Mazyad, 170
Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Thaqafi, 135
Muhammad b. Ziyād b. Jarir, 116
Muhammad b. Zuhra al-Harithi, 112
Mujāhid b. Yahya al-Shaybani, 113
Mujjā'a b. Si'r al-Tamimi, 136
Mtibr b. al-Hawari al-'Atakl, 121
Mukhallad b. Yazid al-Asdi, 142
Mukhallad b. Yazid al-Fazari, 107
Mukhkār, 16, 81, 366, 456
Mundhir b. al-Jarud al-'Abdi, 115
Mundhir b. Jayfar al-'Abdi, 115
Mundhir b. Muhammad al-Jarudi, 116
Mundhir b. Muhammad al-Kindī, 111
Muqanna', 72
Muqā'il b. Hākim al-'Akkī, 185f
Muqā'il b. Musa, 185f
Mūsā b. Ka'b al-Tamiimi, 186
Mūsā b. Mūsāb, 193
Mūsā b. Nuṣayr, 39, 40, 53, 324, 391
Mūsā b. Sinān al-Hudhali, 139
Mūsā b. al-Wajīth al-Himyar, 136
Mūsā b. Yahyā b. Khalīd, 177
Musabbih b. al-Hawari al-'Atak, 121
Musayyab b. Zuhayr al-Dabbi, 186f
Muslim b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Bāhilī, 137
Muslim b. 'Amr al-Bāhilī, 136f
Muslim b. Bakkār al-'Uqayli, 106
Muslim b. Dhakwān, 394
Muslim b. Rabī' al-'Uqayli, 106
Muslim b. Sa'id al-Kilābi, 138
Muslim b. Yāsār, 420
Musarrīf b. al-Mughtīrah b. Shu'ba, 8, 133, 260
Musamīm (A.D. 853–854), 78f, 83
Mutawakkil (A.D. 847–851), 78
Muslim b. al-Hājjīyā b. Qutayba, 137
Muslim b. Salm b. Qutayba, 138
Muslim b. Yazid al-Fazari, 107
Muttalib b. 'Abdallah b. Malik, 182
Musaffāq (regent, d. 891), 83
Nadr, 126
Nadr b. 'Amr al-Himyar, 148
Nadr b. Sa'id al-Harithi, 144
Nadr b. Yarım al-Himyar, 94, (namesake) 95
Nahshāl b. Shakhīr b. Khuzayma, 181
Nash b. Hamza b. Malik, 183
Nasr b. Malik al-Khāzī'ī, 183
Nasr b. Muhammad b. al-Ash'ath, 185
Nasr b. Musāhim, 58, 60
Nasr b. Sayyār al-Laythi, 33, 312, 358
and subgovernors, 312
and armed slaves, 395
and qaum, 406
Nātīl b. Qays al-Judhāmi, 34f
Nawf al-Ash'īrī, 148
Nu'aym b. 'Amr al-Riyāḥī, 112
Nu'aym b. Hammad, 7
Nu'aym b. al-Qa'qa' al-Dārimī, 122
Nūbata b. Hanzala al-Kilābi, 152
Nuh b. 'Amr b. Huwayy, 155
Nuh b. Shāyba'n b. Shāyba'nī, 117
Nu'mān b. Bashīr al-Ansārī, 35, 91, 155
Nu'mān b. al-Maṣṭūq al-Kindī, 155
Numayr b. Yazid b. Husayn, 97
Nuṣayb, 407
Qabīsā b. Dhū'ayb al-Khuza'i128
Qabīsā b. al-Muḥallab, 134
Qahtāba b. Shāhīb al-Tā'ī, 188
Qa'na'b b. 'Attāb al-Riyāḥī, 112
Qa'qa' (of Al Zurāra), 123
Qa'qa' b. Khulasd al-'Abst, 105
Qa'qa' b. Ma'bad al-Dārimī, 122
Qa'qa' b. Suwayd al-Minqarī, 139
Qāsim b. Muhammad al-Kindī, 110
Qāsim b. Muhammad al-Thaqafi, 132
Qāsim b. Naṣr b. Malik, 182
Qāsim b. 'Umar al-Thaqafi, 152
Qata b. 'Abdallāh al-Hārīthī, 112
Qatān b. Mudīrī al-Kilābi, 136
Qata b. Qābīsā al-Hālī, 136
Qata b. Qutayba al-Bāhilī, 137
Qata b. Ziyād al-Hārīthī, 140
Qatān b. Akāma al-Shāyba'nī, 170
Qays b. al-Ash'ath al-Kindī, 110
Qays b. Ḥāṭī al-Anṣārī, 140
Qays b. al-Hayytham [al-Sulami], 234
Qays b. al-Husayn al-Hārīthī, 111
Qays b. Thawr al-Sakūnī, 99, 341
Quorra b. Shārīk al-'Abst, 53, 125
Quṭayba b. Muṣlim b. al-Bāhilī, 38, 40, 76, 136f
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
<th>Notes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rabi' b. 'Abdallah al-Harithi</td>
<td>149, 497f</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabi' b. Imran al-Tamimi</td>
<td>114</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabi' b. Yusuf</td>
<td>193</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabi' b. Ziyad al-Harithi</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rabi'a b. 'Asim al-'Uqayli</td>
<td>106</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raji' b. Layth</td>
<td>71, 72, 77</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raji' b. Salama b. Rawh</td>
<td>101</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rahshid b. Jurw al-Qayni</td>
<td>96f</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawh b. Hamid b. Qabisa</td>
<td>134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawh b. Muqbil</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rawh b. Zanba' al-Harithi</td>
<td>141</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayta bint 'Ubaydallah</td>
<td>149, 176</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rib'i b. 'Amir al-Riyahi</td>
<td>118</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rib'i b. Hashim al-Harithi</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifa'a b. Thabit al-Judhami</td>
<td>159</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramahis b. 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Kinani</td>
<td>100f</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruwaym b. 'Abdalálah al-Shaybani</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ruwaym b. al-Harith al-Shaybani</td>
<td>119</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sabbath b. Muhammad al-Kindi</td>
<td>110</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id</td>
<td>194</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id b. 'Abd al-Malik</td>
<td>129</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id b. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Harashi</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id b. Ahmad al-Bahili</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id b. 'Amr al-Harashi</td>
<td>144</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id b. Aslam al-Kilabi</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa'id b. 'Amr al-Taghlabi</td>
<td>168</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufyan b. 'Abdallah/Umayr al-Kindi</td>
<td>142</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufyan b. al-Abiad al-Kalbi</td>
<td>132, 260</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufyan b. Mu'awiya b. Yazid</td>
<td>134</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufyan b. Salama b. Sulaym</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sufyan b. Sulaym al-Azdi (?), 139</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suhaym b. al-Muhajir</td>
<td>136, 198</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleym b. Kaysan</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn b. 'Abdalálah b. Dihya</td>
<td>116</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn b. 'Abdallah al-'Uqayli</td>
<td>171</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn b. 'Abd al-Malik (A.D. 715-17)</td>
<td>125, 126</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn b. 'Amr al-Muqri</td>
<td>148</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn b. Ghalib b. Jibril</td>
<td>180</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn b. 'Abd al-Muhallab</td>
<td>133, 163f</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn b. Hisham</td>
<td>53</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn the Magnificent</td>
<td>83</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn b. Sulaym al-Kalbi</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suleymn b. Yahya b. 'Uthman</td>
<td>184</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwayd b. 'Abd al-Rahman al-Minqar</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suwayd b. al-Murri</td>
<td>145</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suyüri, Jalal al-Din, al-</td>
<td>88</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tahir [b. al-Husayn], 75, 78, 99, 610</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talha b. Ishiq al-Kindi</td>
<td>111</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Talha b. Sa'id al-Juhani</td>
<td>139</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamim b. al-Hubab al-Sulami</td>
<td>108</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamim b. Zayd al-Qaynti</td>
<td>148, 237</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarif, 195</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tariq b. Qudama al-Qasri/Qushayri, 171</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Yazid b. Jarir al-Qasri, 103
Yazid b. Khalid al-Qasri, 102
Yazid b. Mašād al-Kalbi, 159
Yazid b. Mazyad al-Shaybānī, 169
Yazid b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī, 43f, 47, 53, 133

and Syrian troops, 260

and mawāli, 391

Yazid b. al-Mukhallad al-Fazārī, 107
Yazid b. Ruwaym al-Shaybānī, 119
Yazid b. Sa'īd al-Harāshī, 144
Yazid b. Shammākh al-Lakhmī, 154
Yazid b. Sulaymān b. 'Abd al-Malik, 100

Yazid b. 'Umar b. Hubayra, 105f, 107
Yazid b. Yā'lā b. Dakhm, 163
Yazid b. Ziyād al-Hārithī, 149

Yūnūs b. 'Abd Rabbīh, 53
Yūsuf b. Abī l-Sajī, 66f
Yūsuf b. Muhammad b. al-Qāsim, 153
Yūsuf b. 'Umar al-Thaqafī, 44, 102

Zabbān b. 'Abd al-'Azīz, 391
Zā'idā b. Ma'n al-Shaybānī, 169

Zāmil b. 'Amr al-Hubrānī, 104, 172
Zanba' al-Judhāmī, 99f
Zayd b. 'Alī, 8
Zāmil b. 'Abd al-Rahmān al-Saksakī, 103
Zāmil/Zāmil/Zumayl al-'Udhīrī, 105

Zayd b. Abīthī, 230
Zayd b. Abī Kabsha al-Saksakī, 96
Zayd b. 'Amr al-'Atakī, 121
Zayd b. Husayn al-Kalbī, 163
Zayd b. Jarīr al-Bajalī, 114
Zayd b. al-Muhallab al-Azdī, 143
Zayd b. al-Mundhir al-'Abdī/Hamdānī, 116
Zayd b. Muqātil al-Shaybānī, 117
Zayd b. al-Rābi' al-Hārithī, 140, (namesake) 141

Zayd b. Sakhir al-Lakhmī, 133
Zayd b. Sālih al-Hārithī, 172
Zayd b. 'Ubaydallāh al-Hārithī, 55, 149
Zufar b. 'Āsim al-Hālīfī, 166
Zufar b. al-Hārith al-Kilābī, 108
Zuhayr b. al-Musayyab al-Dabhī, 187
Zuhrā b. 'Udus al-Dārimī, 121